







# PLATO,

ER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.

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βλαβερὸν αἰσχρὸν. — ὅτι το μὲν ωφελίμον  
PLATO, *Republ.* γ. 457 B.  
ἐν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι, καὶ τὸ κομψὸν  
τόμον, καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν· καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπὸν.  
ARISTOTEL. *Polit.* ii. 6, 1265 a 10.

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# PLATO.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

### MENEXENUS.

IN this dialogue the only personages are, Sokrates as an elderly man, and Menexenus, a young Athenian of noble family, whom we have already seen as the intimate friend of Lysis, in the dialogue known under the name of Lysis.

Persons and situation of the dialogue.

*Sokr.*—What have you been doing at the Senate-house, Menexenus? You probably think that your course of education and philosophy is finished, and that you are qualified for high political functions. Young as you are, you aim at exercising command over us elders, as your family have always done before you.\*

Funeral harangue Athens—Choice of a public orator—Sokrates declares the task of the public orator to be easy—Comic exaggeration of the effects of the harangue.

*Menex.*—I shall do so, if you advise and allow me, Sokrates: but not otherwise. Now, however, I came to learn who was the person chosen by the Senate to deliver the customary oration at the approaching public funeral of the citizens who have fallen in battle. The Senate, however, have adjourned the election until to-morrow: but I think either Archinus or Dion will be chosen. *Sokr.*—To die in battle is a fine thing in many ways.<sup>b</sup> He who dies thus may be poor, but he receives a splendid funeral: he may be of little worth, yet he is still praised in prepared speeches by able orators, who decorate his name with brilliant encomiums, whether deserved or not, fascinating all the hearers: extolling us all—not merely the slain warrior, but the city collectively, our ancestors, and us the living—so admirably that I stand bewitched when I hear them, and fancy myself

\* Plat. Menex. p. 234 B-C.

<sup>b</sup> Plat. Menex. p. 235 A-B.

a greater, nobler, and finer man than I was before. I am usually accompanied by some strangers, who admire as much as I do, and who conceive a lofty estimation both of me and of the city. The voice of the orator resounds in my ear, and the feeling of pride dwells in my mind, for more than three days; during which interval I fancy myself almost in the islands of the blest. I hardly come to myself, or recollect where I am, until the fourth or fifth day. Such is the force of these orators.

*Menex.*—You are always deriding the orators, Sokrates.\*

Sokrates professes to have learnt a funeral harangue from Aspasia, and to be competent to recite it himself. Menexenus enters him to do so.

However, on this occasion I think the orator chosen will have little chance of success: he will have no time for preparation, and will be obliged to speak *impromptu*. *Sokr.*—Never fear: each of these orators has harangues ready prepared. Besides, there is no difficulty here in speaking *impromptu*. If indeed

the purpose were to praise the Athenians in Peloponnesus, or the Peloponnesians at Athens, an excellent orator would be required to persuade or to give satisfaction. But when he exhibits before the very hearers whom he praises,<sup>†</sup> there is no great difficulty in appearing to be a good speaker.<sup>‡</sup>

*Menex.*—Indeed! What! do you think you would be competent to deliver the harangue yourself, if the Senate were to elect you? *Sokr.*—Certainly: and it is no wonder that I

should be competent to speak, because I have learnt rhetoric from Aspasia (an excellent mistress, who has taught many eminent speakers, and among them Perikles, the most illustrious of all), and the harp from Konnus. But any one else, even less well-trained than me—instructed in music by Lamprus, and in rhetoric by Antiphon—would still be fully competent to succeed in praising Athenians among Athenians.

*Menex.*—What would you have to say, if the duty were imposed upon you? *Sokr.*—Probably little or nothing of my own. But it was only yesterday that I heard Aspasia going

through a funeral harangue for this very occasion: partly suggestions of the present moment, partly recollections of

\* Plat. *Menex.* p. 235 C. Ἀεὶ σὺ πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνους, ὡς ἑκατέρωθεν, τοὺς ῥητορας.

† Plat. *Menex.* p. 235 D.

Aristotle refers twice to this dictum

as being a true remark made by ——— ἐν τῇ Ἐπιτάφῳ, Rhetoric, i. 9, p.

*Menex.* p. 236 A.

past matters which had occurred to her when she composed the funeral harangue delivered by Perikles. *Menex.*—Could you recollect what Aspasia said? *Sokr.*—I should be much to blame if I could not. I learnt it from herself, and was near being beaten because I partly forgot it. *Menex.*—Why do you not proceed with it, then? *Sokr.*—I fear that my instructress would be displeased, if I were to publish her discourse. *Menex.*—Do not fear that, but proceed to speak. You will confer the greatest pleasure upon me, whether what you say comes from Aspasia or from any one else. Only proceed. *Sokr.*—But perhaps you will laugh me to scorn, if I, an elderly man, continue still such work of pastime.<sup>1</sup> *Menex.*—Not at all: I beseech you to speak. *Sokr.*—Well, I cannot refuse you. Indeed, I could hardly refuse, if you requested me to strip naked and dance—since we are here alone.<sup>2</sup>

Sokrates then proceeds to recite a funeral harangue of some length, which continues almost to the end.<sup>3</sup> When he concludes—repeating his declaration that the harangue comes from Aspasia—Menexenus observes, By Zeus, Sokrates, Aspasia is truly enviable, if she, a woman, is competent to compose such discourses as that.

*Sokr.*—If you do not believe me, come along with me, and you will hear it from her own lips. *Menex.*—I have often been in company with Aspasia, and I know what sort of person she is. *Sokr.*—Well then, don't you admire her? and are you not grateful to her for the harangue? *Menex.*—I am truly grateful for the harangue, to her, or to him, whoever it was that prompted you: and most of all, I am grateful to you for having recited it. *Sokr.*—Very good. Take care then that you do not betray me. I may perhaps be able, on future occasions, to recite to you many other fine political harangues from her. *Menex.*—Be assured that I will not betray you. Only let me hear them. *Sokr.*—I certainly will.

The interval between these two fragments of dialogue is filled up by the recitation of Sokrates: a long funeral

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Menex.* p. 236 C.

<sup>2</sup> Plat. *Menex.* pp. 234 C, 236 C.

<sup>3</sup> Plat. *Menex.* pp. 236 C, 249 C.

harangue in honour of deceased warriors, whom the city directs to be thus commemorated. The period is supposed to be not long after the peace concluded by Antalkidas in 387 B.C. That peace was imposed upon Sparta, Athens, and the other Grecian cities, by the imperative rescript of the Persian king: the condition of it being an enforcement of universal autonomy, or free separate government to each city, small as well as great.<sup>1</sup>

It had been long the received practice among the Athenians to honour their fallen warriors from time to time by this sort of public funeral, celebrated with every demonstration of mournful respect: and to appoint one of the ablest and most dignified citizens as public orator on the occasion.<sup>k</sup> The discourse delivered by Perikles, as appointed orator, at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian war, has been immortalised by Thucydides, and stands as one of the most impressive remnants of Hellenic antiquity. Since the occasion recurred pretty often, and since the orator chosen was always a man already conspicuous,<sup>l</sup> we may be sure that there existed in the time of Plato many funeral harangues which are now lost: indeed he himself says in this dialogue, that distinguished politicians prepared such harangues beforehand, in case the choice of the citizens should fall upon them. And we may farther be sure, amidst the active cultivation of rhetoric at Athens—that the rhetorical teachers as well as their pupils, and the logographers or paid composers of speeches, were practised in this variety of oratorical compositions not less than in others. We have one of them among the remaining discourses of the logographer Lysias: who could not actually have delivered it himself (since he was not even a citizen)—nor could ever probably have been called upon to prepare one for delivery (since the citizens chosen were always eminent speakers and politicians themselves, not requiring the aid of a logographer)—but who composed it as a rhetorical exercise to extend his own celebrity. In like

<sup>1</sup> See respecting the character of the period—shortly after the peace of Antalkidas. Many such harangues existed at Athens, composed by distinguished orators or logographers.—Established type of the harangue. <sup>l</sup> See respecting the character of the of Antalkidas, and the manner which its conditions were executed, my History of Greece, chap. 76.

<sup>k</sup> Thucyd. ii. 34.

<sup>l</sup> Thucyd. ii. 34. &c. &c.

manner we find one among the discourses of Demosthenes, though of very doubtful authenticity. The funeral discourse had thus come to acquire an established type. Rhetorical teachers had collected and generalised, out of the published harangues before them, certain *loci communes*, religious, patriotic, social, historical, or pseudo-historical, &c., suitable to be employed by any new orator.<sup>m</sup> All such *loci* were of course framed upon the actual sentiments prevalent among the majority of Athenians; furnishing eloquent expression for sympathies and antipathies deeply lodged in every one's bosom.

The funeral discourse which we read in the Menexenus is framed upon this classical model. It dwells, with emphasis and elegance, upon the patriotic commonplaces which formed the theme of rhetors generally. Plato begins by extolling the indigenous character of the Athenian population; not immigrants from abroad (like the Peloponnesians), but born from the very soil of Attica:<sup>n</sup> which, at a time when other parts of the earth produced nothing but strange animals and plants, gave birth to an admirable breed of men, as well as to wheat and barley for their nourishment, and to the olive for assisting their bodily exercises.<sup>o</sup> Attica was from the beginning favoured by the Gods; and the acropolis had been an object of competition between Athênê and Poseidon.<sup>p</sup> She was the common and equal mother of all the citizens, who, from such community of birth and purity of Hellenic origin, had derived the attributes which they had ever since manifested—attachment to equal laws among themselves, Panhellenic patriotism, and hatred of barbarians.<sup>q</sup> The free and equal political consti-

Plato in this harangue conforms to the established type—Topics on which he insists.

<sup>m</sup> Aristotel. Rhetoric, i. 5, p. 1360, b. 31, i. 9, p. 1367. Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetoric. c. 6, pp. 260-267.

"Nec enim artibus inventis factum est, ut argumenta inveniremus: sed dicta sunt omnia, antequam præciperentur: mox ea scriptores observata et collecta ediderunt" (Quintilian, Inst. Or. v. 10).

<sup>n</sup> Plat. Menex. pp. 237-245 C. οὐ γάρ Πέλοπες οὐδὲ Κᾶδμοι οὐδὲ Αἰγυπτοὶ τε καὶ Δαναοὶ οὐδὲ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ, φύσει

ἀλλ' αἱροί

οὐ μ

<sup>o</sup> Plat. Menex. pp. 237 D, 238 A.

<sup>p</sup> Plat. Menex. p. 237 C.

Plat. Menex. pp. 238 D-239 A-245 C-D. ἡ ἰσογονία ἡμᾶς ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἰσονομίαν

καὶ

245 D. ὅθεν καὶ καθαρόν τὸ μῖσος

tution of Athens—called an aristocracy, or presidency of the best men, under the choice and approval of the multitude—as it was and as it always had been, is here extolled by Plato, as a result of the common origin.

Alluding briefly to the victories over Eumolpus and the Amazons, the orator passes on to the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, which he celebrates with the warmth of an Hellenic patriot.<sup>1</sup> He eulogizes the generous behaviour of Athens towards the Greeks, during the interval between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars, contrasting it with the unworthy requital which she received from Sparta and others. He then glances at the events of the Peloponnesian wars, though colouring them in a manner so fanciful and delusive, that any one familiar with Thucydides can scarcely recognize their identity—especially in regard to the Athenian expedition against Syracuse.<sup>2</sup> He protests against the faithlessness of Sparta, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war, in allying herself with the common anti-Hellenic enemy—the Great King—against Athens: and he ascribes mainly to this unholy alliance the conquest of Athens at the end of the war.<sup>3</sup> The moderation of political parties in Athens, when the Thirty were put down and the democracy restored, receives its due meed of praise: but the peculiar merit claimed for Athens, in reference to the public events between 403 B.C. and 387 B.C., is—That she stood alone among Greeks in refusing to fraternise with the Persian King, or to betray to him the Asiatic Greeks. Athens had always been prompted by generous feeling, even in spite of political interests, to compassionate and befriend the weak.<sup>4</sup> The orator dwells with satisfaction on the years preceding the peace concluded by Antalkidas; during which years Athens had recovered

<sup>1</sup> Plat. Menex. pp. 240-241.

<sup>2</sup> Plat. Menex. pp. 242-243.

<sup>3</sup> Plat. Menex. pp. 243-244.

<sup>4</sup> Plat. Menex. pp. 244-245. εἴ τι:

τοῦτ' ἂν μόνον λέγων  
 ποίη, ὥς ἂν λαν φίλου  
 ἔσται, καὶ τοῦ ἥττονος θεραπείας. Iso-  
 crates also, in the Oratio Panegyrica  
 (Or. iv.), dwells upon this point, as  
 well as on the pronounced hatred

towards *βάρβαροι*, as standing features  
 in the Athenian character (sect. 59-  
 184). The points touched upon in  
 reference to Athens by Isocrates are  
 in the main the same as those brought  
 out by Plato in the Menexenus, only  
 that Isocrates makes them subservient  
 to a special purpose, that of bringing  
 about an expedition against Persia  
 under the joint headship of Sparta  
 and Athens.

her walls and her ships—had put down the Spartan superiority at sea—and had rescued even the Great King from Spartan force.\* He laments the disasters of Athenian soldiers at Corinth, through difficulties of the ground—and at Lechæum, through treachery. These are the latest political events to which he alludes.†

Having thus touched upon the political history of Athens, he turns to the surviving relatives—fathers, mothers, children, &c.—of the fallen warriors: addressing to them words of mingled consolation and exhortation. Consolation and exhortation to surviving relatives. He adopts the fiction of supposing these exhortations to have been suggested to him by the warriors themselves, immediately before entering upon their last battle.‡ This is the most eloquent and impressive portion of the harangue. The orator concludes by a few words from himself, inculcating on the elders the duty of resignation, and on the youth that of forward and devoted patriotism.

That this oration was much admired, not merely during the lifetime of Plato but also long after his death, we know from the testimony of Cicero; who informs us that it was publicly recited every year on the day when the annual funeral rites were celebrated, in honour of those citizens collectively who had been slain in the service of their country. The rhetor Dionysius<sup>b</sup> recognises the fact of such warm admiration, and concurs generally therein, yet not without reserves. He points out what he considers defects of thought and expression—ostentatious contrast and balancing of antithetical clauses, after the manner of Gorgias. Yet we may easily believe that the harangue found much favour, and greatly extended the reputation of its author. It would please many readers who took little interest in the Sokratic dialectics.

\* Plat. Menex. p. 245.

† Plat. Menex. pp. 245 E, 246 A.

‡ Plat. Menex. pp. 247–248.

§ Plat. Menex. p. 249 A–C.

¶ Cicero, Orator. c. 44, 151. "At non Thucydides, ne ille quidem haud paulo major scriptor Plato: nec solum in his sermonibus, qui *διδάσκοντες* dicuntur, ubi etiam de industria id faciendum fuit—sed in populari ora-

tionem, quæ mos est Athenis laudari eos, qui sint in præliis interfecti: quæ sic probata est, ut eam quotannis, ut scis, illo die recitari necesse sit."

See Plato, Menex. p. 249 B about these yearly funeral rites, and Lysias, Epitaph. s. 80.

<sup>b</sup> Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosth. p. 1027, compared with Ars Rhetoric. c. 6, pp. 260–267.

When Plato first established himself at Athens as a lecturer (about 386 B.C., shortly after the peace made by Antalkidas), he was probably known only by Sokratic dialogues, properly so called: which Dionysius specifies both as his earliest works and as his proper department, wherein he stood unrivalled.\* In these, his opposition to the Rhetors and Sophists was proclaimed: and if, as is probable, the Gorgias had been published before that time, he had already declared war, openly as well as bitterly, against the whole art of Rhetoric. But it would be a double triumph for his genius, if, after standing forward as the representative of Dialectic, and in that character heaping scornful derision on the rival art of Rhetoric, as being nothing better than a mere knack of juggling and flattery<sup>d</sup>—he were able to show that this did not proceed from want of rhetorical competence, but that he could rival or surpass the Rhetors in their own department. Herein lies the purpose of the Menexenus. I agree with Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and some other critics,\* in thinking that it was probably composed not long after the peace of Antalkidas, in competition with the harangue of Lysias now remaining on the same subject. Though the

Probable motives of Plato in composing it, shortly after he established himself at Athens as a teacher—His competition with Lysias—Desire for celebrity both as rhetor and as dialectician.

\* Dionys. Hal. De Platon. p. 762.

τοῖς  
ισχυροτάτοις οἱ

, ἀλλὰ τῆς

καὶ Θεουκλίδου κατασκευῆς ἐρασθεῖς. Compare p. 761, the passage immediately preceding, and De Adm. Vi Dicendi in Demosthene, pp. 1025-1031.

To many critics Plato appeared successful in the figurative and metaphorical style—*θεωρῶν περὶ τὸ τροπικόν*. But Dionysius thinks him very inferior to Demosthenes even on this point, though it was not the strongest point of Demosthenes, whose main purpose *ὁ ἀληθεύς ἀγών* (Dionys. *ibid.* p. 1057).

<sup>d</sup> Isokrates, in his last composition (Panathen. Or. xii.), written in very old age, shows how keenly he felt the aspersions of jealous rivals—Sophists less successful than himself—who publicly complained that he despised the lessons of the poets, and thought no teaching worth having except his

αὐτῶν, ἐνα

λέγονθ' ὡς ἐγὼ πάντων  
ἰσχυροτέρων, καὶ τὰς τε  
τὰς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὰς  
ἀπάσας

ῆς (sect. 22). That which Isokrates complains of these teachers for saying in their talk with each other, the rhetorical teachers would vehemently complain of in Plato, when he expressed forcibly his contempt for rhetoric in the Gorgias and the Phædrus. One way of expressing their resentment would be to affirm that Plato could not compose a regular rhetorical discourse; which affirmation Plato would best contradict by composing one in the received manner.

\* See the Einleitung of Schleiermacher to his translation of the Menexenus; also Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Menex. p. 10, and Westermann, Gesch. der Beredsamkeit, sect. 66, p. 134.

name of Lysias is not mentioned in the *Menexenus*, yet the rivalry between him and Plato is clearly proclaimed in the Platonic *Phædrus*: and the two funeral harangues go so completely over the same ground, that intentional competition on the part of the latest, is the most natural of all hypotheses.

Here then we have Plato exchanging philosophy for "the knack of flattery"—to use the phrase of the *Gorgias*. Stallbaum is so unwilling to admit this as possible, that he represents the Platonic harangue as a mere caricature, intended to make the rhetorical process ridiculous. I dissent from this supposition; as I have already dissented from the like supposition of the same critic, in regard to the etymologies of the *Kratylus*. That Plato might in one dialogue scornfully denounce Rhetoric—and in another, compose an elaborate discourse upon the received rhetorical type—is noway inconsistent with the general theory which I frame to myself, about the intellectual character and distinct occasional manifestations of Plato.\* The funeral harangue in the *Menexenus* proves that, whatever he thought about Rhetoric generally, he was anxious to establish his title as a competent rhetorical composer: it proves farther that he was equal to Lysias in the epideiktic department, though inferior to Perikles. It affords a valuable illustration of that general doctrine which the Platonic Sokrates lays down in the *Gorgias*—That no man can succeed as a rhetor, unless he is in full harmony of spirit and cast of mind with his auditors; or unless he dwells upon and enforces sympathies, antipathies, and convictions, already established in their minds.\* A first-rate

*Menexenus compared with the view of rhetoric presented in the Gorgias—Necessity for an orator to conform to established sentiments.*

\* Compare also the majestic picture which Plato presents of the ancient character and exploits of the early Athenians, in the mythé commenced in the *Timæus* (pp. 23-24), prosecuted in the *Kritias* (pp. 113-114 seqq.), but left by the author incomplete.

\* Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 510 C; see above, ch. xxii. p. 134.

This appears to me the real truth, subject to very rare exception. But I do not think it true to say, as the Platonic Sokrates is made to declare

in the *Menexenus*, that it is an easy matter to obtain admiration when you praise Athens among Athenians—though Aristotle commends the observation. Assuredly Perikles did not think so (*Thucyd.* ii. 35). You have a popular theme, but unless you have oratorical talent to do justice to it, you are likely to disappoint and offend, especially among auditors like the Athenians, accustomed to good speaking. Compare *Plat. Kritias*, p. 107 B.

orator like Perikles, touching the chords of cherished national sentiment, might hope, by such a discourse as that which we read in Thucydides, "*adjecisse aliquid receptæ religioni.*"<sup>a</sup> No public orator ever appointed by the Senate to pronounce the funeral harangue, could have expatiated more warmly than Plato has here done, upon the excellence of the Athenian constitution, and upon the admirable spirit which had animated Athenian politics, both foreign and domestic. Plato falls far short, indeed, of the weight and grandeur, the impressive distinctness of specification, the large sympathies, intellectual as well as popular—with which these topics are handled by Perikles in Thucydides: but his eulogy is quite as highflown and unreserved.

In understanding fully the Menexenus, however, we have to take account, not merely of the harangue which forms the bulk of it, but also of the conversation whereby it is commenced and concluded. Plato, speaking always through the mouth of Sokrates, has to invent some fiction excusing the employment of his master in the unprecedented capacity of public orator. What Stallbaum says (in my judgment, erroneously) about the harangue—appears to me perfectly true about the conversation before and after it. The introductory observations, interchanged between Sokrates and Menexenus, certainly tend to caricature (as Aristophanes<sup>1</sup> does in the *Acharneis* and the *Equites*) the strong effects produced by this panegyric oratory on the feelings of hearers: and to depreciate the task of the orator as nothing better than an easy and amusing pastime. To praise Athens among Athenians auditors (we are told) is a matter in which few speakers can fail to succeed, however poor their abilities. Moreover, the great funeral harangue of Perikles is represented as having been composed for him by Aspasia<sup>b</sup>—a

<sup>a</sup> To employ the striking expression of Quintilian (xii. 10) respecting the great statue of Zeus at Olympia by Pheidias.

<sup>1</sup> Aristoph. *Acharn.* 615, *Equit.* 640-887.

The comic exaggeration of Sokrates, in the colloquial portion of the Men-

(235 B.C.) goes of Aristophanes.

<sup>b</sup> By the language of Plato here, he seems plainly to bring his own harangue into competition not merely with that of Lysias but also with that of Perikles. But we must not suppose, for that reason, that he necessarily

female, though remarkable among her sex—who is extolled as holding the highest place among rhetorical teachers, and is introduced here, as Aristophanes introduces her in the *Acharneis*, when he is putting a construction of discreditable ridicule on the origin of the Peloponnesian war. To make a good funeral harangue (Sokrates says)<sup>1</sup> requires little or no preliminary preparation; besides, the Rhetors have harangues ready prepared at home. All this *persiflage*, in harmony with the polemics of the *Gorgias*, derides and degrades the Rhetors collectively. But when Plato takes the field against them as a competitor, in his own rhetorical discourse, he drops the ironical vein, and takes pains to deliver one really good and excellent in its kind. His triumph is thus doubled. He tells the Rhetors that their business is a trifling and despicable one: at the same time showing them that, despicable as it is, he can surpass them in it, as he professes to surpass Lysias in the *Phædrus*.<sup>m</sup>

Such I believe to be the scope of the dialogue, looked at from Plato's point of view. In order to find a person suitable in point of age to be described as the teacher of Sokrates, he is forced to go back to the past generation—that of Perikles and Aspasia. But though he avoids anachronism on this point, he cannot avoid the anachronism of making Sokrates allude to events long pos-

Anachron-  
ism of the  
Men-----  
—P  
less

has in view the Perikleian harangue which we now read in Thucydides, ii. 35-43: which is the real speech, reported and dressed up by Thucydides in his own language and manner. Probably the Perikleian harangue was preserved separately and in other reports, so that Plato may have known it without knowing the history of Thucydides. When I see the extreme liberty which Plato takes throughout his harangue in regard to the history of the past, I can hardly believe that he ever read Thucydides; if he ever read the history, he certainly disregarded it altogether, and threw himself *ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγγεότερον τῇ ἀκρόσει* ἢ ἀληθέστερον: like the *λογόγραφοι* of whom Thucydides speaks, i. 21. Lysias among them, though in a less degree than Plato. Æschines Sokraticus had composed among his dialogues one entitled *Ἀσπασία*. See

Xenophon, *Œconom.* i. 14; Cicero *de Inventione*, i. 31; Plutarch, *Perikles*, c. 24-32: also Bergk, *De Reliquiis Comœd. Attic. Antiquæ*, p. 237.

<sup>1</sup> Aristoph. *Acharn.* 501.

<sup>m</sup> The remarks of Dionysius of Halikarnassus (in the *Epistle to Cn. Pompey* about Plato, pp. 754-758) are well deserving of attention; especially as he had before him many writers now lost, either contemporary with Plato or of the succeeding generation. He notices not only Plato's asperity in ridiculing most of his distinguished contemporaries, but also his marked feeling of rivalry against Lysias.

*ἦν γὰρ, ἦν μὲν τῇ Πλάτωνος πολλὰς ἀρετὰς εἶχοντα* τ  
&c.

See this subject well handled in an instructive Dissertation by M. Lebeau (*Stuttgart*, 1863, *Lysias' Epitaphios als nicht erwiesen*, pp. 42-46 seq.).

terior to his own death. This anachronism is real, though it has been magnified by some critics into a graver defect than it is in truth. Plato was resolved not to speak in his own person, but through that of Sokrates. But he is not always careful to keep within the limits which consistent adherence to such a plan imposes.<sup>n</sup>

<sup>n</sup> Groen van Prinsterer (*Prosopographia Platonica*, p. 211 seq.) adverts to the carelessness of Plato about exact chronology.

Most of the Platonic critics recognise the *Menexenus* as a genuine Platonic dialogue. Ast, however, includes it among the numerous dialogues which he disallows as spurious; and Suckow, Steinhart, and Ueberweg, are also inclined to disallow it. See Ueberweg, *Die*

*Aechtheit der Platonischen Schriften*, pp. 143-148. These critics make light of the allusion of Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*—Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ Ἐπιταφίῳ—which appears to me, I confess, of more weight than all the grounds of suspicion adduced by them to prove the dialogue spurious. The presumption in favour of the catalogue of Thrasyllus counts with them, here as elsewhere, for nothing.

## CHAPTER XXXII.

## KLEITOPHON.

THE Kleitophon is an unfinished fragment, beginning with a short introductory conversation between Sokrates and Kleitophon, and finishing with a discourse of some length, a sort of remonstrance or appeal, addressed by Kleitophon to Sokrates; who makes no reply.

Persons and circumstances of Kleitophon.

Some one was lately telling me (says Sokrates) that Kleitophon, in conversation with Lysias, depreciated the conversation of Sokrates, and extolled prodigiously that of Thrasymachus.

Whoever told you so (replies Kleitophon), did not report accurately what I said. On some points, indeed, I did not praise you; but on other points I did praise you. Since, however, you are evidently displeased with me, though you affect indifference—and since we are here alone—I should be glad to repeat the same observations to yourself, in order that you may not believe me to think meanly of you. These incorrect reports seem to have made you displeased with me more than is reasonable. I am anxious to speak to you with full freedom, if you will allow it.\*

Conversation of Sokrates with Kleitophon alone: he alludes to observations of an unfavourable character recently made by Kleitophon, who asks permission to explain.

It would be a shame indeed (rejoins Sokrates), if, when you were anxious to do me good, I could not endure to receive it. When I have learnt which are my worst and which are my best points, I shall evidently be in a condition to cultivate and pursue the latter and resolutely to avoid the former.

Hear me then (says Kleitophon).

As your frequent companion, Sokrates, I have often listened to you with profound admiration. I thought you superior

\* Plato, Kleitoph. p. 406.

to all other speakers when you proclaimed your usual strain of reproof, like the God from a dramatic machine, against mankind.<sup>b</sup> You asked them, "Whither are you drifting, my friends? You do not seem aware that you are doing wrong when you place all your affections on the gain of money, and neglect to teach your sons and heirs the right use of money. You do not provide for them teachers of justice, if justice be teachable; nor trainers of it, if it be acquirable by training and habit; nor indeed have you studied the acquisition of it, even for yourselves. Since the fact is obvious that while you, as well as your sons, have learnt what passes for a finished education in virtue (letters, music, gymnastic), you nevertheless yield to the corruptions of gain—how comes it that you do not despise your actual education, and look out for teachers to correct such disorder? It is this disorder, not the want of accomplishment in the use of the lyre, which occasions such terrible discord, and such calamitous war, between brother and brother—between city and city.<sup>c</sup> You affirm that men do wrong wilfully, not from ignorance or want of training: yet nevertheless you are bold enough to say, that wrong-doing is dishonourable and offensive to the Gods. How can any one, then, choose such an evil willingly? You tell us it is because he is overcome by pleasures: well then, that again comes to unwillingness—if victory be the thing which every man wishes: so that, whichever way you turn it, reason shows you that wrong-doing is taken up unwillingly, and that greater precautions ought to be taken upon the subject, both by individuals and by cities."<sup>d</sup>

Such, Sokrates (continues Kleitophon), is the language which I often hear from you; and which I always hear with the strongest and most respectful admiration. You follow it up by observing, that those who

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 A.  
ἀρ, ὁ Σόκράτης, σοὶ

ἀκούων,  
μοι εἰδόμεναι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους  
λέγειν, ὅποτε ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς  
δοσπερ ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Kleitophon, p. 407 B-C.  
<sup>d</sup> Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 C-D.

ἀνδρα ἰδίᾳ ὅ ἑμα καὶ  
τὰς

αἰρεῖ,

train their bodies and neglect their minds, commit the mistake of busying themselves about the subordinate and neglecting the superior. You farther remark, that if a man does not know how to use any object rightly, he had better abstain from using it altogether: if he does not know how to use his eyes, his ears, or his body—it will be better for him neither to see, nor to hear, nor to use his body at all: the like with any instrument or article of property—for whoever cannot use his own lyre well, cannot use his neighbour's lyre better. Out of these premisses you bring out forcibly the conclusion—That if a man does not know how to use his mind rightly, it is better for him to make no use of it:—better for him not to live, than to live under his own direction. If he must live, he had better live as a slave than a freeman, surrendering the guidance of his understanding to some one else who knows the art of piloting men: which art you, Sokrates, denominate often the political art, sometimes the judicial art or justice.\*

lating in  
awakening  
ardour for  
virtue. Ar-  
guments and  
analogies,  
commonly  
used by  
Sokrates.

These discourses of yours, alike numerous and admirable—showing that virtue is teachable, and that a man should attend to himself before he attends to other objects—I never have contradicted, and never shall contradict. I account them most profitable and stimulating, calculated to wake men as it were out of sleep. I expected anxiously what was to come afterwards. I began by copying your style and asking, not yourself, but those among your companions whom you esteemed the most†—How are we now to understand this stimulus imparted by Sokrates towards virtue? Is this to be all? Cannot we make advance towards virtue and get full possession of it? Are we to pass our whole lives in stimulating those who have not yet been stimulated, in order that they in their turn may stimulate others? Is it not rather incumbent upon us, now that we have agreed thus far, to entreat both from Sokrates and from each other, an answer

But Sokrates  
does not ex-  
plain what  
virtue is, nor  
how it is to  
be attained.  
Kleitophon  
has had  
enough of  
stimulus, and  
now wants  
information  
how he is to  
act.

\* Plato, Kleitophon, p. 408 A. ἢν δὲ  
σὺ πολιτικὴν, ὃ Σόκράτης, ἐκπορεύεσαι  
πολλὰς, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην δικαστι-  
κὴν τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην ὡς ἔστι λέγων.

† Plato, Kleitophon, p. 408 D. τούτων

γὰρ τοὺς τι μάλιστα εἶναι δεξαμένους  
ὅτι σοὶ πρώτους ἐπαυρήσαν, πυνθανό-  
μενος τίς ὁ μετὰ ταῦτ' εἴη λόγος, καὶ  
κατὰ σὲ τρόπον τινα ὅπως  
ταῦτων ἀποταίε. ἂν.

to the ulterior question, What next? How are we to set to work in regard to the learning of justice? If any trainer, seeing us careless of our bodily condition, should exhort us strenuously to take care of it, and convince us that we ought to do so—we should next ask him, which were the arts prescribing how we should proceed? He would reply—The gymnastic and medical arts. How will Sokrates or his friends answer the corresponding question in their case?

The ablest of your companions answered me (continues Kleitophon), that the art to which you were wont to allude was no other than Justice itself. I told him in reply—Do not give me the mere name, but tell me what Justice is.<sup>b</sup> In the medical art there are two distinct results contemplated and achieved: one, that of keeping up the succession of competent physicians—another that of conferring or preserving health: this last, *Health*, is not the art itself, but the work accomplished by the art. Just so, the builder's art, has for its object the *house*, which is its work—and the keeping up the continuity of builders, which is its teaching. Tell me in the same manner respecting the art called Justice. Its teaching province is plain enough—to maintain the succession of just men: but what is its working province? what is the work which the just man does for us?

To this question your friend replied (explaining Justice)—It is The Advantageous. Another man near him said, The Proper: a third said, The Profitable: a fourth, The Gainful.<sup>c</sup> I pursued the enquiry by observing, that these were general names equally applicable in other arts, and to something different in each. Every art aims at what is proper, advantageous, profitable, gainful, in

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Kleitophon, p. 408 E. ἢ ἕτερον, ὃ δύναται ποιεῖν ἡμῖν ἔργον  
δεῖ τὸν Σωκράτην καὶ ἀλλήλους τί τοῦτό φαμεν; εἶπε. Οὗτος  
τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' οἶμαι, τὸ σύμφερον ἀπε-  
σας τούτ' αὐτὸ ἀνθρώποις πρακτέον κρίνατο. ἄλλος δὲ, τὸ δέον ἕτερος  
τί τοὶ τέλουσιν. ἐπαρήγει δ.  
ἢ τάγε ὀνόματα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν

μοι τὸ ὄνομα μόνο λυσιτελοῦντα, ὠφέλιμα, τὰλλα τὰ  
ποῦ τις λέγεται τοιαῦτα. ἀλλὰ πρὸς δ, τι ταῦτα πάντα  
καὶ τὸ

, &c.  
Plato, Kleitophon. p. 409 B. τὸ δ' &c.

its own separate department: but each can farther describe to you what that department is. Thus the art of the carpenter is, to perform well, properly, advantageously, profitably, &c., in the construction of wooden implements, &c. That is the special work of the carpenter's art: now tell me, what is the special work, corresponding thereunto, of the art called Justice?

At length one of your most accomplished companions, Sokrates, answered me—That the special work peculiar to Justice was, to bring about friendship in the community.\* Being farther interrogated, he said—That friendship was always a good, never an evil: That the so-called friendships between children, and between animals, mischievous rather than otherwise, were not real friendships, and ought not to bear the name: That the only genuine friendship was, sameness of reason and intelligence:—not sameness of opinion, which was often hurtful—but knowledge and reason agreeing, in different persons.<sup>1</sup>

None of them could explain what the special work of justice or virtue was.

At this stage of our conversation the hearers themselves felt perplexed, and interfered to remonstrate with him; observing, that the debate had come round to the same point again. They declared that the medical art also was harmony of reason and intelligence: that the like was true besides of every other art: that each of them could define the special end to which it tended: but that as to that art, or that harmony of reason and intelligence, which had been called Justice, no one could see to what purpose it tended, nor what was its special work.<sup>m</sup>

After all this debate (continues Kleitophon) I addressed the same question to yourself, Sokrates—What is Justice? You answered—To do good to friends, hurt to enemies. But presently it appeared, that the just man would never, on any occasion, do hurt

Kleitophon at length asked the question from Sokrates himself. But Sokrates did not answer clearly.

\* Plato, Kleitoph. p. 409 C.

τῶν ἀπεκρίνατό τις, ὃ Σώκρατες, μοι  
σὺν ἱταίων, ὅς δὴ κομψότατα  
ὅτι τοῦτ' εἶη τὸ τῆς

c. the hearers said) ὅτι καὶ ἡ  
ἰατροῦ τις ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀπασιν αἱ

τέχναι καὶ  
λέγουσιν τὴν

τείνουσιν

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Kleitophon, p. 409 E.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 A. καὶ

εἴθευγε, καὶ ἀδελφὰ  
δ, τί πότ'

Kleitophon  
believes that  
Sokrates  
knows, but  
will not tell.

to any one:—that he would act towards every one with a view to good. It is not once, nor twice, but often and often, that I have endured these perplexities, and have importuned you to clear them up." At last I am wearied out, and have come to the conviction that you are doubtless a consummate proficient in the art of stimulating men to seek virtue; but that as to the ulterior question, how they are to find it—you either do not know, or you will not tell. In regard to any art (such as steermanship or others), there may be persons who can extol and recommend the art to esteem, but cannot direct the hearers how to acquire it: and in like manner a man might remark about you, that you do not know any better what Justice is, because you are a proficient in commending it. For my part, such is not my opinion. I think that you know, but have declined to tell me. I am resolved, in my present embarrassment, to go to Thrasymachus, or any one else that I can find to help me; unless you will consent to give me something more than these merely stimulating discourses.\* Consider me as one upon whom your stimulus has already told. If the question were about gymnastic, as soon as I had become fully stimulated to attend to my bodily condition, you would have given me, as a sequel to your stimulating discourse, some positive direction, what my body was by nature, and what treatment it required. Deal in like manner with the case before us: reckon Kleitophon as one fully agreeing with you, that it is contemptible to spend so much energy upon other objects, and to neglect our minds, with a view to which all other objects are treasured up. Put me down as having already given my adhesion to all these views of yours.

Proceed, Sokrates—I supplicate you—to deal with me as I have described; in order that I may never more have occasion, when I talk with Lysias, to blame you on some points while praising you on others. I will repeat, that to one who has not yet received

Kleitophon  
is on the  
point of leav-  
ing Sokrates  
and going to  
Thrasyma-  
chus. But

\* Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 A. Ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ἀπαξ οὐδὲ δις ἀλλὰ πολλὸν διηπομείνας χρόνον καὶ λιπαρῶν ἀπειρηκα, &c.

\* Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 C. διὰ

ταῦτα δὴ καὶ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον, αἶμαι πορεύσομαι, καὶ ἄλλοις δῶκε δύναμαι, ἀπορῶν—ἐπεὶ εἰ γ' ἀέλοισι σὺ τούτων μὲν ἤδη παύσασθαι πρὸς ἐμὲ τῶν λόγων τῶν προτρεπτικῶν, &c.

the necessary stimulus, your conversation is of inestimable value: but to one who has already been stimulated, it is rather a hindrance than a help, to his realising the full acquisition of virtue, and thus becoming happy.<sup>p</sup>

before leaving he addresses one last entreaty, that Sokrates will speak out clearly and explicitly.

The fragment called Kleitophon (of which I have given an abstract comparatively long) is in several ways remarkable. The Thrasylllean catalogue places it first in the eighth Tetralogy; the three other members of the same Tetralogy being, Republic, Timæus, Kritias.<sup>q</sup> Though it is both short, and abrupt in its close, we know that it was so likewise in antiquity: the ancient Platonic commentators observing, that Sokrates disdained to make any reply to the appeal of Kleitophon.<sup>r</sup> There were therefore in this Tetralogy two fragments, unfinished works from the beginning—Kleitophon and Kritias.

Remarks on the Kleitophon. Why Thrasyllus placed it in the eighth Tetralogy immediately before the Republic, and along with Kritias, the other fragment.

• We may explain why Thrasyllus placed the Kleitophon in immediate antecedence to the Republic: because 1. It complains bitterly of the want of a good explanation of Justice, which Sokrates in the latter books of the Republic professes

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 E. *μή γὰρ προτετραμμένω σὲ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔξιον εἶναι τοῦ παντός φήσω,*

Plutarchus in Solone."

M. Boeckh here characterises the Kleitophon as *spurious*, in which opinion I do not concur.

Yxem, in his Dissertation, Ueber Platon's Kleitophon, Berlin, 1846, has vindicated the genuineness of this dialogue, though many of his arguments are such as I cannot subscribe to.

<sup>q</sup> Diog. L. iii. 59. The Kleitophon also was one of the dialogues selected by some students of Plato as *proprio* to be studied first of all, Diog. L. iii. 61.

<sup>r</sup> M. Boeckh observes (ad Platonis Minoem, p. 11):—"Nec minus falsum est, quod *spurious* Clitophontem plerique omnes mutilatum putant: quem ex auctoris manibus truncum excidisse inde intelligitur, quod ne vetusti quidem Platonicæ philosophi, quibus antiquissima exemplaria ad manum erant, habuerunt integriorem. Proculus in Timæo i. p. 7. Πτολεμαῖος δὲ ὁ Πλατωνικὸς Κλειτοφῶντα αὐτὸν οἶσται εἶναι. τοῦτον γὰρ ἐν

*vous.* Plané ut in Critia, quem ab ipso Platone non absolutum docet

He shows farther, that the first idea of distrusting the genuineness of the Kleitophon arose from the fact that the dialogue was printed in the Aldine edition of 1513, along with the spurious dialogues: although in that very Aldine edition the editors expressly announce that this was a mistake, and that the dialogue ought to have been printed as first of the eighth tetralogy. See Yxem, pp. 32-33. Subsequent editors followed the Aldine in printing the dialogue among the spurious, though still declaring that they did not consider it spurious.

to furnish. 2. It brings before us Kleitophon, who announces an inclination to consult Thrasymachus: now both these personages appear in the first book of the Republic, in which too Thrasymachus is introduced as disputing in a brutal and insulting way, and as humiliated by Sokrates: so that the Republic might be considered both as an answer to the challenge of the Kleitophon, and as a reproof to Kleitophon himself for having threatened to quit Sokrates and go to Thrasymachus.

Like so many other pieces in the Thrasylllean catalogue, the Kleitophon has been declared to be spurious by Schleiermacher and other critics of the present century. I see no ground for this opinion, and I believe the dialogue to be genuine. If it be asked, how can we imagine Plato to have composed a polemic argument, both powerful and unanswered, against Sokrates,—I reply that this is not so surprising as the *Parmenidès*: in which Plato has introduced the veteran so named as the successful assailant not only of Sokrates, but of the Platonic theory of Ideas defended by Sokrates.

I have already declared, that the character of Plato is, in my judgment, essentially many-sided. It comprehends the whole process of searching for truth, and testing all that is propounded as such: it does not shrink from broaching and developing speculative views not merely various and distinct but sometimes even opposite.

Yet though the Kleitophon is Plato's work, it is a sketch or fragment never worked out. In its present condition, it can hardly have been published (any more than the *Kritias*) either by his direction or during his life. I conceive it to have remained among his papers, to have been made known by his school after his death, and to have passed from thence among the other Platonic manuscripts into the Alexandrian library at its first foundation. Possibly it may have been originally intended as a preparation for the solution of that problem, which Sokrates afterwards undertakes in the Republic: for it is a challenge to Sokrates to explain what he means by Justice. It may have been intended as such, but never prosecuted:—the

Kleitophon is genuine, and perfectly in harmony with a just theory of Plato.

It could not have been published until after Plato's death.

preparation for that solution being provided in another way, such as we now read in the first and second books of the Republic. That the great works of Plato—Republic, Protagoras, Symposium, &c.—could not have been completed without preliminary sketches and tentatives—we may regard as certain. That some of these sketches, though never worked up, and never published by Plato himself, should have been good enough to be preserved by him and published by those who succeeded him—is at the very least highly probable. One such is the Kleitophon.

When I read the Kleitophon, I am not at all surprised that Plato never brought it to a conclusion, nor ever provided Sokrates with an answer to the respectful, yet emphatic, requisition of Kleitophon. The case against Sokrates has been made so strong, that I doubt whether Plato himself could have answered it to his own satisfaction. It resembles the objections which he advances in the Parmenidês against the theory of Ideas: objections which he has nowhere answered, and which I do not believe that he could answer. The characteristic attribute of which Kleitophon complains in Sokrates is, that of a one-sided and incomplete efficiency—(*φύσις μονόκωλος*)—"You are perpetually stirring us up and instigating us: you do this most admirably: but when we have become full of fervour, you do not teach us how we are to act, nor point out the goal towards which we are to move."\* Now this is precisely the description which Sokrates gives of his own efficiency, in the Platonic Apology addressed to the Dikasts. He lays especial stress on the mission imposed upon him by the Gods, to apply his Elenchus in testing and convicting the false persuasion of knowledge universally prevalent: to make sure by repeated cross-examination, whether the citizens pursued money and worldly advancement more energetically than virtue:—and to worry the Athenians with perpetual stimulus, like the gadfly exciting a high-bred but lethargic horse. Sokrates describes this not only as the

*Reasons why the Kleitophon was never finished. It points out the defects of Sokrates, just as he himself confesses them in the Apology.*

\* I have in an earlier chapter (ch. vi. vol. I. p. 277) cited the passage—"Philosophiam multis locis inchoasti: ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum

parum." This is the language addressed by Cicero to Varro, and coinciding substantially with that of Kleitophon here.

mission of his life, but as a signal benefit and privilege conferred upon Athens by the Gods.<sup>†</sup> But here his services end. He declares explicitly that he shares in the universal ignorance, and that he is no wiser than any one else, except in being aware of his own ignorance. He disclaims all power of teaching:<sup>‡</sup> and he deprecates the supposition,—that he himself knew what he convicted others of not knowing,—as a mistake which had brought upon him alike unmerited reputation and great unpopularity.<sup>§</sup> We find thus that the description given by Sokrates of himself in the Apology, and the reproach addressed to Sokrates by Kleitophon, fully coincide. “My mission from the Gods” (says Sokrates), “is to dispel the false persuasion of knowledge, to cross-examine men into a painful conviction of their own ignorance, and to create in them a lively impulse towards knowledge and virtue: but I am no wiser than they: I can teach them nothing, nor can I direct them what to do.”—That is exactly what I complain of (remarks Kleitophon): I have gone through your course,—have been electrified by your Elenchus,—and am full of the impulse which you so admirably communicate. In this condition, what I require is, to find out how, or in which direction I am to employ that impulse. If you cannot tell me, I must ask Thrasymachus or some one else.

Moreover, it is not merely in the declarations of Sokrates himself before the Athenian Dikasts, but also in the Platonic Sokrates as exhibited by Plato in very many of his dialogues, that the same efficiency, and the same deficiency, stand conspicuous. The hearer is convicted of ignorance, on some familiar subject which he believed himself to know: the protreptic stimulus is powerful, stinging his mind into uneasiness which he cannot appease except by finding some tenable result: but the didactic supplement is not forthcoming. Sokrates ends by creating a painful feeling of perplexity in the hearers, but he himself

The same defects also confessed in many of the Platonic and Xenophontic

<sup>†</sup> Plat. Apol. So. pp. 28 E, 29 D-E, 36 A-E. προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὥστε ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ μεγάλους δὲ ναυστήρῳ καὶ

πανταχοῦ προσκαίζων, pp. 36 D, 41 E.

<sup>‡</sup> Plat. Apol. So. pp. 21 D-22 D, 33 A. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος οὐδένος πώποτε

ἴδον δὲ

τοιούτων τινα, δὲ

<sup>§</sup> Plat. Apol. So. pp. 23 A, 28 A.

shares the feeling along with them. It is this which the youth Protarchus deprecates, at the beginning of the Platonic Philêbus;<sup>7</sup> and with which Hippias taunts Sokrates, in one of the Xenophontic conversations<sup>8</sup>—insomuch that Sokrates replies to the taunt by giving a definition of the Just (τὸ δίκαιον), upon which Hippias comments. But if the observations ascribed by Xenophon to Hippias are a report of what that Sophist really said, we only see how inferior he was to Sokrates in the art of cross-questioning: for the definition given by Sokrates would have been found altogether untenable, if there had been any second Sokrates to apply the Elenchus to it.<sup>9</sup> Lastly, Xenophon expressly tells us, that there were others also, who, both in speech and writing, imputed to Sokrates the same deficiency on the affirmative side.<sup>b</sup>

The Platonic Kleitophon corresponds, in a great degree, to these complaints of Protarchus and others, as well as to the taunt of Hippias. The case is put, however, with much greater force and emphasis: as looked at, not by an opponent and outsider, like Hippias—nor by a mere novice, unarmed though eager, like Protarchus—but by a companion of long-standing, who has gone through the full course of negative gymnastic, is grateful for the benefit derived, and feels that it is time to pass from the lesser mysteries to the greater. He is sick of perpetual negation and stimulus: he demands doctrines and explanations, which will hold good against the negative Elenchus of Sokrates himself. But this is exactly what Sokrates cannot give. His mission from the Delphian God finishes with the

Forceful, yet respectful, manner in which these defects are set forth in the Kleitophon. Impossible to answer them in such a way as to hold out against the negative Elenchus of a Socratic pupil.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Philêbus, p. 20 A.

<sup>8</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 9-11.

<sup>9</sup> We need only compare the observations made by Hippias in that dialogue, to the objections raised by Sokrates himself in his conversation with Euthydêmus, Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 2, and to the dialogue of the youthful Alkibiades (evidently borrowed from Sokrates) with Perikles, ib. i. 2, 40-47.

<sup>b</sup> Xenoph. Memor. i. 4, 1. εἰ δὲ κέρτην νομίζουσιν, ὥς ἔνιοι τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ

προτρέψασθαι μὲν

νέμει, προαγαγεῖν δ'

, &c.

See also Cicero, De Oratore, i. 47, 204, in which Sokrates is represented as saying that *concitatio* (προτροπή) was all that people required: they did not need guidance: they would find out the way for themselves: and Yxem, Ueber Platon's Kleitophon, pp. 5-12.

negative: inspiration fails him when he deals with the affirmative. He is like the gad-fly (his own simile) in stimulating the horse—and also in furnishing no direction how the stimulus is to be expended. His affirmative dicta,—as given in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, are for the most part plain, homebred, good sense,—in which all the philosophical questions are slurred over, and the undefined words, Justice, Temperance, Holiness, Courage, Law, &c., are assumed to have a settled meaning agreed to by every one: while as given by Plato, in the Republic and elsewhere, they are more speculative, highflown, and poetical,<sup>c</sup> but not the less exposed to certain demolition, if the batteries of the Sokratic Elenchus were brought to bear upon them. The challenge of Kleitophon is thus unanswerable. It brings out in the most forcible, yet respectful, manner the contrast between the two attributes of the Sokratic mind: in the negative irresistible force and originality: in the affirmative, confessed barrenness alternating with honest, acute, practical sense, but not philosophy. Instead of this, Plato gives us transcendental hypotheses, and a religious and poetical ideal; impressive indeed to the feelings, but equally inadmissible to a mind trained in the use of the Sokratic tests.

We may thus see sufficient reason why Plato, after having drawn up the Kleitophon as preparatory basis for a dialogue, became unwilling to work it out, and left it as an unfinished sketch. He had, probably without intending it, made out too strong a case against Sokrates and against himself. If he continued it, he would have been obliged to put some sufficient reason into the mouth of Sokrates, why Kleitophon should abandon his intention of frequenting some other teacher: and this was a hard task. He would have been obliged to lay before Kleitophon, a pupil thoroughly inoculated with his own negative *æstrus*, affirmative solutions proof against such subtle cross-examination: and this, we may fairly

The Kleitophon represents a point of view which many objectors must have insisted on against Sokrates and Plato.

<sup>c</sup> The explanation of Justice given by Plato in the Republic deserves to be described much in the same words as Sokrates employs (Repub. i. p. 332 B) in characterising the definition of

Justice furnished by (or ascribed to) the poet Simonides:—  
*ὡς ἔοικεν,*

assume, was not merely a hard task, but impossible. Hence it is that we possess the Kleitophon only as a fragment.

Yet I think it a very ingenious and instructive fragment: setting forth powerfully, in respect to the negative philosophy of Sokrates and Plato, a point of view which must have been held by many intelligent contemporaries. Among all the objections urged against Sokrates and Plato, probably none was more frequent than this protest against the continued negative procedure. This same point of view—that Sokrates puzzled every one, but taught no one anything—is reproduced by Thrasymachus against Sokrates in the first book of the Republic: <sup>d</sup> in which first book there are various other marks of analogy with the Kleitophon.<sup>e</sup> It might seem as if Plato had in the first instance projected a dialogue in which Sokrates was to discuss the subject of justice, and had drawn up the Kleitophon as the sketch of a sort of forcing process to be applied to Sokrates: then, finding that he placed Sokrates under too severe pressure, had abandoned the project, and taken up the same subject anew, in the manner which we now read in the Republic. The task which he assigns to Sokrates, in this last-mentioned dialogue, is far easier. Instead of the appeal made to Sokrates by Kleitophon, with truly Sokratic point—we have an assault made upon him by Thrasymachus, alike angry, impudent, and feeble; which just elicits the peculiar aptitude of Sokrates for humbling the boastful affirmer. Again in the second book, Glaukon and Adeimantus are introduced as stating the difficulties which they feel in respect to the theory of Justice; but in a manner totally different from Kleitophon, and without any reference to previous Sokratic requirements. Each of them delivers an eloquent and forcible pleading, in the manner of an Aristotelian or Ciceronian dialogue: and to this Sokrates makes

The Kleitophon was originally intended as a first book of the Republic but was found too hard to answer. Reasons why the existing first book was substituted.

<sup>d</sup> Plat. Republ. pp. 336 D, 337 A, 338 A. ing—τὸ δέον—τὸ

<sup>e</sup> For example, That it is not the province of the just man to hurt any one, either friend or foe, Republ. p. 335 D.

Thrasymachus derides any such definitions of τὸ δίκαιον as the follow-

Repub. i. p. 336 C.

These are exactly the unsatisfactory definitions which Kleitophon describes himself (p. 409 C) as having received from the partisans of Sokrates.

his reply. In that reply, Sokrates explains what he means by Justice: and though his exposition is given in the form of short questions, each followed by an answer of acquiescence, yet no real or serious objections are made to him throughout the whole. The case must have been very different if Plato had continued the dialogue Kleitophon; so as to make Sokrates explain the theory of Justice, in the face of all the objections raised by a Sokratic cross-examiner.<sup>†</sup>

<sup>†</sup> Schleiermacher (Einleitung, v. pp. 453-455) considers the Kleitophon not to be the work of Plato. But this only shows that he, like many other critics, attaches scarcely the smallest importance to the presumption arising from the Canon of Thrasyllus. For the grounds by which he justifies his disallowance of the dialogue are to the last degree trivial.

I note with surprise one of his assertions:—"How" (he asks) "or from what motive can Plato have introduced an attack upon Sokrates, which is thoroughly repelled, both seriously and ironically, in almost all the Platonic dialogues?"

As I read Plato, on the contrary:

the truth is, That it is repelled in none, confirmed in many, and thoroughly ratified by Sokrates himself in the Platonic Apology.

Schleiermacher thinks that the Kleitophon is an attack upon Sokrates and the Sokratic men, Plato included, made by some opponent out of the best rhetorical schools. He calls it "a parody and caricature" of the Sokratic manner. To me it seems no caricature at all. It is a very fair application of the Sokratic or Platonic manner. Nor is it conceived by any means in the spirit of an enemy, but in that of an established companion, respectful and grateful, yet dissatisfied at finding that he makes no progress.

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

## PLATONIC REPUBLIC—ABSTRACT.

THE Republic is the longest of all the Platonic dialogues, except the dialogue *De Legibus*. It consists of ten books, each of them as long as any one of the dialogues which we have passed in review. Partly from its length—partly from its lofty pretensions as the great constructive work of Plato—I shall give little more than an abstract of it in the present chapter, and shall reserve remark and comment for the succeeding.

The professed subject is—What is Justice? Is the just man happy in or by reason of his justice, whatever consequences may befall him? Is the unjust man unhappy by reason of his injustice? But the ground actually travelled over by Sokrates, from whose mouth the exposition proceeds, is far more extensive than could have been anticipated from this announced problem. An immense variety of topics, belonging to man and society, is adverted to more or less fully. A theory of psychology or phrenology generally, is laid down and advocated: likewise a theory of the Intellect, distributed into its two branches: 1. Science, with the Platonic Forms or Ideas as Realities corresponding to it; 2. Opinion, with the fluctuating semi-realities or pseudo-realities, which form its object. A sovereign rule, exercised by philosophy, is asserted as indispensable to human happiness. The fundamental conditions of a good society, as Plato conceived it, are set forth at considerable length, and contrasted with the social corruptions of various existing forms of government. The outline of a perfect education, intellectual and emotional, is drawn up and prescribed for the ruling class: with many accompanying remarks on the objectionable tendencies of the popular and consecrated poems. The post-existence, as well as the

Declared  
theme of the  
Republic—  
Expansion  
and multipli-  
cation of the  
topics con-  
nected with  
it.

pre-existence of the soul, is affirmed in the concluding books. As the result of the whole, Plato emphatically proclaims his conviction, that the just man is happy in and through his justice, quite apart from all consideration of consequences—yet that the consequences also will be such as to add to his happiness, both during life as well as after death: and the unjust man unhappy in and through his injustice.\*

The dramatic introduction of the dialogue, (which is described as held during the summer, immediately after the festival of the Bendideia in Peiræus), with the picture of the aged Kephalus and his views upon old age, is among the richest and most spirited in the Platonic works: but the discussion does not properly begin until Kephalus retires, leaving it to be carried on by Sokrates with Polemarchus, Glaukon, Adeimantus, Thrasymachus.

“Old age has its advantages to reasonable men” (says Kephalus). “If I have lost the pleasures of youth, I have at the same time lost the violent desires which then overmastered me. I now enjoy tranquillity and peace. Without doubt, this is in part owing to my wealth. But the best that wealth does for me is, that it enables me to make compensation for deceptions and injustice, practised on other men in my younger days—and to fulfil all vows made to the Gods. An old man who is too poor to render such atonement for past falsehood and injustice, becomes uneasy in his mind as death approaches; he begins to fear that the stories about Hades, which he has heard and ridiculed in his youth, may perhaps prove true.”<sup>b</sup>

“Is that your explanation of Justice” (asks Sokrates): “that it consists in telling truth, and rendering to every one what you have had from him?” The old man Kephalus here withdraws; Polemarchus and the others prosecute the discussion. “The poet Simonides” (says Polemarchus) “gives an explanation like to that which you have stated—when he affirms, That just dealing consists in rendering to every man what is owing to him.”

Plat. Repub. i. pp. 328 A, 350 D,  
354 A.  
Plato, Repub. i. pp. 330-331.

Compare the language of Cato, more rhetorical and exaggerated than that of Kephalus, in Cicero De Senect. c. 13-14.

"I do not know what Simonides means," replies Sokrates. "He cannot mean that it is always right to tell the truth, or always right to give back a deposit. If my friend, having deposited arms with me, afterwards goes mad, and in that state demands them back, it would not be right in me either to restore the arms, or to tell the truth, to a man in that condition. Therefore to say that justice consists in speaking truth and in giving back what we have received, cannot be a good definition."<sup>c</sup>

Polemarchus here gives a peculiar meaning to the phrase of Simonides: a man owes good to his friends—evil to his enemies: and he ought to pay back both. Upon this Sokrates' comments.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Republ.* i. p. 331 C-D.

The historical Sokrates argues in the same manner (in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon. See his conversation with Euthydemus, iv. 2; and Cicero, *De Offic.* iii. 25, 94-95).

<sup>d</sup> Sokrates here remarks that the precepts—Speak truth; Restore what has been confided to you—ought not to be considered as universally binding. Sometimes justice, or those higher grounds upon which the rules of justice are founded, prescribe that we should disobey the precepts. Sokrates takes this for granted, as a matter which no one will dispute; and it is evident that what Plato had here in his mind was, the obvious consideration that to tell the truth or restore a weapon deposited, to one who had gone mad, would do no good to any one, and might do immense mischief; thus showing that general utility is both the foundation and the limiting principle of all precepts respecting just and unjust. That this is present to the mind of Plato appears evident from his assuming the position as a matter of course; it is moreover Sokratic, as we see by the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon.

But Plato, in another passage of the *Republic*, clothes this Sokratic doctrine in a language and hypothesis of his own. He sets up Forms or Ideas, *per se*. The Just,—the Unjust,—The Honourable,—The Base, &c. He distinguishes each of these from the many separate manifestations in which it is

specialised. The Form, though one reality in itself, appears manifold when embodied and disguised in these diversified accompaniments. It remains One and Unchanged, the object of Science and universal infallible truth; but each of its separate manifestations is peculiar to itself, appears differently to different minds, and admits of no higher certainty than fallible opinion. Though the Form of Justice always remains the same, yet its subordinate embodiments ever fluctuate; there is no given act nor assemblage of acts which is always just. Every just act (see *Republic*, v. pp. 476 A-479 A) is liable under certain circumstances to become unjust; or to be invaded and overclouded by the Form of Injustice. The genuine philosopher will detect the Form of Justice wherever it is to be found, in the midst of accompaniments however discrepant and confused, over all which he will ascend to the region of universal truth and reality. The unphilosophical mind cannot accomplish this ascent, nor detect the pure Form, nor even recognise its real existence: but sees nothing beyond the multiplicity of diverse particular cases in which it is or appears to be embodied. Respecting these particular cases there is no constant or universal truth, no full science. They cannot be thrown into classes to which the superior Form constantly and unconditionally adheres. They are midway between reality and non-reality: they are mat-

Objections to  
it by  
—1

truth.

*S.*—Simonides meant to say (you tell me) that Justice consists in rendering benefits to your friends, evil to your enemies: that is, in rendering to each what is proper and suitable. But we must ask him farther—  
 Proper and suitable—how? in what cases? to whom? The medical art is that which renders what is proper and suitable, of nourishment and medicaments for the health of the body: the art of cookery is that which renders what is proper and suitable, of savoury ingredients for the satisfaction of the palate. In like manner, the cases must be specified in which justice renders what is proper and suitable—to whom, how, or what?°

*P.*—Justice consists in doing good to friends, evil to enemies.

*S.*—Who is it that is most efficient in benefiting his friends and injuring his enemies, as to health or disease? *P.*—It is the physician. *S.*—Who, in reference to the dangers in navigation by sea? *P.*—The steersman. *S.*—In what matters is it that the just man shows his special efficiency, to benefit friends and hurt enemies? *P.*—In war: as a combatant for the one and against the other. *S.*—To men who are not sick, the physician is of no use—nor the steersman, to men on dry land: Do you mean in like manner, that the just man is useless to those who are not at war? *P.*—No: I do not mean that. Justice is useful in peace also. *S.*—So also is husbandry, for raising food—shoemaking, for providing shoes. Tell me for what want or acquisition justice is useful during peace? *P.*—It is useful for the common dealings and joint

ters of opinion more or less reasonable, but not of certain science or unconditional affirmation. Among mankind generally, who see nothing of true and absolute Form, the received rules and dogmas respecting the Just, the Beautiful, &c., are of this intermediate and ambiguous kind: they can neither be affirmed universally, nor denied universally; they are partly true, partly false, determinable only by opinion in each separate case.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 479. οὐ γὰρ εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατόν ἵππων, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλων. Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νό- καλοῦ τε περὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων,

Of the distinction here drawn in general terms by Plato, between the pure unchangeable Form, and the subordinate classes of particulars in which that Form is or appears to be embodied, the reasoning above cited respecting truth-telling and giving back a deposit is an example.

° Plato, Republic, i. p. 332 C. ἡ οὖν δὴ τίσις τί ἀποδιδούσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη

Plato, Republic, i. p. 332 E. τις ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἐρ

μεταξύ που κυλινθεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς.

transactions between man and man. *S.*—When we are engaged in playing at draughts, the good player is our useful co-operator: when in laying bricks and stones, the skilful mason: much more than the just man. Can you specify in what particular transactions the just man has any superior usefulness as a co-operator? *P.*—In affairs of money I think. *S.*—Surely not in the employment of money. When you want to buy a horse, you must take for your assistant, not the just man, but one who knows horses: so also, if you are purchasing a ship. What are those modes of jointly employing money, in which the just man is more useful than others? *P.*—He is useful when you wish to have your money safely kept. *S.*—That is, when your money is not to be employed, but to lie idle: so that when your money is useless, then is the time when justice is useful for it. *P.*—So it seems. *S.*—In regard to other things also, a sickle, a shield, a lyre—when you want to use them, the pruner, the hoplite, the musician, must be invoked as co-operators: justice is useful only when you are to keep them unused. In a word, justice is useless for the use of anything, and useful merely for things not in use. Upon this showing, it is at least a matter of no great worth.<sup>a</sup>

But let us pursue the investigation (continues Sokrates). In boxing or in battle, is not he who is best in striking, best also in defending himself? In regard to disease, is not he who can best guard himself against it, the most formidable for imparting it to others? Is not the general who watches best over his own camp, also the most effective in surprising and overreaching the enemy? In a word, whenever a man is effective as a guard of anything, is he not also effective as a thief of it? *P.*—Such seems the course of the discussion. *S.*—Well then, the just man turns out to be a sort of thief, like the Homeric Autolykus. According to the explanation of Simonides, justice is a mode of thieving for the profit of friends and damage of enemies.<sup>b</sup> *P.*—It cannot be so. I am in

The just man being good for keeping property guarded, must also be good for stealing —A cited.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, i. pp. 332-333.  
 ἂν οὐδὲν πᾶν γὰρ τι σπουδαῖον εἴη

<sup>b</sup> Plat. Rep. i. p. 334 B. *ἔοικεν οὖν δικαιοσύνη—κλεπτική τις εἶναι, καὶ*

utter confusion. Yet I think still that justice is profitable to friends, and hurtful to enemies.

*S.*—Whom do you call friends: those whom a man believes to be good,—or those who really are good, whether he believes them to be so or not: and the like, in reference to enemies? *P.*—I mean those whom he believes to be good. It is natural that he should love *them* and that he should hate those whom he believes to be evil. *S.*—But is not a man often mistaken in this belief? *P.*—Yes: often. *S.*—In so far as a man is mistaken, the good men are his enemies, and the evil men his friends. Justice, therefore, on your showing, consists in doing good to the evil men, and evil to the good men. *P.*—So it appears. *S.*—Now good men are just, and do no wrong to any one. It is therefore just, on your explanation, to hurt those who do no wrong. *P.*—Impossible! that is a monstrous doctrine. *S.*—You mean, then, that it is just to hurt unjust men, and to benefit just men? *P.*—Yes; that is something better. *S.*—It will often happen, therefore, when a man misjudges about others, that justice will consist in hurting his friends, since they are in his estimation the evil men: and in benefiting his enemies, since they are in his estimation the good men. Now this is the direct contrary of what Simonides defined to be justice.<sup>1</sup>

“We have misconceived the meaning of Simonides” (replies Polemarchus). “He must have meant that justice consists in benefiting your friend, assuming him to be a good man: and in hurting your enemy, assuming him to be an evil man.” Sokrates proceeds to impugn the definition in this new sense. He shows that justice does not admit of our hurting any man, either evil or good. By hurting the evil man, we only make him more evil than he was before. To do this belongs not to justice, but to injustice.<sup>2</sup> The definition of justice—That it consists in rendering benefit to friends and hurt to enemies—is not suitable to a wise man like Simonides, but to some rich potentate

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, i. p. 334 D.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Republic, i. pp. 335-336.

like Periander or Xerxes, who thinks his own power irresistible.<sup>1</sup>

At this turn of the dialogue, when the definition given by Simonides has just been refuted, Thrasymachus breaks in, and takes up the conversation with Sokrates. He is depicted as angry, self-confident to excess, and coarse in his manners even to the length of insult. The portrait given of him is memorable for its dramatic vivacity, and is calculated to present in an odious point of view the doctrines which he advances: like the personal deformities which Homer heaps upon Thersites in the Iliad.<sup>m</sup> But how far it is a copy of the real man, we have no evidence to inform us.

Thrasymachus takes up the dialogue—Repulsive portrait drawn of him.

In the contrast between Sokrates and Thrasymachus, Plato gives valuable hints as to the conditions of instructive colloquy. “What nonsense is all this!” (exclaims Thrasymachus). “Do not content yourself with asking questions, Sokrates, which you know is much easier than answering: but tell us yourself what Justice is: give us a plain answer: do not tell us that it is what is right—or profitable—or for our interest—or gainful—or advantageous: for I will not listen to any trash like this.” “Be not so harsh with us, Thrasymachus” (replies Sokrates, in a subdued tone). “If we have taken the wrong course of enquiry, it is against our own will. You ought to feel pity for us rather than anger.” “I thought” (rejoined Thrasymachus, with a scornful laugh) “that you would have recourse to your usual pretence of ignorance, and would decline answering.” S.—How can I possibly answer, when you prescribe beforehand what I am to say or not to say? If you ask men—How much is twelve? and at the same time say—Don’t tell me that it is twice six, or three times four, or four times three—how can any man answer your question? T.—As if the two cases were similar! S.—Why not similar?

Violence of Thrasymachus—Subdued manner of Sokrates—Conditions of useful colloquy.

<sup>1</sup> Here is a characteristic specimen of searching cross-examination in the Platonic or Sokratic style: citing multiplied analogies, and requiring the generalities of a definition to be clothed with particulars, that its sufficiency may be proved in each of many

successive as well as different cases.

<sup>m</sup> Homer, Iliad B 216. Respecting Thrasymachus the reader should compare Spengel—*Συναγωγή Τεχνῶν*—pp. 94-98: which abates the odium inspired by this picture in the Republic.

But even though they be not similar, yet if the respondent thinks them so, how can he help answering according as the matter appears to him, whether we forbid him or not? *T.*—Is that what *you* intend to do? Are you going to give me one of those answers which I forbade? *S.*—Very likely I may, if on consideration it appears to me the proper answer.<sup>a</sup> *T.*—What will you say if I show you another answer better than all of them? What penalty will you then impose upon yourself? *S.*—What penalty?—why, that which properly falls upon the ignorant. It is their proper fate to learn from men wiser than themselves: that is the penalty which I am prepared for.<sup>o</sup>

After a few more words, in the same offensive and insolent tone ascribed to him from the beginning, Thrasymachus produces his definition of Justice:—"Justice is that which is advantageous to the more powerful." Some comments from Sokrates bring out a fuller explanation, whereby the definition stands amended:—"Justice is that which is advantageous to the constituted authority, or to that which holds power, in each different community: monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy, as the case may be. Each of these authorities makes laws and ordinances for its own interest: declares what is just and unjust: and punishes all citizens who infringe its commands. Justice consists in obeying these commands. In this sense, justice is everywhere that which is for the interest or advantage of the more powerful."<sup>p</sup> "I too believe" (says Sokrates) "that justice is something advantageous, in a certain sense. But whether you are right in

Definition given by Thrasymachus—Justice is that which is advantageous to the more powerful. Comments by Sokrates. What if the powerful man mistakes his own advantage?

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, i. p. 337 C.

Εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὁμοιον, δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἡττον τὸ οἶε αὐτὸν σθαι τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ, ἔάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν, ἔάν τε μὴ; Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποῆσεις; ὣν ἐγὼ ἀπέκρινον, τούτων τι ἀποκρῶε; Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰ μοι σκεψαμένῳ οὕτω δόξειεν.

This passage deserves notice, inasmuch as Plato here affirms, in very plain language, the Protagorean doc-

trine, which we have seen him trying to refute in the Theæstétus and Kratylus,—“Homo Mensura,—Every man is a measure to himself. That is true or false to every man which appears to him so.”

Most of Plato's dialogues indeed imply this truth; for no man makes more constant appeal to the internal assent or dissent of the individual interlocutor. But it is seldom that he declares it in such express terms.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, i. p. 337 D.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Republic, i. pp. 338-339.

adding these words—‘to the more powerful’—is a point for investigation.<sup>1</sup> Assuming that the authorities in each state make ordinances for their own advantage, you will admit that they sometimes mistake, and enact ordinances tending to their own disadvantage. In so far as they do this, justice is not that which is advantageous, but that which is disadvantageous, to the more powerful.<sup>2</sup> Your definition therefore will not hold.”

Thrasymachus might have replied to this objection by saying, that he meant what the superior power conceived to be for its own advantage, and enacted accordingly, whether such conception was correct or erroneous. This interpretation, though indicated by a remark put into the mouth of Kleitophon, is not farther pursued.<sup>3</sup> But in the reply really ascribed to Thrasymachus, he is made to retract what he had just before admitted—that the superior authority sometimes commits mistakes. In so far as a superior or a ruler makes mistakes (Thrasymachus says), he is not a superior. We say, indeed, speaking loosely, that the ruler falls into error, just as we say that the physician or the steersman falls into error. The physician does not err *quâ* physician, nor the steersman *quâ* steersman. No craftsman errs *quâ* craftsman. If he errs, it is not from his craft, but from want of knowledge: that is, from want of craft.<sup>4</sup> What the ruler, as such, declares to be best for himself, and therefore enacts, is always really best for himself: this is justice for the persons under his rule.

To this subtle distinction, Sokrates replies by saying (in substance), “If you take the craftsman in this strict meaning, as representing the abstraction Craft, it is not true that his proceedings are directed towards his own interest or advantage. What he studies is, the advantage of his subjects or clients, not his own. The physician, as such, has it in

Correction by Thrasymachus—If the Ruler mistakes, he is *pro tanto* no Ruler—The Ruler, *quâ* Ruler—*quâ* Craftsman—is infallible.

Sokrates—The Ruler, *quâ* infallible Craftsman, studies the interest of those whom he governs, and not his own interest.

Plato, Republic, i. p. 339 B.

δὲ συμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ  
γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον, σὺ δὲ προστί-  
και αὐτὸ φησὶ εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείτ-  
τονος.

Plato, Republic, i. p. 339 E.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 B.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 E.

γὰρ ἐπιστήμης δὲ  
ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἐστὶ  
ὥστε

δταν ἄρχων ᾖ.

view to cure his patients: the steersman, to bring his passengers safely to harbour: the ruler, so far forth as craftsman, makes laws for the benefit of his subjects, and not for his own. If obedience to these laws constitutes justice, therefore, it is not true that justice consists in what is advantageous to the superior or governing power. It would rather consist in what is advantageous to the governed."<sup>u</sup>

Thrasymachus is now represented as renouncing the abstraction above noted,<sup>x</sup> and reverting to the actualities of life. "Such talk is childish!" (he exclaims, with the coarseness imputed to him in this dialogue). "Shepherds and herdsmen tend and fatten their flocks and herds, not for the benefit of the sheep and oxen, but for the profit of themselves and the proprietors. So too the genuine ruler in a city: he regards his subjects as so many sheep, looking only to the amount of profit which he can draw from them.<sup>y</sup> Justice is, in real truth, the good of another; it is the profit of him who is more powerful and rules—the loss of those who are weaker and must obey. It is the unjust man who rules over the multitude of just and well-meaning men. They serve him because he is the stronger: they build up his happiness at the cost of their own. Everywhere, both in private dealing and in public function, the just man is worse off than the unjust. I mean by the unjust, one who has the power to commit wrongful seizure on a large scale. You may see this if you look at the greatest injustice of all—the case of the despot, who makes himself happy while the juster men over whom he rules are miserable. One who is detected in the commission of petty crimes is punished, and gets a bad name: but if a man has force enough to commit crime on the grand scale, to enslave the persons of the citizens, and to appropriate their goods—instead of being called by a bad name, he is envied and regarded as happy, not only by the citizens themselves, but by all who hear him named. Those

Thrasymachus denies this—Justice is the good of another. The just many are worse off than the unjust One, and are forced to submit to his superior strength.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Republic, i. p. 342.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Republic, p. 345 B-C.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Republic, p. 343 B.

A similar comparison is put into the mouth of Sokrates himself by Plato in the Theætétus, p. 174 D.

who blame injustice, do so from the fear of suffering it, not from the fear of doing it. Thus then injustice, in its successful efficiency, is strong, free, and overruling, as compared with justice. Injustice is profitable to a man's self: justice (as I said before) is what is profitable to some other man stronger than he."<sup>2</sup>

Thrasymachus is described as laying down this position in very peremptory language, and as anxious to depart immediately after it, if he had not been detained by the other persons present. His position forms the pivot of the subsequent conversation. The two opinions included in it—(That justice consists in obedience yielded by the weak to the orders of the strong, for the advantage of the strong—That injustice, if successful, is profitable and confers happiness: justice the contrary)—are disputed, both of them, by Sokrates as well as by Glaukon.<sup>a</sup>

Sokrates is represented as confuting and humiliating Thrasymachus by various arguments, of which the two first at least are more subtle than cogent.<sup>b</sup> He next proceeds to argue that injustice, far from being a source of strength, is a source of weakness—That any community of men, among whom injustice prevails, must be in continual dispute; and therefore incapable of combined action against others—That a camp of mercenary soldiers or robbers, who plunder every one else, must at least observe justice among themselves—That if they have force, this is because they are unjust only by halves: that if they were thoroughly unjust, they would also be thoroughly impotent—That the like is true also of an individual separately taken, who, so far as he is unjust, is in a perpetual state of hatred and conflict with himself, as well as with just men and with the Gods: and would thus be divested of all power to accomplish any purpose.<sup>c</sup>

Having thus shown that justice is stronger than injustice, Sokrates next offers an argument to prove that it is happier

Position laid for the subsequent debate and exposition.

Arguments of Sokrates—Injustice is a source of weakness—Every multitude must observe justice among themselves, in order to avoid perpetual quarrels. The same about any single individual: if he is unjust, he will be at war with himself, and perpetually weak.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, i. pp. 343-344.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, i. pp. 345 A-348 A.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, i. pp. 346-350.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, i. pp. 351-352 D.

or confers more happiness than injustice. The conclusion of this argument is—That the just man is happy, and the unjust miserable.<sup>d</sup> Thrasy-machus is confuted, and retires humiliated from the debate. Yet Sokrates himself is represented as dissatisfied with the result. “At the close of our debate” (he says) “I find that I know nothing about the matter. For as I do not know what justice is, I can hardly expect to know whether it is a virtue or not; nor whether the man who possesses it is happy or not happy.”<sup>e</sup>

Here Glaukon enters the lists, intimating that he too is dissatisfied with the proof given by Sokrates, that justice is every way better than injustice: though he adopts the conclusion, and desires much to hear it fully demonstrated. “You know” (he says), “Sokrates, that there are three varieties of Good:—

1. Good *per se*, and for its own sake (apart from any regard to ulterior consequences): such as enjoyment and the innocuous pleasures.
2. Good both in itself, and by reason of its ulterior consequences: such as full health, perfect vision, intelligence, &c.
3. Good, not in itself, but altogether by reason of its consequences: such as gymnastic training, medical treatment, professional business, &c.

Now in which of these branches do you rank Justice?” *S.*—I rank it in the noblest—that is—in the second branch: which is good both in itself, and by reason of its consequences. *G.*—Most persons put it in the third branch: as being in itself difficult and laborious, but deserving to be cultivated in consequence of the reward and good name which attaches to the man who is reputed just.<sup>f</sup> *S.*—I know that this is the view taken by Thrasy-machus and many others: but it is not mine. *G.*—Neither is it mine.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, i. pp. 353-354 A.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, i. fn. p. 354 C. τις οὐσα τυγχάνει εἶτε καὶ οὐ, καὶ οὐκ εἶ

ἔπυτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα δ' ἔστι, σχολῇ εἰσομαί εἶτε

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357.

Yet still I think that you have not made out your case against Thrasymachus, and that he has given up the game too readily. I will therefore re-state his argument, not at all adopting his opinion as my own, but simply in order to provoke a full refutation of it from you, such as I have never yet heard from any one. First, I shall show what his partisans say as to the nature and origin of justice. Next, I shall show that all who practise justice, practise it unwillingly; not as good *per se*, but as a necessity. Lastly, I shall prove that such conduct on their part is reasonable. If these points can be made out, it will follow that the life of the unjust man is much better than that of the just.<sup>a</sup>

Glaukon undertakes to set forth the case against Sokrates, though professing not to agree with it.

The case, as set forth first by Glaukon, next by Adeimantus, making themselves advocates of Thrasymachus—is as follows. “To do injustice, is by nature good: to suffer injustice is by nature evil; but the last is greater as an evil, than the first as a good: so that when men have tasted of both, they find it advantageous to agree with each other, that none shall either do or suffer injustice. These agreements are embodied in laws; and what is prescribed by the law is called lawful and just. Here you have the generation and essence of justice, which is intermediate between what is best and what is worst: that is, between the power of committing injustice with impunity, and the liability to suffer injustice without protection or redress. Men acquiesce in such compromise, not as in itself good, but because they are too weak to commit injustice safely. For if any man were strong enough to do so, and had the dispositions of a man, he would not make such a compromise with any one: it would be madness in him to do so.<sup>b</sup>

Pleading of Glaukon. Justice is in the nature of a compromise for all—a medium between what is best and what is worst.

“That men are just, only because they are too weak to be unjust, will appear if we imagine any of them, either the just or the unjust, armed with full power and impunity, such as would be conferred by the ring of Gyges, which rendered the wearer invisible at pleasure. If the just man could become

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 358.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 358-359.

thus privileged, he would act in the same manner as the unjust: his temper would never be adamantine enough to resist the temptations which naturally prompt every man to unlimited satisfaction of his desires. Such temptations are now counteracted by the force of law and opinion; but if these sanctions were nullified, every man, just or unjust, would seize everything that he desired, without regard to others. When he is just, he is so not willingly, but by compulsion. He chooses that course not as being the best for him absolutely, but as the best which his circumstances will permit.

“To determine which of the two is happiest, the just man or the unjust, let us assume each to be perfect in his part, and then compare them. The unjust man must be assumed to have at his command all means of force and fraud, so as to procure for himself the maximum of success; *i. e.* the reputation of being a just man, along with all the profitable enormities of injustice. Against him we will set the just man, perfect in his own simplicity and righteousness; a man who cares only for being just in reality, and not for seeming to be so. We shall suppose him, though really just, to be accounted by every one else thoroughly unjust. It is only thus that we can test the true value of his justice: for if he be esteemed just by others, he will be honoured and recompensed, so that we cannot be sure that his justice is not dictated by regard to these adventitious consequences. He must be assumed as just through life, yet accounted by every one else unjust, and treated accordingly: while the unjust man, with whom we compare him, is considered and esteemed by others as if he were perfectly just. Which of the two will have the happiest life? Unquestionably the unjust man. He will have all the advantages derived from his unscrupulous use of means, together with all that extrinsic favour and support which proceeds from good estimation on the part of others: he will acquire superior wealth, which will enable him both to purchase partisans, and to offer costly sacrifices ensuring to him the patronage of the Gods. The just man,

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parallel cir-  
cumstances.

on the contrary, will not only be destitute of all these advantages, but will be exposed to a life of extreme suffering and torture. He will learn by painful experience that his happiness depends, not upon being really just, but upon being accounted just by others.”<sup>i</sup>

Here Glaukon concludes. Adeimantus now steps in as second counsel on the same side, to the following effect:<sup>k</sup>

“Much yet remains to be added to the argument. To make it clearer, we must advert to the topics insisted on by those who oppose Glaukon—those who panegyrisé justice and denounce injustice. A father, who exhorts his sons to be just, says nothing about the intrinsic advantages of justice *per se*: he dwells upon the beneficial consequences which will accrue to them from being just. Through such reputation they will obtain from men favours, honours, commands, prosperous alliances—from the Gods, recompenses yet more varied and abundant. If on the contrary they commit injustice, they will be disgraced and ill-treated among men, severely punished by the Gods. Such are the arguments whereby a father recommends justice, and dissuades injustice, he talks about opinions and after consequences only, he says nothing about justice or injustice in themselves. Such are the allegations even of those who wish to praise and enforce justice. But there are others, and many among them, who hold an opposite language, proclaiming unreservedly that temperance and justice are difficult to practise—injustice and intemperance easy and agreeable, though law and opinion brand them as disgraceful. These men affirm that the unjust life is for the most part more profitable than the just. They are full of panegyrics towards the wealthy and powerful, however unprincipled; despising the poor and weak, whom nevertheless they admit to be better men.<sup>l</sup> They even say that the Gods themselves entail misery upon many good men, and confer prosperity on the wicked. Then there come the prophets and jugglers, who profess to instruct rich men, out of many books composed by Orpheus and Musæus, how they

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<sup>i</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 361-362.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 362-367.

<sup>l</sup> Plat. Rep. ii. p. 364 A-B.

may by appropriate presents and sacrifices atone for all their crimes and die happy.<sup>m</sup>

“When we find that the case is thus stated respecting justice, both by its panegyrists and by its enemies—that the former extol it only from the reputation which it procures, and that the latter promise to the unjust man, if clever, and energetic, a higher recompense than any such reputation can obtain for him—what effect can we expect to be produced on the minds of young men of ability, station, and ambition? What course of life are they likely to choose? Surely they will thus reason: A just life is admitted to be burdensome—and it will serve no purpose, unless I acquire, besides, the reputation of justice in the esteem of others. Now the unjust man, who can establish such reputation, enjoys the perfection of existence. My happiness turns not upon the reality, but upon the seeming: upon my reputation with others.<sup>n</sup> Such reputation then it must be my aim to acquire. I must combine the real profit of injustice with the outside show and reputation of justice. Such combination is difficult: but all considerable enterprises are difficult: I must confederate with partisans to carry my point by force or fraud. If I succeed, I attain the greatest prize to which man can aspire. I may be told that the Gods will punish me; but the same poets, who declare the existence of the Gods, assure me also that they are placable by prayer and sacrifice: and the poets are as good authority on the one point as on the other.<sup>o</sup> Such” (continues Adeimantus) “will be the natural reasoning of a powerful, energetic, aspiring man. How can we expect that such a man should prefer justice, when the rewards of injustice on its largest scale are within his reach?<sup>p</sup> Unless he be averse to injustice, from some divine peculiarity of disposition—or unless he has been taught to abstain from it by the acquisition of knowledge,—he will treat the current encomiums on justice as ridiculous. No man is just by his own impulse. Weak men or old men censure injustice, because they have not force enough to commit it with success: which is proved by the fact that any one of

<sup>m</sup> Plat. Rep. p. 364 C-E.

<sup>o</sup> Plat. Rep. ii. pp. 365 E, 366 A.

<sup>n</sup> Plat. Rep. ii. p. 365 B-D.

<sup>p</sup> Plat. Rep. ii. p. 366 B-D.

them who acquires power, immediately becomes unjust as far as his power reaches.

"The case as I set it forth" (pursues Adeimantus) "admits of no answer on the ground commonly taken by those who extol justice and blame injustice, from the earliest poets down to the present day.<sup>1</sup> What they praise is not justice *per se*, but the reputation which the just man obtains, and the consequences flowing from it. What they blame is not injustice *per se*, but its results. They never commend, nor even mention, justice as it exists in and moulds the internal mind and character of the just man; even though he be unknown, misconceived and detested, by Gods as well as by men. Nor do they ever talk of the internal and intrinsic effects of injustice upon the mind of the unjust man, but merely of his ulterior prospects. They never attempt to show that injustice itself, in the mind of the unjust man, is the gravest intrinsic evil: and justice in the mind of the just man, the highest intrinsic good: apart from consequences on either side. If you had all held this language from the beginning, and had impressed upon us such persuasion from our childhood, there would have been no necessity for our keeping watch upon each other to prevent injustice. Every man would have been the best watch upon himself, through fear lest by becoming unjust he might take into his own bosom the gravest evil."

"Here therefore is a deficiency in the argument on behalf of justice, which I call upon you,<sup>2</sup> Sokrates, who have employed all your life in these meditations, to supply. You have declared justice to be good indeed for its

Nobody :

*se*, but only by reason of its conse-

calls upon Sokrates to recommend and enforce Justice on its

<sup>1</sup> Plat. Rep. ii. p. 366 D-E. πάντων ὅσοι ἐπαινέται φατέ δικαιοσύνης ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡρώων ἀρετῶν λόγῳι λελειμμένοι μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων, οὐδεὶς πάποτε ἐψέξεν ἄλλως

τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένας· αὐτὸ δ' ἐκάτερον τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ λάνθανον θεοὺς τε καὶ πούς, οὐδεὶς πάποτε οὐτ' οὐτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς &c. Compare p. 362 E.

Whoever reads this, will see that Plato does not intend (as most of his

commentators assert) that the arguments which Sokrates combats in the Republic were the invention of Protagoras, Prodikus, and other Sophists of the Platonic century.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 A. γὰρ οὕτως

οὐκ

αὐτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος

<sup>3</sup> Plat. Rep. ii. p. 367 E. πάντα τὸν βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν τοῦτο (you, Sokrates).

own grounds, and to explain how Justice in itself benefits the mind of the just man. consequences, but still more of a good from its own intrinsic nature. Explain how it is good, and how injustice is evil, in its own intrinsic nature: what effect each produces on the mind, so as to deserve such an appellation. Omit all notice of consequences accruing to the just or unjust man, from the opinion, favourable or otherwise, entertained towards him by others. You must even go farther: you must suppose that both of them are misconceived, and that the just man is disgraced and punished as if he were unjust—the unjust man honoured and rewarded as if he were just. This is the only way of testing the real intrinsic value of justice and injustice, considered in their effects upon the mind. If you expatiate on the consequences—if you regard justice as in itself indifferent, but valuable on account of the profitable reputation which it procures, and injustice as in itself profitable, but dangerous to the unjust man from the hostile sentiment and damage which it brings upon him—the real drift of your exhortation will be, to make us aspire to be unjust in reality, but to aim at maintaining a reputation of justice along with it. In that line of argument you will concede substantially the opinion of Thrasymachus—That justice is another man's good, the advantage of the more powerful: and injustice the good or profit of the agent, but detrimental to the weaker.”<sup>†</sup>

With the invocation here addressed to Sokrates, Adeimantus concludes his discourse. Like Glaukon, he disclaims participation in the sentiments which the speech embodies. Both of them professing to be dissatisfied with the previous refutation of Thrasymachus by Sokrates, call for a deeper exposition of the subject. Both of them then enunciate a doctrine, resembling partially, though not entirely, that of Thrasymachus—but without his offensive manner, and with superior force of argument. They propose it as a difficult problem, which none but Sokrates can adequately solve. He accepts the challenge, though with apparent diffidence: and we now enter upon his solution, which occupies the remaining eight books and a half of the Republic. All these last books are in fact expository, though in the broken

<sup>†</sup> Plat. Rep. ii. p. 367 C-D.

form of dialogue. The other speakers advance scarce any opinions for Sokrates to confute, but simply intervene with expressions of assent, or doubt, or demand for farther information.

I here repeat the precise state of the question, which is very apt to be lost amidst the mæanderings of a Platonic dialogue.

First, What is Justice? Sokrates had declared at the close of the first book, that he did not know what Justice was; and that therefore he could not possibly decide, whether it was a virtue or not:—nor whether the possessor of it was happy or not.

Statement of the question as it stands after the speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus. What Sokrates undertakes to prove.

Secondly, To which of the three classes of good things does Justice belong? To the second class—*i. e.* things good *per se*, and good also in their consequences? Or to the third class—*i. e.* things not good *per se*, but good only in their consequences? Sokrates replies (in the beginning of the second book) that it belongs to the second class.

Evidently, these two questions cannot stand together. In answering the second, Sokrates presupposes a certain determination of the first; inconsistent with that unqualified ignorance, of which he had just made profession. Sokrates now professes to know, not merely that Justice is a good, but to what class of good things it belongs. The first question has thus been tacitly dropped without express solution, and has given place to the second. Yet Sokrates, in providing his answer to the second, includes implicitly an answer to the first, so far as to assume that Justice is a good thing, and proceeds to show in what way it is good.

Some say that Justice is good (*i. e.* that it ensures, or at least contributes to, the happiness of the agent), but not *per se*: only in its ulterior consequences. Taken *per se*, it imposes privation, loss, self-denial; diminishing instead of augmenting the agent's happiness. But taken along with its results, this preliminary advance is more than adequately repaid; since without it the agent would not obtain from others that reciprocity of justice, forbearance, and good treatment without which his life would be intolerable.

If this last opinion be granted, Glaukon argues that Justice

would indeed be good for weak and middling agents, but not for men of power and energy, who had a good chance of extorting the benefit without paying the antecedent price. And Thrasymachus, carrying this view still farther, assumes that there are in every society men of power who despotise over the rest; and maintains that Justice consists, for the society generally, in obeying the orders of these despots. It is all gain to the strong, all loss to the weak. These latter profit by it in no other way than by saving themselves from farther punishment or ill usage on the part of the strong.

Sokrates undertakes to maintain the opposite—That Justice is a good *per se*, ensuring the happiness of the agent by its direct and intrinsic effects on the mind:—whatever its ulterior consequences may be. He maintains indeed that these ulterior consequences are also good: but that they do not constitute the paramount benefit, or the main recommendation of justice: that the good of Justice *per se* is much greater. In this point of view, Justice is not less valuable and necessary to the strong than to the weak. He proceeds to show, what Justice is, and how it is beneficial *per se* to the agent, apart from consequences: also, what Injustice is, and how it is injurious to the agent *per se*, apart from consequences.<sup>u</sup>

He begins by affirming the analogy between an entire city or community, and each individual man or agent. There is justice (he says) in the entire city—and justice in each individual man. In the city, the characteristics of Justice are stamped in larger letters or magnified, so as to be more easily legible. We will therefore first read them in the city, and then apply the lesson to explain what appears in smaller type in the individual man.<sup>x</sup> We will trace the steps by which a city is generated, in order that we may see how justice and injustice spring up in it.

It is in this way that Plato first conducts us to the formation of a political community. A parallel is assumed between the entire city and each individual man: the city is a man on a great scale—the man is a city on a small scale. Justice

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Republic, ii.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 368-369.

belongs both to one and to the other. The city is described and analysed, not merely as a problem for its own sake, but in order that the relation between its constituent parts may throw light on the analogous constituent parts, which are assumed to exist in each individual man.<sup>7</sup>

The fundamental principle (Sokrates affirms) to which cities or communities owe their origin, is, existence of wants and necessities in all men. No single man is sufficient for himself: every one is in want of many things, and is therefore compelled to seek communion or partnership with neighbours and auxiliaries. Reciprocal dealings begin: each man gives to others, and receives from others, under the persuasion that it is better for him to do so.<sup>8</sup>

Common needs, helplessness of individuals apart, reciprocity of service when they are brought together—are the generating causes of this nascent association. The simplest association, comprising the mere necessities of life, will consist only of four or five men: the husbandman, builder, weaver, shoemaker, &c. It is soon found advantageous to all, that each of these should confine himself to his own proper business: that the husbandman should not attempt to build his own house or make his own shoes, but should produce corn enough for all, and exchange his surplus for that of the rest in their respective departments. Each man has his own distinct aptitudes and dispositions; so that he executes both more work and better work, by employing himself exclusively in the avocation for which he is suited. The division of labour thus becomes established, as reciprocally advantageous to all. This principle soon extends itself: new wants arise: the number of different employments is multiplied. Smiths, carpenters, and other artisans, find a place: also shepherds and herdsmen, to provide oxen for the farmer, wool and hides for the weaver and the shoemaker. Presently a farther subdivision of labour is introduced for carrying on exchange and distribution: markets are established: money is coined: foreign merchants will import and export commodities:

Fundamental principle, to which communities of mankind owe their origin—Reciprocity of want and service between individuals—No individual can suffice to himself.

Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 A. τὴν τοῦ μέγιστος οὐμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἰδέα ἡγεμονίας.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369.

dealers, men of weak body, and fit for sedentary work, will establish themselves to purchase wholesale the produce brought by the husbandman, and to sell it again by retail in quantities suitable for distribution. Lastly, the complement of the city will be made up by a section of labouring men who do jobs for hire: men of great bodily strength, though not adding much to the intelligence of the community.<sup>a</sup>

Such is the full equipment of the sound and healthy city, Moderate confined to what is simple and necessary. Those —moderate as who compose it will have sufficient provision of healthy city wheat and barley, for loaves and cakes—of wine to —Few wants. drink—of clothing and shoes—of houses for shelter, and of myrtle and yew twigs for beds. They will enjoy their cheerful social festivals, with wine, garlands, and hymns to the Gods. They will take care not to beget children in numbers greater than their means, knowing that the consequence thereof must be poverty or war.<sup>b</sup> They will have, as condiment, salt and cheese, olives, figs, and chesnuts, peas, beans, and onions. They will pass their lives in peace, and will die in a healthy old age, bequeathing a similar lot to their children. Justice and injustice, which we are seeking for, will be founded on a certain mode of mutual want and dealing with each other.<sup>c</sup>

You feed your citizens, Sokrates (observes Glaukon), as if you were feeding pigs. You must at least supply them with as many sweets and condiments as are common at Athens: and with beds and tables besides.

I understand you (replies Sokrates): you are not satisfied with a city of genuine simplicity: you want a city Enlargement of the city—Multiplied wants and services. First origin of war and strife with neighbours—It arises out of these multiplied wants. luxurious and inflated. Well then—we will suppose it enlarged until it comprehends all the varieties of elegant and costly enjoyment: gold, silver, and ivory: musicians and painters in their various branches: physicians: and all the crowd of attendants required for a society thus enlarged. Such extension of consumption will carry with it a numerous popu-

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 371.

It is remarkable that in this first outline of the city Plato recognises only free labour, not slave labour.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic; ii. p. 372 B. οὐχ

τὴν οὐσίαν ποιοῦμενοι τοὺς

ἀνθρώπους ἡ πόλις.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republ. ii. p. 372 A.

—ὡν τούτων χρειαί τινι τῇ πρὸς

lation, who cannot be maintained from the lands belonging to the city. We shall be obliged to make war upon our neighbours, and seize some of their lands. They too will do the same by us, if they have acquired luxurious habits. Here we see the first genesis of war, with all its consequent evils: springing from the acquisition of wealth, beyond the limit of necessity.<sup>d</sup> Having war upon our hands, we need soldiers, and a considerable camp of them. Now war is essentially a separate craft and function, requiring to be carried on by persons devoted to it, who have nothing else to do. We laid down from the beginning, that every citizen ought to confine himself exclusively to that business for which he was naturally fit; and that no one could be allowed to engage in two distinct occupations. This rule is above all things essential for the business of war. The soldier must perform the duties of a soldier, and undertake no others.<sup>e</sup>

The functions of these soldiers are more important than those of any one else. Upon them the security of the whole community depends. They are the Guardians of the city: or rather, those few seniors among them, who are selected from superior merit and experience, and from a more perfect education to exercise command, are the proper Guardians: while the remaining soldiers are their Auxiliaries.<sup>f</sup> These Guardians, or Guardians and their Auxiliaries, must be first chosen with the greatest care, to ensure that they have appropriate natural dispositions: next their training and education must be continued as well as systematic. Appropriate natural dispositions are difficult to find: for we require the coincidence of qualities which are rarely found together. The Auxiliaries must be mild and gentle towards their fellow-citizens, passionate and fierce towards enemies. They must be like generous dogs, full of kindness towards those whom they know, angrily disposed towards those whom they do not know.<sup>g</sup>

Separate class of soldiers or Guardians. One man cannot do well more than one business. Character required in the Guardians—Mildness at home with pugnacity against enemies.

Assuming children of these dispositions to be found, we must provide for them the best training and education.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 373.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 414 B.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 374.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376.

The training must be twofold: musical, addressed to the mind: gymnastical, addressed to the body—pur-  
 Peculiar edu- suant to the distribution dating from ancient times.<sup>b</sup>  
 cation neces-  
 sary, musical  
 — well as  
 gymnastical. Music includes all training by means of words or  
 sounds: speech and song, recital and repetition, reading and  
 writing, &c.

The earliest training of every child begins from the stories  
 or fables which he hears recounted: most of which  
 are false, though some among them are true. We  
 must train the child partly by means of falsehood,  
 partly by means of truth: and we must begin first  
 with the falsehood. The tenor of these fictions,  
 which the child first hears, has a powerful effect in  
 determining his future temper and character. But  
 such fictions as are now currently repeated, will tend  
 to corrupt his mind, and to form in him sentiments and  
 opinions adverse to those which we wish him to entertain in  
 after life. We must not allow the invention and circulation  
 of stories at the pleasure of the authors: we must establish a  
 censorship over all authors; licensing only such of their pro-  
 ductions as we approve, and excluding all the rest, together  
 with most of those now in circulation.<sup>1</sup> The fables told by  
 Homer, Hesiod, and other poets, respecting the Gods and  
 Heroes, are in very many cases pernicious, and ought to be  
 suppressed. They are not true: and even were they true,  
 ought not to be mentioned before children. Stories about  
 battles between the Gods and the Giants, or quarrels among  
 the Gods themselves, are mischievous, whether intended as  
 allegories or not: for young hearers cannot discriminate the  
 allegorical from the literal.<sup>k</sup>

I am no poet (continues the Platonic Sokrates), nor can I  
 pretend to compose legends myself: but I shall lay  
 down a type of theological orthodoxy, to which all  
 the divine legends in our city must conform. Every

Orthodox  
 type to be  
 laid down:  
 all poets are  
 required to  
 conform their

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376 E.

Τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἡ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν  
 ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνῳ  
 ἔστι δέ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώ-  
 ρει, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.

This appeal of Plato to antiquity  
 and established custom deserves notice.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republ. ii. p. 377. ὅν  
 νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς

Compare the animadversions in  
 Sextus Empiricus about the mischie-  
 vious doctrines to be found in the poets  
 advers. Mathematicos, i. s. 276-293.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republ. ii. p. 378 D.

poet must proclaim that the Gods are good, and therefore cannot be the cause of anything except good. No poet can be allowed to describe the Gods (according to what we now read in Homer and elsewhere) as dispensing both good and evil to mankind. The Gods must be announced as causes of all the good which exists, but other causes must be found for all the evil: the Gods therefore are causes of comparatively few things, since bad things are far more abundant among us than good.<sup>1</sup> No poetical tale can be tolerated which represents the Gods as assuming the forms of different persons, and going about to deceive men into false beliefs.<sup>m</sup> Falsehood is odious both to Gods and to men: though there are some cases in which it is necessary as a precaution against harm, towards enemies, or even towards friends during seasons of folly or derangement.<sup>n</sup> But none of these exceptional circumstances can apply to the Gods.

causes of nothing but good: therefore they are causes of few things. Gr preponderance of fact evil.

It is indispensable to inspire these youthful minds with courage, and to make them fear death as little as possible. But the terrific descriptions, given by the poets, of Hades and the underworld, are above all things likely to aggravate the fear of death. Such descriptions must therefore be interdicted, as neither true nor useful. Even if poetically striking, they are all the more pernicious to be listened to by youths whom we wish to train up as spirited freemen, fearing enslavement more than death.<sup>o</sup> We must also prohibit the representations of intense grief and distress, imputed by Homer to Heroes or Gods, to Achilles, Priam, or Zeus, for the death of friends and relatives. A perfectly reasonable man will account death no great evil, either for himself or for his friend: he will be, in a peculiar degree, sufficient to himself for his own happiness, and will

The Guardians must not fear death. No terrible descriptions of Hades must be presented to them: no intense sorrow, nor violent nor sensual passion, must be recounted either of Gods or Heroes.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Republ.* ii. p. 379 C.

Οὐδ' ἔρα ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός,  
των ἂν εἴη αἴτιος, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν,  
ἀλλ' ἀλὶγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος,  
δὲ ἀνάτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἔλαττω  
τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν. Καὶ τῶν μὲν  
ὦν οὐδένα ἕλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ  
κῶν ἅλλ' ἕττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια  
λ' οὐ τὸν θεόν.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Republic*, ii. pp. 380-381.

Dacier blames Plato for this as an error, saying, that God may appear, and has appeared to men, under the form of an Angel or of some man whom he has created after his own image (*Traduction de Platon*, tom. i. p. 172).

<sup>n</sup> Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 382 C.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Republic*, iii. pp. 386-387.

therefore endure with comparative equanimity the loss of friends, relatives, or fortune.<sup>p</sup> We must teach youth to be ashamed of indulging in immoderate grief or in violent laughter.<sup>q</sup> We must teach them also veracity and temperance, striking out all those passages in Homer which represent the Gods or Heroes as incontinent, sensual, furiously vindictive, reckless of obligation, or money-loving.<sup>r</sup> The poets must either not recount such proceedings at all, or must not ascribe them to Gods and Heroes.

We have thus prescribed the model to which all poets must accommodate their narratives respecting Gods and Heroes. We ought now to set out a similar model for their narratives respecting men. But this is impossible, until our present investigation is brought to a close: because one of the worst misrepresentations which the poets give of human affairs, is, when they say that there are many men unjust, yet happy—just, yet still miserable:—that successful injustice is profitable, and that justice is a benefit to other persons, but a loss to the agent. We affirm that this is a misrepresentation; but we cannot assume it as such at present, since the present enquiry is intended to prove that it is so.<sup>s</sup>

From the substance of these stories we pass to the style and manner. The poet will recount either in his own person, by simple narrative: or he will assume the characters and speak in the names of others, thus making his composition imitative. He will imitate every diversity of character, good and bad, wise and foolish. This however cannot be tolerated in our city. We can permit no imitation except that of the reasonable and virtuous man. Every man in our city exercises one simple function: we have no double-faced or many-faced citizens. We shall respectfully dismiss the poet who captivates us by variety of characters, and shall be satisfied with the dry recital of simple stories useful in their tendency, expressing the feeling of the reasonable man and no other.<sup>t</sup>

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 387 D-E.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 388 B-E.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 390-391.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 392 C.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 396-398.

Style of narratives. The poet must not practise variety of imitation: he must not speak in the name of bad characters.

We must farther regulate the style of the Odes and Songs, consistent with what has been already laid down. Having prescribed what the sense of the words must be, we must now give directions about melody and rhythm. We shall permit nothing but simple music, calculated less to please the ear, than to inspire grave, dignified, and resolute sentiment. We shall not allow either the wailing Lydian, or the soft and convivial Ionic mood: but only the Phrygian and Dorian moods. Nor shall we tolerate either the fife, or complicated stringed instruments: nothing except the lyre and harp, with the panspipe for rural abodes.<sup>u</sup> The rhythm or measure must also be simple, suitable to the movements of a calm and moderate man. Both good rhythm, graceful and elegant speaking, and excellence of sense, flow from good and virtuous dispositions, tending to inspire the same dispositions in others: \* just as bad rhythm, ungraceful and indecorous demeanour, defective proportion, &c., are companions of bad speech and bad dispositions. Contrasts of this kind pervade not only speech and song, but also every branch of visible art; painting, architecture, weaving, embroidery, pottery, and even the natural bodies of animals and plants. In all of them we distinguish grace and beauty, the accompaniments of a good and sober disposition—from ungracefulness and deformity, visible signs of the contrary disposition. Now our youthful Guardians, if they are ever to become qualified for their functions, must be trained to recognise and copy such grace and beauty.<sup>v</sup> For this purpose our poets, painters, architects, and artisans, must be prohibited from embodying in their works any ungraceful or unseemly type. None will be tolerated as artists, except such as can detect and embody the type of the beautiful. Our youth will thus insensibly contract exclusive familiarity, both through the eye and through the ear, with beauty in its various manifestations: so that their minds will be brought into harmonious preparation for the subsequent influence of beautiful discourse.<sup>z</sup>

This indeed (continues Sokrates) is the principal benefit

Rhythm and Melody regulated. None but simple and grave music allowed: only the Dorian and Phrygian moods, with the lyre and harp.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, *Repub.* iii. pp. 398-399.  
<sup>v</sup> Plato *Republic*, iii. pp. 400-401.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, *Repub.* iii. p. 400 A.  
<sup>z</sup> Plato, *Republic*, iii. p. 401 C-D.

arising from musical tuition, that the internal mind of a youth becomes imbued with rhythm and harmony. Hence he learns to commend and be delighted with the beautiful, and to hate and blame what is ugly; before he is able to render any reason for his sentiments: so that when mature age arrives, his sentiments are found in unison with what reason enjoins, and already predisposed to welcome it.<sup>a</sup> He becomes qualified to recognise the Forms of Temperance, Courage, Liberality, Magnanimity, and their embodiments in particular persons. To a man brought up in such sentiments, no spectacle can be so lovely as that of youths combining beauty of mental disposition with beauty of exterior form. He may indeed tolerate some defects in the body, but none in the mind.<sup>b</sup> His love, being genuine and growing out of musical and regulated contemplations, will attach itself to what is temperate and beautiful; not to the intense pleasures of sense, which are inconsistent with all temperance. Such will be the attachments subsisting in our city, and such is the final purpose of musical training—To generate love of the Beautiful.<sup>c</sup>

We next proceed to gymnastic training, which must be simple, for the body—just as our musical training was simple for the mind. We cannot admit luxuries and refinements either in the one or in the other. Our gymnastics must impart health and strength to the body, as our music imparts sobriety to the mind.<sup>d</sup> We shall require few courts of justice and few physicians. Where many of either are needed, this is a proof that ill-regulated minds and diseased bodies abound. It would be a disgrace to our Guardians if they could not agree on what is right and proper among themselves, without appealing to the decision of others. Physicians too are only needed for wounds or other temporary and special diseases. We cannot admit those refinements of the medical art, and that elaborate nomenclature and classification of diseases, which the clever sons of Æsculapius have in-

Effect of musical training of the mind—makes youth love the Beautiful and hate the Ugly.

Training of the body—simple and sober. No refined medical art allowed. Wounds or temporary ailments treated; but sickly frames cannot be kept alive.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 402 A.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 402 D-E.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 403 C. δει

δέ που τελευταίᾳ τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ κελοῦ ἐρωτικά.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 404 B.

vented, in times more recent than *Æsculapius* himself.\* He knew, but despised, such artifices; which, having been devised chiefly by *Herodikus*, serve only to keep alive sickly and suffering men—who are disqualified for all active duty through the necessity of perpetual attention to health,—and whose lives are worthless both to themselves and to the city. In our city, every man has his distinct and special function, which he is required to discharge. If he be disqualified by some temporary ailment, the medical art will be well employed in relieving and restoring him to activity: but he has no leisure to pass his life as a patient under cure, and if he be permanently unfit to fill his place in the established cycle of duties, his life ought not to be prolonged by art, since it is useless to himself and useless to the city also.<sup>1</sup> Our medical treatment for evils of the body, and our judicial treatment for evils of the mind, must be governed by analogous principles. Where body and mind are sound at bottom, we must do our best to heal temporary derangements: but if a man has a body radically unsound, he must be suffered to die—and if he has a mind unsound and incurable, he must be put to death by ourselves.<sup>2</sup>

Gymnastic training does some good in strengthening the body, but it is still more serviceable in imparting force and courage to the mind. As regards the mind, gymnastic and music form the indispensable supplement one to the other. Gymnastic by itself makes a man's nature too savage and violent: he acquires no relish for knowledge, comes to hate discourse, and disdains verbal persuasion.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, music by itself makes him soft, cowardly, and sensitive, unfit for danger or hardship. The judicious combination of the two is the only way to form a well-balanced mind and character.<sup>4</sup>

Value of  
Gymnastic  
in imparting  
courage to  
the mind—  
Gymnastic  
and Music  
necessary to  
correct each  
other.

\* Plato, Republic, iii. p. 405. φύσας τε καὶ κατάρτους νοσημασιν ὀνόματα ἀναγκάζειν τίθεσθαι τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ὡς ἀληθῶς κανὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἔτοσα νοσημάτων ὀνόματα. Οἶα, ὡς οἶμαι, οὐκ ἦν ἐπ' Ἀσκληπιοῦ. P. 406 C.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 406 C. οὐδενὶ σχολὴ διὰ βίου κάμνειν ἰατρευομένη. P. 406 D. οὐ σχολὴ κάμνειν οὐδὲ λυσιτελεῖ οὕτω ζῆν, νοσήματι τὸν νοῦν

προσέχοντα, τῇ δὲ προκειμένης ἐργασίας ἀμελοῦντα. P. 407 D-E. ἀλλὰ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ περιόδῳ ζῆν, μὴ οἶσθαι θεῶν θεραπεύειν, ὡς οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε πόλει λυσιτελεῖ. P. 408 A.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 409-410.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 411 D. Μισόλογος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται καὶ ἄμουσος, καὶ πειθοὶ μὲν διὰ λόγων οὐδὲν ἔτ χρηταί, &c.

<sup>4</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 410-411.

Such must be the training, from childhood upwards, of these Guardians and Auxiliaries of our city. We must now select from among these men themselves, a few to be Governors or chief Guardians; the rest serving as auxiliaries. The oldest and best of them must be chosen for this purpose, those who possess in the greatest perfection the qualities requisite for Guardians. They must be intelligent, capable, and solicitous for the welfare of the city. Now a man is solicitous for the welfare of that which he loves. He loves those whose interests he believes to be the same as his own; those whose well-being he believes to coincide with his own well-being<sup>k</sup>—the contrary, with the contrary. The Guardians chosen for Chiefs must be those who are most thoroughly penetrated with such sympathy; who have preserved most tenaciously throughout all their lives the resolution to do everything which they think best for the city, and nothing which they do not think to be best for it. They must be watched and tested in temptations pleasurable as well as painful, to see whether they depart from this resolution. The elders who have best stood such trial, must be named Governors.<sup>1</sup> These few will be the chief Guardians or Rulers: the remaining Guardians will be their auxiliaries or soldiers, acting under their orders.

Here then our city will take its start; the body of Guardians marching in arms under the orders of their Chiefs, and encamping in a convenient acropolis, from whence they may best be able to keep order in the interior and to repel foreign attack.<sup>m</sup> But it is indispensable that both they and the remaining citizens should be made to believe a certain tale,—which yet is altogether fictitious and of our own invention. They must be told that they are all earthborn, sprung from the very soil which they inhabit: all therefore brethren, from

Out of the Guardians a few of the very best must be chosen as Elders or Rulers—highly educated and severely tested.

Fundamental creed required to be planted in the minds of all the citizens respecting their breed and relationship.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iii. p. 412 C. Οὐκ οὐν φρονίμους τε εἰς τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν καὶ δυνατοὺς καὶ ἔτι κηδεμόνας τῆς πόλεως; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Κῆδοιτο δ' ἂν τις μάλιστα τούτου ὃ τύγχανοι φιλῶν; Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ μὴν τῷτο γ' ἂν μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ὃ συμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ,

καὶ ὅταν μάλιστα ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ πράττοντος οἴηται ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ εὖ πράττειν, μὴ δέ, τούναντιον.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Republic*, iii. pp. 413-414. Refer to *De Leg.* (I. p. 633-636-637) about resisting pleasures as well as pains.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Republic*, iii. p. 415 D.

the same mother Earth: the auxiliaries or soldiers, born with their arms and equipments. But there was this difference (we shall tell them) between the different brethren. Those fit for Chiefs or Rulers, were born with a certain mixture of gold in their constitution: those fit for soldiers or Guardians simply, with a like mixture of silver: the remainder, with brass or iron. In most individual cases, each of these classes will beget an offspring like themselves. But exceptions will sometimes happen, in which the golden man will have a child of silver, or brass,—or the brazen or iron man, a child of nobler metal than his own. Now it is of the last importance that the Rulers should keep watch to preserve the purity of these breeds. If any one of their own children should turn out to be of brass or iron, they must place him out among the husbandmen or artisans: if any of the brazen or iron men should chance to produce a child of gold, they must receive him among themselves, since he belongs to them by his natural constitution. Upon the maintenance of these distinct breeds, each in its appropriate function, depends the entire fate of the city: for an oracle has declared that it will perish, if ever iron or brazen men shall become its Guardians.<sup>n</sup>

It is indispensable (continues Sokrates) that this fiction should be circulated and accredited, as the fundamental, consecrated, unquestioned, creed of the whole city, from which the feeling of harmony and brotherhood among the citizens springs. But how can we implant such unanimous and unshaken belief, in a story altogether untrue? Similar fables have often obtained implicit credence in past times: but no such case has happened of late, and I question whether it could happen now.<sup>o</sup> The postulate seems extravagant: do *you* see by what means it could be realised? —I see no means (replies Glaukon) by which the fiction could be first passed off and accredited, among these men themselves: but if it were once firmly implanted, in any one

How is such a fiction to be accredited in the first instance? Difficulty extreme, of first beginning; but if once accredited, it will easily transmit itself by tradition.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 414-415.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 414 B.

ἀνὸν μηχανῇ γένοιτο τῶν

σαι μάλιστα μὲν αὐτοὺς τοὺς

εἰ δὲ μή,

τῇ μὲν ἤδη πολλαχοῦ γεγονός, ὥς φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πεπείκασιν, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ οὐ

σαι δὲ

generation, I do not doubt that their children and descendants would inherit and perpetuate it.<sup>p</sup> We must be satisfied with thus much (replies Sokrates): assuming the thing to be done, and leaving the process of implanting it to spontaneous and oracular inspiration.<sup>q</sup> I now proceed with the description of the city.

The Rulers and their auxiliaries the body of Guardians must be lodged in residences, sufficient for shelter and comfort, yet suitable for military men, and not for tradesmen. Every arrangement must be made for rendering them faithful guardians of the remaining citizens. It would be awful indeed, if they were to employ their superior strength in oppressing instead of protecting the flock entrusted to them. To ensure their gentleness and fidelity, the most essential guarantee is to be found in the good musical and gymnastic training which they will have received. But this alone will not suffice. All the conditions of their lives must be so determined, that they shall have the least possible motive for committing injustice towards the other citizens. None of them must have any separate property of his own, unless in special case of proved necessity: nor any house or store cupboard from which others are excluded. They must receive, from the contributions of the remaining citizens, sufficient subsistence for the health and comfort of military men, but nothing beyond. They must live together in their camp or barrack, and dine together at a public mess-table. They must not be allowed either to possess gold and silver, or to drink in cups of those metals, or to wear them as appendages to clothing, or even to have them under the same roof. They must be told, that these metals, though not forbidden to the other citizens, are forbidden to them, because they have permanently inherent in their mental constitution the divine gold and silver, which would be corrupted by intermixture with human.<sup>r</sup>

If these precautions be maintained, the Guardians may be

Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 D.  
 Τοῦτον οὖν τὸν μῦθον ὅπως ἀν πείσθαιεν,  
 ἔχεις τιτὰ μηχανήν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη,  
 ἀν αὐτοὶ οὐτοὶ ὅπως μέντ' ἀν οἱ  
 αἱ οἱ ἔπειτα, οἱ τ'

ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὄσπερον.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 D.  
 Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἔχει ὅπως ἀν αὐτὸ ἡ

Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 416-417.

secure themselves, and may uphold in security the entire city. But if the precautions be relinquished—if the Guardians or Soldiers acquire separate property in lands, houses, and money—they will then become householders and husbandmen instead of Guardians or Soldiers: hostile masters, instead of allies and protectors to their fellow-citizens. They will hate their fellow-citizens, and be hated by them in return: they will conspire against them, and will be themselves conspired against. In this manner they will pass their lives, dreading their enemies within far more than their enemies without. They, and the whole city along with them, will be perpetually on the brink of destruction.\*

If the Guardians fail in these precautions, and acquire private interests, the city will be ruined.

But surely (remarks Adeimantus), according to this picture, your Guardians or Soldiers, though masters of all the city, will be worse off than any of the other citizens. They will be deprived of those means of happiness which the others are allowed to enjoy. Perhaps they will (replies Sokrates): yet I should not be surprised if they were to be the happiest of all. Be that as it may, however, my purpose is, not to make *them* especially happy, but to make the whole city happy. The Guardians can enjoy only such happiness as consists with the due performance of their functions as Guardians. Every man in our city must perform his appropriate function, and must be content with such happiness as his disposition will admit, subject to this condition.<sup>†</sup> In regard to all the citizens without exception, it must be the duty of the Guardians to keep out both riches and poverty, both of which spoil the character of every one. No one must be rich, and no one must be poor.<sup>‡</sup> In case of war, the constant discipline of our soldiers will be of more avail than money, in making them efficient combatants against other cities.<sup>§</sup> Moreover, other cities are divided against themselves: each is many cities, and not one: poor and rich are at variance with each other, and various fractions of each of these classes against other fractions. Our city alone, constituted as I propose, will be

Complete unity of the city, every man performing his own special function.

\* Plato, Republic, iii. p. 417 A-B.

† Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421 E.

‡ Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421.

§ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 422 B.

really and truly One. It will thus be the greatest of all cities, even though it have only one thousand fighting men. It may be permitted to increase, so long as it will preserve its complete unity, but no farther.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, each of our citizens is one and not many: confined to that special function for which he is qualified by his nature.

It will devolve upon our Guardians to keep up this form of communion unimpaired; and they will have no difficulty in doing so, as long as they maintain their own education and training unimpaired. No change must be allowed either in the musical or gymnastic training: especially not in the former, where changes are apt to creep in, with pernicious effect.<sup>8</sup> Upon this education depends the character and competence of the Guardians. They will provide legislation in detail, which will be good, if their general character is good—bad, on the contrary supposition. If their character and the constitution of the city be defective at the bottom, it is useless for us to prescribe regulations of detail, as we would do for sick men. The laws in detail cannot be good, while the general constitution of the city is bad. Those teachers are mistaken who exhort us to correct the former, but to leave the latter untouched.<sup>9</sup>

In regard to religious legislation—the raising of temples, arrangement of sacrifices, &c.—we must consult Apollo at Delphi, and obey what he directs. We know nothing ourselves about these matters, nor is there any other authority equally trustworthy.<sup>b</sup>

Our city is now constituted and peopled (continues Sokrates). We must examine it, and see where we can find Justice and Injustice—reverting to our original problem, which was, to know what each of them was, and which of the two conferred happiness. Now assuming our city to be rightly constituted, it will be perfectly good: that is, it will be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. These four constituents cover the whole: accordingly, if we can discover and set out

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 423 A.

<sup>8</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 424 A.

<sup>9</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 425-426.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 427 B.

ἡ τοιαῦτα οὐκ

Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance—that which remains afterwards will be Justice.<sup>c</sup>

First, we can easily see where Wisdom resides. The city includes in itself a great variety of cognitions, corresponding to all the different functions in which its citizens are employed. But it is not called *wise*, from its knowledge of husbandry, or of brazier's and carpenter's craft: since these are specialties which cover only a small fraction of its total proceedings. It is called *wise*, or well-advised, from that variety of intelligence or cognition which directs it as a whole, in its entire affairs: that is, the intelligence possessed by the chief Guardians or Rulers. Now the number of persons possessing this variety of intelligence is smaller than the number of those who possess any other variety. The wisdom of the entire city resides in this very small presiding fraction, and in them alone.<sup>d</sup>

First, where is the wisdom of the city? It resides in the few elder Rulers.

Next, we can also discern without difficulty in what fraction of the city Courage resides. The city is called courageous from the valour of those Guardians or Soldiers upon whom its defence rests. These men will have learnt, in the course of their training, what are really legitimate objects of fear, and what are not legitimate objects of fear. To such convictions they will resolutely adhere, through the force of mind implanted by their training, in defiance of all disturbing impulses. It is these right convictions, respecting the legitimate objects of fear, which I (says Sokrates) call true political courage, when they are designedly inculcated and worked in by regular educational authority: when they spring up without any rational foundation, as in animals or slaves, I do not call them Courage. The Courage of the entire city thus resides in its Guardians or Soldiers.<sup>e</sup>

Where is the Courage? In the body of Guardians or Soldiers.

Thirdly, wherein resides the Temperance of the city? Temperance implies a due relation, proportion, or accord, between different elements. The temperate man is called, superior to himself: but this expression, on first hearing, seems unmeaning, since the man must also be inferior to himself. But the ex-

Where is the Temperance? It resides in all and each, Rulers, Guardians, and People. Superiors rule and Inferiors obey.

\* Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 427-428.    <sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 428-429.

\* Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 429-430.

pression acquires a definite meaning, when we recognise it as implying that there are in the same man's mind better and worse elements: and that when the better rules over the worse, he is called superior to himself, or temperate—when the worse rules over the better, he is called inferior to himself, or intemperate. Our city will be temperate, because the better part of it, though smaller in number, rules over the worse and inferior part, numerically greater. The pleasures, pains, and desires of our few Rulers, which are moderate and reasonable, are preponderant: controuling those of the Many, which are miscellaneous, irregular, and violent. And this command is exercised with the perfect consent and good-will of the subordinates. The Many are not less willing to obey than the Few to command. There is perfect unanimity between them as to the point—Who ought to command, and who ought to obey? It is this unanimity which constitutes the temperance of the city: which thus resides, not in any one section of the city, like Courage and Wisdom, but in all sections alike: each recognising and discharging its legitimate function.<sup>f</sup>

There remains only Justice for us to discover. Wherein does the Justice of the city reside? Not far off. Its justice consists in that which we pointed out at first as the fundamental characteristic of the city, when we required each citizen to discharge one function, and one alone—that for which he was best fitted by nature. That each citizen shall do his own work, and not meddle with others in their work—that each shall enjoy his own property, as well as do his own work—this is true Justice.<sup>g</sup> It is the fundamental condition without which neither temperance, nor courage, nor wisdom could exist; and it fills up the good remaining after we have allowed for the effects of the preceding three.<sup>h</sup> All the four are alike indispensable to make up the entire

Where is the Justice? In all and each of them also. It consists in each performing his own special function, and not meddling with the function of the others.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 431-432.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 432-433.

Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν.

P. 433 E. ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἐξίς καὶ ποῦξις δικαιοσύνη ἂν δυο-

λογοῖτο.

Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 C. δομοι

ἐσκέμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι δὲ πᾶσιν τὴν δύναμιν πάρεσχεν ὥστε ἐγγὺς καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε σωτηρίαν παρέχῃ ἕως πρὸς ἂν ἐνῇ.

Good of the city : Justice, or each person (man, woman, free-man, slave, craftsman, guardian) doing his or her own work—Temperance, or unanimity as to command and obedience between Chiefs, Guardians, and the remaining citizens—Courage, or the adherence of the Guardians to right reason, respecting what is terrible and not terrible—Wisdom, or the tutelary superintendence of the Chiefs, who protect each person in the enjoyment of his own property.<sup>1</sup>

As justice consists in each person doing his own work, and not meddling with that of another—so injustice occurs, when a person undertakes the work of another instead of his own, or in addition to his own. The mischief is not great, when such interference takes place only in the subordinate functions : when, for example, the carpenter pretends to do the work of the shoemaker, or *vice versa* ; or when either of them undertake both. But the mischief becomes grave and deplorable, when a man from the subordinate functions meddles with the higher—when a craftsman, availing himself of some collateral support, wealth or party or strength, thrusts himself into the functions of a soldier or auxiliary—or when the Guardian, by similar artifice, usurps the functions of a Chief—or when any one person combines these several functions all at once in himself. Herein consists the true injustice, ruinous to the city : when the line of demarcation is confounded between these three classes—men of business, Guardians, Chiefs. That each of these classes should do its own work, is Justice : that either of them should meddle with the work of the rest, and especially that the subordinate should meddle with the business of the superior, is Injustice, with ruin following in its train.<sup>k</sup> It is from these opposite characteristics that the titles Just or Unjust will be rightfully bestowed upon our city.

We must now apply, as we undertook to do, the analogy of the city to the individual. The just man, so far forth

Injustice arises when any one part of the city interferes with the functions of the other part, or undertakes double functions.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 D.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 434 B-C.

ἡ τριῶν ἅρα ὄντων γενῶν πολυπραγμοσύνη καὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς ἄλληλα, μεγίστη τε βλαβὴ τῇ πόλει καὶ ὁρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο μάλιστα κα-

κουργία—Κακουργίαν δὲ τὴν μεγίστην τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πόλεως, οὐκ ἀδικίαν φῆσεις εἶναι ;

χρηματιστικοῦ, ἐπικουρικοῦ, φυλακικοῦ, γένους οἰκειοπραγία, δικαιοσύνη τ' ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὴν πόλιν δίκαιαν παρέχου.

as justice is concerned, cannot differ from the just city.  
 He must therefore have in his own individual  
 the city to the mind three distinct parts, elements, or classes,  
 corresponding to the three classes above distinguished in the city. But is it the fact that  
 Energy, Appetite. These three elements are distinct, and often conflicting. there are in each man three such mental constituents—three different classes, sorts, or varieties, of mind?

To settle this point as it ought to be settled, would require a stricter investigation than our present dialogue will permit: but we may contribute something towards it.<sup>1</sup> It is manifest that there exist different individuals in whom reason, energy (courage or passion), and appetite, are separately and unequally developed: thus in the Thracians there is a predominance of energy or courage—in the Phœnicians, of appetite—in the Athenians, of intellect or reason. The question is, whether we employ one and the same mind for all the three—reason, energy, and appetite; or whether we do not employ a different mind, or portion of mind, when we exercise reason—another, when we are under the influence of energy—and a third, when we follow appetite.<sup>m</sup>

To determine this question, we must consider that the same thing cannot at the same time do or suffer opposites, in the same respect and with reference to the same thing. The same thing or person cannot at the same time, and in the same respect, both stand still and move. This may be laid down as an universal truth: but since some may not admit it to be so, we will at any rate assume it as an hypothesis.<sup>n</sup> Now in reference to the mind, we experience at the same time various movements or affections contrary to each other: assent and dissent—desire and aversion—the attracting anything to ourselves, and the repelling it from ourselves: each of these is different from and contrary to the other. As a specimen of desires, we will take thirst. When a man is in this condition, his mind desires nothing else but to drink; and

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 435 C.

Schleiermacher (in the Introduction to his translation of the Republic, p. 71) considers that this passage of the Republic is intended to note as a desideratum the exposition in the

Timæus; wherein the constituent elements of mind or soul are more fully laid down, and its connection with the fundamental elements of the Kosmos.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 436 A.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 437 A.

strains entirely towards that object. If there be any thing which drags back his mind when in this condition, it must be something different from that which pulls him forward and attracts him to drink. That which attracts him, and that which repels him, cannot be the same: just as when the archer at the same time pulls his bow towards him and pushes it away from him, it is one of his hands that pulls and another that pushes.<sup>o</sup> Now it often happens that a man athirst refuses to drink: there is something within him that prompts him to drink, and something still more powerful that forbids him. These two cannot be the same: one of them is different from the other: that which prompts is appetite, that which forbids is reason. The rational element of the mind is in like manner something different or distinguishable from all the appetites, which tend towards repletion and pleasure.

Here then we have two distinct species, forms, or kinds existing in the mind.<sup>p</sup> Besides these two, however, there is a third, distinct from both: Energy, Passion, Courage, which neither belongs to Appetite nor to Reason. Each of these three acts apart from, and sometimes in contrariety to, each of the others.<sup>q</sup> There are thus three distinct elements or varieties of mind in the individual—Reason, Energy, Appetite: corresponding to the three constituent portions of the city—The Chiefs or Rulers—The Guardians or Soldiers—The Craftsmen, or the remaining community.<sup>r</sup> The Wisdom of the city resides in its Elders: that of the individual in his Reason. The Courage of the city resides in its Guardians or Soldiers: that of the individual in his Energy. But in the city as well as in the individual, it is the right and privilege of the rational element to exercise command, because it alone looks to the welfare and advantage of the whole compound: it is the duty of the two

Reason, Energy, Appetite, in the individual—analogs to Rulers, Guardians, Craftsmen in the city. Reason is to rule Appetite. Energy assists Reason in ruling it.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 A-B.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 E.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν δύο ἡμῖν ὀρίσθω εἶδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόντα, &c.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 440-441.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 441 C. τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν ἐν πόλει, τὰ αὐτὰ δ' ἐν ἑνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ τῇ ψυχῇ γένη ἐνεῖναι, καὶ ἴσα

τὸν ἀριθμόν. P. 443 C. τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, &c.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 441 E, 442 B. τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἀρχεῖν προσήκει, σοφῷ δὲ καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ἐπὶ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν—Σοφὸν δὲ γε (ἓνα ἕκαστον καλούμεν) ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει, τῷ δ' ἡρχέ τ'

other elements—the energetic and the appetitive—to obey. It is moreover the special function of the Guardians in the city to second the Chiefs in enforcing obedience upon the Craftsmen: so also in the individual, it is the special function of Energy or Courage to second Reason in controuling Appetite.

These special functions of the separate parts being laid down, Justice as well as Temperance will appear analogous in the individual and in the city. Both Justice and Temperance reside in all the parts equally: not in one of them exclusively, as Wisdom and Courage reside. Justice and Temperance belong to the subordinate as well as to the dominant parts. Justice exists when each of the parts performs its own function, without encroaching on the function of the others: Temperance exists when all the parts are of one opinion as to the title of the higher or rational element to exercise command.<sup>t</sup>

A man as well as a city is just, when each of his three sorts or varieties of mind confines itself to its own legitimate function: when Reason reigns over and controuls the other two, and when Energy seconds Reason in controuling Appetite. Such a man will not commit fraud, theft, treachery, perjury, or any like proceedings.<sup>u</sup> On the contrary, injustice exists when the parts are in conflict with each other: when either of them encroaches on the function of the other: or when those parts which ought to be subordinate rise in insurrection against that which ought to be superior.

Justice is in the mind what health is in the body, when the parts are so arranged as to controul and be controuled pursuant to the dictates of nature. Injustice is in the mind what disease is in the body, when the parts are so arranged as to controul and be controuled contrary to the dictates of nature. Virtue is thus the health, beauty, good condition of the mind: Vice is the disease, ugliness, weakness, of the mind.<sup>x</sup>

Having thus ascertained the nature of justice and injustice,

αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν,  
κάκεινο ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ  
φύροντος ἐκάστω τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ  
κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων.

Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442 C,  
443 B.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442  
Plato, Republic, iv. p. 444

A man is just  
when these  
different  
parts of his  
mind exercise  
their appro-  
priate func-  
tions without  
hindrance.

Justice and  
temperance in  
the mind—  
what health  
and disease  
are in the  
body.

we are now in a condition (continues Sokrates) to reply to the question proposed for investigation—Is it profitable to a man to be just and to do justice *per se*, even though he be not known as just either by Gods or men, and may thus be debarred from the consequences which would ensue if he were known? Or is it profitable to him to be unjust, if he can contrive to escape detection and punishment? We are enabled to answer the first question in the affirmative, and the second question in the negative. As health is the greatest good, and sickness the greatest evil, of body: so Justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil, of mind. No measure of luxury, wealth, or power, could render life tolerable, if we lost our bodily health: no amount of prosperity could make life tolerable, without mental health or justice. As bodily health is good *per se*, and sickness evil *per se*, even apart from its consequences: so justice also is good in itself, and injustice evil in itself, apart from its consequences.<sup>7</sup>

Original question now resumed—Does Justice make a man happy, and Injustice make him miserable, apart from all consequences? Answer—Yes.

Sokrates now assumes the special question of the dialogue to be answered, and the picture of the just or perfect city, as well as of the just or perfect individual, to be completed. He is next proceeding to set forth the contrasts to this picture—that is, the varieties of injustice, or the various modes of depravation and corruption—when he is arrested by Polemarchus and Adeimantus: who call upon him to explain more at large the position of the body of Guardians or Soldiers in the city, in regard to women, children, and the family.<sup>8</sup>

Glaukon requires farther explanation about the condition of the Guardians, in regard to sexual and family ties.

In reply, Sokrates announces his intention to make such provision as will exclude separate family ties, as well as separate property, among these Guardians. The Guardians will consist both of men and women. The women will receive the same training, both musical and gymnastical, as the men.<sup>9</sup> They will take part both in the bodily exercises of the palæstra, in the military drill, and in the combats

Men and women will live together and perform the duties of Guardians alike—They will receive the same gymnastic and musical training.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Republic, iv. p. 445 A.

<sup>8</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 449 C.

<sup>9</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 A.

of war. Those who deride these naked exercises as preposterous for the female sex, should be reminded (Sokrates says) that not long ago it was considered unseemly among the Greeks (as it still is among many of the *barbari*) for men to expose their naked bodies in the palæstra: but such repugnance has been overpowered by the marked usefulness of the practice: the Kretans first setting the example, next the Lacedæmonians; lastly all other Greeks doing the same.<sup>b</sup> We maintain the principle which we laid down in the beginning, that one person should perform only one duty—that for which he is best qualified. But there is no one function, or class of functions, for which women as such are peculiarly qualified, or peculiarly disqualified. Between women generally, and men generally, in reference to the discharge of duties, there is no other difference, except that men are superior to women in every thing:<sup>c</sup> the best women will be on a level only with the second-best men, but they will be superior to all men lower than the second-best. But among women, as among men, there are great individual differences: one woman is fit for one duty, another for another: and in our city, each must be employed for the duty suitable to her individual disposition. Those who are best qualified by nature for the office of Guardians, must be allotted to that office: they must discharge it along with the men, and must be trained for it by the same education as the men, musical and gymnastical.

If an objector accuses us of proposing arrangements contrary to nature, we not only deny the force of the objection, but we retort the charge. We affirm that the arrangements now existing in society, which restrict all women to a limited number of domestic and family functions, are contrary to nature—and that ours are founded upon the genuine and real dictates of nature.<sup>d</sup> The only difference admissible between men and women, in the joint discharge of the functions of Guardians, is, that the easier portion of such functions must in general be assigned to women, and the

Nature does not prescribe any distribution of functions between men and women. Women are inferior to men in every thing. The best women are equal to second-best men.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 D.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 455 C-D.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 456 C. κατὰ

ταῦτα γιγνόμενα  
ὡς οἶκε,

more difficult to men, in consequence of the inferiority of the feminine nature.\*

These intermingled male and female Guardians, in the discharge of their joint functions, will live together all in common barracks and at common mess-tables. There must be no separate houses or separate family-relations between them. All are wives or husbands of all: no youth must know his own father, no mature man must know his own son: all the mature men and women are fathers or mothers of all the younger: all of the same age are brothers and sisters.<sup>f</sup> We do not intend, however, that the copulation between them shall take place in a promiscuous and arbitrary manner: we shall establish laws to regulate the intermarriages and breeding.<sup>g</sup> We must copy the example of those who regulate the copulation of horses, dogs, and other animals: we must bring together those who will give existence to the best offspring.<sup>h</sup> We must couple, as often as we can, the men who are best, with the women who are best, both in mind and body; and the men who are least good, with the women who are least good. We must bring up the offspring of the former couples—we must refuse to bring up the offspring of the latter.<sup>i</sup> And such results must be accomplished by underhand arrangements of the Elder Chiefs; so as to be unknown to every one else, in order to prevent discontent and quarrel among the body of the Guardians. These Elders will celebrate periodical festivals, in which they will bring together the fitting brides and bridegrooms, under solemn hymns and sacrifices. They must regulate the number of marriages in such manner as to keep the total list of Guardians as much as possible without increase as well as without diminution.<sup>k</sup> The Elders must make an artful use of the lot, so that these couplings shall appear to every one else the effect of chance.

Community of life and relations between the male and female Guardians. Temporary marriages arranged by contrivance of the Elders. No separate families.

\* Plato, Republic, v. p. 457 B.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, v. pp. 457-458.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Republic v. p. 458 E.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 A.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 E. δεῖ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων τοὺς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίστοις συγγίγνεσθαι ὥς τις, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς

ταῖς τοῦναντίον, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἔκγονα τρέφειν, τῶν δὲ μὴ, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποίμνιον ὥς ἀκρότατον εἶναι· καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γιγνόμενα λαμβάνειν πλὴν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ ἂν ἡ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων δ, τι μάλιστα ἀστασίastos ἔσται.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 A.

Distinguished warriors must be rewarded with a larger licence of copulation with different women, which will produce the farther advantage of having as many children as possible born from their procreation.<sup>1</sup> All the children as soon as born must be consigned to the Chiefs or Elders, male and female, who will conceal in some convenient manner those who are born either from the worst couples or with any bodily imperfection; while they place the offspring of the best couples in special outbuildings under the charge of nurses. Those mothers who are full of milk will be brought here to give suck, but every precaution will be taken that none of them shall know her own child: wet-nurses will also be provided in addition, to ensure a full supply: but all the care of the children will devolve on the public nurses, not on the mothers.<sup>m</sup>

The age for such intermarriages, destined to be procreative for the benefit of the city, must be from thirty to fifty-five, for men—from twenty to forty, for women. No man or woman, above or below these limits of age, will be allowed to meddle with the function of intermarriage and procreation for the public; which function must always be conducted under superintendence of the authorities, with proper sacrifice and prayers to the Gods. Nor will any man, even within the licensed age, be allowed to approach any woman except by assignment from the authorities. If any infringement of this law should occur, the offspring arising from it will be pronounced spurious and outcast.<sup>n</sup> But when the above limits of age are passed, both men and women may have intercourse with whomsoever they please, except fathers with daughters or sons with mothers: under condition, however, that no offspring shall be born from such intercourse, or that if any offspring be born, it shall be exposed.<sup>o</sup>

How is the father to know his own daughter (it is asked), or the son his own mother? They cannot know (replies Sokrates): but each couple will consider every child born in the seventh month or tenth month after their marriage, as their child, and will address him or her by the appellation of

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 B.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 C-D.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 A-B.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 C.

son or daughter. The fathers and mothers will be fathers and mothers of all the children born at that time: the sons and daughters will be in filial relation to all the couples brought together at the given antecedent period.<sup>p</sup>

The main purpose of such regulations, in respect to family as in respect to property, is to establish the fullest communion between all the Guardians, male and female—and to eliminate as much as possible the feeling of separate interest in any fraction of them. The greatest evil to any city is, that which pulls it to pieces and makes it many instead of one: the greatest good to it is that which binds it together and makes it one. Now what is most efficacious in binding it together, is, community of the causes of pleasure and pain: when each individual feels pleasure from the same causes and on the same occasions as all the rest, and pain in like manner. On the other hand, when the causes of pleasure and pain are distinct, this tends to dissolution; and becomes fatal if the opposition is marked, so that some individuals are much delighted, and others much distressed, under the same circumstances. That city is the best arranged, wherein all the citizens pronounce the words, *Mine* and *Not Mine*, with reference to the same things: when they coalesce into an unity like the organism of a single individual. To him a blow in the finger is a blow to the whole man: so also in the city, pleasure or pain to any one citizen ought to communicate itself by sympathy as pleasure and pain to all.<sup>q</sup>

Perfect communion of sentiment and interest among the Guardians—Causes of pleasure and pain the same to all, like parts of the same organism.

Now the Guardians under our regulations will present as much as possible this community of *Mine* and *Not Mine*, as well as of pleasures and pains—and this exclusion of the separate individual *Mine* and *Not Mine*, as well as of separate pleasures and pains. No individual among them will have either separate property or separate family relationship: each will have both one and the other in common with the rest.<sup>r</sup> No one will have property of his own to be increased, nor a family of his own to be benefited, apart from the rest: all will be as

Harmony—absence of conflicting interest—assured scale of equal comfort—quantities—among the Guar-

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 D.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 462 D.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 B.

much as possible common recipients of pleasure and pain.<sup>a</sup> All the ordinary causes of dispute and litigation will thus be excluded. If two Guardians of the same age happen to quarrel, they must fight it out: this will discharge their wrath and prevent worse consequences—while at the same time it will encourage attention to gymnastic excellence.<sup>t</sup> But no younger Guardian will raise his hand against an older Guardian, whom he is taught to reverence as his father, and whom every one else would protect if attacked. If the Guardians maintain harmony among themselves, they will easily ensure it among the remaining inhabitants. Assured of sufficient but modest comforts, the Guardians will be relieved from all struggles for the maintenance of a family, from the arts of trade, and from subservience to the 'rich.<sup>u</sup> They will escape all these troubles, and will live a life happier than the envied Olympic victor: for they will gain the victory in an enterprise more illustrious than he undertakes, and they will receive from their fellow-citizens fuller maintenance and higher privilege than what is awarded to him, as well as honours after death.<sup>x</sup> Their lives are not to be put in comparison with those of the farmer or the shoemaker. They must not indeed aspire to any happiness incompatible with their condition and duty as Guardians. But that condition will itself involve the highest happiness. And if any silly ambition prompts them to depart from it, they will assuredly change for the worse.<sup>y</sup>

Such is the communion of sexes which must be kept up for the duties of Guardians, and for the exigencies of military defence. As in other races of animals, males and females must go out to fight, and each will inspire the other with bravery. The children must be taken out on horseback to see the encounters from a distance, so that they may be kept clear of danger, yet may nevertheless be gradually accustomed to

In case of war both sexes will go together to battle—Rewards to distinguished warriors.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 D. πάντας εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ὁμοπαθεῖς λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς εἶναι.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 E.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 C.

τε πλουσίων, ἀπορίας τε

ἀλγηδόνας, &c.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 D.

των τε δὴ τούτων ἀπαλλάσσονται, τε τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου, ὃν οἱ πιονίκαί

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 466 A-C.

the sight of it.<sup>2</sup> If any one runs away from the field, he must be degraded from the rank of Guardian to that of husbandman or craftsman. If any man suffers himself to be taken prisoner, he is no loss: the enemy may do what they choose with him. When any one distinguishes himself in battle, he shall be received on his return by garlands and by an affectionate welcome from the youth.<sup>3</sup> Should he be slain in battle, he shall be recognised as having become a Dæmon or Demigod (according to the Hesiodic doctrine), and his sepulchre shall be honoured by appropriate solemnities.<sup>b</sup>

In carrying on war, our Guardians will observe a marked difference in their manner of treating Hellenic enemies and barbaric enemies. They will never enslave any Hellenic city, nor hold any Hellenic person in slavery. They will never even strip the body of an Hellenic enemy, except so far as to take his arms. They will never pile up in their temples the arms, nor burn the houses and lands, of Hellenic enemies. They will always keep in mind the members of the Hellenic race as naturally kindred with each other, and bound to aid each other in mutual defence, against Barbaric aliens who are the natural enemies of all of them.<sup>c</sup> They will not think themselves authorised to carry on war as Hellens now do against each other, except when their enemies are Barbaric.

War against Hellenic enemies to be carried on mildly—Hellens are all by nature kinsmen.

Enough of this Sokrates, replies Glaukon. I admit that your city will have all the excellencies and advantages of which you boast. But you have yet to show me that it is practicable, and how.<sup>d</sup>

The task which you impose (says Sokrates) is one of great difficulty: even if you grant me, what must be granted, that every reality must fall short of its ideal type.<sup>e</sup> One condition, and one only, is essential to render it practicable: a condition which you may ridicule as preposterous, but which, though not probable, is certainly supposable. Either philosophers must acquire the ruling power, or else the present

Question—How is the scheme practicable? It is difficult, yet practicable on one condition—That philosophy and political power should come into the same hands.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, v. pp. 466-467.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 468 B.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 469 B.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, v. pp. 470-471.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, v. pp. 471-472.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, v. pp. 472-473.

rulers of mankind must themselves become genuine philosophers. In one or other of these two ways philosophy and political power must come into the same hands. Unless such condition be fulfilled, our city can never be made a reality, nor can there ever be any respite of suffering to the human race.<sup>f</sup>

The supremacy which you claim for philosophers (replies Glaukon), will be listened to with repugnance and scorn. But at least you must show who the philosophers are, on whose behalf you invoke such supremacy. You must show that it belongs to them by nature both to pursue philosophy, and to rule in the various cities: and that by nature also, other men ought to obey them as well as to abstain from philosophy.<sup>g</sup>

The first requisite for a philosopher (replies Sokrates) is, that he shall love and pursue eagerly every sort of knowledge or wisdom, without shrinking from labour for such purpose. But it is not sufficient that he should be eager about hearing tragedies or learning the minor arts. Other men, accomplished and curious, are fond of hearing beautiful sounds and discourses, or of seeing beautiful forms and colours. But the philosopher alone can see or distinguish truth.<sup>h</sup> It is only he who can distinguish the genuine Form or Idea, in which truth consists, from the particular embodiments in which it occurs. These Forms or Ideas exist, eternal and unchangeable. Since Pulchrum is the opposite of Turpe, they must be two, and each of them must be One: the same about Just and Unjust, Good and Evil; each of these is a distinct Form or Idea, existing as One and Unchangeable by itself, but exhibiting itself in appearance as manifold, diverse, and frequently changing, through communion with different objects and events, and through communion of each Form with others.<sup>i</sup> Now the accomplished, but

Character-  
istic marks  
of the philo-  
sopher—He  
contemplates  
and knows  
Entia or un-  
changeable  
Forms, as  
distinguished  
from fluc-  
uating par-  
ticulars or  
entia.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 473 D.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 474 A-B.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Republic, v. pp. 474-475.  
τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοθεάμονας. P.  
475 E.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 A.

<sup>a</sup> ἐναντίον καλὸν αἰσχυρῶ, δύο

εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δύο, καὶ ἐν  
ἐκάτερον; Καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου,  
καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν  
εἰδῶν περί, ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος;

ἀλλήλων

φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἑκάστων;

unphilosophical, man cannot see or recognise this Form in itself. He can see only the different particular cases and complications in which it appears embodied.<sup>k</sup> None but the philosopher can contemplate each Form by itself, and discriminate it from the various particulars in conjunction with which it appears. Such philosophers are few in number, but they are the only persons who can be said truly to live. Ordinary and even accomplished men—who recognise beautiful things, but cannot recognise Beauty in itself, nor even follow an instructor who points it out to them—pass their lives in a sort of dream or reverie: for the dreamer, whether asleep or awake, is one who believes what is similar to another thing to be not merely similar, but to be the actual thing itself.<sup>l</sup> The philosopher alone, who embraces in his mind the one and unchangeable Form or Idea, along with, yet distinguished from, its particular embodiments, possesses knowledge or science. The unphilosophical man, whose mind embraces nothing higher than variable particulars, does not know—but only opines, or has opinions.<sup>m</sup>

This latter, the unphilosophical man, will not admit what we say. Accordingly, we must prove it to him. You cannot know without knowing Something: that is, Some Ens: for Non-Ens cannot be known. That which is completely and absolutely Ens, is completely and absolutely cognizable: that which is Non-Ens, and nowhere, is in every way uncognizable. If then there be anything which is at once Ens and Non-Ens, it will lie midway between these two: it will be something neither absolutely and completely cognizable, nor absolutely and completely uncognizable: it belongs to something between ignorance and science. Now science or knowledge is one thing, its object is, complete Ens. Opinion is another thing, its object also is different. Knowing and Opining belong, like Sight and Hearing, to the class of Entia called Powers or Faculties, which we and others possess, and by means of which—that is, by means of one or other of

Ens alone can be known—Non-Ens is unknowable. That which is midway between Ens and Non-Ens (particulars) is matter only of opinion. Ordinary men attain this opinion.

Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 C.

κοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διδόναι ὡς γιγνώ-  
δν  
ν, ὡς

them—we accomplish everything that we do accomplish. Now no one of these powers or faculties has either colour or figure, whereby it may be recognised or distinguished from others. Each is known and distinguished, not by what it is in itself, but by what it accomplishes, and by the object to which it has special relation. That which has the same object and accomplishes the same result, I call the same power or faculty : that which has a different object, and accomplishes a different result, I call a different power or faculty. Now Knowing, Cognition, Science, is one of our faculties or powers, and the strongest of all : Opining is another, and a different one. A marked distinction between the two is, that Knowing or Cognition is infallible—Opining is fallible. Since Cognition is one power or faculty, and Opining another—the object of one must be different from the object of the other. But the object of Cognition is, the Complete Ens : the object of Opining must therefore be, not the Complete Ens, but something different from it. What then is the object of Opining ? It is not Complete Ens, but it is still Something. It is not Non-Ens, or Nothing ; for Non-Ens or Nothing is not thinkable or opinable : you cannot think or opine, and yet think or opine nothing. Whoever opines or thinks, must opine or think something. Ens is the object of Cognition, Non-Ens is the object of non-Cognition or Ignorance : Opination or Opinion is midway between Cognition and Ignorance, darker than the former, but clearer than the latter. The object of opination is therefore something midway between Ens and Non-Ens.

But what is this Something, midway between Ens and Non-Ens, and partaking of both—which is the object of Opination ? To make out this, we must revert to the case of the unphilosophical man. We have described him, as not believing in the existence of the Form or Idea of Beauty, or Justice *per se* ; not enduring to hear it spoken of as a real Ens and Unum ; not knowing anything except of the many diverse particulars, beautiful and just. We must remind him that every one of these particular beautiful things will appear repulsive also : every one of these just and holy particulars,

Particulars  
fluctuate :  
they are  
sometimes  
just or beau-  
tiful, some-  
times unjust  
or ugly.  
Forms or  
Entia alone  
remain con-  
stant.

will appear unjust and unholy also. He cannot refuse to admit that each of them will appear under certain circumstances beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, holy and unholy. In like manner, every particular double will appear also a half: every light thing will appear heavy: every little thing great. Of each among these many particulars, if you can truly predicate any one quality about it, you may with equal truth predicate the opposite quality also. Each of them both is, and is not, the substratum of all these different and opposite qualities. You cannot pronounce them to be either one or the other, with fixity and permanence: they are at once both and neither.

Here then we find the appropriate object of Opinion: that which is neither Ens nor Non-Ens, but something between both. Particulars are the object of Opinion, as distinguished from universal Entities, Forms, or Ideas, which are the object of Cognition. The many, who disbelieve or ignore the existence of these Forms, and whose minds dwell exclusively among particulars—cannot know, but only opine. Their usages and creeds, as to beautiful, just, honourable, float between positive Ens and Non-Ens. It is these intermediate fluctuations which are caught up by their opining faculty, intermediate as it is between Cognition and Ignorance. It is these also, the objects of Opinion, which they love and delight in: they neither recognise nor love the objects of Cognition or Knowledge. They are lovers of opinion and its objects, not lovers of Knowledge. The philosopher alone recognises and loves Knowledge and the objects of Knowledge. His mind dwells, not amidst the fluctuating, diverse, and numerous particulars, but in contemplation of the One, Universal, permanent, unchangeable, Form or Idea.

Here is the characteristic difference (continues Sokrates) which you required me to point out, between the philosopher and the unphilosophical man, however accomplished. The philosopher sees, knows, and contemplates, the One, Real, unchangeable, Form or Idea: the unphilosophical man knows nothing of this Form *per se*, and sees only its multifarious

The Many cannot discern or admit the reality of Forms—Their minds are always fluctuating among particulars.

The philosopher will be ardent for all varieties of knowledge—His excellent moral attributes—He will be trained to capacity for active life.

manifestations, each perpetually variable and different from all the rest. The philosopher, having present to his mind this type—and approximating to it, as far as may be, the real institutions and practices—will be the person most competent to rule our city: especially as his education will give him farther—more—besides such familiarity with the Form or Type—as large a measure of experience, and as much virtue, as can fall to the lot of the unphilosophical man.<sup>n</sup> The nature and disposition of the true philosopher, if improved by education, will include all the virtue and competence of the practical man. The philosopher is bent on learning everything which can make him familiar with Universal Forms and Essences in their pure state, not floating amidst the confusion of generated and destroyed realities: and with Forms and Essences little as well as great, mean as well as sublime.<sup>o</sup> Devoted to knowledge and truth—hating falsehood—he has little room in his mind for the ordinary desires: he is temperate, indifferent to money, free from all meanness or shabbiness. A man like him, whose contemplations stretch over all time and all essence, thinks human life a small affair, and has no fear of death. He will be just, mild in his demeanour, quick in apprehension, retentive in memory, elegant in his tastes and movements. All these excellencies will be united in the philosophers to whom we confide the rule of our city.<sup>p</sup>

It is impossible, Sokrates (remarks Adeimantus), to answer in the negative to your questions. Nevertheless we, who hear and answer, are not convinced of the truth of your conclusion. Unskilled as we are in the interrogatory process, we feel ourselves led astray little by little at each successive question; until at length, through the accumulated effect of such small deviations, we are driven up into a corner without the power of moving, like a bad player at draughts defeated by one superior to himself.<sup>q</sup> Here in this

Adeimantus does not dispute the conclusion, but remarks that it is at variance with actual facts—Existing philosophers are either worthless

are good, useless.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 484.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 485 A.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 485-486.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 B.

Πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἶός τι  
ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῖόνδε τι  
ἀκούοντες ἐκάστοτε ἂ νῦν

ἡγούμενοι δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ  
καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ  
ἀπαγόμενοι, ἀθροισθέντων τῶν  
ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων, μέγα  
δὲ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις

This is an interesting remark on the

particular case your conclusion has been reached by steps to which we cannot refuse assent. Yet if we look at the facts, we see something quite the reverse as to the actual position of philosophers. Those who study philosophy, not simply as a branch of juvenile education but as a continued occupation throughout life, are in most cases strange creatures, not to say thoroughly unprincipled: while the few of them who are most reasonable, derive nothing from this pursuit which you so much extol, except that they become useless in their respective cities.<sup>r</sup>

Yes (replies Sokrates), your picture is a correct one. The position of true and reasonable philosophers, in their respective cities, is difficult and uncomfortable. Conceive a ship on her voyage, under the management of a steersman distinguished for force of body as well as for skill in his craft, but not clever in dealing with, or acting upon other men. Conceive the seamen all quarrelling with each other to get possession of the rudder; each man thinking himself qualified to steer, though he has never learnt it—nor had any master in it—nor even believes it to be teachable, but is ready to massacre all who affirm that it is teachable.<sup>s</sup> Imagine, beside, these seamen importuning the qualified steersman to commit the rudder to them, each being ready to expel or kill any others whom he may prefer to them: and at last proceeding to stupify with wine or drugs the qualified steersman, and then to navigate the vessel themselves according to their own views; feasting plentifully on the stores. These men know nothing of what constitutes true and able steersmanship. They extol, as a perfect steersman, that leader who is most efficacious, either by persuasion or force, in seizing the rudder for them to manage: they despise as useless any one who does not possess this talent. They never reflect that the genuine steersman has enough to do in surmounting the dangers of his own special art, and in watching the stars and the winds:

Sokrates admits the fact to be so—His simile of the able steersman on ship-board, among a disobedient crew.

effect produced upon many hearers by the Sokratic and Platonic dialogues,—puzzling, silencing, and ultimately stimulating the mind, but not satisfying or convincing,—rather raising suspicions as to the trustworthiness of the

process, which suspicions have to be turned over and scrutinised by subsequent meditation.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 D.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488.

and that if he is to acquire technical skill and practice adequate to such a purpose, he cannot at the same time possess skill and practice in keeping his hold of the rudder whether the crew are pleased with him or not. Such being the condition of the ship and the crew, you see plainly that they will despise and set aside the true steersman as an useless proser and star-gazer.<sup>t</sup>

Now the crew of this ship represent the citizens and leaders of our actual cities: the steersman represents the true philosopher. He is and must be, useless in the ship: but his uselessness is the fault of the crew and not his own. It is not for the true steersman to entreat permission from the seamen, that they will allow him to command; nor for the wise man to solicit employment at the doors of the rich. It is for the sick man, whether he be poor or rich, to ask for the aid of the physician; and for every one who needs to be commanded, to invoke the authority of the person qualified to command. No man really qualified will submit to ask command as a favour.<sup>u</sup>

Thus, Adeimantus (continues Sokrates), I have dealt with the first part of your remark, that the true philosopher is an useless man in cities as now constituted: I have shown you this is not his fault—that it could not be otherwise,—and that a man even of the highest aptitude, cannot enjoy reputation among those whose turn of mind is altogether at variance with his own.<sup>x</sup>

I shall now deal with your second observation—That while even the best philosophers are useless, the majority of those who cultivate philosophy are worthless men, who bring upon her merited discredit. I admit that this also is correct; but I shall prove that philosophy is not to be blamed for it.<sup>y</sup>

You will remember the great combination of excellent dispositions, intellectual as well as moral, which I laid down as

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488 D-E.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 B. τῆς μέντοι ἀχρηστίας τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους κέλευε αἰτιάσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπικεικούς. Οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι ὑφ' αὐτοῦ, &c.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 D. ἐκ

τε τοίνυν τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ λτιστον

τῶν τι

Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 E.

τούτου φιλοσοφία αἰτία, πειραθῶ-

indispensable to form the fundamental character of the true philosopher. Such a combination is always rare. The great Even under the best circumstances, philosophers must be very few. But these few stand exposed, in our existing cities, to such powerful causes of corruption, that they are prevented from reaching maturity, except by some happy accident. come sources First, public opinion. each one of those very qualities, which, when combined, constitute the true philosopher,—serves as a cause of corruption, if it exists by itself and apart from the rest. Next, what are called good things, or external advantages, act in the same manner—such as beauty, strength, wealth, powerful connections, &c. Again, the stronger a man's natural aptitudes and the greater his external advantages,—the better will he become under favourable circumstances, the worse will he become, if circumstances are unfavourable. Heinous iniquity always springs from a powerful nature perverted by bad training: not from a feeble nature, which will produce no great effects either for good or evil. Thus the eminent predispositions,—which, if properly improved, would raise a man to the highest rank in virtue,—will, if planted in an unfavourable soil, produce a master-mind in deeds of iniquity, unless counteracted by some providential interposition.

The multitude treat these latter as men corrupted by the Sophists. But this is a mistake. Neither Sophists Mistake of supposing that such perversion arises from the Sophists. Irresistible effect of the public opinion gene- nor other private individuals produce mischief worth mentioning. It is the multitude themselves, utterers of these complaints, who are the most active Sophists and teachers: it is they who educate and mould every individual, man and woman, young and old, into such a character as they please.\* When they are assembled in the public assembly or orthodoxy. the dikastery, in the theatre or the camp—when they praise some things and blame others, with vociferation and vehemence echoed from the rocks around—how irresistible will

\* Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 A. ἡ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, διαφθεῖρο-  
 εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους,  
 δὲ τινες σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτι-  
 καὶ ἕξιον λόγου—ἄλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας  
 μὲν εἶναι σοφιστὰς; παιδεύειν  
 τατα καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἷους  
 εἶναι καὶ νεοὺς καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ  
 ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας;

be the impression produced upon the mind of a youth who hears them! No private training which he may have previously received can hold out against it. All will be washed away by this impetuous current of multitudinous praise or blame, which carries him along with it. He will declare honourable or base the same things as they declare to be so: he will adopt the character, and follow the pursuits, which they enjoin. Moreover, if he resists such persuasive influence, these multitudinous teachers and Sophists have stronger pressure in store for him.<sup>a</sup> They punish the disobedient with disgrace, fine, and even death. What other Sophists, or what private exhortation, can contend successfully against teachers such as these? Surely none. The attempt to do so is insane. There neither is, nor has been, nor will be, any individual human disposition educated to virtue in opposition to the training of the multitude:<sup>b</sup> I say *human*, as distinguished from *divine*, of which I make exception: for in the existing state of society, any individual who is preserved from these ascendant influences to acquire philosophical excellence, owes his preservation to the divine favour.

Moreover, though the multitude complain of these professional teachers as rivals, and decry them as Sophists—yet we must recollect that such teachers inculcate only the opinions received among the multitude themselves, and extol these same opinions as wisdom.<sup>c</sup> The teachers know nothing of what is really honourable and base,—good and evil,—just and unjust. They distribute all these names only with reference to the opinions of the multitude:—pronouncing those things which please the multitude to be good, and those which displease to be evil,—without furnishing any other rational account. They call things necessary by the name of just and honour-

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 C. Καὶ φήσιν τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ ἔσσεσθαι τοιοῦτον—Καὶ μὴν οὐκ

τοῖς κολάζουσιν; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφίξ--

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 D.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 A.

ἕκαστον τῶν μισθαρνούντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ

οὗτοι οἱ παιδευταὶ τε καὶ σο-

<sup>a</sup> Ἡ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανά-

δροισθῶσι, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην

able; not knowing the material difference between what is good and what is necessary, nor being able to point out that difference to others. Thus preposterous are the teachers, who count it wisdom to suit the taste and feelings of the multitude, whether in painting or in music or in social affairs. For whoever lives among them, publicly exhibiting either poetry or other performances private or official, thus making the multitude his masters beyond the strict limits of necessity—the consequence is infallible, that he must adapt his works to that which they praise. But whether the works which he executes are really good and honourable, he will be unable to render any tolerable account.<sup>d</sup>

It is therefore the multitude, or the general voice of society—not the Sophists or private teachers, mere echoes of that general voice—which works upon and moulds individuals. Now the multitude cannot tolerate or believe in the existence of those Universals or Forms which the philosopher contemplates. They know only the many particulars, not the One Universal. Incapable of becoming philosophers themselves, they look upon the philosopher with hatred; and this sentiment is adopted by all those so-called philosophers who seek to please them.<sup>e</sup> Under these circumstances, what chance is there that those eminent predispositions, which we pointed out as the foundation of the future philosopher, can ever be matured to their proper result? A youth of such promise, especially if his body be on a par with his mind, will be at once foremost among all his fellows. His relatives and fellow-citizens, eager to make use of him for their own purposes, and anxious to appropriate to themselves his growing force, will besiege him betimes with solicitations and flatteries.<sup>f</sup> Under these influences, if we assume him to be rich, well born, and in a powerful city, he will naturally become intoxicated with unlimited hopes and ambition; fancying himself competent to manage the affairs of all governments, and giving himself the empty airs of a lofty potentate.<sup>g</sup>

The people generally hate philosophy—A youth who aspires to it will be hated by the people, and persecuted even by his own relatives.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 C-D.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 A. φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα πλήθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι—καὶ τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἄρα ψέγεσθαι ὅπ' αὐτῶν—καὶ

τούτων τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, δοῖαι προσομιλοῦντες ὅχλῳ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 B.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 C. θαί ἄμην;

If there be any one to give him a quiet hint that he has not yet acquired intelligence, nor *can* acquire it without labour—he will turn a deaf ear. But suppose that such advice should by chance prevail, in one out of many cases, so that the youth alters his tendencies and devotes himself to philosophy—what will be the conduct of those who see, that they will thereby be deprived of his usefulness and party-service towards their own views? They will leave no means untried to prevent him from following the advice, and even to ruin the adviser, by private conspiracy and judicial prosecution.<sup>b</sup> It is impossible that the young man can really turn to philosophy, against obstructions thus powerful. You see that those very excellences and advantages, which form the initial point of the growing philosopher, become means and temptations for corrupting him. The best natures, rare as they always are, become thus not only ruined, but turned into instruments of evil. For the same men (as I have already said) who, under favourable training, would have done the greatest good, become perpetrators of the greatest evil, if they are badly placed. Small men will do nothing important, either in the one way or the other.<sup>i</sup>

It is thus that the path of philosophy is deserted by those who ought to have trodden it, and who pervert their exalted powers to unworthy objects. That path—being left vacant, yet still full of imposing titles and pretensions, and carrying a show of superior dignity as compared with the vulgar professions—becomes invaded by interlopers of inferior worth and ability, who quit their own small craft, and set up as philosophers.<sup>k</sup> Such men, poorly endowed by nature, and debased by habits of trade, exhibit themselves, in their self-assumed exaltation as philosophers, like a slave recently manumitted, who has

The really great minds are thus driven away from the path of philosophy—which is left to empty pretenders.

μενον καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἰκανὸν εἶναι πράττειν.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 D.

οὐκ, διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων, εἰς αἰσθάνηται τέ

πρὶ καὶ κάμπτηται καὶ ἔλκεται πρὸς

φιλοσοφίαν, τί οἶδέ μεθα δρᾶσειν ἐκ

τοῦς ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύει αὐτοῦ

χρεῖαν καὶ ἑταιρείαν; οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον,

πᾶν δὲ ἔπος, λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας

καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ πεισθῇ, καὶ

περὶ τὸν πείθοντα, ὅπως ἂν μὴ οὐδὲ τ

ῆ, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ δημοσίᾳ εἰς ἀγῶνας καθίσταντας;

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 A-B.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 D.

καθορῶντες γὰρ αὐ ἄλλοι

καλῶν

μεστέην, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰργμῶν εἰς

τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, ἄσμενοι καὶ

οἷτοι ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκπαιδῶσιν εἰς τὴν

put on new clothes and married his master's daughter. Having intruded themselves into a career for which they are unfit, they cannot produce any grand or genuine philosophical thoughts, or anything better than mere neat sophisms, pleasing to the ear.<sup>m</sup> Through them arises the discredit which is now attached to philosophers.

Amidst such general degradation of philosophy, some few and rare cases are left, in which the pre-eminent natures qualified for philosophy remain by some favourable accident uncorrupted. One of these is Theagès, who would have been long ago drawn away from philosophy to active politics, had he not been disqualified by bad health. The restraining Dæmon, peculiar to myself (says Sokrates) is another case.<sup>n</sup> Such an exceptional man, having once tasted the sweetness and happiness of philosophy, embraces it as an exclusive profession. He sees that the mass of society are wrongheaded—that scarce any one takes wholesome views on social matters—that he can find no partisans to aid him in upholding justice<sup>o</sup>—that while he will not take part in injustice, he is too weak to contend singlehanded against the violence of all, and would only become a victim to it without doing any good either to the city or to his friends—like a man who has fallen among wild beasts. On these grounds he stands aloof in his own separate pursuit, like one sheltering himself under a wall against a hurricane of wind and dust. Witnessing the injustice committed by all around, he is content if he can keep himself clear and pure from it during his life here, so as to die with satisfaction and good hopes.

He will perform no small achievement (remarks Adeimantus) if he keeps clear to the end.<sup>p</sup>

True (replies Sokrates)—yet nevertheless he can perform

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 E.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 A.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 D.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 D.  
καὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ

βοήθειαν σώζουσιν· ἂν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰς  
θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσὼν, οὔτε ξυναδικεῖν  
ἐθέλων οὔτε ἱκανὸς ὢν εἰς πάντων ἀγροῖς  
ἀντέχειν, πρὶν τι τὴν πόλιν ἢ φίλους

τὸ

γένοιτο—ταῦτα

τῶν

καὶ ὅτι

τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων—ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλ-

υγιᾶς, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, περὶ τὰ

λεων πράττει, οὐδ' ἔστι ξί

δου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν

καθαρὸς

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 497.

no great achievement, unless he meets with a community suited to him. Amidst such a community he will himself rise to greatness, and will preserve the public happiness as well as his own. But there exists no such community anywhere at the present moment. Not one of those now existing is worthy of a philosophical disposition: which accordingly becomes perverted, and degenerates into a different type adapted to its actual abode, like exotic seed transported to a foreign soil. But if this philosophical disposition were planted in a worthy community, so as to be able to assert its own superior excellence, it would then prove itself truly divine, leaving other dispositions and pursuits behind as merely human.

You mean by a worthy community (observes Adeimantus), such an one as that of which you have been drawing the outline?—I do (replies Sokrates): with this addition, already hinted but not explained, that there must always be maintained in it a perpetual supervising authority representing the scheme and purpose of the primitive lawgiver. This authority must consist of philosophers: and the question now arises—difficult but indispensable—how such philosophers are to be trained up and made efficient for the good of the city.

The plan now pursued for imparting philosophy is bad. Some do not learn it at all: and even to those who learn it best, the most difficult part (that which relates to debate and discourse) is taught when they are youths just emerging from boyhood, in the intervals of practical business and money-getting.<sup>1</sup> After that period, in their mature age, they abandon it altogether; they will scarcely so much as go to hear an occasional lecture on the subject, without any effort of their own: accordingly it has all died out within them, when they become mature in years. This manner of teaching philosophy ought to be

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 497 B-C.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 A.

Νῦν μὲν οἱ καὶ ἀπτόμενοι μεράκια ὄντα  
ἔρτι ἐκ παιδῶν τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας  
καὶ χρηματισμοῦ πλησιάζαντες αὐτοῦ  
τῷ χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλάττονται, οἱ φιλο-

σοφώτατοι

τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους—ἐν  
τῷ ἔπειτα, ἐὰν καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο

ἀκροαταὶ γίγνεσθαι, μέγала  
πάρργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν.

reversed. •In childhood and youth, instruction of an easy character and suitable to that age ought to be imparted; while the greatest care is taken to improve and strengthen the body during its period of growth, as a minister and instrument to philosophy. As age proceeds, and the mind advances to perfection, the mental exercises ought to become more difficult and absorbing. Lastly, when the age of bodily effort passes away, philosophy ought to become the main and principal pursuit.<sup>a</sup>

Most people will hear all this (continues Sokrates) with mingled incredulity and repugnance. We cannot wonder that they do so: for they have had no experience of one or a few virtuously trained men ruling in a city suitably prepared.<sup>b</sup> Such combination of philosophical rulers within a community adapted to them, we must assume to be realised.<sup>c</sup> Though difficult, it is noway impracticable: and even the multitude will become reconciled to it, if you explain to them mildly what sort of persons we mean by philosophers. We do not mean such persons as the multitude now call by that name; interlopers in the pursuit, violent in dispute and quarrel with each other, and perpetually talking personal scandal.<sup>d</sup> The multitude cannot hate a philosophical temper such as we depict, when they once come to know it—a man who, indifferent to all party disputes, dwells in contemplation of the Universal Forms, and tries to mould himself and others into harmony with them.<sup>e</sup> Such a philosopher will not pretend to make regulations, either for a city or for an individual, until he has purified it thoroughly. He will then make regulations framed upon the type of the eternal Forms—Justice, Temperance, Beauty—adapting them as well as he can to human exigencies.<sup>f</sup> The multitude, when they know what is really meant, will become perfectly reconciled to it. One single prince, if he rises so as to become a philosopher, and has a consenting community, will suffice to introduce the system which we have been describing. So fortunate an accident can

If the multitude could once see a real, perfect philosopher, they could not fail to love him: but this never happens.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 C.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 E.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 499 B-C.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 499-500.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic vi. p. 500 C-D.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 501 A.

undoubtedly occur but seldom; yet it is not impossible, and one day or other it will really occur.<sup>a</sup>

I must now (continues Sokrates) explain more in detail the studies and training through which these preservers and Rulers of our city, the complete philosophers, must be created. The most perfect among the Guardians, after having been tested by years of exercises and temptations of various kinds, will occupy that distinguished place. Very few will be found uniting those distinct and almost incompatible excellences which qualify them for the post. They must give proof of self-command against pleasures as well as pains, and of competence to deal with the highest studies.<sup>b</sup> But what are the highest studies? What is the supreme object of knowledge? It is the Idea of Good—the Form of Good: to the acquisition of which our philosophers must be trained to ascend, however laborious and difficult the process may be.<sup>c</sup> Neither justice nor anything else can be useful or profitable, unless we superadd to them a knowledge of the Idea of Good: without this, it would profit us nothing to possess all other knowledge.<sup>d</sup>

Now as to the question, What Good is? there are great and long-standing disputes. Every mind pursues Good, and does everything for the sake of it—yet without either knowledge or firm assurance what Good is, and consequently with perpetual failure in deriving benefit from other acquisitions.<sup>e</sup> Most people say that Pleasure is the Good: an ingenious few identify Intelligence with the Good. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. For when a man says that Intelligence is the Good, our next question to him must be, What sort of Intelligence do you mean?—Intelligence of what? To this he must reply, Intelligence of the Good:

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 502.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 503.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 504.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505. *ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀ χρησίμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίνονται, &c.*

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 E. \*Ο

*δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπανα ψυχὴ καὶ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντὶ τί εἶναι, ἀπορούσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' ἔστιν, οὐδὲ χρῆσασθαι μόνιμον, οἷα διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ*

which is absurd, since it presumes us to know already what the Good is—the very point which he is pretending to elucidate. Again, he who contends that Pleasure is the Good, is forced in discussion to admit that there are such things as bad pleasures: in other words, that pleasure is sometimes good, sometimes bad.<sup>f</sup> From these doubts and disputes about the real nature of good, we shall require our philosophical Guardians to have emancipated themselves, and to have attained a clear vision. They will be unfit for their post if they do not well know what the Good is, and in what manner just or honourable things come to be good.<sup>g</sup> Our city will have received its final consummation, when it is placed under the superintendence of one who knows what the Good is.

But tell me, Sokrates (asks Adeimantus), what do *you* conceive the Good to be—Intelligence, or Pleasure, or any other thing different from these? I do not profess to know (replies Sokrates), and cannot tell you. We must decline the problem, What Good itself is? as more arduous than our present impetus will enable us to reach.<sup>h</sup> Nevertheless I will partially supply the deficiency by describing to you the offspring of Good, very like its parent. You will recollect that we have distinguished the Many from the One: the many just particulars, beautiful particulars, from the One Universal Idea or Form, Just *per se*, Beautiful *per se*. The many particulars are seen, but not conceived: the one Idea is conceived, but not seen.<sup>i</sup> We see the many particulars through the auxiliary agency of light, which emanates from the Sun, the God of the visible world. Our organ and sense of vision are not the Sun itself, but they are akin to the Sun in a greater degree than any of our other senses. They imbibe their peculiar faculty from the influence of the Sun.<sup>k</sup> The Sun furnishes to

Adeimantus

says. Sokrates says that he cannot answer: but he compares it by a metaphor to the Sun.

Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 C.

Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 A.

τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπρ' ὅτε  
οὐ πολλοῦ

τοῦτο

ἀγνοοῦντα.

Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 B-E.

Αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ

τὰ νῦν εἶναι· πλέον γὰρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ

γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοί τὰ νῦν ὅς  
τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ  
ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

Plato, Republic, vi. p. 507 B. Καὶ

ἴ) σθαὶ δὲ οὐ· τὰς δ' αὖ ἰδέας  
οὐ.

Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 A.

objects the power of being seen, and to our eyes the power of seeing: we can see no colour unless we turn to objects enlightened by its rays. Moreover it is the Sun which also brings about the generation, the growth, and the nourishment, of these objects, though it is itself out of the limits of generation: it generates and keeps them in existence, besides rendering them visible.<sup>1</sup> Now the Sun is the offspring and representative of the Idea of Good: what the Sun is in the sensible and visible world, the Idea of Good is in the intelligible or conceivable world.<sup>m</sup> As the Sun not only brings into being the objects of sense, but imparts to them the power of being seen—so the Idea of Good brings into being the objects of conception or cognition, imparts to them the power of being known, and to the mind the power of knowing them.<sup>n</sup> It is from the Idea of Good that all knowledge, all truth, and all real essence spring. Yet the Idea of Good is itself extra-essential; out of or beyond the limits of essence, and superior in beauty and dignity both to knowledge and to truth; which are not Good itself, but akin to Good, as vision is akin to the Sun.<sup>o</sup>

Here then we have two distinct regions or genera: one, the conceivable or intelligible, ruled by the Idea of Good—the other, the visible, ruled by the Sun, which is the offspring of Good. Now let us subdivide each of these regions or genera into two portions. The two portions of the visible will be—first, real objects, such as animals, plants, works of art, &c.—second, the images or representations of these, such as shadows, reflexions in water or in mirrors, &c. The first of these two

The Idea of Good rules the ideal or intelligible world, as the Sun rules the sensible or world.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 509 B. τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον τὴν τοῦ

δύναμιν ἀποδίδον, τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν δ' &c.

καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 C. Τοῦτον (τὸν ἥλιον) τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐκγονον, ὃν τὰγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν αἰ ἑαυτῷ, ὃ, τι περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ πρὸς τε τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὰ νο τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρὸς τε ὕψιν καὶ

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 509 B. Καὶ τοῖς γιγνώσκομένοις τοῖνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεισθαι φαναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ᾗς οὐσίας πρεσβεῖα καὶ

Καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων φη, δαιμόνιος

Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 E.

Τοῦτο τοῖνυν τὸ

καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι

ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ -also p. 509 A.

subdivisions will be greatly superior in clearness to the second: it will be distinguished from the second as truth is distinguished from not-truth.<sup>p</sup> Matter of knowledge is in the same relation to matter of opinion, as an original to its copy. Next, the conceivable or intelligible region must be subdivided into two portions, similarly related one to the other: the first of these portions will be analogous to the real objects of vision, the second to the images or representations of these objects: the first will thus be the Forms, Ideas, or Realities of Conception or Intellect—the second will be particular images or embodiments thereof.<sup>q</sup>

Now in regard to these two portions of the conceivable or intelligible region, two different procedures of the mind are employed: the pure Dialectic, and the Geometrical, procedure. The Geometer or the Arithmetician begins with certain visible images, lines, figures, or numbered objects, of sense: he takes his departure from certain hypotheses or assumptions, such as given numbers, odd and even—given figures and angles, of three different sorts.<sup>r</sup> He assumes these as data without rendering account of them, or allowing them to be called in question, as if they were self-evident to every one. From these premisses he deduces his conclusions, carrying them down by uncontradicted steps to the solution of the problem which he is examining.<sup>s</sup> But though he has before his eyes the visible parallelogram inscribed on the sand, with its visible diagonal, and though all his propositions are affirmed respecting these—yet what he has really in his mind is something quite different—the Parallelogram *per se*, or the Form of a Parallelogram—the Form of a Diagonal, &c. The

To the intelligible world there are applicable two distinct modes of procedure—the Geometrical—the Dialectic. Geometrical procedure assumes diagrams.

Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 509-510.

ἀληθεία τε καὶ μὴ, ὡς τὸ πρὸς τὸ γνωστὸν, οὕτω τὸ

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 B.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 B. ἢ

αὐτοῦ (τμήμα) τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσι χρωμένῃ (this is farther illustrated by p. 511 A.—εἰκόσι αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεψυχῇ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὅτου οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη ἀλλ' ἐπὶ

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 C. οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοῦς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματεῖται μὲν τό τε περὶ τὸν καὶ

καὶ γωνίων τριττὰ εἶδη

ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτὰ, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ

τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο, (

visible figure before him is used only as an image\* or representative of this self-existent Form; which last he can contemplate only in conception, though all his propositions are intended to apply to it.<sup>†</sup> He is unable to take his departure directly from this Form, as from a first principle: he is forced to assume the visible figure as his point of departure, and cannot ascend above it: he treats it as something privileged and self-evident.<sup>‡</sup>

From the geometrical procedure thus described, we must now distinguish the other section—the pure Dialectic. Here the Intellect ascends to the absolute Form, and grasps it directly. Particular assumptions or hypotheses are indeed employed, but only stepping-stones, by which the Intel-

lect is to ascend to the Form: they are afterwards to be discarded: they are not used here for first principles of reasoning, as they are by the Geometer.\*

The Dialectician uses for his first principle the highest absolute Form; he descends from this to the next highest, and so lower and lower through the orderly gradation of Forms, until he comes to the end or lowest: never employing throughout the whole descent any hypothesis or assumption, nor any illustrative aid from sense. He contemplates and reasons upon the pure intelligible essence, directly and immediately: whereas the Geometer can only contemplate it indirectly and mediately, through the intervening aid of particular assumptions.<sup>‡</sup>

\* Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 D-E.

τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἶδеси προσχρῶνται, καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τοῦτων διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων περὶ οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμενοι καὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης ἦν γράφουσι, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως· αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἂν πλάττουσι τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασι εἰκόνες εἰσιν, τοῦτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὐτῶν χρῶμενοι, αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ.

† Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 A. οὐκ ὥς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσι δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν, καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ὧς ἐναργεῖσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετι-

μημένοις.

\* Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 B. τὸ ἕτερον τμήμα τοῦ νοητοῦ, οὐ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἄπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιοῦμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, ὅσον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμᾶς, ἵνα μέχρη τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου, τοῦ παντός

αὐτῶς ἐπὶ τελευταίην καταφάντασιν οὐδενὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἶδη.

‡ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511. σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν

The distinction here indicated—between the two different sections of the Intelligible Region, and the two different sections of the Region of Sense—we shall mark (continues Sokrates) by appropriate terms. The Dialectician alone has Noûs or Intellect, direct or the highest cognition: he alone grasps and comprehends directly the pure intelligible essence or absolute Form. The Geometer does not ascend to this direct contemplation or intuition of the Form: he knows it only through the medium of particular assumptions, by indirect Cognition or Dianoia; which is a lower faculty than Noûs or Intellect, yet nevertheless higher than Opinion.

Two distinct grades of Cognition—  
Direct or Superior—Noûs  
—Indirect or Inferior—Dianoia.

As we assign two distinct grades of Cognition to the Intelligible Region, so we also assign two distinct grades of Opinion to the Region of Sense, and its two sections. To the first of these two sections, or to real objects of sense, we assign the highest grade of Opinion, viz.: Faith or Belief. To the second of the two, or to the images of real objects of sense, we assign the lower grade, viz.: Conjecture.

Two distinct grades of Opinion also in the Sensible World—  
Faith or Belief—Conjecture.

Here then are the four grades. Two grades of Cognition—  
1. Noûs, or Direct Cognition. 2. Dianoia, or Indirect Cognition: both of them belonging to the Intelligible Region, and both of them higher than Opinion. Next follow the two grades of Opinion. 3. The higher grade, Faith or Belief. 4. The lower grade, Conjecture. Both the two last belong to the sensible world; the first to real objects, the last to images of those objects.<sup>2</sup>

Sokrates now proceeds to illustrate the contrast between the philosopher and the unphilosophical or ordinary man, by the memorable simile of the cave and its shadows. Mankind live in a cave, with its aperture directed towards the light of the sun; but they are so chained, that their backs are constantly turned towards this aperture, so that they cannot see the sun and sunlight. What they do see is by means of a fire which is always burning behind them. Between them and this fire there is a wall; along the wall are posted

Distinction between the philosopher and the unphilosophical public, illustrated by the simile of the Cave, and the captives imprisoned therein.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Republic, p. 511 D-E.

men who carry backwards and forwards representations or images of all sorts of objects; so that the shadows of these objects by the firelight are projected from behind these chained men upon the ground in front of them, and pass to and fro before their vision. All the experience which such chained men acquire, consists in what they observe of the appearance and disappearance, the transition, sequences, and co-existences, of these shadows, which they mistake for truth and realities, having no acquaintance with any other phenomena.\* If now we suppose any one of them to be liberated from his chains, turned round, and brought up to the light of the sun and to real objects—his eyesight would be at first altogether dazzled, confounded, and distressed. Distinguishing as yet nothing clearly, he would believe that the shadows which he had seen in his former state were true and distinct objects, and that the new mode of vision to which he had been suddenly introduced was illusory and unprofitable. He would require a long time to accustom him to daylight: at first his eyes would bear nothing but shadows—next images in the water—then the stars at night—lastly, the full brightness of the Sun. He would learn that it was the Sun which not only gave light, but was the cause of varying seasons, growth, and all the productions of the visible world. And when his mind had been thus opened, he would consider himself much to be envied for the change, looking back with pity on his companions still in the cave.<sup>b</sup> He would think them all miserably ignorant, as being conversant not with realities, but only with the shadows which passed before their eyes. He would have no esteem even for the chosen few in the cave, who were honoured by their fellows as having best observed the co-existences and sequences among these shadows, so as to predict most exactly how the shadows would appear in future.<sup>c</sup> Moreover if, after having become fully accustomed to daylight and the contemplation of realities, he were to descend again into

\* Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 514-515.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 515-516.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 516 C.

τε καὶ ἔπαινοι εἰ τινες αὐτοῖς ἦσαν  
παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα τῷ δεύτατα  
παριόντα, καὶ

οντι μάλιστα ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν  
εἰώθει καὶ ἔμα πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων  
δυνατώτατα

λον :

αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ' ἐκεῖ-  
καὶ

the cave, his eyesight would be dim and confused in that comparative darkness; so that he would not well recognise the shadows, and would get into disputes about them with his companions. They on their side would deride him as having spoilt his sight as well as his judgment, and would point him out as an example to deter others from emerging out of the cave into daylight.<sup>d</sup> Far from wishing to emerge themselves, they would kill, if they could, any one who tried to unchain them and assist them in escaping.<sup>e</sup>

By this simile (continues Sokrates) I intend to illustrate, as far as I can, yet without speaking confidently,<sup>f</sup> the relations of the sensible world to the intelligible world: the world of transitory shadows, dimly seen and admitting only opinion, contrasted with that of unchangeable realities steadily contemplated and known, illuminated by the Idea of Good, which is itself visible in the background, being the cause both of truth in speculation and of rectitude in action.<sup>g</sup> No wonder that the few who can ascend into the intelligible region, amidst the clear contemplations of Truth and Justice *per se*, are averse to meddle again with the miseries of human affairs, and to contend with the opinions formed by ordinary men respecting the shadows of Justice, the reality of which these ordinary men have never seen. There are two causes of temporary confused vision: one, when a man moves out of darkness into light—the other when he moves out of light into darkness. It is from the latter cause that the philosopher suffers when he redescends into the obscure cave.<sup>h</sup>

Daylight of philosophy contrasted with the fire-light and shadows of the Cave.

The great purpose of education is to turn a man round from his natural position at the bottom of this dark cave, where he sees nothing but shadows: to fix his eyes in the other direction, and to induce him to ascend

Purpose of a philosophical trial: turn a man round from

Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 A.  
ἀρ' οὐ γέλωτ' ἂν παράσχοι καὶ λέγοιτο  
ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀναβάς ἄνω διεφθα-  
μένος ἤκει τὰ δῖματ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιον  
οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι ἄνω ἵέναι;

μεῖς ἀκούειν·

\* Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 A.  
καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀνδ-  
ρῶν τὰς ἀποκτείναντων, ἀποκτείναντων ἂν;

This tone of uncertainty in Plato deserves notice. It forms a striking contrast with the dogmatism of many among his commentators.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 C.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 517-518.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517. τῆς

clear daylight. Education does not, as some suppose, either pour knowledge into an empty mind, or impart visual power to blind persons. Men have good eyes, but these eyes are turned in the wrong direction. The clever among them see sharply enough what is before them; but they have nothing before them except shadows, and the sharper their vision the more mischief they do.<sup>1</sup> What is required is, to turn them round and draw them up so as to face the real objects of daylight. Their natural eyesight would then suffice to enable them to see these objects well.<sup>2</sup> The task of our education must be, to turn round the men of superior natural aptitude, and to draw them up into the daylight of realities. Next, when they shall have become sufficiently initiated in truth and philosophy, we must not allow them to bury themselves permanently in such studies—as they will themselves be but too eager to do. We must compel them to come down again into the cave and exercise ascendancy among their companions, for whose benefit their superior mental condition will thus become available.<sup>1</sup>

Those who  
do this.  
Coming as they do from the better light, they will, after a little temporary perplexity, be able to see the dim shadows better than those who have never looked at anything else. Having contemplated the true and real Forms of the Just, Beautiful, Good—they will better appreciate the images of these Forms which come and go, pass by and repass in the cave.<sup>m</sup> They will indeed be very reluctant to undertake the duties or exercise the powers of government: their genuine delight is in philosophy; and if left to themselves, they would cultivate nothing else. But such reluctance is in itself one proof that they are the fittest persons to govern. If government be placed in the hands of men eager to possess it, there will be others eager to dispossess them, so that competition and factions will arise. Those who come forward to govern, having no good of their own, and seeking to

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, p. 519 A-B.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Republic, p. 519 B. *ὥν ἐὶ | ἂ νῦν τέτραπται.*

*εἰς*  
<sup>1</sup> *ἐκεῖνα ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν*

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 519-520.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 520 C.

extract their own good from the exercise of power, are both unworthy of trust, and sure to be resisted by opponents of the like disposition. The philosopher alone has his own good in himself. He enjoys a life better than that of a ruler; which life he is compelled to forego when he accepts power and becomes a ruler.<sup>n</sup>

The main purpose of education, I have said (continues Sokrates) is, to turn round the faces of the superior men, and to invite them upwards from darkness to light—from the region of perishable shadows to that of imperishable realities.<sup>o</sup> Now what cognitions, calculated to aid such a purpose, can we find to teach?<sup>p</sup> Gymnastic, music, the vulgar arts, are all useful to be taught: but they do not tend to that which we are here seeking. Arithmetic does so to a certain extent, if properly taught—which at present it is not.<sup>q</sup> It furnishes a stimulus to awaken the dormant intellectual and reflective capacity. Among the variety of sensible phenomena, there are some in which the senses yield a clear and satisfactory judgment, leaving no demand in the mind for anything beyond: there are others in which the senses land us in apparent equivocation, puzzle, and contradiction—so that the mind is stung by this apparent perplexity, and instigated to find a solution by some intellectual effort.<sup>r</sup> Thus, if we see or feel the fingers of our hand, they always appear to the sense, fingers: in whatever order or manner they may be looked at, there is no contradiction or discrepancy in the judgment of sense. But if we see or feel them as great or small, thick or thin, hard or soft, &c., they then appear differently according as they are seen or felt in different order or under different circumstances. The same object which now appears great, will at another time appear small: it will seem to the sense hard or soft, light or heavy, according as it is seen under different comparisons and relations.<sup>s</sup> Here then, sense is involved in an apparent contradiction, declaring the same object to be

Studies serving as introduction to philosophy—Arithmetic, its awakening power—shock to the mind by felt contradiction.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 520-521.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 521 C.

περιαγωγή, ἐκ νυκτερινῆς εἰς ἀληθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰ

εἶναι.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 521 C.

Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλοκρὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν;

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 522-523 A.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 523 C.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Republic, pp. 523-524.

both hard and soft, great and small, light and heavy, &c. The mind, painfully confounded by such a contradiction, is obliged to invoke intellectual reflection to clear it up. Great and small are presented by the sense as inhering in the same object. Are they one thing, or two separate things? Intellectual reflection informs us that they are two: enabling us to conceive separately two things, which to our sense appeared confounded together. Intellectual (or abstract) conception is thus developed in our mind, as distinguished from sense, and as a refuge from the confusion and difficulties of sense, which furnish the stimulus whereby it is awakened.<sup>t</sup>

Now arithmetic, besides its practical usefulness for arrangements of war, includes difficulties and furnishes a stimulus of this nature. We see the same thing both as One and as infinite in multitude: as definite and indefinite in number.<sup>u</sup> We can emerge from these difficulties only by intellectual and abstract reflection. It is for this purpose, and not for purposes of traffic, that our intended philosophers must learn Arithmetic. Their minds must be raised from the confusion of the sensible world to the clear daylight of the intelligible.<sup>x</sup> In teaching Arithmetic, the master sets before his pupils numbers in the concrete, that is, embodied in visible and tangible objects—so many balls or pebbles.<sup>y</sup> Each of these balls he enumerates as One, though they be unequal in magnitude, and whatever be the magnitude of each. If you remark that the balls are unequal—and that each of them is Many as well as One, being divisible into as many parts as you please—he will laugh at the objection as irrelevant. He will tell you that the units to which his numeration refers are each *Unum per se*, indivisible and without parts; and all equal among themselves without the least shade of difference. He will add that such units cannot be exhibited to the senses, but can only be conceived by the intellect: that the balls before you are not such units in reality, but serve to suggest

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 524 B-C.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 A.

ταῦτόν ὡς ἓν τε ὁρώμεν καὶ ἄς

πα τὸ πλῆθος.

Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 B.

διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτότεον εἶναι γενέσεως  
ἐξαναδύντι, &c.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 C.

ὁρατὰ

&c.

and facilitate the effort of abstract conception.<sup>2</sup> In this manner arithmetical teaching conducts us to numbers in the abstract—to the real, intelligible, indivisible unit—the *Unum per se*.

Geometrical teaching conducts the mind to the same order of contemplations; leading it away from variable particulars to unchangeable universal Essence. Some persons extol Geometry chiefly on the ground of its usefulness in applications to practice. But this is a mistake: its real value is in conducing to knowledge, and to elevated contemplations of the mind. It does, however, like Arithmetic, yield useful results in practice: and both of them are farther valuable as auxiliaries to other studies.<sup>a</sup>

After Geometry—the measurement of lines and superficial areas—the proper immediate sequel is Stereometry, the measurement of solids. But this latter is nowhere properly honoured and cultivated; though from its intrinsic excellence, it forces its way partially even against public neglect and discouragement.<sup>b</sup> Most persons omit it, and treat Astronomy as if it were the immediate sequel to Geometry: which is a mistake, for Astronomy relates to solid bodies in a state of rotatory movement, and ought to be preceded by the treatment of solid bodies generally.<sup>c</sup> Assuming Stereometry, therefore, as if it existed, we proceed to Astronomy.

Certainly (remarks Glaukon) Astronomy, besides its usefulness in regard to the calendar, and the seasons, must be admitted by every one to carry the mind upwards, to the contemplation of things not below but on high. I do not admit this at all (replies Sokrates), as Astronomy is now cultivated: at least in my sense of the words, *looking upwards and looking downwards*. If a man lies on his back, contemplating the ornaments of the ceiling, he may carry his eyes upward, but not his mind.<sup>d</sup> To look upwards, as I understand it, is to

Geometry  
conducts the  
mind towards  
Universal  
Ess.

Astronomy  
—how useful  
—not useful  
as now  
taught—  
must be  
studied by  
ideal fig  
not by c  
vation.

Plato, Republic, vii. p. 526 A. | *μόνον ἐγχαρῆι, ἄλλως δ' ἔστι τις ἔροιο αὐτοῦς, ὃν θαυμάσιοι, περὶ διαλέγεσθαι, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οἷον ὁμῆς ἀξιοῦντέ ἐστιν, ἴσον*

οἷοι αὐτοῦς ἀποκρίνασθαι; Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ περὶ τούτων λέγουσιν ὧν

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 526-527.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 528 A-C.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 528 B.

<sup>d</sup> ἐν περιφορᾷ δὲ ἤδη στερεὸν λαβόντες, πρὶν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ λαβεῖν. P. 528 E.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 529 B.

carry the mind away from the contemplation of sensible things, whereof no science is attainable—to the contemplation of intelligible things, entities invisible and unchangeable, which alone are the objects of science. Observation of the stars, such as astronomers now teach, does not fulfil any such condition. The heavenly bodies are the most beautiful of all visible bodies and the most regular of all visible movements, approximating most nearly, though still with a long interval of inferiority, to the ideal figures and movements of genuine and self-existent Forms—quickness, slowness, number, figure, &c., as they are in themselves, not visible to the eye, but conceivable only by reason and intellect.<sup>e</sup> The movements of the heavenly bodies are exemplifications, approaching nearest to the perfection of these ideal movements, but still falling greatly short of them. They are like visible circles or triangles drawn by some very exact artist; which, however beautiful as works of art, are far from answering to the conditions of the idea and its definition, and from exhibiting exact equality and proportion.<sup>f</sup> So about the movements of the sun and stars: they are comparatively regular, but they are yet bodily and visible, never attaining the perfect sameness and unchangeableness of the intelligible world and its forms. We cannot learn truth by observation of phenomena constantly fluctuating and varying. We must study astronomy, as we do geometry, not by observation, but by mathematical theorems and hypotheses: which is a far more arduous task than astronomy as taught at present. Only in this way can it be made available to improve and strengthen the intellectual organ of the mind.<sup>g</sup>

In like manner (continues Sokrates), Acoustics or Harmonics must be studied, not by the ear, listening to and comparing various sounds, but by the contemplative intellect, applying arithmetical relations and theories.<sup>h</sup>

After going through all these different studies, the student will have his mind elevated so as to perceive

Acoustics, in like manner—The student will be thus conducted to the highest of all studies—Dialectic; and to the region of pure intelligible Forms.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 529 D.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 529-530.

Plato, Republic, vii. p. 530 B.

ὥσπερ γῶ-

μετρίαν, οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομίαν μέτμεν. τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἰδόμεν, &c.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 531.

the affinity<sup>o</sup> of method<sup>i</sup> and principle which pervades them all. In this state he will be prepared for entering on Dialectic, which is the final consummation of his intellectual career. He will then have ascended from the cave into daylight. He will have learnt to see real objects, and ultimately the Sun itself, instead of the dim and transitory shadows below. He will become qualified to grasp the pure Intelligible Form with his pure Intellect alone, without either aid or disturbance from sense. He will acquire that dialectical discursive power which deals exclusively with these Intelligible Forms, carrying on ratiocination by means of them only, with no reference to sensible objects. He will attain at length the last goal of the Dialectician—the contemplation of Bonum *per se* (the highest perfection and elevation of the Intelligible)<sup>k</sup> with Intellect *per se* in its full purity: the best part of his mind will have been raised to the contemplation and knowledge of the best and purest entity.<sup>l</sup>

I know not whether I ought to admit your doctrine, Sokrates (observes Glaukon). There are difficulties both in admitting and denying it. However, let us assume it for the present. Your next step must be to tell us what is the characteristic function of this Dialectic power—what are its different varieties and ways of proceeding? I would willingly do so (replies Sokrates), but you would not be able to follow me.<sup>m</sup> I would lay before you not merely an image of the truth but the very truth itself; as it appears to me at least, whether I am correct or not—for I ought not to be sure of my own correctness.

But I am sure that the dialectic power is something of the nature which I have described. It is the only force which can make plain the full truth to students who have gone through the preliminary studies that we have described. It is the only study which investigates rationally real forms and essences<sup>n</sup>—what

Question by Glaukon—What is the Dialectic Power? Sokrates declares that he cannot answer with certainty, and that Glaukon could not follow him if he did.

He answers partially—It is the consummation of all the sciences, raising the student to the contemplation of

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 531 D.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 532 A.

τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ δ' ἔστιν ἕκαστον  
καὶ μ.

ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, &

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 532 D.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 A.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 A. αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου πέρι, δ' ἔστι

pure Forms,  
and espe-  
cially to that  
of the highest  
Form—Good.

each thing is, truly in itself. Other branches of study are directed either towards the opinions and preferences of men—or towards generation and combination of particular results—or towards upholding of combinations already produced or naturally springing up: while even as to geometry and the other kindred studies, we have seen that as to real essence, they have nothing better than dreams<sup>o</sup>—and that they cannot see it as it is, so long as they take for their principle or point of departure certain assumptions or hypotheses of which they can render no account. The principle being thus unknown, and the conclusion as well as the intermediate items being spun together out of that unknown, how can such a convention deserve the name of Science?<sup>p</sup> Pursuant to custom, indeed, we call these by the name of Sciences. But they deserve no higher title than that of Intellectual Cognitions, lower than Science, yet higher than mere Opinion. It is the Dialectician alone who discards all assumptions, ascending at once to real essence as his principle and point of departure:<sup>q</sup> defining, and discriminating, by appropriate words, each variety of real essence—rendering account of it to others—and carrying it safely through the cross-examining process of question and answer.<sup>r</sup> Whoever cannot discriminate in this way the Idea or Form of Good from everything else, will have no proper cognition of Good itself, but only, at best, opinions respecting the various shadows of Good. Dialectic—the capacity of discriminating real Forms and maintaining them in cross-examining dialogue—is thus the coping-stone, completion, or consummation, of all the other sciences.<sup>s</sup>

The preliminary sciences must be imparted to our Guardians during the earlier years of life, together with such bodily and mental training as may test their energy and perseverance of character.<sup>t</sup> After the age of twenty, those who have distinguished themselves in

The Synoptic  
view peculiar  
to the Diale-  
ctician.

Scale and

τῆς  
ὁδῷ περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν, &c.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 C.

ὡς ἀνείρωττονται μὲν περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἔπαρ-  
αὐτὰς ἕως

ἀκινήτους ἔωσιν, &c.

Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 D.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 E.

Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534 B.  
καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον  
οὐσίας;

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534 C-E.  
ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ δια-  
&c.

Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 535-536 D.

the juvenile studies and gymnastics, must be placed <sup>studies for the young</sup> in a select class of honour above the rest, and must be initiated in a synoptic view of the affinity pervading all the separate cognitions which have been imparted to them. They must also be introduced to the view of Real Essence and its nature. This is the test of aptitude for Dialectics: it is the synoptic view only, which constitutes the Dialectician.<sup>a</sup> <sup>youth upwards.</sup>

In these new studies they will continue until thirty years of age: after which a farther selection must be made, of those who have most distinguished themselves. The men selected will be enrolled in a class of yet higher honour, and will be tested by dialectic cross-examination: so that we may discover who among them are competent to apprehend true, pure, and real Essence, renouncing all visual and sensible perceptions.<sup>x</sup> It is important that such Dialectic exercises should be deferred until this advanced age—and not imparted, as they are among us at present, to immature youths: who abuse the license of interrogation, find all their homegrown opinions uncertain, and end by losing all positive convictions.<sup>y</sup> Our students will remain under such dialectic tuition for five years, until they are thirty-five years of age: after which they must be brought again down into the cave, and constrained to acquire practical experience by undertaking military and administrative functions. In such employments they will spend fifteen years: during which they will undergo still farther scrutiny, to ascertain whether they can act up to their previous training, in spite of all provocations and temptations.<sup>z</sup> Those who well sustain all these trials will become, at fifty years of age, the finished Elders or Chiefs of the Republic. They will pass their remaining years partly in philosophical contemplations, partly in application of philosophy to the regulation of the city. It is these Elders whose mental eye will have been so trained as to contemplate the Real Essence of Good, and to copy it as an archetype in all their ordinances and administration. They will be the Moderators of the city: but they

Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 536-537 C.

πειρα  
σως καὶ μή· ὁ μὲν γὰρ  
μή, οὐ.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Republic, p. 537 D.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 538-539.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 539 D-E.

will perform this function as a matter of duty and necessity—not being at all ambitious of it as a matter of honour.<sup>a</sup>

What has here been said about the male guardians and philosophers must be understood to apply equally to the female. We recognise no difference in this respect between the two sexes. Those females who have gone through the same education and have shown themselves capable of enduring the same trials as males, will participate, after fifty years of age, in the like philosophical contemplations, and in superintendence of the city.<sup>b</sup>

I have thus shown (Sokrates pursues) how the fundamental postulate for our city may be brought about.—That philosophers, a single man or a few, shall become possessed of supreme rule: being sufficiently exalted in character to despise the vulgar gratifications of ambition, and to carry out systematically the dictates of rectitude and justice. The postulate is indeed hard to be realised—yet not impossible.<sup>c</sup> Such philosophical rulers, as a means for first introducing their system into a new city, will send all the inhabitants above ten years old away into the country, reserving only the children, whom they will train up in their own peculiar manners and principles. In this way the city, according to our scheme, will be first formed: when formed, it will itself be happy, and will confer inestimable benefit on the nation to which it belongs.<sup>d</sup>

Plato thus assumes his city, and the individual man forming a parallel to his city, to be perfectly well constituted. Reason, the higher element, exercises steady controul: the lower elements, Energy and Appetite, both acquiesce contentedly in her right to controul, and obey her orders—the former constantly and forwardly—the latter sometimes requiring constraint by the strength of the former.

But even under the best possible administration, the city, though it will last long, will not last for ever. Eternal continuance belongs only to Ens; everything generated must one day or other be destroyed.<sup>e</sup> The fatal period will at length arrive, when the

All these studies, and this education, are common to females as well as males.

First formation of the Platonic city—how brought about: difficult, but not impossible.

The city thus formed will last long, but not for ever. After a certain time, it will begin to

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 539-540.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 540 C.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 540 E.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 541 A.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. p. 546 A. *ενομένην παντὶ φθορὰ ἐστίν, &c.*

breed of Guardians will degenerate. A series of <sup>degenerate.</sup> changes for the worse will then commence, whereby <sup>Stages of its degeneracy.</sup> the Platonic city will pass successively into timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, despotism. The first change will be, that the love of individual wealth and landed property will get possession of the Guardians: who, having in themselves the force of the city, will divide the territory among themselves, and reduce the other citizens to dependance and slavery.<sup>f</sup> They will at the same time retain a part of their former mental training. They will continue their warlike habits and drill: they will be ashamed of their wealth, and will enjoy it only in secret: they will repudiate money-getting occupations as disgraceful. They will devote themselves to the contests of war and political ambition—the rational soul becoming subordinate to the energetic and courageous.<sup>g</sup> The system which thus obtains footing will be analogous to the Spartan and Kretan, which have many admirers.<sup>h</sup> The change in individual character will correspond to this change in the city. Reason partially losing its ascendancy, while energy and appetite both gain ground—an intermediate character is formed in which energy of courage predominates. We have the haughty, domineering, contentious, man.<sup>i</sup>

Out of this timocracy, or timarchy, the city will next pass into an oligarchy, or government of wealth. The rich will here govern, to the exclusion of the poor. Reason, in the timocracy, was under the dominion of energy or courage: in the oligarchy, it will be under the dominion of appetite. The love of wealth will become predominant, instead of the love of force and aggrandisement. Now the love of wealth is distinctly opposed to the love of virtue: virtue and wealth are like weights in opposite scales.<sup>k</sup> The oligarchical city will lose all its unity, and will consist of a few rich with a multitude

1. Timocracy and the timocratical individual.  
2. Oligarchy and the oligarchical individual.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. p. 547.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 547-

548 D. διαφανέστατον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ  
μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατοῦν-

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. p. 544 C.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 549-550.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 550 D-E.

551 A. προϊόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ  
, τοῦτο.

οὕτω πλοῦτον  
ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου  
ἐκατέρου, αἰ τοῦναντίον ῥέποντε; also  
p. 555 D.

of discontented poor ready to rise against them.<sup>1</sup> "The character of the individual citizen will undergo a modification similar to that of the collective city. He will be under the rule of appetite: his reason will be only invoked as the servant of appetite, to teach him how he may best enrich himself."<sup>m</sup> He will be frugal,—will abstain from all unnecessary expenditure, even for generous and liberal purposes—and will keep up a fair show of honesty, from the fear of losing what he has already got."<sup>n</sup>

The oligarchical city will presently be transformed into a democracy, mainly through the abuse and exaggeration of its own ruling impulse—the love of wealth. The rulers, anxious to enrich themselves, rather encourage than check the extravagance of young spendthrifts, to whom they lend money at high interest, or whose property they buy on advantageous terms. In this manner there arises a class of energetic men, with ruined fortunes and habits of indulgence. Such are the adventurers who put themselves at the head of the discontented poor, and overthrow the oligarchy.<sup>o</sup> The ruling few being expelled or put down, a democracy is established with equal franchise, and generally with officers chosen by lot.<sup>p</sup>

The characteristic of the democracy is equal freedom and open speech to all, with liberty to each man to shape his own life as he chooses. Hence there arises a great diversity of individual taste and character. Uniformity of pursuit or conduct is scarcely enforced: there is little restraint upon any one. A man offers himself for office whenever he chooses and not unless he chooses. He is at war or at peace, not by obedience to any public authority, but according to his own individual preference. If he be even condemned by a court of justice, he remains in the city careless of the sentence, which is never enforced against him. This democracy is an equal, agreeable, diversified, society, with little or no government: equal in regard to all—to the good, bad, and indifferent.<sup>q</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. p. 552 D-E.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. p. 553 C.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. p. 554 D.

Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 555-556.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. p. 557 A.

Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 557-558.

So too the democratical individual. The son of one among these frugal and money-getting oligarchs, departing from the habits and disregarding the advice of his father, contracts a taste for expensive and varied indulgences. He loses sight of the distinction between what is necessary, and what is not necessary, in respect to desires and pleasures. If he be of a quiet temperament, not quite out of the reach of advice, he keeps clear of ruinous excess in any one direction; but he gives himself up to a great diversity of successive occupations and amusements, passing from one to the other without discrimination of good from bad, necessary from unnecessary.<sup>r</sup> His life and character thus becomes an agreeable, unconstrained, changeful, comprehensive, miscellany, like the society to which he belongs.<sup>s</sup>

Democracy, like oligarchy, becomes ultimately subverted by an abuse of its own characteristic principle. Freedom is gradually pushed into extravagance and excess, while all other considerations are neglected. No obedience is practised: no authority is recognised. The son feels himself equal to his father, the disciple to his teacher, the metic to the citizen, the wife to her husband, the slave to his master. Nay, even horses, asses, and dogs, go free about, so that they run against you in the road, if you do not make way for them.<sup>t</sup> The laws are not obeyed: every man is his own master.

The subversion of such a democracy arises from the men who rise to be popular leaders in it: violent, ambitious, extravagant, men, who gain the favour of the people by distributing among them confiscations from the property of the rich. The rich, resisting these injustices, become enemies to the constitution: the people, in order to put them down, range themselves under the banners of the most energetic popular leader, who takes advantage of such a position to render himself a despot.<sup>u</sup> He begins his rule by some accept-

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 560-561 B. *εἰς ἴσον δὲ τι καταστήσας τὰς διδάγει τῇ παραπιπτούσῃ αἰὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχὴν παρα-*

*ἴσου τῇ*  
Plato, Republic, viii. p. 561 D-E.

*τε καὶ καὶ τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτον ἀνδρὰ εἶναι.*

Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 562-563 C.  
<sup>u</sup> Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 565-566.

4. Passage from democracy to despotism. Character of the despotic city.

able measures, such as abolition of debts, and assignment of lands to the poorer citizens, until he has expelled or destroyed the parties opposed to him. He seeks pretences for foreign war, in order that the people may stand in need of a leader, and may be kept poor by the contributions necessary to sustain war. But presently he finds, or suspects, dissatisfaction among the more liberal spirits. He kills or banishes them as enemies: and to ensure the continuance of his rule, he is under the necessity of dispatching in like manner every citizen prominent either for magnanimity, intelligence, or wealth.\* Becoming thus odious to all the better citizens, he is obliged to seek support by enlisting a guard of mercenary foreigners and manumitted slaves. He cannot pay his guards, without plundering the temples, extorting perpetual contributions from the people, and grinding them down by severe oppression and suffering.† Such is the government of the despot, which Euripides and other poets employ their genius in extolling.‡

We have now to describe the despotic individual, the parallel of the despotised city. As the democratic individual arises from the son of an oligarchical citizen departing from the frugality of his father and contracting habits of costly indulgence: so the son of this democrat will contract desires still more immoderate and extravagant than his father, and will thus be put into training for the despotic character. He becomes intoxicated by insane appetites, which serve as seconds and auxiliaries to one despotic passion or mania, swaying his whole soul.¶ To gratify such desires, he spends all his possessions, and then begins to borrow money wherever he can. That resource being exhausted, he procures additional funds by fraud or extortion; he cheats and ruins his father and mother; he resorts to plunder and violence. If such men are only a small minority, amidst citizens of better character, they live by committing crimes on the smaller scale. But if they are more numerous, they set up as a despot the most unprincipled and energetic

Despotic individual corresponding to that city.

\* Plato, Republic, viii. p. 567 B.

† Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 568-569.

‡ Plato, Republic, viii. p. 568 B.

¶ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 572-573 D.

Ἔρως τύραννος ἐνδον οἰκῶν

ἢς ἅπαντα (pp. 574-575)

τυραννευθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἐρωτος—Ἔρως μόναι-  
χος, &c.

of their number, and become his agents for the enslavement of their fellow-citizens.<sup>b</sup> The despotic man passes his life always in the company of masters, or instruments, or flatterers: he knows neither freedom nor true friendship—nothing but the relation of master and slave. The despot is the worst and most unjust of mankind: the longer he continues despot, the worse he becomes.<sup>c</sup>

We have thus gone through the four successive depravations which our perfect city will undergo—timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, despotism. Step by step we have passed from the best to the worst—from one extreme to the other. As is the city, so is the individual citizen—good or bad: the despotic city is like the despotic individual,—and so about the rest. Now it remains to decide whether in each case happiness and misery is proportioned to good and evil: whether the best is the happiest, the worst the most miserable,—and so proportionally about the intermediate.<sup>d</sup> On this point there is much difference of opinion.<sup>e</sup>

The city has thus passed, by four stages, from best to worst. Question—How are Happiness and Misery apportioned among them?

If we look at the condition of the despotised city, it plainly exhibits the extreme of misery; while our model city presents the extreme of happiness. Every one in the despotised city is miserable, according to universal admission, except the despot himself with his immediate favourites and guards. To be sure, in the eyes of superficial observers, the despot with these few favourites will appear perfectly happy and enviable. But if we penetrate beyond this false exterior show, and follow him into his interior, we shall find him too not less miserable than those over whom he tyrannises.<sup>f</sup>

Misery of the despotised city.

What is true of the despotised city, is true also of the despotising individual.<sup>g</sup> The best parts of his mind are under subjection to the worst: the rational mind is trampled down by the appetitive mind, with its insane and unsatisfied cravings. He is full of perpetual perturbation, anxiety, and fear; grief when he fails, repentance

Supreme Misery of the despotising individual.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 574-575.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 575-576.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 576 D.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 576 C.

τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πολλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 577 A.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 577 C. τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἀναμιμνησκόμενος τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός—εἰ οὖν ὁμοιος τῇ πόλει, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ ἢ αὐτὴν τάξιν ἐνεῖναι; &c. P. 579 E.

even after he has succeeded. Speaking of his mind as a whole, he never does what he really wishes: for the rational element, which alone can ensure satisfaction to the whole mind, and guide to the attainment of his real wishes, is enslaved by furious momentary impulses.<sup>b</sup> The man of despotical mind is thus miserable; and most of all miserable, the more completely he succeeds in subjugating his fellow-citizens and becoming a despot in reality. Knowing himself to be hated by every one, he lives in constant fear of enemies within as well as enemies without, against whom he can obtain support only by courting the vilest of men as partisans.<sup>i</sup> Though greedy of all sorts of enjoyment, he cannot venture to leave his city or visit any of the frequented public festivals. He lives indoors like a woman, envying those who can go abroad and enjoy these spectacles.<sup>k</sup> He is in reality the poorest and most destitute of men, having the most vehement desires, which he can never satisfy.<sup>l</sup> Such is the despot who, not being master even of himself, becomes master of others: in reality, the most wretched of men, though he may appear happy to superficial judges who look only at 'external show.'<sup>m</sup>

Thus then (concludes Sokrates) we may affirm with confidence, having reference to the five distinct cities above described—(1. The Model-City, regal or aristocratical. 2. Timocracy. 3. Oligarchy. 4. Democracy. 5. Despotism)—that the first of these is happy, and the last miserable: the three intermediate cities being more or less happy in the order which they occupy from the first to the last.

Conclusion—  
The Model  
city and the  
individual  
correspond-  
ing to it, are  
the happiest  
of all—That  
which is  
farthest re-  
moved from  
it, is the most  
miserable of  
all.

The Just  
Man is  
happy in and  
through his  
Justice, how-  
ever he may  
be treated by  
others. The  
Unjust Man,  
miserable.

Each of these cities has its parallel in an individual citizen. The individual citizen corresponding to the first is happy—he who corresponds to the last is miserable: and so proportionally for the individual corresponding to the three intermediate cities. He is happy or miserable, in and through himself,

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 577-578.

Καὶ ἡ τυραννομένη ἔρα ψυχὴ ἥκιστα  
καὶ ἂν βουλήθῃ, ὥς περ  
εἰπὼν ψυχῆς· ὑπὸ δὲ οἴστρου ἀεὶ ἔλκο-

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 578-579.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 579 C.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 579 E.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 579-580.

or essentially ; whether he be known to Gods and men or not—whatever may be the sentiment entertained of him by others.<sup>n</sup>

There are two other lines of argument (continues Sokrates) establishing the same conclusion.

1. We have seen that both the collective city and the individual mind are distributed into three portions : Reason, Energy, Appetite. Each of these portions has its own peculiar pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, beginnings or principles of action : Love of Knowledge : Love of Honour : Love of Gain. If you question men in whom these three varieties of temper respectively preponderate, each of them will extol the pleasures of his own department above those belonging to the other two. The lover of wealth will declare the pleasures of acquisition and appetite to be far greater than those of honour or of knowledge : each of the other two will say the same for himself, and for the pleasures of his own department. Here then the question is opened, Which of the three is in the right ? • Which of the three varieties of pleasure and modes of life is the more honourable or base, the better or worse, the more pleasurable or painful ?<sup>o</sup> By what criterion, or by whose judgment, is this question to be decided ? It must be decided by experience, intelligence, and rational discourse.<sup>p</sup> Now it is certain that the lover of knowledge, or the philosopher, has greater experience of all the three varieties of pleasure than is possessed by either of the other two men. He must in his younger days have tasted and tried the pleasures of both ; but the other two have never tasted his.<sup>q</sup> Moreover, each of the three acquires more or less of honour, if he succeeds in his own pursuit : accordingly the pleasures belonging to the love of honour are shared, and may be appreciated, by the philosopher ; while the lover of honour as such, has no sense for the pleasures of philosophy. In the range of personal experience, therefore, the philosopher surpasses the other two : he surpasses them no less in exercised

Other arguments proving the same conclusion—Pleasures of Intelligence are the best of all pleasures.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 580 D.  
 ἂν τε λαοθάνωσιν ἂν τε μὴ, πάντας

ἰ τε

Plato, Republic, ix. p. 581.

Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 A.  
 τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 B.

intelligence, and in rational discourse, which is his own principal instrument.<sup>r</sup> If wealth and profit furnished the proper means of judgment, the money-lover would have been the best judge of the three: if honour and victory furnished the proper means, we should consult the lover of honour: but experience, intelligence, and rational discourse, have been shown to be the means—and therefore it is plain that the philosopher is a better authority than either of the other two. His verdict must be considered as final. He will assuredly tell us, that the pleasures belonging to the love of knowledge are the greatest: those belonging to the love of honour and power the next: those belonging to the love of money and to appetite, the least.<sup>s</sup>

2. The second argument, establishing the same conclusion, is as follows:—No pleasures, except those belonging to philosophy or the love of wisdom, are completely true and pure. All the other pleasures are mere shadowy outlines, looking like pleasure at a distance, but not really pleasures when you contemplate them closely.<sup>t</sup> Pleasure and pain are two conditions opposite to each other. Between them both is another state, neither one nor the other, called neutrality or indifference. Now a man who has been sick and is convalescent, will tell you that nothing is more pleasurable than being in health, but that he did not know what the pleasure of it was, until he became sick. So too men in pain affirm that nothing is more pleasurable than relief from pain. When a man is grieving, it is exemption or indifference, not enjoyment, which he extols as the greatest pleasure. Again, when a man has been in a state of enjoyment, and the enjoyment ceases, this cessation is painful. We thus see that the intermediate state—cessation, neutrality, indifference—will be sometimes pain, sometimes pleasure, according to circumstances. Now that which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot possibly be both.<sup>u</sup>

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 C-D. *ἵσται δὲ τοῦτου μάλιστα ὄργανον.*

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 582-583.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 583 B. *δὲ παναληθὲς ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἐστὶν, οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ*

*μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινος ἀκηκοέναι.*

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Republic ix. pp.

*\*Ο μεταξὺ ἄρα νῦν ἔστι μεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἀμφοτέρω ἐστὶν, λύπη δὲ καὶ δυνάμει τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι; Οὐ μοι δι*

Pleasure is<sup>a</sup> a positive movement or mutation of the mind : so also is pain. Neutrality or indifference is a negative condition, intermediate between the two : no movement but absence of movement : non-pain, non-pleasure. But non-pain is not really pleasure : non-pleasure is not really pain. When therefore neutrality or non-pain, succeeding immediately after pain, appears to be a pleasure—this is a mere appearance or illusion, not a reality. When neutrality or non-pleasure, succeeding immediately after pleasure, appears to be pain—this also is a mere appearance or illusion, not a reality. There is nothing sound or trustworthy in such appearances. Pleasure is not cessation of pain, but something essentially different : pain is not cessation of pleasure, but something essentially different.

Take, for example, the pleasures of smell, which are true and genuine pleasures of great intensity: they spring up instantaneously without presupposing any anterior pain—they depart without leaving any subsequent pain.<sup>x</sup> These are true and pure pleasures, radically different from cessation of pain: so also true and pure pains are different from cessation of pleasure. Most of the so-called pleasures, especially the more intense, which reach the mind through the body, are in reality not pleasures at all, but only cessations or reliefs from pain. The same may be said about the pleasures and pains of anticipation belonging to these so-called bodily pleasures.<sup>y</sup> They may be represented by the following simile:—There is in nature a real Absolute Up and uppermost point—a real Absolute Down and lowest point—and a centre between them.<sup>z</sup> A man borne from the lowest point to the centre will think himself moving upwards, and will be moving upwards relatively. If his course be stopped in the centre, he will think

Most men know nothing of true and pure pleasure. Simile of the Kosmos—Absolute height and depth.

γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ  
λυπηρὸν, κίνησις τις ἀμφοτέρω ἔστων;  
ἢ οὐ; Ναί. Τὸ δὲ μήτε ἡδὺ μήτε λυπη-  
ρὸν οὐχὶ ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ  
τούτων ἰφάντ' ἄρτι; Ἐφάνη γάρ. Πῶς  
θῶς ἔστι τὸ  
σθαι, ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν  
ἄρα τοῦτο,

αὐτῶν τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς

Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 B.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 C.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 C. Νο-  
μίζεις τι εἶναι ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄνω,  
τὸ δὲ κάτω, τὸ δὲ μέσον;

παρὰ

himself at the absolute summit—on looking to the point from which he came, and ignorant as he is of anything higher. If he be forced to return from the centre to the point from whence he came, he will think himself moving downwards, and will be really moving downwards, absolutely as well as relatively. Such misapprehension arises from his not knowing the portion of the Kosmos above the centre—the true and absolute Up or summit. Now the case of pleasure and pain is analogous to this. Pain is the absolute lowest—Pleasure the absolute highest—non-pleasure, non-pain, the centre intermediate between them. But most men know nothing of the region above the centre, or the absolute highest—the region of true and pure pleasure: they know only the centre and what is below it, or the region of pain. When they fall from the centre to the point of pain, they conceive the situation truly, and they really are pained: but when they rise from the lowest point to the centre, they misconceive the change, and imagine themselves to be in a process of replenishment and acquisition of pleasure. They mistake the painless condition for pleasure, not knowing what true pleasure is: just as a man who has seen only black and not white, will fancy, if dun be shown to him, that he is looking on white.<sup>a</sup>

Hunger and thirst are states of emptiness in the body: ignorance and folly are states of emptiness in the mind. A hungry man in eating or drinking obtains replenishment: an ignorant man becoming instructed obtains replenishment also. Now replenishment derived from that which exists more fully and perfectly, is truer and more real than replenishment from that which exists less fully and perfectly.<sup>b</sup>

Nourishment  
of the mind  
partakes  
more of real  
essence than  
nourishment  
of the body  
—Replenish-

fuller plea-

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, pp. 584-585.

Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα πάσχοι ἂν πάντα διὰ  
τὸ μὴ ἔμπειρος εἶναι τοῦ ἀληθῶς ἄνω τε  
ὄντος καὶ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κάτω;—ὅταν μὲν  
ἐπὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν φέρωνται, ἀληθῆ τε  
οἴονται καὶ τῷ ὄντι λυποῦνται, ὅταν δὲ  
ἀπὸ λύπης ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξὺ, σχοί  
οἴονται πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ  
ὥσπερ

λευκοῦ, καὶ

es

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 585 B.  
ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἡττον  
τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος; Δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ  
λον. Πότερα οὖν ἡγεῖ τὰ γένη μί  
καθαρὰς οὐσίας μετέχειν, τὰ οἷον σίτου  
καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὕψου καὶ  
, ἢ τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ  
καὶ νοῦ καὶ

Let us then compare the food which serves for replenishment of the body, with that which serves for replenishment of the mind. Which of the two is most existent? Which of the two partakes most of pure essence? Meat and drink—or true opinions, knowledge, intelligence, and virtue? Which of the two exists most perfectly? That which embraces the true, eternal, and unchangeable—and which is itself of similar nature? Or that which embraces the mortal, the transient, and the ever variable—being itself of kindred nature? Assuredly the former. It is clear that what is necessary for the sustenance of the body partakes less of truth and real essence, than what is necessary for the sustenance of the mind. The mind is replenished with nourishment more real and essential: the body with nourishment less so: the mind itself is also more real and essential than the body. The mind therefore is more, and more thoroughly, replenished than the body. Accordingly, if pleasure consists in being replenished with what suits its peculiar nature, the mind will enjoy more pleasure and truer pleasure than the body.<sup>c</sup> Those who are destitute of intelligence and virtue, passing their lives in sensual pursuits, have never tasted any pure or lasting pleasure, nor ever carried their looks upwards to the higher region in which alone it resides. Their pleasures, though seeming intense, and raising vehement desires in their uninstructed minds, are yet only phantoms deriving a semblance of pleasure from contrast with pains:<sup>d</sup> they are like the phantom of Helen, for which (as Stesichorus says) the Greeks and Trojans fought so many battles, knowing nothing about the true Helen, who was never in Troy.

The pleasures belonging to the Love of Honour (Energy or Passion) are no better than those belonging to the Love of Money (Appetite). In so far as the desires belonging to both these departments of mind are under the controul of the third or best department (Love of Wisdom, or Reason), the nearest approach to true pleasure, which it is in the nature of either of them to bestow, will be realised. But in so far as either

Comparative worthlessness of the pleasures of Appetite and Ambition, when measured against those of Intelligence.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 585 E.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 586.

of them throws off the controul of Reason, it will neither obtain its own truest pleasures, nor allow the other departments of mind to obtain theirs.<sup>e</sup> The desires connected with love, and with despotic power, stand out more than the others, as recusant to Reason, Law, and Regulation. The kingly and moderate desires are most obedient to this authority. The lover and the despot, therefore, will enjoy the least pleasure: the kingly-minded man will enjoy the most. Of the three sorts of pleasure, one true and legitimate, two bastard, the despot goes most away from the legitimate, and to the farthest limit of the bastard. His condition is the most miserable, that of the kingly-minded man is the happiest: between the two come the oligarchical and the democratical man. The difference between the two extremes is as 1 : 729.<sup>f</sup>

I have thus refuted (continues Sokrates) the case of those who contend—That the unjust man is a gainer by

The Just Man will be happy from his justice—He will look only to the good order of his own mind—He will stand aloof from public affairs, in cities as now constituted.

his injustice, provided he could carry it on successfully, and with the reputation of being just. I have shown that injustice is the greatest possible mischief, intrinsically and in itself, apart from consequences and apart from public reputation: inasmuch as it enslaves the better part of the mind to the worse.

Justice, on the other hand, is the greatest possible good, intrinsically and in itself, apart from consequences and reputation, because it keeps the worse parts of the mind under due controul and subordination to the better.<sup>g</sup> Vice and infirmity of every kind is pernicious, because it puts the best parts of the mind under subjection to the worst.<sup>h</sup> No success in the acquisition of wealth, aggrandisement, or any other undue object, can compensate a man for the internal disorder which he introduces into his own mind by becoming unjust. A well-ordered mind, just and temperate, with the better part governing the worse, is the first of all objects: greater even than a healthy, strong, and beautiful body.<sup>i</sup> To put his mind into this condition, and to acquire all the knowledge thereunto conducing, will be the purpose of a wise man's life.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 586-587.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 587 E.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 588-589.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 590 B-C.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 B.

Even in the management of his body, he will look not so much to the health and strength of his body, as to the harmony and fit regulation of his mind. In the acquisition of money, he will keep the same end in view: he will not be tempted by the admiration and envy of people around him to seek great wealth, which will disturb the mental polity within him:<sup>k</sup> he will, on the other hand, avoid depressing poverty, which might produce the same effect. He will take as little part as possible in public life, and will aspire to no political honours, in cities as at present constituted—nor in any other than the model-city which we have described.<sup>l</sup>

The tenth and last book of the Republic commences with an argument of considerable length, repeating and confirming by farther reasons the sentence of expulsion which Plato had already pronounced against the poets in his second and third books.<sup>m</sup> The Platonic Sokrates here not only animadverts upon poetry, but extends his disapprobation to other imitative arts, such as painting. He attacks the process of imitation generally, as false and deceptive; pleasing to ignorant people, but perverting their minds by phantasms which they mistake for realities. The work of the imitator is not merely not reality, but is removed from it by two degrees. What is real is the Form or Idea: the one conceived object denoted by each appellative name common to many particulars. There is one Form or Idea, and only one, known by the name of Bed; another by the name of Table.<sup>n</sup> When the carpenter constructs a bed or a table, he fixes his contemplation on this Form or Idea, and *τίσις το αὐτὸν* it. What he constructs, however, is not the true, real, existent, table, which

Tenth Book  
—Censure of  
the poets is  
renewed—  
Mischiefs of  
imitation  
generally, as  
deceptive—  
Imitation  
from imita-  
tion.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 D. καὶ τὸν ἕγον τοῦ πλῆθους οὐκ, ἐκπλητ-  
ῖπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακά  
κἀκα  
ζων—'Ἄλλ' ἀποβλέπων γε, πρὸς τὴν  
' αὐτῷ πολιτείαν, καὶ φυλάττων μὴ τι  
τῶν

οὐσίας ἢ δι' ὀλιγότητα, οὕτω  
προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας,

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, x.  
language here used by Plato seems to

imply that his opinions adverse to poetry had been attacked and required defence.

Plato, Republic, x. p. 596 A-B.

γὰρ πού τι ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι  
περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ, οἷς ταῦτ' ὄνομα  
ἐπιφέρομεν—θῶμεν δὴ καὶ νῦν ὅτι  
βούλει τῶν πολλῶν· οἷον, εἰ θέλεις πολ-  
λαὶ πού εἰσι κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι—'Ἄλλ'  
γέ που περὶ ταῦτα τὰ σκεῖ  
ι, μία δὲ τραπέζης.

alone exists in nature, and may be presumed to be made by the Gods<sup>o</sup>—but a something like the real existent table: not true Ens, but only quasi-Ens:<sup>p</sup> dim and indistinct, as compared with the truth, and standing far off from the truth. Next to the carpenter comes the painter, who copies not the real existent table, but the copy of that table made by the carpenter. The painter fixes his contemplation upon it, not as it really exists, but simply as it appears: he copies an appearance or phantasm, not a reality. Thus the table will have a different appearance, according as you look at it from near or far—from one side or the other: yet in reality it never differs from itself. It is one of these appearances that the painter copies, not the reality itself. He can in like manner paint anything and everything, since he hardly touches anything at all—and nothing whatever except in appearance. He can paint all sorts of craftsmen and their works—carpenters, shoemakers, &c.—without knowledge of any one of their arts.<sup>q</sup>

The like is true also of the poets. Homer and the tragedians give us talk and affirmations about everything: government, legislation, war, medicine, husbandry, the character and proceedings of the Gods, the habits and training of men, &c. Some persons even extol Homer as the great educator of the Hellenic world, whose poems we ought to learn by heart as guides for education and administration.<sup>r</sup> But Homer, Hesiod, and the other poets, had no real knowledge of the multifarious matters which they profess to describe. These poets know nothing except about appearances, and will describe only appearances, to the satisfaction of the ignorant multitude.<sup>s</sup> The representations of the painter, reproducing only the appearances to sense, will be constantly fallacious and deceptive, requiring to be corrected by measuring, weighing, counting—which are processes belonging to Reason.<sup>t</sup> The lower and the

Censure of  
Homer—He  
is falsely ex-  
toll'd as edu-  
cator of the  
Hellenic  
world. He  
and other  
poets only  
deceive their  
hearers.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, x. p. 597 B-D.

μία μὲν ἡ ἱ-  
δν, ὥς ἐγώμ

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Republic, x. p. 597 A. οὐκ  
ἂν τὸ δν ποιῶι, ἀλλὰ τι τοιοῦτον οἶον τὸ  
δν, δν δὲ οὐ.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Republic, x. p. 598 B-C.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Republic, p. 606 E.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Republic, x. pp. 600-601 C.  
τοῦ μὲν δντος οὐδὲν ἐπαίει, τοῦ δὲ φαινο-  
μένου. P. 602 B. οἶον φαίνεται  
εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ  
τοῦτο μὴ

Plato, Republic, x. pp. 602-603.

higher parts of the mind are here at variance; and the painter addresses himself to the lower, supplying falsehood as if it were truth. The painter does this through the eye, the poet through the ear.<sup>u</sup>

In the various acts and situations of life a man is full of contradictions. He is swayed by manifold impulses, often directly contradicting each other. Hence we have affirmed that there are in his mind two distinct principles, one contradicting the other: the emotional and the rational.<sup>x</sup> When a man suffers misfortune, emotion prompts him to indulge in extreme grief, and to abandon himself like a child to the momentary tide. Reason, on the contrary, exhorts him to resist, and to exert himself immediately in counsel to rectify or alleviate what has happened, adapting his conduct as well as he can to the actual throw of the dice which has befallen him.<sup>y</sup> Now it is these vehement bursts of emotion which lend themselves most effectively to the genius of the poet, and which he must work up to please the multitude in the theatre: the state of rational self-command can hardly be described so as to touch their feelings. We see thus that the poet, like the painter, addresses himself to the lower department of the mind, exalting the emotional into preponderance over the rational—the foolish over the wise—the false over the true.<sup>z</sup> He introduces bad government into the mind, giving to pleasure and pain the sceptre over reason. Hence we cannot tolerate the poet, in spite of all his sweets and captivations. We can only permit him to compose hymns for the Gods and encomiums for good men.<sup>a</sup>

The poet chiefly appeals to emotions—Mischief of such eloquent appeals, as disturbing the rational government of the mind.

This quarrel between philosophy and poetry (continues the

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Republic, x. p. 603 B.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Republic, x. p. 603 C.

ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γι-

μένους τοῦ π

τρίβειν, &c.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Republic, x. p. 605.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Republic, x. pp. 605-606-607.

τὸν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἐκδύτου τῇ

περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ, ἅμα δύο τινεῖ φαμεν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.

Plato, Republic, x. p. 604. Τῷ —εἰ

ύεσθαι περὶ τὸ γεγονὸς, καὶ ὥσπερ

ἐν

σοι

τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράγματα, ὅπρ δ λόγος αἰρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔφειν,

ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.

Platonic Sokrates) is of ancient date.<sup>b</sup> I myself am very sensible to the charms of poetry, especially that of Homer. I should be delighted if a case could be made out to justify me in admitting it into our city. But I cannot betray the cause of what seems to me truth. We must resist our sympathies and preferences, when they are incompatible with the right government of the mind.<sup>c</sup>

Ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry—Plato fights for philosophy, though his feelings are strongly enlisted for poetry.

To maintain the right government and good condition of the soul or mind, is the first of all considerations: and will be seen yet farther to be such, when we consider that it is immortal and imperishable. Of this Plato proceeds to give a proof,<sup>d</sup> concluding with a mythical sketch of the destiny of the soul after death. The soul being immortal (he says), the total number of souls is and always has been the same—neither increasing nor diminishing.<sup>e</sup>

Immortality of the soul affirmed and sustained by argument—Total number of souls always the same.

I have proved (the Platonic Sokrates concludes) in the preceding discourse, that Justice is better, in itself and intrinsically, than Injustice, quite apart from consequences in the way of reward and honour: that a man for the sake of his own happiness ought to be just, whatever may be thought of him by Gods or men—even though he possessed the magic ring of Gyges. Having proved this, and having made out the intrinsic superiority of justice to injustice, we may now take in the natural consequences and collateral bearings of both. We have hitherto reasoned upon the hypothesis that the just man was mistaken for unjust, and treated accordingly—that the unjust man found means to pass himself off for just, and to attract to himself the esteem and the rewards of justice.<sup>f</sup> But this hypothesis concedes too much, and we must now take back the concession. The just man will be happier than the unjust, not simply from the intrinsic working of justice on his own mind, but also from the exterior consequences of justice. He will be favoured and rewarded both by Gods and

Recapitulation—The Just Man will be happy, both from his justice and from its consequences, both here and hereafter.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 B.  
παλαιά τις διαφορά φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητική.

Plato, Republic, x. pp. 607-608.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, x. pp. 609-610.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, x. p. 611 A.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republic, x. p. 612 B-C.

men. Though he may be in poverty, sickness, or any other apparent state of evil, he may be assured that the Gods will compensate him for it by happiness either in life or after death.<sup>a</sup> And men too, though they may for a time be mistaken about the just and the unjust character, will at last come to a right estimation of both. The just man will finally receive honour, reward, and power, from his fellow-citizens : the unjust man will be finally degraded and punished by them.<sup>b</sup> And after death, the reward of the just man, as well as the punishment of the unjust, will be far greater than even during life.

This latter position is illustrated at some length by the mythe with which the Republic concludes, describing the realm of Hades, with the posthumous condition and treatment of the departed souls.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, x. pp. 612-613.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, x. p. 613 C-D.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

## REPUBLIC—REMARKS ON ITS MAIN THESIS.

THE preceding Chapter has described, in concise abstract, that splendid monument of Plato's genius, which passes under the name of the Πολιτεία or Republic. It is undoubtedly the grandest of all his compositions; including in itself all his different points of excellence. In the first Book, we have a subtle specimen of negative Dialectic,—of the Sokratic cross-examination or Elenchus. In the second Book, we find two examples of continuous or Ciceronian pleading (like that ascribed to Protagoras in the dialogue called by his name), which are surpassed by nothing in ancient literature, for acuteness and ability in the statement of a case. Next, we are introduced to Plato's most sublime effort of constructive ingenuity, in putting together both the individual man and the collective City: together with more information (imperfect as it is even here) about his Dialectic or Philosophy, than any other dialogue furnishes. The ninth Book exhibits his attempts to make good his own thesis against the case set forth in his own antecedent counterpleadings. The last Book concludes with a highly poetical mythe, embodying a Νέκυια shaped after his own fancy,—and the outline of cosmical agencies afterwards developed, though with many differences, in the Timæus. The brilliancy of the Republic will appear all the more conspicuous, when we come to compare it with Plato's two posterior compositions: with the Pythagorean mysticism and theology of the Timæus—or with the severe and dictatorial solemnity of the Treatise De Legibus.

Title of the Republic, of ancient date, but only a partial indication of its contents.

The title borne by this dialogue—the Republic or Polity—whether affixed by Plato himself or not, dates at least from his immediate disciples, Aristotle among them.<sup>a</sup> This title hardly presents a clear idea either of its proclaimed purpose or of its total contents.

<sup>a</sup> See Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Staat, p. 63 seq; Stallbaum, Proleg. p. lviii. seq.

The larger portion of the treatise is doubtless employed in expounding the generation of a commonwealth generally: from whence the author passes insensibly to the delineation of a Model-Commonwealth—enumerating the conditions of aptitude for its governors and guardian-soldiers, estimating the obstacles which prevent it from appearing in the full type of goodness—and pointing out the steps whereby, even if fully realised, it is likely to be brought to perversion and degeneracy. Nevertheless the avowed purpose of the treatise is, not to depict the ideal of a commonwealth, but to solve the questions, What is Justice? What is Injustice? Does Justice, in itself and by its own intrinsic working, make the just man happy, apart from all consequences, even though he is not known to be just, and is even treated as unjust, either by Gods or men? Does Injustice, under the like hypothesis, (*i. e.* leaving out all consideration of consequences either from Gods or from men), make the unjust man miserable? The reasonings respecting the best polity, are means to this end—intermediate steps to the settlement of this problem. We must recollect that Plato insists strongly on the parallelism between the individual and the state: he talks of “the polity” or Republic in each man’s mind, as of that in the entire city.<sup>b</sup>

The Republic, or Commonwealth, is introduced by Plato as being the individual man “writ large,” and therefore more clearly discernible and legible to an observer.<sup>c</sup> To illustrate the individual man, he begins <sup>was the dual.</sup> by describing (to use Hobbes’s language) the great Leviathan called a “Commonwealth or State, in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended.”<sup>d</sup> He pursues in much detail this parallel between the individual and the commonwealth, as well as

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Repub.* ix. p. 591 E. *βλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολι.* x. p. 608. *περὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ δεδιότι, &c.*

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 368 D.

“New presbyter is but old priest writ large.” —(Milton.)

<sup>d</sup> This is the language of Hobbes. Preface to the *Leviathan*. In the same treatise (*Part ii.* ch. 17, pp. 157-158,

Molesworth’s ed.) \* Hobbes says:—“The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend men from the invasion of foreigners and the injury of one another, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man or one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices to one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one

between the component parts and forces of the one, and those of the other. The perfection of the commonwealth (he represents) consists in its being One;° an integer or unit, of which the constituent individuals are merely functions, each having only a fractional, dependant, relative existence. As the commonwealth is an individual on a large scale, so the individual is a commonwealth on a small scale; in which the constituent fractions, Reason,—Energy or Courage,—and many-headed Appetite,—act each for itself and oppose each other. It is the tendency of Plato's imagination to bestow vivid reality on abstractions, and to reason upon metaphorical analogy as if it were close parallelism. His language exaggerates both the unity of the commonwealth, and the partibility of the individual, in illustrating the one by comparison with the other. The commonwealth is treated as capable of happiness or misery as an entire Person, apart from its component individuals:† while on the other hand, Reason, Energy, Appetite, are described as distinct and conflicting Persons, packed up in the same wrapper and therefore looking like One from the outside, yet really distinct, each acting and suffering by and for itself: like the charioteer and his two horses, which form the conspicuous metaphor in the Phædrus.¶ We are thus told, that though the man is apparently One, he is in reality Many or multipartite: though the perfect Commonwealth is apparently Many, it is in reality One.

Of the parts composing a man, as well as of the parts composing a commonwealth, some are better, others worse. A few are good and excellent; the greater number are low and bad; while there are intermediate gradations between the two. The perfection of a commonwealth, and the perfection of an individual man, is attained when each part performs its own appropriate function and no more,—not interfering with the rest. In

Each of them a whole, composed of parts distinct in function, and unequal in merit.

man or assembly of men to bear their person. This is more than consent or concord: *it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth, in Latin Civitas.* This is the genera-

tion of that great Leviathan," &c.

° Plato, Republic, iv. p. 423.

† Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421.

¶ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 588, x. p. 604, iv. pp. 436-441.

the commonwealth there are a small number of wise Elders or philosophers, whose appropriate function it is to look out for the good or happiness of the whole; and to controul the ordinary commonplace multitude, with a view to that end. Each of the multitude has his own special duty or aptitude, to which he confines himself, and which he executes in subordination to the wise or governing Few. And to ensure such subordination, there are an intermediate number of trained, or disciplined Guardians; who employ their force under the orders of the ruling Few, to controul the multitude within, as well as to repel enemies without. So too in the perfect man, Reason is the small but excellent organ whose appropriate function is, to controul the multitude of desires and to watch over the good of the whole: the function of Energy or Courage is, while itself obeying the Reason, to assist Reason in maintaining this controul over the Desires: the function of each several desire is to obey, pursuing its own special end in due harmony with the rest.

The End to be accomplished, and with reference to which Plato tests the perfection of the means, is, the happiness of the entire commonwealth,—the happiness of the entire individual man. In order to be happy, a commonwealth or an individual man must be at once wise, brave, temperate, just. There is however this difference between the four qualities. Though all four are essential, yet wisdom and bravery belong only to separate fractions of the commonwealth and separate fractions of the individual: while justice and temperance belong equally to all the fractions of the commonwealth and all the fractions of the individual. In the perfect commonwealth, Wisdom or Reason is found only in the One or Few Ruling Elders:—Energy or Courage only in the Soldiers or Guardians: but Elders, Guardians, and the working multitude, alike exhibit Justice and Temperance. All are just, inasmuch as each performs his appropriate business: all are temperate, inasmuch as all agree in recognising what is the appropriate business of each fraction—that of the Elders is, to rule—that of the others is, to obey. So too the individual: he is wise only in his Reason, brave only in his Energy or Courage:

End proposed by Plato. Happiness of the commonwealth. Happiness of the individual. Conditions of happiness.

but he is just and temperate in his Reason, Courage, and Appetites alike—each of these fractions acting in its own sphere under proper relations to the rest. In fact, according to the definitions given by Plato in the Republic, justice and temperance are scarce at all distinguishable from each other—and must at any rate be inseparable.

Now in regard to the definition here given by Plato of Justice, which is the avowed object of his Treatise, we may first remark that it is altogether peculiar to Plato; and that if we reason about Justice in the Platonic sense, we must take care not to affirm of it predicates which might be true in a more usual acceptation of the word. Next, that even adopting Plato's own meaning of Justice, it does not answer the purpose for which he produces it—viz.: to provide reply to the objections, and solution for the difficulties, which he had himself placed in the mouths of Glaukon and Adeimantus.

These two speakers (in the second Book) have advanced the position (which they affirm to be held by every one, past and present)—That justice is a good thing or a cause of happiness to the just agent—not in itself or separately, since the performance of just acts is more or less onerous and sometimes painful, presenting itself in the aspect of an obligation, but—because of its consequences, as being indispensable to procure for him some ulterior good, such as esteem and just treatment from others. Sokrates on the other hand declares justice to be good, or a cause of happiness, to the just agent, most of all in itself—but also, additionally, in its consequences: and injustice to be bad, or a cause of misery to the unjust agent, on both grounds also.

Suppose (we have seen it urged by Glaukon and Adeimantus) that a man is just, but is mis-esteemed by the society among whom he lives, and believed to be unjust. He will certainly be hated and ill-used by others, and may be ill-used to the greatest possible extent—impoverishment, scourging, torture, crucifixion. Again, suppose a man to be unjust, but to be in like manner misconceived, and treated as if he were just. He will receive from others golden opinions, just dealing, and goodwill, producing to him comfortable conse-

Peculiar  
view of Jus-  
tice taken  
by Plato.

Pleadings of  
Glaukon and

quences: and he will obtain, besides, the profits of injustice. Evidently, under these supposed circumstances, the just man will be miserable, in spite of his justice: the unjust man will, to say the least, be the happier of the two.

Moreover (so argues Glaukon), all fathers exhort their sons to be just, and forbid them to be unjust, admitting that justice is a troublesome obligation, but insisting upon it as indispensable to avert evil consequences and procure good. So also poets and teachers. All of them assume that justice is not inviting for itself, but only by reason of its consequences: and that injustice is in itself easy and inviting, were it not for mischievous consequences and penalties more than countervailing the temptation. All of them either anticipate, or seek to provide, penalties to be inflicted in case the agent commits injustice, and not to be inflicted if he continues just: so that the treatment which he receives afterwards shall be favourable or severe, conditional upon his own conduct. Such treatment may emanate either from Gods or from men: but in either case, it is assumed that the agent shall be known, or shall seem, to be what he really is: that the unjust agent shall seem, or be known, to be unjust—and that the just shall seem also to be what he is.

It is against this doctrine that the Platonic Sokrates in the Republic professes to contend. To refute it, he sets forth his own explanation, wherein justice consists. How far, or with what qualifications, the Sophists inculcated the doctrine (as various commentators tell us) we do not know. But Plato himself informs us that it was current and received in society, before Protagoras and Prodikus were born: taught by parents to their children, and by poets in their compositions generally circulated.<sup>b</sup> Moreover, Sokrates himself (in the Platonic Apology) recommends virtue on the ground of its remunerative consequences to the agent, in the shape of wealth and other good things.<sup>c</sup> Again, the Xenophontic

The arguments which they enforce were not invented by the Sophists, but were the received views anterior to Plato.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 363-364.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. p. 30 B.  
λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐ

τὰλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰσχύ  
καὶ ἰσχύ

Xenophon in the Cyropædia puts the following language into the mouth of the hero Cyrus, in addressing his officers (Cyrop. i. 5, 9). Καίτοι ἐγώ γε

Sokrates, as well as Xenophon himself, agree in the same general doctrine: presenting virtue as laborious and troublesome in itself, but as being fully requited by its remunerative consequences in the form of esteem and honour, to the attainment of which it is indispensable. In the memorable Choice of Heraklēs, that youth is represented as choosing a life of toil and painful self-denial, crowned ultimately by the attainment of honourable and beneficial results—in preference to a life of easy and inactive enjoyment.\*

We see thus that the doctrine which the Platonic Sokrates impugns in the Republic, is countenanced elsewhere by Socratic authority. It is, in my judgment, more true than that which he opposes to it. The exhortations and orders of parents to their children, which he condemns—were founded upon views of fact and reality more correct than those which the Sokrates of the Republic would substitute in place of them.

Let us note the sentiment in which Plato's creed here originates. He desires, above everything, to stand forward as the champion and panegyrist of justice,† as the enemy and denouncer of injustice. To praise justice, not in itself, but for its consequences—and to blame injustice in like manner—appears to him disparaging and insulting to justice.<sup>1</sup> He is not satisfied with showing that the just man benefits others by his justice, and that the unjust man hurts others by his injustice: he admits nothing into his calculation, except happiness or misery to

Argument of  
Sokrates to  
refute them.  
Sentiments  
in which it  
originates.  
Panegyric  
on Justice.

οἷτε τῶν παρ' αὐτὰ ἡδονῶν ἂ  
οὐχ ἵνα μηδέποτε εὐφρανθῶσι, τοῦτο  
πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' ὥς διὰ ταύτην τὴν  
εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα  
εὐφρανόμενοι, οὕτω παρ' αὐτὰ  
&c.

The love of praise is represented as the prominent motive of Cyrus to the practice of virtue (i. 5, 12, i. 2, 1).

Compare also Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* ii. 3, 5-15, vii. 5, 82, and Xenophon, *Economic.* xiv. 5-9; Xenophon, *De Venatione*, xii. 15-19.

\* Xenophon, *Memorab.* ii. 1, 19-20.  
&c. We read in the 'Works and Days' of Hesiod, 287:—

μέντοι κακότητα καὶ ἴλαδον ἔστιν

ὁδὸς,

γυβί :

δὲ καὶ ὀρθὸς οἶμος

Καὶ τῇ ῥχυσ τοπρῶτον ἐπὴν δ' εἰς

δ'

ἐοῦσα.

It is remarkable that while the Xenophontic Sokrates cites these verses from Hesiod as illustrating and enforcing the drift of his exhortation, the Platonic Sokrates cites them as misleading, and as a specimen of the hurtful errors instilled by the poets (*Republic*, ii. p. 364 D).

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 368 B.  
γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὀσιον ἢ παραγενέ-  
ικαιοςὺνη κακηγορουμένη  
' καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν, &c.

the agent himself: and happiness, moreover, inherent in the process of just behaviour—misery inherent in the process of unjust behaviour—whatever be the treatment which the agent may receive from either Gods or men. Justice *per se* (affirms Plato) is the cause of happiness to the just agent, absolutely and unconditionally; injustice, in like manner, of misery to the unjust—*quand même*—whatever the consequences may be either from men or Gods. This is the extreme strain of panegyric suggested by Plato's feeling, and announced as a conclusion substantiated by his reasons. Nothing more thoroughgoing can be advanced in eulogy of justice. "Neither the eastern star nor the western star is so admirable"—to borrow a phrase from Aristotle.<sup>m</sup>

Plato is here the first proclaimer of the doctrine afterwards so much insisted on by the Stoics—the all-sufficiency of virtue to the happiness of the virtuous agent, whatever may be his fate in other respects—without requiring any farther conditions or adjuncts. It will be seen that Plato maintains this thesis with reference to the terms *justice* and its opposite *injustice*; sometimes (though not often) using the general term *virtue* or wisdom, which was the ordinary term with the Stoics afterwards.

The ambiguous meaning of the word *justice* is known to Plato himself (as it is also to Aristotle). One professed purpose of the dialogue called the Republic is to remove such ambiguity. Apart from the many other differences of meaning (arising from dissentient sentiments of different men and different ages), there is one duplicity of meaning which Aristotle particularly dwells upon.<sup>n</sup>

Different  
senses of justice—wider  
and narrower  
sense.

<sup>m</sup> Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. v. 1, 1129, b. 28. οὐθ' ἔσπερος, οὐθ' ἔφος οὕτω θαυμαστός.

<sup>n</sup> Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. v. 2, 1129, a. 25. ξοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ καὶ ἡ ἀδικία.—also 1130, a. 3. τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον

κοινῶ.

This proposition—that justice is ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν—is the very proposition which Thrasymachus is introduced as affirming and Sokrates as combating,

in the first book of the Republic.

Compare also Aristotle's *Ethica Magna*, i. 34, p. 1193, b. 19, where the same explanation of justice is given: also p. 1194, a. 7, where the Republic of Plato is cited, and the principle of reciprocity, as laid down at the end of the second book of the Republic, is repeated. We read in a fragment of the lost treatise of Cicero, *De Republicâ* (iii. 6, 7):—"Justitia foras spectat, et projecta tota est atque eminent.—Quam virtus, præter cæteras, tota se ad alienas porrigit utilitates atque explicat."

In the stricter and narrower sense, justice comprehends only those obligations which each individual agent owes to others, and for the omission of which he becomes punishable as unjust—though the performance of them, under ordinary circumstances, carries little positive merit: in another and a larger sense, justice comprehends these and a great deal more, becoming co-extensive with wise, virtuous, and meritorious character generally. The narrower sense is that which is in more common use; and it is that which Plato assumes provisionally when he puts forward the case of opponents in the speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus. But when he comes to set forth his own explanation, and to draw up his own case, we see that he uses the term justice in its larger sense, as the condition of a mind perfectly well-balanced and well-regulated: as if a man could not be just, without being at the same time wise, courageous, and temperate. The just man described in the counter-pleadings of Glaukon and Adeimantus, would be a person like the Athenian Aristeides: the unjust man whom they contrast with him, would be one who maltreats, plunders, or deceives others, or usurps power over them. But the just man, when Sokrates replies to them and unfolds his own thesis, is made to include a great deal more: he is a person in whose mind each of the three constituent elements is in proper relation of controul or obedience to the others, so that the whole mind is perfect: a person whose Reason, being illuminated by contemplation of the Universals or self-existent Ideas of Goodness, Justice, Virtue, has become qualified to exercise controul over the two inferior elements: one of which (Energy) is its willing subordinate and auxiliary—while the lowest of the three (Appetite) is kept in regulation by the joint action of the two. The just man, so described, becomes identical with the true philosopher: no man who is not a philosopher can be just.<sup>o</sup> Aristeides would not at all correspond to the Platonic idéal of justice. He would be a stranger to the pleasure extolled by Plato as the

<sup>o</sup> This is the same distinction as that drawn by Epiktetus between the *φιλόσοφος* and the *ιδιώτης* (Arrian, *Epiktet.* iii. 19). An *ιδιώτης* may be just in the ordinary meaning of the word. Aristeides was an *ιδιώτης*. The Greek word *ιδιώτης*, designating the ordinary average citizen, as distinguished from any special or professional training, is highly convenient.

exclusive privilege of the just and virtuous—the pleasure of contemplating universal Ideas and acquiring extended knowledge.<sup>p</sup>

The Platonic conception of Justice or Virtue on the one side, and of Injustice or Vice on the other, is self-regarding and prudential. Justice is in the mind a condition analogous to good health and strength in the body—(*mens sana in corpore sano*)—Injustice is a condition analogous to sickness, corruption, impotence, in the body.<sup>q</sup> The body is healthy, when each of its constituent parts performs its appropriate function: it is unhealthy, when there is failure in this respect, either defective working of any part, or interference of one part with the rest. So too in the just mind, each of its tripartite constituents performs its appropriate function—the rational mind directing and controuling, the energetic and appetitive minds obeying such controul. In the unjust mind, the case is opposite: Reason exercises no supremacy: Passion and Appetite, acting each for itself, are disorderly, reckless, exorbitant. To possess a healthy body is desirable for its consequences as a means towards other constituents of happiness; but it is still more desirable in itself, as an essential element of happiness *per se*, i. e. the negation of sickness, which would of itself make us miserable. On the other hand, an unhealthy or corrupt body is miserable by reason of its consequences, but still more miserable *per se*, even apart from consequences. In like manner, the just mind blesses the possessor twice: first and chiefly, as bringing to him happiness in itself—next also, as it leads to ulterior happy results: the unjust mind is a curse to its possessor in itself, and apart from results—though it also leads to ulterior results which render it still more a curse to him.

This theory respecting justice and injustice was first introduced into ethical speculation by Plato. He tells us himself (throughout the speeches ascribed to Glaukon and Adeimantus), that no one before him had announced it: that all

Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 446-447.

καὶ τοῦ ὄντος θεᾶς, οἷαν γυγνέσθαι πλὴν τῷ

Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 B, iv.

p. 444

Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 D.

ἀ τῶν τε ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἕνεκα ἕξια

ἐ αὐτῶν, &c.

with one accord<sup>s</sup>—both the poets in addressing an audience, and private citizens in exhorting their children—inculcated a different doctrine, enforcing justice as an onerous duty, and not as a self-recommending process: that he was the first who extolled justice in itself, as conferring happiness on the just agent, apart from all reciprocity or recognition either by men or Gods—and the first who condemned injustice in itself, as inflicting misery on the unjust agent, independent of any recognition by others. Here then we have the first introduction of this theory into ethical speculation. Injustice is an internal taint, corruption of mind, which (like bad bodily health) is in itself misery to the agent, however he may be judged or treated by men or Gods: and justice is (like good bodily health) a state of internal happiness to the agent, independent of all recognition and responsive treatment from others.

The Platonic theory, or something substantially equivalent to it under various forms of words, has been ever since upheld by various ethical theorists, from the time of Plato downward.<sup>t</sup> Every one would be glad if it could be made out as true: Glaukon and Adeimantus are already enlisted in its favour, and only demand from Sokrates a decent justification for their belief. Moreover, those who deny its truth incur the reproach of being deficient in love of virtue or in hatred of vice. What is still more remarkable—Plato has been complimented as if his theory had been the first antithesis to what is called the “selfish theory of morals”—a compliment which is certainly noway merited: for Plato’s theory is essentially self-regarding.<sup>u</sup> He does not indeed lay his main stress on the retri-

He represents the motives to it, as arising from the internal happiness of the just agents.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 364 A. *πάντες ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὑπνοῦσιν*, &c. P. 366 D.

<sup>t</sup> It will be found maintained by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and impugned by Rutherford in his Essay on Virtue: also advocated by Sir James Mackintosh in his Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy, prefixed to the Encyclopædia Britannica; and controverted, or rather reduced to its proper limits, by Mr. James Mill, in his very acute and philosophical volume, Fragment on Mackintosh, published in 1835, see pp. 174-188 seq.

Sir James indeed uses the word Benevolence where Plato uses that of Justice: he speaks of “the inherent delights and intrinsic happiness of Benevolence,” &c.

<sup>u</sup> Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Rep. p. lvii. “Quo facto deinceps ad gravissimam totius sermonis partem ita transitur, ut inter colloquentes conveniat, justitiæ vim et naturam eo modo esse investigandam, ut emolumentorum et commodorum ex eâ redundantium nulla planè ratio habeatur.”

This is not strictly exact, for Plato claims on behalf of justice not only

bution and punishments which follow injustice, because he represents injustice as being itself a state of misery to the unjust agent: nor upon the rewards attached to justice, because he represents justice itself as a state of intrinsic happiness to the just agent. Nevertheless the motive to performance of justice, and to avoidance of injustice, is derived in his theory (as it is in what is called the selfish theory) entirely from the happiness or misery of the agent himself. The just man is not called upon for any self-denial or self-sacrifice, since by the mere fact of being just, he acquires a large amount of happiness: it is the unjust man who, from ignorance or perversion, sacrifices that happiness which just behaviour would have ensured to him. Thus the Platonic theory is entirely self-regarding: looking to the conduct of each separate agent as it affects his own happiness, not as it affects the happiness of others.

So much to explain what the Platonic theory is. But when we ask whether it consists with the main facts of society, or with the ordinary feelings of men living in society, the reply must be in the negative.

His theory  
departs more  
widely from

If (says Plato, putting the words into the counterpleading of Adeimantus)—“If the Platonic theory were preached by all of you, and impressed upon our belief from childhood, we should not have watched each other to prevent injustice; since each man would have been the best watch upon himself, from fear lest by committing injustice he should take to his bosom the maximum of evil.”<sup>x</sup>

discussed.

These words are remarkable. They admit of two constructions:—1. If the Platonic theory were true. 2. If the Platonic theory, though not true, were constantly preached and impressed upon every one's belief from childhood.

Understanding the words in the first of these two constructions, the hypothetical proposition put into the mouth of

that the performance of it is happy in itself, but also that it entails an independent result of ulterior happiness. But he dwells much less upon the second point; which indeed would be superfluous if the first could be thoroughly established. Compare Cicero, *Tusc. Disput.* v. 12-34, and the notes, on Mr. James Harris's *Three Treatises*, p. 351 seq., wherein the

Stoical doctrine—*πάντα αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα πράττειν*—is explained.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 367 A. *εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἐλέγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπειθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος ἀριστος.*

Adeimantus is a valid argument against the theory afterwards maintained by Sokrates. If the theory were conformable to facts, no precautions would need to be taken by men against the injustice of each other. But such precautions have been universally recognised as indispensable, and universally adopted. Therefore the Sokratic theory is not conformable to facts. It is not true that the performance of duty (considered apart from consequences) is self-inviting and self-remunerative—the contrary path self-detering and self-punitive—to each individual agent. Plato might perhaps argue that it would be true, if men were properly educated; and that the elaborate education which he provides for his Guardians in the Republic would suffice for this purpose. But even if this were granted, we must recollect that the producing Many of his Republic would receive no such peculiar education.

Understanding the words in the second construction, they would then mean that the doctrine, though not true, ought to be preached and accredited by the lawgiver as an useful fiction: that if every one were told so from his childhood, without ever hearing either doubt or contradiction, it would become an established creed which each man would believe, and each agent would act upon: that the effect in reference to society would therefore be the same as if the doctrine were true. This is in fact expressly affirmed by Plato in another place.<sup>7</sup> Now undoubtedly the effect of preaching and teaching, assuming it to be constant and unanimous, is very great in accrediting all kinds of dogmas. Plato believed it to be capable of almost unlimited extension—as we may see by the prescriptions which he gives for the training of the Guardians in his Republic. But to persuade every one that the path of duty and justice was in itself inviting, would be a task overpassing the eloquence even of Plato, since every man's internal sentiment would refute it. You might just as well expect to convince a child, through the declarations and encouragements of his nurse, that the medicine prescribed to him during sickness was very nice. Every child has to learn obedience as a necessity, under the authority and sanction of his parents. You may assure him that what is at first repulsive will become by habit comparatively

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 663-664.

easy: and that the self-reproach, connected with evasion of duty, will by association become a greater pain than that which is experienced in performing duty. This is to a great degree true, but it is by no means true to the full extent: still less can it be made to appear true before it has been actually realised. You cannot cause a fiction like this to be universally accredited. A child is compelled to practice justice by the fear of displeasure and other painful consequences from those in authority over him: the reason for bringing this artificial motive to bear upon him, is, that it is essential in the first instance for the comfort and security of others: in the second instance for his own. In Plato's theory, the first consideration is omitted, while not only the whole stress is laid upon the second, but more is promised in regard to the second than the reality warrants.

The opponents whom the Platonic Sokrates here seeks to confute held—That Justice is an obligation in itself onerous to the agent, but indispensable in order to ensure to him just dealing and estimation from others—That injustice is a path in itself easy and inviting to the agent, but necessary to be avoided, because he forfeits his chance of receiving justice from others, and draws upon himself hatred and other evil consequences. This doctrine (argues Plato) represents the advantages of justice to the just agent as arising, not from his actually being just, but from his seeming to be so, and being reputed by others to be so: in like manner, it represents the misery of injustice to the unjust agent as arising not from his actually being unjust, but from his being reputed to be so by others. The inference which a man will naturally draw from hence (adds Plato) is, That he must aim only at seeming to be just, not at being just in reality: that he must seek to avoid the reputation of injustice, not injustice in reality: that the mode of life most enviable is, to be unjust in reality, but just in seeming—to study the means either of deceiving others into a belief that you are just, or of coercing others into submission to your injustice.<sup>2</sup> This indeed cannot be done unless you are strong or artful: if you are weak or simple-minded, the best thing which you can do is to be just. The weak alone

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 362-367.

are gainers by justice : the strong are losers by it,<sup>a</sup> and gainers by injustice.<sup>a</sup>

These are legitimate corollaries (so Glaukon and Adeimantus are here made to argue) from the doctrine preached by most fathers to their children, that the obligations of justice are in themselves onerous to the just agent, and remunerative only so far as they determine just conduct on the part of others towards him. Plato means, not that fathers, in exhorting their children, actually drew these corollaries : but that if they followed out their own doctrine consistently, they would have drawn them : and that there is no way of escaping them, except by adopting the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates—That justice is in itself a source of happiness to the just agent, and injustice a source of misery to the unjust agent—however each of them may be esteemed or treated by others.

Now upon this we may observe, That Plato, from anxiety to escape corollaries which are only partially true, and which, in so far as they are true, may be obviated by precautions—has endeavoured to accredit a fiction misrepresenting the constant phenomena and standing conditions of social life. Among those conditions, reciprocity of services is one of the most fundamental. The difference of feeling which attaches to the service which a man renders, called duties or obligations—and the services which he receives from others, called his rights—is alike obvious and undeniable. Each individual has both duties and rights : each is both an agent towards others, and a patient or sentient from others. He is required to be just towards others, they are required to be just towards him : he in his actions must have regard, within certain limits, to their comfort and security—they in their actions must have regard to his. If he has obligations towards them, he has also rights against them ; or (which is the same thing) they have obligations towards him. If punishment is requisite to deter him from doing wrong to them, it is equally requisite to deter them from doing wrong to him. Whoever theorises upon society, contemplating it as a connected scheme or system including different individual agents, must accept this

Reciprocity of rights and duties between men in social life—different feelings towards one and towards the other.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 366 C.

reciprocity<sup>a</sup> as a fundamental condition. The rights and obligations, of each towards the rest, must form inseparable and correlative parts of the theory. Each agent must be dealt with by others according to his works, and must be able to reckon beforehand on being so dealt with:—on escaping injury or hurt, and receiving justice, from others, if he behaves justly towards them. The theory supposes, that whether just or unjust, he will appear to others what he really is, and will be appreciated accordingly.<sup>b</sup>

The fathers of families, whose doctrine Plato censures, adopted this doctrine of reciprocity, and built upon it their exhortations to their children. “Be just to others: without that condition, you cannot expect that they will be just to you.” Plato objects to their doctrine, on the ground, that it assumed justice to be onerous to the agent, and therefore indirectly encouraged the evading of the onerous preliminary condition, for the purpose of extorting or stealing the valuable consequent without earning it fairly. Persons acting thus unjustly would efface reciprocity by taking away the antecedent. Now Plato, in correcting them, sets up a counter-doctrine which effaces reciprocity by removing the consequent. His counter-doctrine promises me that if I am just towards others, I shall be happy in and through that single circumstance; and that I ought not to care whether they behave justly or unjustly towards me. Reciprocity thus disappears. The authoritative terms *right* and *obligation* lose all their specific meaning.

In thus eliminating reciprocity—in affirming that the performance of justice is not an onerous duty, but in itself happiness-giving, to the just agent—Plato con-

Plato's own theory, respecting the genesis of society, is

<sup>a</sup> Euripid. Herakleid. 425.

Οὐ γὰρ τυραννίδ', ὥστε βαρβάρων, ἔχω, Ἄλλ', ἦν δίκαια δρῶ, δίκαια πείσομαι.

In a remarkable passage of the Laws Plato sets a far higher value upon correct estimation from others, which in the Republic he depicts under the contemptuous appellation of show or seeming.

Plato, Legg. xii. p. 950 B.

δὲ οὐποτε περὶ μικροῦ ποιῆσθαι  
... τοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἢ  
οὐ γὰρ ὅσον οὐσίας ἀρετῆς  
τυγχάνουσιν οἱ πολλοί,

τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ κρίνειν τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ  
πονηροὶ καὶ ἀχρηστοί, θεῖον δέ τι καὶ  
εὐστοχόν ἐστι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς. ὥστε  
πάνπολλοι καὶ τῶν σφόδρα κακῶν εὖ  
τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ταῖς δόξαις διαιροῦνται  
τοὺς ἀμείνους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς

Διὸ καλὸν ταῖς πολλαῖς πόλε  
τὸ παρακέλευσμά ἐστι, προτιμᾶν  
εὐδοξίαν πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
ὀρθότατον καὶ μέγιστον, ὅντα ἀγαθὸν  
εἶτω τὸν εὐδοξόν βίον  
... γε

foundation of society. What is the explanation<sup>c</sup> which he himself gives (in this very Republic) of the primary origin of a city? It arises (he says) from the fact, that each individual among us is not self-sufficing, but full of wants. All having many wants, each takes to himself others as partners and auxiliaries to supply them: thus grows up the aggregation called a city.<sup>c</sup> Each man gives to another, and receives from another, in the belief that it will be better for him to do so. It is found most advantageous to all, that each man shall devote himself exclusively to one mode of production, and shall exchange his produce with that of others. Such interchange of productions and services is the generating motive which brings about civic communion.<sup>d</sup> Justice and injustice will be found in certain modes of carrying on this useful interchange between each man and the rest.<sup>e</sup>

Here Plato expressly declares the principle of reciprocity to be the fundamental cause which generates and sustains the communion called the city. No man suffices to himself: every man has wants which require supply from others: every man can contribute something to supply the wants of others. Justice or injustice have place, according as this reciprocal service is carried out in one manner or another. Each man labours to supply the wants of others as well as his own.

This is the primitive, constant, indispensable, bond whereby society is brought and held together. Doubtless it is not the only bond, nor does Plato say that it is. There are other auxiliary social principles besides, of great value and importance: but they presuppose and are built upon the fundamental principle—reciprocity of need and service—which remains when we reduce society to its lowest terms; and which is not the less real as underlying groundwork, though it is seldom enuntiated separately, but appears overlaid, disguised, and adorned, by numerous additions and refinements. Plato cor-

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B-C.  
 γίγνεται πόλις, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν  
 ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἀλλὰ πολλῶν

ἀλλήλοις μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν ἕκ  
 ἐργάζωνται; ὧν δὴ ἐνεκα καὶ  
 κοινωνίαν ποιησάμενοι πό-  
 λιν ὠκίσσαμεν.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 371-372.  
 Ποῦ οὖν ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτῇ (τῇ πόλει)  
 εἴη ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδ-  
 οῦκ ἐννοῶ, εἰ μὴ που ἐν  
 τούτων χρεῖα τινὶ τῇ

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 371 B.  
 τί δὲ δὴ; ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει πῶς

rectly announces the reciprocity of need and service as one indivisible, though complex fact, when looked at with reference to the social communion. Neither of the two parts of that fact, without the other part, would serve as adequate groundwork. Each man must act, not for himself alone, but for others also: he must keep in view the requirements of others, to a certain extent, as well as his own. In his purposes and scheme of life, the two must be steadily combined.

It is clear that Plato—in thus laying down the principle of reciprocity, or interchange of service, as the groundwork of the social union—recognises the antithesis, and at the same time the correlation, between obligation and right. The service which each man renders to supply the wants of others is in the nature of an onerous duty; the requital for which is furnished to him in the services rendered by others to supply his wants. It is payment against receipt, and is expressly so stated by Plato—which every man conforms to, “believing that he will be better off thereby.” Taking the two together, every man is better off; but no man would be so by the payment alone; nor could any one continue paying out, if he received nothing in return. Justice consists in the proper carrying on of this interchange in its two correlative parts.<sup>f</sup>

Antithesis  
and correla-  
tion of obli-  
gation and  
right. Ne-

the 1  
any  
respecting  
society.

We see therefore that Plato contradicts his own fundamental principle, when he denies the doing of justice to be an onerous duty, and when he maintains that it is in itself happiness-giving to the just agent, whether other men account him just and do justice to him in return—or not. By this latter doctrine he sets aside that reciprocity of want and service, upon which he had affirmed the social union to rest. The fathers, whom he blames, gave advice in full conformity with

<sup>f</sup> We may remark that Plato, though he states the principle of reciprocity very justly, does not state it completely. He brings out the reciprocity of need and service; he does not mention the reciprocal liability of injury. Each man can do hurt to others: each man may receive hurt from others. Abstinence on the part of each from hurting others, and security to each that he shall not be hurt by others, are neces-

sities quite as fundamental as that of production and interchange.

The reciprocal feeling of security, or absence of all fear of ill-usage from others (*τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀδεῖς καὶ βούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, to use the phrase of Thucydides iii. 37) is no less essential to social sentiment, than the reciprocal confidence that each man may obtain from others a supply of his wants, on condition of supplying theirs.

his own principle of reciprocity—when they exhorted their sons to the practice of justice, not as self-inviting, but as an onerous service towards others, to be requited by corresponding services and goodwill from others towards them. If (as he urges) such advice operates as an encouragement to crime, because it admits that the successful tyrant or impostor, who gets the services of others for nothing, is better off than the just man who gets them only in exchange for an onerous equivalent—this inference equally flows from that proclaimed reciprocity of need and service, which he himself affirms to be the generating cause of human society. If it be true (as Plato states) that each individual is full of wants, and stands in need of the services of others—then it cannot be true, that payment without receipt, as a systematic practice, is self-inviting and self-satisfying. That there are temptations for strong or cunning men to evade obligation and to usurp wrongful power, is an undeniable fact. We may wish that it were not a fact: but we gain nothing by denying or ignoring it. The more clearly the fact is stated, the better; in order that society may take precaution against such dangers—a task which has always been found necessary, and often difficult. In reviewing the *Gorgias*,<sup>g</sup> we found Sokrates declaring, that Archelaus, the energetic and powerful king of Macedonia, who had usurped the throne by means of crime and bloodshed, was thoroughly miserable: far more miserable than he would have been, had he been defeated in his enterprise and suffered cruel punishment. Such a declaration represents the genuine sentiment of Sokrates as to what he *himself* would feel, and what ought to be (in his conviction) the feeling of every one, after having perpetrated such nefarious acts. But it does not represent the feeling of Archelaus himself, nor that of the large majority of bystanders: both to these latter, and to himself, Archelaus appears an object of envy and admiration.<sup>h</sup>

<sup>g</sup> See above, ch. xxii. pp. 108-112.

<sup>h</sup> Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* iii. 3, 52-53. *Cyrtus* says:—

Ἄρ' οὐκ, εἰ μέλλουσι τοιαῦτα διανοήσασθαι  
 ἄνθρωποις καὶ  
 , πρῶτον μὲν νόμους ὑπάρχειν  
 τοιοῦτους, δι' ὧν  
 ἐντιμος καὶ ἐλευθέριος ὁ βίος  
 παρὰ σκευασθήσεται, τοῖς δὲ κα-

κοῖς ταπεινός τε καὶ

καὶ ἀβίωτος ὁ αἰὼν

Ἐπειτα δὲ διδασκάλους, οἶμαι, δεῖ καὶ  
 ἔρχοντας ἐπὶ τοῖς γενέσθαι, οἵτινες

τε ὁρθῶς  
 ταῦτα δρᾶν, ἔστ'

αὐτοῖς, τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ εὖ-  
 εὐδαιμονεστάτους τῶν  
 , τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς καὶ

And it would be a fatal mistake, if the peculiar sentiment of Sokrates were accepted as common to others besides, and as forming a sound presumption to act upon: that is, if, under the belief that no ambitious man will voluntarily bring upon himself so much misery, it were supposed that precautions against his designs were unnecessary. The rational and tutelary purpose of punishment is, to make the proposition true and obvious to all—That the wrong-doer will draw upon himself a large preponderance of mischief by his wrong-doing. But to proclaim the proposition by voice of herald (which Plato here proposes) as if it were already an established fact of human nature, independent of all such precautions—would be only an unhappy delusion.<sup>1</sup>

The characteristic feature of the Platonic commonwealth is to specialize the service of each individual in that function for which he is most fit. It is assumed, that each will render due service to the rest, and will receive from them due service in requital. Upon this assumption, Plato pronounces that the community will be happy.

Character-  
istic feature  
of the Pla-  
tonic Com-  
monwealth  
—specializa-  
tion of ser-  
vices to that  
function for  
which each  
man is fit—  
will not  
apply to one  
individual  
separately.

Let us grant for the present that this conclusion follows from his premisses. He proceeds forthwith to apply it by analogy to another and a different case—the case of the individual man. He presumes complete analogy between the community and an individual.<sup>k</sup> To a certain extent, the analogy is real: but it fails on the main point which Plato's inference requires as a basis. The community, composed of various and differently endowed members, suffices to itself and its own happiness: "the individual is not sufficient to himself, but stands in need of much aid from

δυσκλεεῖς ἀθλιωτὰ τοὺς πάντων ἡγεῖσθαι.

Xenophon here uses language at variance with that of Plato, and consonant to that of the fathers of families whom Plato censures. To create habits of just action, and to repress habits of unjust action, society must meet both the one and the other by a suitable response. Assuming such conditional reciprocity to be realised you may then persuade each agent that the unjust man, whom society brands with dishonour, is miserable (οἱ κακοὶ καὶ δυσκλεεῖς).

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon, *Economic*. xiii. 11. Ischomachus there declares:—

Πάνν γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρην, ἀθυμία ἐγγίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅταν ὀρῶσι τὰ μὲν ἔργα δι' αὐτῶν καταπρα-  
τόμενα, τῶν δὲ ὁμοίων τυγχάνοντας  
ἑαυτοῖς τοὺς μήτε ποιεῖν οὐδὲ  
νεύειν ἐθέλοντας, ὅταν δέη.—also xiv.  
9-10.

<sup>k</sup> The parallel between the Commonwealth and the individual is perpetually reproduced in Plato's reasoning. *Republic*, ii. pp. 368-369, vii. p. 541 B, ix. pp. 577 C-D, 579 E, &c.

others”<sup>l</sup>—a grave fact which Plato himself proclaims as the generating cause and basis of society. Though we should admit therefore, that Plato’s commonwealth is perfectly well-constituted, and that a well-constituted commonwealth will be happy—we cannot from thence infer that an individual, however well-constituted, will be happy. His happiness depends upon others as well as upon himself. He may have in him the three different mental varieties of souls, or three different persons—Reason, Energy, Appetite—well tempered and adjusted; so as to produce a full disposition to just behaviour on his part: but constant injustice on the part of others will nevertheless be effectual in rendering him miserable. From the happiness of a community, all composed of just men—you cannot draw any fair inference to that of one just man in an unjust community.

Thus much to show that the parallel between the community and the individual, which Plato pursues through the larger portion of the Republic, is fallacious. His affirmation—That the just man is happy in his justice, *quand même*—in his own mental perfection, whatever supposition may be made as to the community among whom he lives—implies that the just man is self-sufficing: and Plato himself expressly declares that no individual is self-sufficing. Indeed, no author can set forth more powerfully than Plato himself in this very dialogue—the uncomfortable and perilous position of a philosophical individual, when standing singly as a dissenter among a community with fixed habits and sentiments—unphilosophical and anti-philosophical. Such a person (Plato says) is like a man who has fallen into a den of wild beasts: he may think himself fortunate, if by careful retirement and abstinence from public manifestation, he can preserve himself secure and uncorrupted: but his characteristic and superior qualities can obtain no manifestation. The philosopher requires a community suited to his character. Nowhere does any such community (so Plato says) exist at present.<sup>m</sup>

I cannot think, therefore, that the main thesis which Sokrates professes to have established, against the difficulties

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Repub. vi. pp. 494 E, 496 D, | 497 B. ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμ-  
 ῥεσών, &c. Compare also ix. p. 592 A.

raised by Glaukon, is either proved or proveable. Plato has fallen into error, partly by exaggerating the parallelism between the individual man and the commonwealth: partly by attempting to reason on justice and injustice in abstract isolation, without regard to the natural consequences of either—while yet those consequences cannot be really excluded from consideration, when we come to apply to these terms, predicates either favourable or unfavourable. That justice, taken along with its ordinary and natural consequences, tends materially to the happiness of the just agent—that injustice, looked at in the same manner, tends to destroy or impair the happiness of the unjust—these are propositions true and valuable to be inculcated. But this was the very case embodied in the exhortations of the ordinary moralists and counsellors, whom Plato intends to refute. He is not satisfied to hear them praise justice taken along with its natural consequences: he stands forward to panegyrisé justice abstractedly, and without its natural consequences: nay, even if followed by consequences the very reverse of those which are ordinary and natural." He insists that justice is eligible and pleasing *per se*, self-recommending: that among the three varieties of *Bona* (1. That which we choose for itself and from its own immediate attractions. 2. That which is in itself indifferent or even painful, but which we choose from regard to its ulterior consequences. 3. That which we choose on both grounds, both as immediately attractive and as ultimately beneficial), it belongs to the last variety: whereas the opponents whom he impugns referred it to the second.

Plato has made good his refutation—the thesis which he impugns is true.

Plato has not made good his refutation—the thesis which he impugns is true.

Here the point at issue between the two sides is expressly set forth. Both admit that Justice is a Bonum—both of them looking at the case with reference only to the agent himself. But the opponents contend, that it is Bonum (with reference to the agent) only through its secondary effects, and noway Bonum or attractive in its primary working: being thus analogous to medical treatment or gymnastic discipline, which men submit to only for the

Statement  
of the real  
issue between  
him and his  
opponents.

n Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 B. εἰ οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε,  
 ὡς ἀφαιρήσεις ἐκατέρωθεν (i.e. both τὸ δοί-  
 μιν justice and from injustice) τὰς  
 ὑπερβαλόντων, &c.

ὕψος λαμβάνειν, &c.

sake of ulterior benefits. On the contrary, Plato maintained that it is good both in its primary and secondary effects: good by reason of the ulterior benefits which it confers, but still better and more attractive in its direct and primary effect: thus combining the pleasurable and the useful, like a healthy constitution and perfect senses. Both parties agree in recognising justice as a good: but they differ in respect of the grounds on which, and the mode in which, it is good.

Such is the issue as here announced by Plato himself: and the announcement deserves particular notice because the Platonic Sokrates afterwards, in the course of his argument, widens and misrepresents the issue: ascribing to his opponents the invidious post of enemies who defamed justice and recommended injustice, while he himself undertakes to counterwork the advocates of injustice, and to preserve justice from unfair calumny<sup>o</sup>—thus professing to be counsel for Justice *versus* Injustice. Now this is not a fair statement of the argument against which Sokrates is contending. In that argument, justice was admitted to be a Good, but was declared to be a Good of that sort which is laborious and irksome to the agent in the primary proceedings required from him—though highly beneficial and indispensable to him by reason of its ulterior results: like medicine, gymnastic discipline, industry,<sup>p</sup> &c. Whether this doctrine be correct or not, those who hold it cannot be fairly described as advocates of injustice and enemies of Justice:<sup>q</sup> any more than they are enemies of medicine, gymnastic discipline, industry, &c., which they recommend as good and indispensable, on the same grounds as they recommend justice.

It may suit Plato's purpose, when drawing up an argument which he intends to refute, to give to it the colour of being a

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Repub.* ii. p. 368 B. δέ-δοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἢ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κακηγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν, ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα καὶ δυνάμενον φθάγεσθαι.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Republic*, ii. pp. 357-358.

<sup>q</sup> In the lost treatise, *De Republica* of Cicero, Philus, one the disputants, was introduced as spokesman of the memorable discourse delivered by Carneades at Rome, said to have been against Justice, and in favour of In-

justice—"patrocinium in justitiæ." Laelius replied to him, as "*Justitiæ defensor*." The few fragments preserved do not enable us to appreciate the line of argument taken by Carneades; but as far as we can judge, it seems to have been very different from that which is assigned to Glaukon and Adeimantus in the Platonic Republic. See the Fragments of the third book *De Republica* in Orelli's edition of Cicero, pp. 460-467.

panegyric upon injustice: but this is no real or necessary part of the opponent's case. Nevertheless the commentators on Plato bring it prominently forward. The usual programme affixed to the Republic is—Plato, the defender of Justice, against Thrasymachus and the Sophists, advocates and panegyrists of Injustice. How far the real Thrasymachus may have argued in the slashing and offensive style described in the first book of the Republic, we have no means of deciding. But the Sophists are here brought in as assumed preachers of injustice, without any authority either from Plato or elsewhere: not to mention the impropriety of treating the Sophists as one school with common dogmas. Glaukon (as I have already observed) announces the doctrine against which Sokrates contends, not as a recent corruption broached by the Sophists, but as the generally received view of Justice: held by most persons, repeated by the poets from ancient times downwards, and embodied by fathers in lessons to their children: Sokrates farther declares the doctrine which he himself propounds to be propounded for the first time.<sup>r</sup>

Over and above the analogy between the just commonwealth and the just individual, we find two additional and independent arguments, to confirm the proof of the Platonic thesis, respecting the happiness of the just man. Plato distributes mankind into three varieties. 1. He in whom Reason is preponderant—the philosopher. 2. He in whom Energy or Courage is preponderant—the lover of dominion and superiority—the ambitious man. 3. He in whom Appetite is preponderant—the lover of money. Plato considers the two last as unjust men, contrasting them with the first, who alone is to be regarded as just.

The language of Plato in arguing this point is vague, and requires to be distinguished before we can appreciate the extent to which he has made out his point. At one time, he

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Republ. ii. p. 358 B. Οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ  
, &c. P. 358 C. ἀκούων  
καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων τὸν  
ὕπὲρ τῇ.

λέγουσι δέ που καὶ παρακλείονται  
τε ὕεσι καὶ πάντες οἱ  
ν, &c.—τούτοις  
λόγοις μάρτυρας τοὺς  
(p. 364 D): also p. 366 D.

states his conclusion to the effect—That the man who pursues and enjoys the pleasures of ambition or enrichment, but only under the conditions and limits which reason prescribes, is happier than he who pursues them without any such controul, and who is the slave of violent and ungovernable impulses.<sup>a</sup> This is undoubtedly true.

But elsewhere Plato puts his thesis in another way. He compares the pleasures of the philosopher, arising from intellectual contemplation and the acquisition of knowledge—with the pleasures of the ambitious man and the money-lover, in compassing their respective ends, the attainment of power and wealth. If you ask (says Plato) each of these three persons which is the best and most pleasurable mode of life, each will commend his own: each will tell you that the pleasures of his own mode of life are the greatest, and that those of the other two are comparatively worthless.<sup>b</sup> But though each thus commends his own, the judgment of the philosopher is decidedly the most trustworthy of the three. For the necessities of life constrain the philosopher to have some experience of the pleasures of the other two, while they two are altogether ignorant of his:—moreover, the comparative estimate must be made by reason and intelligent discussion, which is his exclusive prerogative. Therefore, the philosopher is to be taken as the best judge, when he affirms that *his* pleasures are the greatest, in preference to the other two.<sup>c</sup> To establish this same conclusion, Plato even goes a step farther. No pleasures, except those peculiar to the philosopher, are perfectly true and genuine, pure from any alloy or mixture of pain. The pleasures of the ambitious man, and of the money-lover, are untrue, spurious, alloyed with pain and for the most part mere riddances from pain—appearing falsely to be pleasures by contrast with the antecedent pains to which they are consequent. The pleasures of the philosophic life are not preceded by any pains. They are mental pleasures, having in them closer affinity with truth and reality than the corporeal: the matter of knowledge, with which the philosophising mind is filled and satisfied, comes from the

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 586-587.      <sup>b</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 581 C-D.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 582-583.

everlasting and unchangeable Ideas—and is thus more akin to true essence and reality, than the perishable substances which relieve bodily hunger and thirst.<sup>x</sup>

It is by these two lines of reasoning, and especially by the last, that Plato intends to confirm and place beyond dispute the triumph of the just man over the unjust.<sup>y</sup> He professes to have satisfied the requirement of Glaukon, by proving that the just man is happy by reason of his justice—*quand même*—however he may <sup>to aim at.</sup> be esteemed or dealt with either by Gods or men. But even if we grant the truth of his premisses, no such conclusion can be elicited from them. He appears to be successful only because he changes the terminology, and the state of the question. Assume it to be true, that the philosopher, whose pleasures are derived chiefly from the love of knowledge and of intellectual acquisitions, has a better chance of happiness than the ambitious or the money-loving man. This I believe to be true in the main, subject to many interfering causes—though the manner in which Plato here makes it out is much less satisfactory than the handling of the same point by Aristotle after him.<sup>z</sup> But when the point is granted, nothing is proved about the just and the unjust man, except in a sense of those terms peculiar to Plato himself.

Nor indeed is Plato's conclusion proved, even in his own sense of the words. He identifies the just man with the philosopher or man of reason—the unjust man with the pursuer of power or wealth. Now, even in this Platonic meaning, the just man or philosopher cannot be called happy *quand même*: he requires, as one condition of his happiness, a certain amount of service, forbearance, and estimation, on the part of his fellows. He is not completely self-sufficing, nor can any human being be so.

The confusion, into which Plato has here fallen, arises mainly from his exaggerated application of the analogy between the Commonwealth and the Indi-

Exaggerated  
parallelism  
between the

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 585-586.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Republic, ix. p. 583 B.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω δὴ ἐφελθὲς ἂν  
καὶ δις γενικηκώς ὁ δίκαιος  
τρίτον—τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη

καὶ κυριώτατον

των.

<sup>z</sup> Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. i. 5, p. 1095 b, 1096 a, x. 6-9, pp. 1176-1179.

Common-  
wealth and  
the indi-  
vidual man.

vidual: from his anxiety to find in the individual something like what he notes as justice in the Commonwealth: from his assimilating the mental attributes of each individual, divisible only in logical abstraction,—to the really distinct individual citizens whose association forms the Commonwealth.\* It is only by a poetical or rhetorical metaphor that you can speak of the several departments of a man's mind, as if they were distinct persons, capable of behaving well or ill towards each other. A single man, considered without any reference to others, cannot be either just or unjust. "The just man" (observes Aristotle, in another line of argument), "requires others, towards whom and with whom he may behave justly."† Even when we talk by metaphor of a man being just towards himself, reference to others is always implied, as a standard with which comparison is taken.

In the main purpose of the Republic, therefore—to prove that the just man is happy in his justice, and the unjust miserable in his injustice, whatever supposition may be made as to consequent esteem or treatment from Gods or men—we cannot pronounce Plato to have succeeded. He himself indeed speaks triumphant confidence of his own demonstration. Yet we find him at the close of the dialogue admitting that he had undertaken the defence of a position unnecessarily difficult. "I conceded to you" (he says) "for argument's sake that the just man should be accounted unjust, by Gods as well as men, and that the unjust man should be accounted just. But this is a concession which I am not called upon to make; for the real fact will be otherwise. I now compare the happiness of each,

Second argu-  
ment of Plato  
to prove the  
happiness of  
the just man  
—He now re-  
calls his pre-  
vious con-  
cession, and

will receive  
just treat-  
ment and  
esteem from  
others.

\* Plato, Republic, i. pp. 351 C, 352 C. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι νῦν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, ἣ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει μή τοι καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφ' οὓς ἤσαν ἅμα ἀδικεῖν, δι' ἣν ἔπρε-  
ν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄδικα.

ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἔδωκε (Ζεὺς)

we find the same sentiment in the Opera et Dies of Hesiod, 275, contrast-  
ing human society with animal life:—

† Aristotel. Ethic. Nikomach. x. 7.  
ὁ δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει,  
καὶ μεθ' ὧν.

assuming that each has the reputation and the treatment which he merits from others. Under this supposition, the superior happiness of the just man over the unjust, is still more manifest and undeniable.”<sup>c</sup>

Plato then proceeds to argue the case upon this hypothesis, which he affirms to be conformable to the reality. The just man will be well-esteemed and well-treated by men: he will also be favoured and protected by the Gods, both in this life and after this life. The unjust man, on the contrary, will be ill-esteemed and ill-treated by men: he will farther be disapproved and punished by the Gods, both while he lives and after his death. Perhaps for a time the just man may seem to be hardly dealt with and miserable—the unjust man to be prosperous and popular—but in the end, all this will be reversed.<sup>d</sup>

This second line of argument is essentially different from the first. Plato dispatches it very succinctly, in two pages: while in trying to prove the first, and in working out the very peculiar comparison on which his proof rests, he had occupied the larger portion of this very long treatise.

In the first line of argument, justice was recommended as implicated with happiness *per se* or absolutely—*quand même*—to the agent: injustice was discouraged, as implicated with misery. In the second line, justice is recommended by reason of its happy ulterior consequences to the agent: injustice is dissuaded on corresponding grounds, by reason of its miserable ulterior consequences to the agent.

It will be recollected that this second line of argument is the same as that which Glaukon described as adopted by parents and by other monitors, in discourse with pupils. Plato therefore here admits that their exhortations were founded on solid grounds: though he blames them for denying or omitting the announcement, that just behaviour conferred happiness upon the agent by its own efficacy, apart from all consequences. He regards the happiness attained by the just man, through the consequent treatment by men and Gods, as real indeed,—but as only supplemental and secondary, inferior in value to the happiness involved in the just behaviour *per se*.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republic, x. pp. 612-613.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, x. p. 613

In this part of the argument, too, as well as in the former, we are forced to lament the equivocal meaning of the word *justice*: and to recollect the observation of Plato at the close of the first book, that those who do not know what justice is can never determine what is to be truly predicated of it, and what is not.\* If by the just man he means the philosopher, and by the unjust man the person who is not a philosopher,—he has himself told us before, that in societies as actually constituted, the philosopher enjoys the minimum of social advantages, and is even condemned to a life of insecurity; while the unphilosophical men (at least a certain variety of them) obtain sympathy, esteem, and promotion.†

Now in this second line of argument, Plato holds a totally different language respecting the way in which the just man is treated by society. He even exaggerates, beyond what can be reasonably expected, the rewards accruing to the just man: who (Plato tells us), when he has become advanced in life and thoroughly known, acquires command in his own city if he chooses it, and has his choice among the citizens for the best matrimonial alliances: while the unjust man ends in failure and ignominy, incurring the hatred of every one and suffering punishment.‡ This is noway consistent with Plato's previous description of the position of the philosopher in actual society: yet nevertheless his argument identifies the just man with the philosopher.

Plato appears so anxious to make out a triumphant case in favour of justice and against injustice, that he forgets not only the reality of things, but the main drift of his own previous reasonings. Nothing can stand out more strikingly, throughout this long and eloquent treatise, than the difference between one society and another: the necessary dependance of every one's lot, partly indeed upon his own character, but also most materially upon the society to which he belongs: the impossibility of affirming anything generally respecting the result of such and such dispositions in the individual, until you know the society of which he is a member, as well as his

Dependence  
of the happi-  
ness of the  
individual on  
the society in  
which he is  
placed.

\* Plato, Republic, i. p. 354 B. † Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 492-494-495-497.

‡ Plato, Republic, x. p. 613 D-E.

place therein. Hence arises the motive for Plato's own elaborate construction—a new society upon philosophical principles. This essentially relative point of view pervades the greater part of his premisses, and constitutes the most valuable part of them.

Whether the commonwealth as a whole, assuming it to be once erected, would work as he expects, we will not here enquire. But it is certain that the commonwealth and the individuals are essential correlates of each other; and that the condition of each individual must be criticised in reference to the commonwealth in which he is embraced. Take any member of the Platonic Commonwealth, and place him in any other form of government, at Athens, Syracuse, Sparta, &c.—immediately his condition, both active and passive, is changed. Thus the philosophers, for whom Plato assumes unqualified ascendancy as the cardinal principle in his system, become, when transferred to other systems, divested of influence, hated by the people, and thankful if they can obtain even security. “The philosopher” (says Plato) “must have a community suited to him and docile to his guidance: in communities such as now exist, he not only has no influence as philosopher, but generally becomes himself corrupted by the contagion and pressure of opinions around him: this is the natural course of events, and it would be wonderful if the fact were otherwise.”<sup>h</sup>

After thus forcibly insisting upon the necessary correlation between the individual and the society, as well as upon the variability and uncertainty of justice and injustice in different existing societies<sup>i</sup>—Plato is inconsistent with himself in affirming, as an universal position, that the just man receives the favour and good treatment of society, the unjust man, hatred and punishment.<sup>k</sup> You cannot decide this until you know in what society the just man is placed. In order to

ral positions  
respecting  
the happiness  
of the just  
man, in all  
societies  
without  
distinction.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 487-488-489 B, 497 B-C, 492 C. καὶ φήσειν τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς τοῖς καλὰ καὶ τοιοῦτον; Compare also ix. pp. 592 A, 494 A. τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας ἔρα ἀνάγκη

ὑπ' αὐτῶν (τοῦ πλήθους). vii. p. 517 A.  
<sup>i</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 479, vi. p. C.  
Plato, Republic, x. p. 613.

make him comfortable, Plato is obliged to construct an imaginary society suited to him : which would have been unnecessary, if you can affirm that he is sure to be well treated in every society.

There is a sense indeed (different from what Plato intended), in which the proposition is both true, and consistent with his own doctrine about the correlation between the individual and the society. When Plato speaks of the just or the unjust man, to whose judgment does he make appeal? To his own judgment? or to which of the numerous other dissentient judgments? For that there were numerous dissentient opinions on this point, Plato himself testifies : a person regarded as just or unjust in one community, would not be so regarded in another. All this ethical and intellectual discord is fully recognised as a fact, by Plato himself : who moreover keenly felt it, when comparing his own judgment with that of the Athenians his countrymen. Such being the ambiguity of the terms, we can affirm nothing respecting the just or the unjust man absolutely and generally—respecting justice or injustice in the abstract : We cannot affirm anything respecting the happiness or misery of either, except with reference to the sentiments of the community wherein each is placed. Assuming their sentiments to be known, we may pronounce that any individual citizen who is unjust *relatively to them* (*i. e.* who behaves in a manner which they account unjust), will be punished by their superior force, and rendered miserable : while any one who abstains from such behaviour, and conducts himself in a manner which they account just, will receive from them just dealing, with a certain measure of trust, and esteem. Taken in this relative sense, we may truly say of the unjust man, that he will be unhappy ; because displeasure, hatred, and punitive infliction from his countrymen will be quite sufficient to make him so, without any other causes of unhappiness. Respecting the just man, we can only say that he will be happy, so far as exemption from this cause of misery is concerned : but we cannot make sure that he will be happy on the whole, because happiness is a product to which many different conditions, positive and negative, must

sense in  
which only  
this can be  
done.

concur—while the serious causes of misery are efficacious, each taken singly, in producing their result.

Moreover, in estimating the probable happiness either of the just (especially taking this word *sensu Platónico* as equivalent to *the philosophers*) or the unjust, another element must be included : which an illustrious self-thinking reasoner like Plato ought not to have omitted. Does the internal reason and sentiment of the agent coincide with that of his countrymen, as to what is just and unjust ? Is he essentially homogeneous with his countrymen (to use the language of Plato in the *Gorgias*<sup>1</sup>), a chip of the same block ? Or has he the earnest conviction that the commandments and prohibitions which they enforce upon him, on the plea of preventing injustice, are themselves unjust ? Is he (like the philosopher described by Plato among societies actually constituted, or like Sokrates at Athens<sup>m</sup>) a conscientious dissenter from the orthodox creed—political, ethical or æsthetical—received among his fellow-citizens generally ? Does he, (like Sokrates) believe himself to be inculcating useful and excellent lessons, while his countrymen blame and silence him as a corruptor of youth, and as a libeller of the elders ?<sup>n</sup> Does he, in those actions which he performs either under legal restraint or under peremptory unofficial custom, submit merely to what he regards as *civium ardor prava jubentium*, or as *vultus instantis tyranni* ?

This is a question essentially necessary to be answered, when we are called upon to affirm the general principle—"That the just man is happy, and that the unjust man is unhappy." Antipathy and ill-treatment will be the lot of any citizen who challenges opinions which his society cherish as consecrated, or professes such as they dislike. Such was the fate of Sokrates himself at Athens. He was indicted as unjust and criminal (Ἀδικοῦν

Question—

his  
—it

happy.

Comparison  
of the  
tion of  
krates at  
Athens with  
that of his  
accusers.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 513 B. αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιος τῇ πολιτείᾳ, &c.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Republic*, vi. pp. 496-497.

*Gorgias*, p. 521 D.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 522 B.

ἐὰν δὲ τις με ἢ νεωτέρους φῆ διαφθελεῖν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ πρεσβυτέρους

γέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε  
, ὅτι δίκαιως πάντα ταῦτα  
καὶ

ἄλλο οὐδὲν  
ὥστε ἴσως δ, τι, ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πέλομαι

Σωκράτης), while his accusers, Anytus and Melétus, carried away the esteem and sympathy of their fellow-citizens generally, as not simply just men, but zealous champions of justice—as resisting the assailants of morality and religion, of the political constitution, and of parental authority. How vehement was the odium and reprobation which Sokrates incurred from the majority of his fellow-citizens, we are assured by his own Apology<sup>o</sup> before the Dikasts. Now it is to every one a serious and powerful cause of unhappiness, to feel himself the object of such a sentiment. Most men dread it so much, like the Platonic Euthyphron, that they refrain from uttering, or at least are most reserved in communicating, opinions which are accounted heretical among their countrymen or companions.<sup>p</sup> The resolute and free-spoken Sokrates braved that odium; which, aggravated by particular circumstances, as well as by the character of his own defence, attained at last such a height as to bring about his condemnation to death. That he was sustained in this unthankful task by native force of character, conscientious persuasion, and belief in the approbation of the Gods—is a fact which we should believe, even if he himself had not expressly told us so. But to call him *happy*, would be a misapplication of the term, which no one would agree with Plato in making—least of all the friends of Sokrates in the last months of his life. Besides, if we are to call Sokrates happy on these grounds, his accusers would be still happier: for they had the same conscientious conviction, and the same belief in the approbation of the Gods: while they enjoyed besides the sympathy of their countrymen as champions of religion and morality.

In spite of all the charm and eloquence, therefore, which  
 Imperfect ethical basis on which Plato has conducted  
 abunds in the Republic, we are compelled to declare that the Platonic Sokrates has not furnished the solution required from him by Glaukon and

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Apolog. Sokr. pp. 28 A, 37 D.

πολλή μοι ἀπεχθεία γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, &c.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 D.

Ἀθηναίους γὰρ τοὶ οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν ὦνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἂν

καὶ ἄλλους ὦνται ποιεῖν τοιοῦτους, θυμοῖνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι.

Euthyphr. Τούτου μὲν περί ὧπως ποτε πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι.

Sokr. ἴσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δονεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν, καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν, &c.

Adeimantus: and that neither the first point (ix. p. 580 D) nor the second point, of his conclusion (x. p. 613) is adequately made out. The very grave ethical problem, respecting the connexion between individual just behaviour and individual happiness, is discussed in a manner too exclusively self-regarding, and inconsistent with that reciprocity which Plato himself sets forth as the fundamental, generating, sustaining, principle of human society. If that principle of reciprocity is to be taken as the starting-point, you cannot discuss the behaviour of any individual towards society, considered in reference to his own happiness, without at the same time including the behaviour of society towards him. Now Plato, in the conditions that he expressly prescribes for the discussion,<sup>1</sup> insists on keeping the two apart; and on establishing a positive conclusion about the first, without at all including the second. He rejects peremptorily the doctrine—"That just behaviour is performed for the good of others, apart from the agent." Yet if society be, in the last analysis (as Plato says that it is), an exchange of services, rendered indispensable by the need which every one has of others—the services which each man renders are rendered *for the good of others*, as the services which they render to him are rendered *for his good*. The just dealing of each man is, in the first instance, beneficial to others: in its secondary results, it is for the most part beneficial to himself.<sup>2</sup> His unjust dealing, in like manner, is, in the first instance, injurious to others: in its secondary results, it is for the most part injurious to himself. Particular acts of injustice may, under certain circumstances, be not injurious, nay even beneficial,

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367.

<sup>2</sup> See the instructive chapter on the Moral Sense, in Mr. James Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, ch. xxiii. p. 234.

"The actions from which men derive advantage have all been classed under four titles—Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, Beneficence. When those names are applied to our own acts, the first two, Prudent and Brave, express acts which are useful to ourselves in the first instance: the latter two, Just and Beneficent, express acts

which are useful to others in the first instance. It is farther to be remarked, that those acts of ours which are primarily useful to ourselves, are secondarily useful to others; and those which are primarily useful to others, are secondarily useful to ourselves. Thus it is by our own prudence and fortitude that we are best enabled to do acts of justice and beneficence to others. And it is by acts of justice and beneficence to others, that we best dispose them to do similar acts to us."

to the unjust agent: but they are certain to be hurtful to others: were it not so, they would not deserve to be branded as injustice. I am required to pay a debt, for the benefit of my creditor, and for the maintenance of a feeling of security among other creditors—though the payment may impose upon myself severe privation: indirectly, indeed, I am benefited, because the same law which compels me, compels others also to perform their contracts towards me. The law (to use a phrase of Aristotle) guarantees just dealing by and towards each.\* The Platonic Thrasymachus, therefore, is right in so far as he affirms—That injustice is *Malum Alienum*, and justice *Bonum Alienum*,† meaning that such is the direct and primary characteristic of each. The unjust man is one who does wrong to others, or omits to render to others a service which they have a right to exact, with a view to some undue profit or escape of inconvenience for himself: the just man is one who abstains from wrong to others, and renders to others the full service which they have a right to require, whatever hardship it may impose upon himself. A man is called just or unjust, according to his conduct towards others.

In considering the main thesis of the Republic, we must look upon Plato as preacher—inculcating a belief which he thinks useful to be diffused; rather than as philosopher, announcing general truths of human nature, and laying down a consistent, scientific, theory of Ethics. There are occasions on which even he himself seems to accept this character. “If the fable of Kadmus and the dragon’s teeth” (he maintains) “with a great many other stories equally improbable, can be made matters of established faith, surely a doctrine so plausible as mine, about justice and injustice, can be easily taught and accredited.”‡ To ensure unanimous

Re-  
public is  
preacher,  
inculcating  
useful beliefs  
—not philo-  
sopher, esta-  
blishing  
scientific  
theory. State  
of Just and  
Unjust Man

\* Aristot. Polit. iii. 9, 1280, b. 10. δμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ δὲ  
καθάπερ ἔφη καιον,

λοῖς τῶν δίκαιων. Chrysippus also, writing against Plato, maintained that ἀδικία was essentially πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐ πρὸς ἑαυτόν (Plutarch, Stoic. Repugnant. c. 16, p. 1041 D.)

† Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 C. καὶ

ξύμφορον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ

See Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 663-664.  
Good and simple people, in the earlier times (says Plato), believed everything that was told them. They

acquiescence, Plato would constrain all poets to proclaim and illustrate his thesis—and would prohibit them from uttering anything inconsistent with it.\* But these or similar official prohibitions may be employed for the upholding of any creed, whatever it be : and have been always employed, more or less, in every society, for the upholding of the prevalent creed. Even in the best society conceivable under the conditions of human life, assuming an ideal commonwealth in which the sentiments of *just* and *unjust* have received the most systematic, beneficent, and rational embodiments, and have become engraven on all the leading minds—even then Plato's first assertion—That the just man is happy *quand même*—could not be admitted without numerous reserves and qualifications. Justice must still be done by each agent, not as a self-inviting process, but as an obligation entailing more or less of sacrifice made by him to the security and comfort of others. Plato's second assertion—That the unjust man is miserable—would be more near the truth ; because the ideal commonwealth is assumed to be one in which the governing body has both the disposition and the power to punish injustice—and the discriminating equanimity, or absence of antipathies, which secures them against punishing anything else. The power of society to inflict misery is far more extensive than its power of imparting happiness. But even thus, we have to recollect that the misery of the unjust person arises not from his injustice *per se*, but from consequent treatment at the hands of others.

were more virtuous and just then than they are now (Legg. iii. p. 679 C-E).

\* Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 661-662. Illustrated in the rigid and detailed censorship which he imposes on the poets in the Republic, in the second and third books.

In the Legg., however, Plato puts his thesis in a manner less untenable than in the Republic :—"Neither to do wrong to others, nor to suffer wrong from others ; this is the happiest condition" (Legg. ii. p. 663 A). This is a very different proposition from that which is defended in the Republic ; where we are called upon to believe, that the man who acts justly will be happy, whatever may be the conduct

of others towards him.

Epikurus laid down, as one of the doctrines in his *Kύριαι Δόξαι* (see Diog. La. x. 150), Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον ἐστὶ σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος, εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. "Ὅσα τῶν ζῶων μὴ ἡδύνατο συνθήκας ποιῆσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλληλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτ' ἄδικον. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ

ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, &c.

Lucretius expresses the same—v. 1020 :—

"Tunc et amicitiam coeperunt jungere aventes  
Finitimi inter se nec lacerare nec violari, &c."

Thus much for the Platonic or ideal commonwealth. But when we pass from that hypothesis into the actual world, the case becomes far stronger against the truth of both Plato's assertions. Of actual societies, even the best have many imperfections—the less good, many attributes worse than imperfections :—“*ob virtutes certissimum exitium.*” The dissenter for the better, is liable to be crucified alongside of the dissenter for the worse : King Nomos will tolerate neither.

Plato as a preacher holds one language : as a philosopher and analyst, another. When he is exhorting youth to justice, or dissuading them from injustice, he thinks himself entitled to depict the lot of the just man in the most fascinating colours, that of the unjust man as the darkest contrast against it,—without any careful observance of the line between truth and fiction : the fiction, if such there be, becomes in his eyes a *pia fraus*, excused or even ennobled by its salutary tendency. But when he drops this practical purpose, and comes to philosophise on the principles of society, he then proclaims explicitly how great is the difference between society as it now stands, and society as it ought to be : how much worse is the condition of the just, how much less bad that of the unjust (in every sense of the words, but especially in the Platonic sense) than a perfect commonwealth would provide. Between the exhortations of Plato the preacher, and the social analysis of Plato the philosopher, there is a practical contradiction, which is all the more inconvenient because he passes backwards and forwards almost unconsciously, from one character to the other. The splendid treatise called the Republic is composed of both, in portions not easy to separate.

The difference between the two functions just mentioned—the preceptor, and the theorizing philosopher—deserves careful attention, especially in regard to Ethics. If I lay down a theory of social philosophy, I am bound to take in all the conditions and circumstances of the problem : to consider the whole position of each individual in society, as an agent affecting the security and comfort of others, and also as a person acted on by others,

Comparative  
happiness of

actual com-  
munities.  
Plato is dis-  
satisfied with  
it—This is  
his motive  
for recasting  
society on  
his own prin-  
ciples.

Confusion  
between the  
preacher and  
the philoso-  
pher in the  
Platonic  
Republic.

Remarks on  
it.

precepts.

and having his security and comfort affected by their behaviour: as subject to obligations or duties, in the first of the two characters—and as enjoying rights (*i.e.* having others under obligation to him) in the second. This reciprocity of service and need—of obligation and right—is the basis of social theory: its two parts are in indivisible correlation: alike integrant and co-essential. But when a preceptor delivers exhortations on conduct, it is not necessary that he should insist equally on each of the two parts. As a general fact of human nature, it is known that men are disposed *proprio motu* to claim their rights, but not so constantly or equally disposed to perform their obligations: accordingly, the preceptor insists upon this second part of the case, which requires extraneous support and enforcement—leaving untouched the first part, which requires none. But the very reason why the second part needs such support, is, because the performance of the obligation is seldom self-inviting, and often the very reverse: that is, because the Platonic doctrine misrepresents the reality. The preceptor ought not to indulge in such misrepresentation: he may lay stress especially upon one part of the entire social theory, but he ought not to employ fictions which deny the necessary correlation of the other omitted part. Many preceptors have insisted on the performance of obligation, in language which seemed to imply that they considered a man to exist only for the performance of obligations, and to have no rights at all. Plato in another way undermines equally the integrity of the social theory, when he contends, that the performance of obligations alone, without any rights, is delightful *per se*, and suffices to ensure happiness to the performer. Herein we can recognise only a well-intentioned preceptor, narrowing and perverting the social theory for the purpose of edification to his hearers.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

## REPUBLIC—REMARKS ON THE PLATONIC COMMONWEALTH.

IN my last Chapter, I discussed the manner in which Plato had endeavoured to solve the ethical problem urged upon him by Glaukon and Adeimantus. But this is not the entire purpose of the Republic. Plato, drawing the closest parallel between the Commonwealth and the individual, seeks solution of the problem first in the former; because it is there (he says) written in larger and clearer letters. He sketches the picture of a perfect Commonwealth—shows wherein its justice consists—and proves, to his own satisfaction, that it will be happy in and through its justice—*per se*. This picture of a Commonwealth is unquestionably *one* of the main purposes of the dialogue; serving as commencement—or more properly as intermediate stage—to the *Timæus* and *Kritias*. Most critics have treated it as if it were the dominant and almost exclusive purpose. Aristotle, the earliest of all critics, adverts to it in this spirit; numbering Plato or the Platonic Sokrates among those who, not being practical politicians, framed schemes for ideal commonwealths, like Phaleas or Hippodamus. I shall now make some remarks on the political provisions of the Platonic Commonwealth: but first I shall notice the very peculiar manner in which Plato discovers therein the notions of Justice and Injustice.

The Platonic Sokrates (as I remarked above) lays down as the fundamental, generating, principle of human society, the reciprocity of need and service, essentially belonging to human beings: exchange of services is indispensable, because each man has many wants more than he can himself supply, and thus needs the services of others: while each also can contribute something to supply the wants of others.

Double purpose of the Platonic Republic—public—ethical and political.

Plato recognises the generating principle of human society—reciprocity of need and ser-

To this general principle Plato gives a peculiar direction. He apportions the services among the various citizens; and he provides that each man shall be specialised for the service to which he is peculiarly adapted, and confined to that alone. No double man<sup>a</sup> is tolerated. How such specialisation is to be applied in detail among the multitude of cultivators and other producers, Plato does not tell us. Each is to have his own employment: we know no more. But in regard to the two highest functions, he gives more information: first, the small cabinet of philosophical Elders,<sup>b</sup> Chiefs, or Rulers—artists in the craft of governing, who supply professionally that necessity of the Commonwealth, and from whom all orders emanate: next, the body of Guardians, Soldiers, Policemen, who execute the orders of this cabinet, and defend the territory against all enemies. Respecting both of these, Plato carefully prescribes both the education which they are to receive, and the circumstances under which they are to live. They are to be of both sexes intermingled, but to know neither family nor property: they live together in barrack, and with common mess, receiving subsistence and the means of decent comfort, but no more, from the producers: respecting sexual relations and births, I shall say more presently.

When Plato has provided thus much, he treats his city as already planted and brought to consummation. He thinks himself farther entitled to proclaim it as perfectly good, and therefore as including the four constituent elements of Good: that is, as being wise, brave, temperate, just.<sup>c</sup> He then looks to find wherein each of these four elements resides: wisdom resides specially in the cabinet of Rulers—courage specially in the Guardians—temperance and justice, in these two, but

The four cardinal virtues are assumed as constituting the whole of Good or Virtue, where each of these virtues resides.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Rep. iii. p. 397 E.

<sup>b</sup> The principle laid down in the Protagoras will be remembered—*εἰς ἕχων τέχνην πολλοῖς ἱκανοῖς ιδιώταις* (Protag. p. 322 D).

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Repub. iv. pp. 427 D, 428 A.

*τοῖν, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, ἥδη ἄν σοι εἴη.*

*Οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ ὁρθῶς γε  
τέλεως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι.  
φη. Δῆλον δὲ, ὅτι σοφὴ τ'  
ἔστι καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ σώφρων καὶ δίκαια.  
λον. Οὐκοῦν, ὅ, τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὖρω-  
εν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ  
ἄο.*

in the producing multitude also. The two last virtues are universal in the Commonwealth. Temperance consists in the harmony of opinion between the multitude and the two higher classes as to obedience: the Guardians are as ready to obey as the Chiefs to command: the multitude are also for the most part ready to obey—but should they ever fail in obedience, the Guardians are prepared to lend their constraining force to the authority of the Chiefs. Having thus settled three out of the four elements of Good, which enumeration he assumes to be exhaustive—Plato assumes that what remains must be Justice. This remainder he declares to be—That each of the three portions of the Commonwealth performs its own work and nothing else: and this is Justice. Justice and Temperance are thus common to all the three portions of the Commonwealth: while Wisdom and Prudence belong entirely to the Chiefs, and Courage entirely to the Guardians.

Here, for the first time in Ethical Theory, Prudence, Cou-  
 rage, Temperance, Justice, are assumed as an ex-  
 First men-haustive enumeration of virtues: each distinct from  
 the other three, but all together including the  
 whole of Virtue.<sup>d</sup> Through Cicero and others, these  
 four have come down as the cardinal virtues. From  
 whom Plato derived it, I do not know: not certainly  
 from the historical Sokrates, who resolved the last  
 three into the first.<sup>e</sup> Nor is it indeed in harmony with Plato's  
 own view: for temperance and justice are substantially coinci-  
 dent, in his explanation of them (since he does not recognise  
 the characteristic feature of Justice, as directly tending to the  
 good of a person other than the agent): and the line, by which  
 he endeavours to part them, is obscure as well as unimportant.  
 Schleiermacher—who admits that the distinction drawn here  
 between Temperance and Justice is altogether forced—sup-

<sup>d</sup> Plat. Rep. iv. p. 432 B. τὸ δὲ δὴ  
 λοιπὸν εἶδος, δι' ὃ ἂν ἔτι ἀρετῆς  
 τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη; δῆλ-  
 γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη.

Compare p. 444 D, where he defines  
 'Ἀρετὴ—'Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἔρα, ὡς εἰκεν,  
 ὑγίειά τε τίς ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ  
 κακία δὲ, νόσος τε καὶ

<sup>e</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 1-5.

Compare the discussion of  
 νη, iv. 5, 9-11, where Sokrates en-  
 forces the practice of it on the ground  
 that it ensured to a man both more  
 pleasures and greater pleasures, of  
 which he would deprive himself if he  
 were foolish enough to be intemperate.

poses that Plato took up this quadruple classification, because he found it already established in the common, non-theorising, consciousness.<sup>f</sup> If this be true, the real distinction between Justice (as directly bearing on the rights of another person) and Temperance (as directly concerning only the future happiness of the agent himself), which is one of the most important distinctions in Ethics—must have been already felt, without being formulated, in the common mind: and Plato, by retaining the two words, but effacing the distinction between the two, and giving a new meaning to Justice—took a step in the wrong direction. He himself however tells us, that the definition, here given of Justice, is not his own; but that he had heard it enunciated by many others before him.<sup>g</sup> What makes this more remarkable is, That the same definition (to do your own business and not to meddle with other people's business) is what we read in the Charmidês as delivered respecting Temperance, by Charmides and Kritias:<sup>h</sup> delivered by them, and afterwards pulled to pieces in cross-examination by Sokrates. Herein we see further proof, how little distinction Plato drew between Justice and Temperance.

From whomsoever Plato may have derived this ethical classification—Virtue as a whole, distributed into four varieties—1. Prudence or Knowledge—2. Courage or Energy—3. Temperance—4. Justice—we find it here placed in the foreground of his doctrine, respecting both the collective

<sup>f</sup> Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Staat, pp. 25-26. "Dieser Tadel trifft höchstens die Aufstellung jener vier zusammengehörigen Tugenden; welche Platon offenbar genug nur mit richtigem praktischen Sinne aus Ehrfurcht für das Bestehende aufgenommen hat: wie sie denn schon auf dieselbe Weise aus dem gemeinen Gebrauch in die Lehrweise des Sokrates übergegangen sind."

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Rep. iv. p. 433 A. καὶ μὴ ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν, καὶ τοῦτο ἕλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόα- καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλὰκις

Compare iii. p. 406 E.

<sup>h</sup> See Charmidês, pp. 161-162. Heindorf observes in his note on this passage:—"A *sophistis* ergo *vulgata*

hæc σωφροσύνης definitio: ad *justitiam* quoque ab iisdem ut videtur, translata. Republ. iv. p. 433 (the passage cited in note preceding). Quo pertinent illa Ciceronis, De Officiis, i. 9, 2. Item ad *prudentiam*, Aristot. Eth. Nicom. vi. 8, Philosopho vero hoc tribuit Sokrates, Gorgias, p. 526)."

The definition given in the Charmidês appears plainly ascribed to Kritias as its author (p. 162 D.) The affirmation that it was "a *sophistis* *vulgata*," and afterwards transferred by these same to Justice, is made without any authority produced; and is expressed in the language usual with the Platonic commentators, who treat the Sophists as a philosophical sect or school.

Commonwealth and the individual man.<sup>1</sup> He professes to understand and explain what they are—to reason upon them all with confidence—and to apply them to very important conclusions.

But let us pause for a moment to ask, how these professions harmonise with the dialogues reviewed in my preceding volumes. No reader will have forgotten the doubts and difficulties, exposed by the Sokratic Elenchus throughout the Dialogues of Search: the confessed inability of Sokrates himself to elucidate them, while at the same time his contempt for the false persuasion of knowledge—for those who talk confidently about matters which they can neither explain nor defend—is expressed without reserve. Now, when we turn to the Hippias Major, we find Sokrates declaring, that no man can affirm, and that a man ought to be ashamed to pretend to affirm, what particular matters are beautiful (fine, honourable) or ugly (mean, base), unless he knows and can explain what Beauty is.<sup>k</sup> A similar declaration appears in the Menon, where Sokrates treats it as absurd to affirm or deny any predicate respecting a Subject, until you have satisfied yourself that you know what the Subject itself is: and where he farther proclaims, that as to Virtue, he does not know what it is, and that he has never yet found any one who *did* know.<sup>l</sup> Such ignorance is stated at the end of the dialogue not less emphatically than at the beginning. Again, respecting the four varieties or parts of Virtue. The first of the four, Prudence—(Wisdom—Knowledge)—has been investigated in the Theætétus—one of the most elaborate of all the Platonic dialogues: several different explanations of it are proposed by Theætétus, and each is shown by Sokrates to be untenable: the problem remains unsolved at last. As to Courage and Temperance, we have not been more fortunate.

<sup>1</sup> In some of the Platonic Dialogues these four varieties are not understood as exhausting the sum total of Virtue: *ἡ δούλη* is included also; see Lachês, p. 199 D, Protagoras, p. 329 D, Euthyphron, pp. 5-6. Plato does not advert to *τὸ δούλον* in the Republic as a sepa-

rate constituent, seemingly because on matters of piety he enjoins direct reference to Apollo and the Delphian oracle, Rep. iv. p. 427 B.

<sup>k</sup> Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 286 D, 304 C.  
<sup>l</sup> Plato, Menon, pp. 71 B-C, 86 B, 100 B.

though in  
former dia-  
logues they

terminate  
and full of  
unsolved  
difficulties.

The Lachês and Charmidês exhibit nothing but a fruitless search both for one and for the other. And here the case is more remarkable; because in the Lachês, one of the several definitions of Courage, tendered to Sokrates and refuted by him, is, the very definition of Courage delivered by him in the Republic as complete and satisfactory: while in the Charmidês, one of the definitions of Temperance, refuted, and even treated as scarcely intelligible, by Sokrates (*τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*) is the same as that which Sokrates in the Republic relies on as a valid definition of Justice.<sup>m</sup> Lastly, every one who has read the Parmenidês, will remember the acute objections there urged against the Platonic hypothesis of substantive Ideas, participated in by particulars: of which objections no notice is taken in the Republic, though so much is said therein about these Ideas, in regard to the training of the philosophical Chiefs.

If we revert to these passages (and many others which might be produced) of past dialogues, we shall find no means provided of harmonising them with the Republic. The logical and ethical difficulties still exist: they have never been elucidated: the Republic does not pretend to elucidate them, but overlooks or overleaps them. In composing it, Plato has his mind full of a different point of view, to which he seeks to give full effect. While his spokesman Sokrates was leader of opposition, Plato delighted to arm him with the maximum of negative cross-examining acuteness: but here Sokrates has passed over to the ministerial benches, and has undertaken the difficult task of making out a case in reply to the challenge of Glaukon and Adeimantus. No new leader of opposition is allowed to replace him. The splendid constructive effort of the Republic would have been spoiled, if exposed to such an analytical cross-examination as that which we read in Menon, Lachês, or Charmidês.

Difficulties  
left un-  
solved, but  
overleaped  
by Plato.

<sup>m</sup> See Lachês, p. 195 A. *τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην*, pp. 196 C-199 A-E—in the cross-examination of Nikias by Sokrates: and the question in the cross-examination of Lachês (who has defined Cou- rage to be *ἡ φρόνιμος* τὴ φρόνιμος; compared with Republic, iv. pp. 429 C, 430 B, 433 C. See also Charmidês, pp. 161 B, 162 B-C, compared with Republic, iv. p. 433 B-D.

In remarking upon the Platonic Republic as a political scheme only, we pass from the Platonic point of view to the Aristotelian: that is, to the discussion of Ethics and Politics as separate subjects, though adjoining and partially overlapping each other. Plato conceives the two in intimate union, and even employs violent metaphors to exaggerate the intimacy. Xenophon also conceives them in close conjunction. Aristotle goes farther in separating the two: a great improvement in regard to the speculative dealing with both of them.<sup>a</sup>

If, following the example of Aristotle, we criticise the Platonic Republic as a scheme of political constitution, we find that on most points which other theorists handle at considerable length, Plato is intentionally silent. His project is an outline and nothing more. He delineates fully the brain and heart of the great Leviathan, but leaves the rest in very faint outline. He announces explicitly the purpose of all his arrangements, to obtain happiness for the whole city: by which he means, not happiness for the greatest number of individuals, but for the abstract unity called the City, supposed to be capable of happiness or misery, apart from any individuals, many or few, composing it.<sup>o</sup> Each individual is to do the work for which he is best fitted, contributory to the happiness of the whole—and to do nothing else. Each must be content with such happiness as consists with his own exclusive employment.<sup>p</sup>

<sup>a</sup> The concluding chapter of the *Nikomachean Ethics* contains some striking remarks upon this separation.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Repub.* iv. pp. 420-421. The objection that the Guardians will have no happiness, is put by Plato into the mouth of Adeimantus, but is denied by Sokrates: who, however, says that even if it were true he could not admit it as applicable, since what he wishes is that the entire commonwealth shall be happy. Aristotle (*Politic.* ii. 5, 1264, 6-15) repeats the objection of Adeimantus, and declares that collective happiness (not enjoyed by some individuals) is impossible.

See the valuable chapter on *Ideal Models in Politics* (vol. ii. ch. xxii.

p. 236 seq.) in Sir George Cornewall Lewis's *Treatise on the methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics*. The different ideal models framed by theorists ancient and modern, Plato among the number, are there collected, with judicious remarks in comparing and appreciating them.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Republic*, iv. p. 421 C.

He lays down this minute subdivision and speciality of aptitude in individuals as a fundamental property of human nature. *Republic*, iii. p. 395 καὶ ἐτι γε τούτων φαίνεται μοι εἰς τοὺς

&c.

Compare Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* ii. 1, 21, where the same principle is laid

The Chiefs or Rulers are assumed to be both specially qualified and specially trained for the business of governing. Their authority is unlimited: they represent that One Infallible Wise Man, whom Plato frequently appeals to (in the *Politikus*, *Kriton*, *Gorgias*, and other dialogues), but never names. Absolute rule  
of a  
lost  
  
train  
the (dians.

They are a very small number, perhaps only one: the persons naturally qualified being very few, and even they requiring the severest preparatory training. The Guardians, all of them educated up to a considerable point, both obey themselves the orders of these few Chiefs, and enforce obedience upon the productive multitude. Of this last-mentioned multitude, constituting numerically almost the whole city, we hear little or nothing: except that the division of labour is strictly kept up among them, and that neither wealth nor poverty is allowed to grow up.<sup>1</sup> How this is to be accomplished, Plato does not point out: nor does he indicate how the mischievous working (*i. e.* mischievous, in his point of view, and as he declares it) of the proprietary and the family relations is to be obviated. His scheme tacitly assumes that separate property and family are to subsist among the great mass of the community, but not among the Guardians: he proclaims explicitly, that if the proprietary relations or the family relations were permitted among the Guardians, entire corruption of their character would ensue.<sup>2</sup> Among the *Demos*, or multitude, he postulates nothing except unlimited submission to the orders of the Rulers enforced through the Guardians. The regulative powers of the Rulers are assumed to be of omnipotent efficacy against every cause of mischief, subject only to one condition—That the purity of the golden breed, together with the Platonic training and discipline, are to be maintained among them unimpaired.

Everything in the Platonic Republic turns upon this elaborate training of the superior class: most of all, the Chiefs or

down. Another passage in the same treatise (*Cyropæd.* viii. 2, 5) is also interesting. Xenophon there contrasts the smaller towns, where many trades were combined in the same hand and none of the works well performed, with

the larger towns, where there was a minuter subdivision of labour, each man doing one work only, and doing it well.

Plato, *Republic*, iv. p. 421.

Plato, *Republic*, iii. p. 417.

Rulers—next, the Soldiers or Guardians. Besides this training, they are required to be placed in circumstances which will prevent them from feeling any private or separate interest of their own, apart from or adverse to that of the multitude. "Every man" (says Plato) "will best love those whose advantage he believes to coincide with his own, and when he is most convinced that if they do well, he himself will do well also: if not, not."<sup>s</sup> "The Rulers must be wise, powerful, and affectionately solicitous for the city."

These then are the two circumstances which Plato works out: The Education of the Rulers and Guardians: Their position and circumstances in regard to each other and to the remaining multitude. He does not himself prescribe, or at least he prescribes but rarely, what is to be enacted or ordered. He creates the generals and the soldiers; he relies upon the former for ordering, upon the latter for enforcing, aright.

On this point we may usefully compare him with his contemporary Xenophon. He, like Plato, presents himself to mankind as a preceptor or schoolmaster, rather than as a lawgiver. Most Grecian cities (he remarks) left the education of youth in the hands of parents, and permitted adults to choose their own mode of life, subject only to the necessity of obeying the laws: that is, of abstaining from certain defined offences, and of performing certain defined obligations—under penalties if such obedience were not rendered. From this mode of proceeding Xenophon dissents, and commends the Spartan lawgiver Lykurgus for departing from it.<sup>t</sup> To regulate public matters, without regulating the private life of the citizens, appeared to him impossible.<sup>u</sup> At Sparta, the citizen was subject to authoritative regulation, from childhood to old age. In the public education, or in the public drill, he was constantly under

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 412 D.

Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ' ἂν μάλιστα

<sup>t</sup> Xenophon, Rep. Lacedæm. i. 2.

ἵ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντία γνοὺς ταῖς πλείσταις, προέχουσιν εὐδαιμονίᾳ τὴν πόλιν ἀπέδειξεν.

καὶ ὅταν μάλιστα ἐκείνου μὲν εὐ πράττοντος οἴηται ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ εὐ πράττειν, μὴ δὲ, τοῦναντίον;

Compare v. pp. 463-464.

<sup>u</sup> Compare Plato, Legg. vi. p. 780 A.

supervision, going through prescribed exercises. This produced, according to Xenophon, "a city of pre-eminent happiness." He proclaims and follows out the same peculiar principle, in his ideal scheme of society called the Persian laws. He embodies in the *Cyropædia* the biography of a model chief, trained up from his youth in (what Xenophon calls) the Persian system, and applying the virtues acquired therein to military exploits and to the government of mankind. The Persian polity, in which the hero Cyrus receives his training, is described. Instead of leaving individuals to their own free will, except as to certain acts or abstinences specifically enjoined, this polity placed every one under a regimental training: which both shaped his character beforehand, so as to make sure that he should have no disposition to commit offences<sup>x</sup>—and subjected him to perpetual supervision afterwards, commencing with boyhood and continued to old age, through the four successive stages of boys, youths, mature men, and elders.

This general principle of combining polity with education is fundamental both with Plato and Xenophon: to a great degree, it is retained also by Aristotle. The lawgiver exercises a spiritual as well as a temporal function. He does not content himself with prohibitions and punishments, but provides for fashioning every man's character to a predetermined model, through systematic discipline begun in childhood and never discontinued. This was the general scheme, realised at Sparta in a certain manner and degree, and idealised both by Plato and Xenophon. The full application of the scheme, however, is restricted, in all the three, to a select body of qualified citizens; who are assumed to exercise dominion or headship over the remaining community.<sup>y</sup>

Both of them combine polity with education—temporal with spiritual.

<sup>x</sup> Xenophon, *Cyrop.* i. 2, 2-6.

Οὗτοι δὲ δοκοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι ἄρχεισθαι τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιμελούμενοι οὐκ ἔνθεν ὅθεν περ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσιν ἄρχονται. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ πλείσται πόλεις, ἀφεῖσαι παιδεύειν ὅπως τις ἐθέλει τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ὅπως ἐθέλουσι διδάγειν, ἔπειτα προστάττουσιν αὐτοὺς μὴ κλέπτειν. Οἱ

δὲ Περσικοὶ νόμοι προλαμβάνοντες ἵται ὅπως τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ τοιοῦτ οἱ πολῖται, οἱ πονηροῦ τινὸς ἔργου ἐφίεσθαι. Ἐπιμέλονται δὲ ὧδε.

<sup>y</sup> In Xenophon, all Persians are supposed to be legally admissible to the public training; but in practice, none can frequent it constantly except those whose families can maintain them

justice and temperance,<sup>g</sup> which are made express<sup>i</sup> subjects of teaching by Xenophon and under express masters : Xenophon thus supplies the deficiency so often lamented by the Platonic Sokrates, who remarks that neither at Athens nor elsewhere can he find either teaching or teacher of justice. Cyrus learns justice and temperance along with the rest,<sup>h</sup> but he does not learn more than the rest : nor does Xenophon perform his promise of explaining by what education such extraordinary genius for command is brought about.<sup>i</sup> The superior character of Cyrus is assumed and described, but noway accounted for : indeed his rank and position at the court of Astyages (in which he stands distinguished from the other Persians) present nothing but temptations to indulgence, partially countervailed by wise counsel from his father Kambyses. We must therefore consider Cyrus to be a king by nature, like the chief bee in each hive<sup>k</sup>—an untaught or self-taught genius, in his excellence as general and emperor. He obtains only one adventitious aid peculiar to himself. Being of divine progeny, he receives the special favour and revelations of the Gods, who, in doubtful emergencies, communicate to him by signs, omens, dreams, and sacrifices, what he ought to do and what he ought to leave undone.<sup>l</sup> Such privileged communications are represented as indispensable to the success of a leader : for though it was his duty to learn all that could be learnt, yet even after he had done this, so much uncertainty remained behind, that his decisions were little better than a lottery.<sup>m</sup> The Gods arranged the sequences of

<sup>g</sup> Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 6-8.

The boys are appointed to adjudicate, under the supervision of the teacher, in disputes which occur among their fellows. As an instance of this practice, we find the well-known adjudication by young Cyrus, between the great boy and the little boy, in regard to the two coats ; and a very instructive illustration it is, of the principle of property (Cyrop. i. 3, 17).

<sup>h</sup> Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 3, 16, iii. 3, 35. Cyrus is indeed represented as having taken lessons from a paid teacher in the art *τοῦ στρατηγεῖν* : but these lessons were meagre, comprising nothing beyond *τὰ τακτικά*, i. 6, 12-15.

<sup>i</sup> Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 1, 6. *πολὴν τινα παιδείαν παιδευθεὶς τοσούτῃ διήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ ἐρχειν ἀνθρώπων.*

<sup>k</sup> Xenophon, Cyrop. v. 1, 24. The queen-bee is masculine in Xenophon's conception.

<sup>l</sup> Xenophon, Cyrop. viii. 7, 3, iv. 2, 15, iv. 1, 24. Compare Xenophon, Economic. v. 19, 20.

<sup>m</sup> Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 6, 46. *Οὕτως ἢ γε ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία*

*μεγας δ, τι λαχοι τοῦτό τις ἔρπειν. Θεοὶ δὲ αἱ δυντες πάντα ἴσασιν τὰ τε γεγεννημένα καὶ τὰ θνητά, καὶ δ, τι ἐξ ἐκάστου αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται καὶ συμβουλευομένων*

events partly in a regular and decypherable manner, so that a man by diligent study might come to understand them: but they reserved many important events for their own free-will, so as not to be intelligible by any amount of human study. Here the wisest man was at fault no less than the most ignorant: nor could he obtain the knowledge of them except by special revelation solicited or obtained. The Gods communicated such peculiar knowledge to their favourites, but not to every one indiscriminately: for they were under no necessity to take care of men towards whom they felt no inclination.<sup>n</sup> Cyrus was one of the men thus specially privileged: but he was diligent in cultivating the favour of the Gods by constant worship, not merely at times when he stood in need of their revelations, but at other times also: just as in regard to human friends or patrons, assiduous attentions were requisite to keep up their goodwill.<sup>o</sup>

When it is desired to realise an ideal improvement of society (says Plato),<sup>p</sup> the easiest postulate is to assume a despot, young, clever, brave, thoughtful, temperate, and aspiring, belonging to that superhuman breed which reigned under the presidency of Kronus. Such a postulate is assumed by Xenophon in his hero Cyrus. The Xenophontic scheme, though presupposing a collective training, resolves itself ultimately into the will of an individual, enforcing good regulations, and full of tact in dealing with subordinates. What Cyrus is in campaign and empire, Ischomachus (see the *Economica* of Xenophon) is in the household: but everything depends on the life of this distinguished individual. Xenophon leads us at once into practice, laying only a scanty basis of theory.

In Plato's *Republic*, on the contrary, the theory predominates. He does not build upon any individual hero: he constructs a social and educational system, capable of self-perpetuation at least for a considerable

Plato does not build upon an individual hero.

ᾧ σι, προσημαίνουσιν, ἃ, τε  
ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ οὐ χρή. Εἰ δὲ μὴ  
θέλουσι συμβουλευεῖν, οὐδὲν  
αὐτοῖς ἔστω,

morabil. i. 1, 8, where the same doctrine is ascribed to Sokrates.

<sup>n</sup> Xenoph. *Cyrop.* i. 6, 40 ad fin.

Xenoph. *Cyrop.* i. 6, 3-5.

Plato, *Legg.* iv. pp. 709 E, 710-

Compare i. 6, 6-23, also the *Me-*

713.

time.<sup>1</sup> He describes the generating and sustaining principles of his system, but he does not exhibit it in action, by any pseudo-historical narrative: we learn indeed, that he had intended to subjoin such a narrative, in the dialogue called *Kritias*, of which only the commencement was ever written.<sup>2</sup> He aims at forming a certain type of character, common to all the Guardians: superadding new features so as to form a still more exalted type, peculiar to those few Elders selected from among them to exercise the directorial function. He not only lays down the process of training in greater detail than Xenophon, but he also gives explanatory reasons for most of his recommendations.

One prominent difference between the two deserves to be noticed. In the Xenophontic training, the ethical, gymnastic, and military, exigencies are carefully provided for: but the musical and intellectual exigencies are left out. The Xenophontic Persians are not affirmed either to learn letters, or to hear and repeat poetry, or to acquire the knowledge of any musical instrument. Nor does it appear, even in the case of the historical Spartans, that letters made any part of their public training. But the Platonic training includes music and gymnastics as co-ordinate and equally indispensable. Words or intellectual exercises, come in under the head of music.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, in Plato's view, even gymnastics, though bearing immediately on the health and force of the body, have for their ultimate purpose a certain action upon the mind: being essential to the due development of courage, energy, endurance, and self-assertion.<sup>4</sup> Gymnastics without

<sup>1</sup> Plato pronounces Cyrus to have been a good general and a patriot, but not to have received any right education, and especially to have provided no good education for his children, who in consequence became corrupt and degenerate (Legg. iii. 694). Upon this remark some commentators of antiquity founded the supposition of grudge or quarrel between Plato and Xenophon. We have no evidence to prove such a state of unfriendly feeling between the two, yet it is no way unlikely: and I think it highly probable that the remark just cited from Plato may have had direct reference to the Xenophontic

Cyropædia. When we read the elaborate intellectual training which Plato prescribes for the rulers in his Republic, we may easily understand that, in his view, the Xenophontic Cyrus had received no right education at all. His remark moreover brings to view the defect of all schemes built upon a perfect despot—that they depend upon an individual life.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 20-26. Plato, *Kritias*, p. 108.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376 E.

Plato, Republic, iii. p. 410 B.

πρὸς τὸ θυμοειδὲς τῆς φύσεως βλέπων καὶ αὐτὸ ἐλπίων ποιεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς

music produce a hard and savage character, insensible to persuasive agencies, hating discourse or discussion,<sup>u</sup> ungraceful as well as stupid. Music without gymnastics generates a susceptible temperament, soft, tender, and yielding to difficulties, with quick but transient impulses. Each of the two, music and gymnastic, is indispensable as a supplement and corrective to the other.

The type of character here contemplated by Plato deserves particular notice, as contrasted with that of Xenophon. It is the Athenian type against the Spartan. Periklēs in his funeral oration, delivered at Athens in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, boasts that the Athenians had already reached a type similar to this—and that too, without any special individual discipline, legally enforced: that they combined courage, ready energy, and combined action—with developed intelligence, the love of discourse, accessibility to persuasion, and taste for the Beautiful. That which Plato aims at accomplishing in his Guardians, by means of a state-education at once musical and gymnastical—Periklēs declares to have been already realised at Athens without any state-education, through the spontaneous tendencies of individuals called forth and seconded by the general working of the political system.<sup>x</sup> He compliments his countrymen as having accomplished this object without the unnecessary rigour of a positive state-discipline, and without any other restraints than the special injunctions and prohibitions of a known law. It is this absence of state-discipline to which both Xenophon and Plato are opposed. Both of them follow Lykurgus in proclaiming the insufficiency of mere prohibitions; and in demanding a positive routine of duty to be prescribed

cor  
wil  
phonic, is  
like the

<sup>u</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iii. pp. 410-411.  
ὅθι, οἶμαι, ὁ τοιοῦτος γίνεται

ἐτι  
ἔσπερ  
καὶ ἐν

καὶ ἡ ἀποστολή αὐτοῦ.  
<sup>x</sup> Thucyd. ii. 38-39-40.

the comparison between this speech  
and the third book of

public, (pp. 401-402-410-411) is very interesting. The words of Perikles, φιλοκαλοῦμεν γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἔνευ μαλακίας, taken along with the chapter preceding, mark that concurrent development of τὸ φιλόσοφον and τὸ θυμοειδές which Plato provides, and the avoidance of those defects which spring from the separate and exclusive cultivation of either.

by authority, and enforced upon individuals through life. In regard to end, Plato is more in harmony with Periklês: in regard to means, with Xenophon.

Plato's views respecting special laws and criminal procedure generally are remarkable. He not only manifests that repugnance towards the Dikastery—which is common to Sokrates, Xenophon, Isokrates, and Aristophanes—but he excludes it almost entirely from his system, as being superseded by the constant public discipline of the Guardians.

It is to be remembered that these propositions of Plato have reference, not to an entire and miscellaneous community, but to a select body called the Guardians, required to possess the bodily and mental attributes of soldiers, policemen, and superintendants. The standard of comparison in modern times, for the Professional phon. Lykurgean, Xenophontic, or Platonic training, is to be sought in the stringent discipline of professional soldiers: not in the general liberty, subject only to definite restrictions, enjoyed by non-military persons. In regard to soldiers, the Platonic principle is now usually admitted—that it is not sufficient to enact articles of war, defining what a soldier ought to do, and threatening him with punishment in case of infraction—but that, besides this, it is indispensable to exact from him a continued routine of positive performances, under constant professional supervision. Without this preparation, few now expect that soldiers should behave effectively when the moment of action arrives. This is the doctrine applied by Plato and Xenophon to the whole life of the citizen.

Music and Gymnastic are regarded by Plato mainly as they bear upon and influence the emotional character of his citizens. Each of them is the antithesis, and at the same time the supplement, to the other. Music and music. Gymnastic tends to develop exclusively the courageous and energetic emotions:—anger and the feeling of power—but no others. Whereas music (understood in the Platonic sense) has a far more multifarious and varied agency: it may develop either those, or the gentle and tender emotions,

according to circumstances.<sup>7</sup> In the hands of Tyrtæus and Æschylus, it generates vehement and fearless combatants: in the hands of Euripides and other pathetic poets, it produces tender, amatory, effeminate natures, ingenious in talk but impotent for action.<sup>8</sup>

In the age of Plato, Homer and other poets were extolled as the teachers of mankind, and as themselves possessing universal knowledge. They enjoyed a religious respect, being supposed to speak under divine inspiration, and to be the privileged reporters or diviners of a forgotten past.<sup>a</sup> They furnished the most interesting portion of that floating mass of traditional narrative respecting Gods, Heroes, and ancestors, which found easy credence both as matter of religion and as matter of history: being in full harmony with the emotional preconceptions, and uncritical curiosity, of the hearers. They furnished likewise exhortation and reproof, rules and maxims, so expressed as to live in the memory—impressive utterance for all the strong feelings of the human bosom. Poetry was for a long time the only form of literature. It was not until the fifth century B.C. that prose compositions either began to be multiplied, or were carried to such perfection as to possess a charm of their own calculated to rival the poets, who had long enjoyed a monopoly as purveyors

Great influence of the poets and their works on education.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376 B-C. If we examine Plato's tripartite classification of the varieties of soul or mind, as it is given both in the Republic and in the Timæus (1. Reason, in the cranium. 2. Energy, *θυμὸς*, in the thoracic region. 3. Appetite, in the abdominal region)—we shall see that it assigns no place to the gentle, the tender, or the æsthetical emotions. These cannot be properly ranked either with energy (*θυμὸς*) or with appetite

Plato can find no root for them except in reason or knowledge, from which he presents them as being collateral derivatives—a singular origin. He illustrates his opinion by the equally singular analogy of the dog, who is gentle towards persons whom he *knows*, fierce towards those whom he does not *know*; so that *gentleness* is the product of *knowledge*.

<sup>a</sup> See the argument between Æs-

chylus and Euripides in the *Ranæ* of Aristophanes, 1043-1061-1068.

<sup>a</sup> Aristophan. *Ranæ*, 1053. Æschylus is made to say:—

ἀλλ' ἀποκρύπτειν χρὴ τὸ πονηρὸν τὸν  
γε ποιητὴν,  
καὶ μὴ παράγειν μηδὲ διδάσκειν τοῖς  
μὲν γὰρ παιδὶ  
ἐστὶ διδάσκαλος ὅστις

πάννυ

Compare the words of Plato which conclude the *Ranæ*, 1497.

Plato, Republic, x. p. 598 D. *ἐπειδὴ τινῶν ἀκούομεν ὅτι οὗτοι* (Homer and the poets) *πᾶσαι*

*καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τὰ γε θεία, &c.*: also Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 810-811; Ion, pp. 536 A, 541 B; Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 10; and Sympos. iii. 6, where we learn that Nikeratus could repeat by heart the whole *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

for æsthetical sentiment and fancy. Rhetors, Sophists, Philosophers, then became their competitors; opening new veins of intellectual activity,<sup>b</sup> and sharing, to a certain extent, the pædagogic influence of the poets—yet never displacing them from their traditional function of teachers, narrators, and guides to the intelligence, as well as improving ministers to the sentiments, emotions, and imagination, of youth. Indeed, many Sophists and Rhetors presented themselves not as superseding,<sup>c</sup> but as expounding and illustrating the poets. Sokrates also did this occasionally, though not upon system.<sup>d</sup>

It is this educational practice—common to a certain extent among Greeks, but more developed at Athens than elsewhere<sup>e</sup>

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 810. *δλους ποιητὰς ἐκμανθάνοντας, &c.*

<sup>c</sup> It was to gain this facility that Kritias and Alkibiades, as Xenophon tells us, frequented the society of Sokrates, who (as Xenophon also tells us) "handled persons conversing with him just as he pleased" (Memor. i. 2, 14-18).

A speaker in one of the Orationes of Lysias (Orat. viii. *Κακολογιών*, s. 12) considers this power of arguing a disputed case as one of the manifestations τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν—*Καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄμην φιλοσοφούντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀντιλέγειν τὸν ἐναίτιον λόγον· οἱ δ' ἄρα οὐκ ἀντέλεγον ἀλλ' ἀντέπραττον.*

Compare the curious oration of Demosthenes against Lakritus, where the speaker imputes to Lakritus this abuse of argumentative power, as having been purchased by him at a large price from the teaching of Isokrates the Sophist, pp. 928-937-938.

<sup>d</sup> Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 57-60.

<sup>e</sup> The language of Plato is remarkable on this point. Republic, ii. p. 376 E. *Τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἡ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὐρημένης; ἐστὶ δέ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική*—and a striking passage in the Kriton (p. 50 D), where education in μουσική and γυμναστική is represented as a positive duty on the part of fathers towards their sons.

About the multifarious and indefinite province of the Muses, comprehending all *παιδεία* and *λόγος*, see Plutarch, Sympos. Problem. ix. 14, 2-3, p. 908-

909. Also Plutarch, De Audiendis Poetis, p. 31 F, about the many diverse interpretations of Homer; especially those by Chrysippus and Kleantes.

The last half of the eighth Book of Aristotle's *Politica*, contains remarkable reflections on the educational effects of music, showing the refined distinctions which philosophical men of that day drew respecting the varieties of melody and rhythm. Aristotle adverts to music as an agency not merely for *παῖδεία* but also for *κάθαρσις* (viii. 7, 1341, b. 38); to which last Plato does not advert. Aristotle also notices various animadversions by musical critics upon some of the dicta on musical subjects in the Platonic Republic (*καλῶς ἐπιτιμᾶσι καὶ ταῦτα Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τινες*, 1342, b. 23)—perhaps Aristoxenus: also 1342, a. 32. That the established character and habits of music could not be changed without leading to a revolution, ethical and political, in the minds of the citizens—is a principle affirmed by Plato, not as his own, but as having been laid down previously by Damon the celebrated musical instructor (Repub. iii. p. 424 C).

The following passage about Luther is remarkable:—

"Après avoir essayé de la théologie, Luther fut décidé par les conseils de ses amis, à embrasser l'étude du droit; que conduisiat alors aux postes les plus lucratifs de l'État et de l'Eglise. Mais il ne semble pas s'y être jamais livré avec gout. Il aimait bien mieux la belle littérature, et surtout la musique. C'était son art de prédilection. Il la

—which Plato has in his mind, when he draws up the outline of a musical education for his useful Guardians. He does not intend it as a scheme for fostering the highest intellectual powers, or for exalting men into philosophers—which he reserves as an ulterior improvement, to be communicated at a later period of life, and only to a chosen few—the large majority being supposed incapable of appropriating it. His musical training (co-operating with the gymnastical) is intended to form the character of the general body of Guardians: to implant in them from early childhood a peculiar vein of sentiments, habits, emotions and emotional beliefs, ethical esteem and disesteem, love and hatred, &c., to inspire them (in his own phrase) with love of the beautiful or honourable.

of the purpose which poetry and music ought to serve in education.

It is in this spirit that he deals with the traditional, popular, almost consecrated, poetical literature which prevailed around him. He undertakes to revise and recast the whole of it. Repudiating avowedly the purpose of the authors, he sets up a different point of view by which they are to be judged. The contest of principle, into which he now enters, subsisted (he tells us) long before his time: a standing discord between the philosophers and the poets.<sup>1</sup> The poet is an artist<sup>2</sup> whose aim is to give immediate pleasure and satisfaction: appealing to æsthetical sentiment, feeding imagination and belief, and finding embodiment for emotions, religious or patriotic, which he shares with his hearers: the philosopher is a critic, who lays down authoritatively deeper and more distant ends which he considers that poetry *ought to serve*, judging the poets according as they promote, neglect, or frustrate those ends. Plato declares the end which he requires poetry to serve in

He declares

cultiva toute sa vie et l'enseigna à ses enfans. Il n'hésite pas à déclarer que la musique lui semble le premier des arts, après la théologie. La musique (dit il) est l'art des prophètes: c'est le seul qui, comme la théologie, puisse calmer les troubles de l'ame et mettre le diable en fuite. Il touchait du luth, jouait de la flûte." (*Michelet, Mémoires de Luther, écrits par lui-même, pp. 4-5,*

Paris, 1835.)

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Republ. x.* p. 607 B. μέν τις διαφορά φιλοσοφία τε κ τικῆ, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Republ. x.* p. 607 A-C. τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν—ἢ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ μίμησις, &c.

Compare also *Leges ii.* p. 655 D seq., about 1

the training of his Guardians. It must contribute to form the ethical character which he approves: in so far as it thus contributes, he will tolerate it, but no farther. The charm and interest especially, belonging to beautiful poems, is not only no reason for admitting them, but is rather a reason (in his view) for excluding them.<sup>b</sup> The more beautiful a poem is, the more effectively does it awaken, stimulate, and amplify, the emotional forces of the mind: the stronger is its efficacy in giving empire to pleasure and pain, and in resisting or overpowering the rightful authority of Reason. It thus directly contravenes the purpose of the Platonic education—the formation of characters wherein Reason shall effectively controul all the emotions and desires.<sup>i</sup> Hence he excludes all the varieties of imitative poetry:—that is, narrative, descriptive, or dramatic poetry. He admits only hymns to the Gods and panegyrics upon good citizens:—probably also didactic, gnomic, or hortative, poetry of approved tone. Imitative poetry is declared objectionable farther, not only as it exaggerates the emotions, but on another ground—that it fills the

<sup>b</sup> It is interesting to read in the first book of Strabo (pp. 15-19-25-27, &c.) the controversy which he carries on with Eratosthenes, as to the function of poets generally, and as to the purpose of Homer in particular. Eratosthenes considered Homer, and the other poets also, as having composed verses to please and interest, not to teach—*ψυχαγωγίας χάριν, οὐ διδασκαλίας*. Strabo (following the astronomer Hipparchus) controverts this opinion; affirming that poets had been the earliest philosophers and teachers of mankind, and that they must always continue to be the teachers of the multitude, who were unable to profit by history and philosophy. Strabo has the strongest admiration for Homer, not merely as a poet but as a moralising teacher. While Plato banishes Homer from his commonwealth, on the ground of pernicious ethical influence, Strabo claims for Homer the very opposite merit, and extols him as the best of all popular teachers—*ἡ δὲ*

*δημιωφελεστέρα καὶ θέατρα  
ἢ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Ὀμηροῦ*

*ἵστανται δὲ πρὸς τὸ παιδεύειν  
εἶδος ἀναφέρων τοῖς*

*ποιητῆς, ἐφρόντισε πολὺ μέρος.*

(Strabo, i. p. 20). The contradiction between Plato and Strabo is remarkable. Compare the beginning of Horace's Epistle, i. 2. In the time of Strabo (more than three centuries after Plato's death) there existed an abundant prose literature on matters of erudition, history, science, philosophy. The work of instruction was thus taken out of the poet's hands; yet Strabo cannot bear to admit this. In the age of Plato the prose literature was comparatively small. Alexandria and its school did not exist: the poets covered a far larger portion of the entire ground of instruction.

As a striking illustration of the continued and unquestioning faith in the ancient legends, we may cite Galen: who, in a medical argument against Erasistratus, cites the cure of the daughters of Proetus by Melampus as an incontestable authentic fact in medical evidence; putting to shame Erasistratus, who had not attended to it in his reasoning (Galen, De Atrá Bile, T. v. p. 132, Kühn).

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Republic, x. pp. 606-607, iii. p. 387 B.

mind with false and unreal representations; being composed by men who have no real knowledge of their subject, though they pretend to a sort of fallacious omniscience, and talk boldly about every thing.<sup>k</sup>

Even hymns to the Gods, however, may be composed in many different strains, according to the conception Strict limits which the poet entertains of their character and attributes. The Homeric Hymns which we now possess could not be acceptable to Plato. While denouncing much of the current theological poetry, he assumes a censorial authority, in his joint character of Lykurgus and Sokrates,<sup>l</sup> to dictate what sort of poetical compositions shall be tolerated among his Guardians. He pronounces many of the tales in Homer and Hesiod to be not merely fictions, but mischievous fictions: not fit to be circulated, even if they had been true.

Plato admits fiction, indeed, along with truth as an instrument for forming the character. Nay, he draws little distinction between the two, as regards particular narratives. But the point upon which he specially insists, is, that all the narratives in circulation, true or false, respecting Gods and Heroes, shall ascribe to them none but qualities ethically estimable and venerable. He condemns Homer and Hesiod as having misrepresented the Gods and Heroes, and as having attributed to them acts inconsistent with their true character, like a painter painting a portrait unlike to the original.<sup>m</sup> He rejects in this manner various tales told in these poems respecting Zeus, Hêrê, Hephæstus—the fraudulent rupture of

the purposes of fiction—little distinction between fiction and truth. His censures upon Homer and the tragedians.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republic, x. pp. 598-599. When Plato attacks the poets so severely on the ground of their departure from truth and reality, and their false representations of human life—the poets might have retorted, that Plato departed no less from truth and reality in many parts of his Republic, and especially in his panegyric upon Justice; not to mention the various mythes which we read in Republic, Phædon, Phædrus, Politikus, &c.

Plato's fictions are indeed ethical, intended to serve a pædagogic purpose; Homer's fictions are æsthetical, addressed to the fancy and emotions.

But it is not fair in Plato, the avowed champion of useful fiction, to censure the poets on the ground of their departing from truth.

<sup>l</sup> Plutarch, Sympos. Quæst. viii. 2, 2, p. 719.

<sup>o</sup> Ὁ Πλάτων, ὅτε δὴ τῷ Σωκράτει Ἀγκούργον ἀναμειγνύς, &c.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 377 E.

the treaty between the Greeks and Trojans by Pandarus, at the instigation of Zeus and Athênê—the final battle of the Gods, in the *Iliad*<sup>n</sup>—the transformations of Proteus and Thetis, and the general declaration in the *Odyssey* that the Gods under the likeness of various strangers visit human cities as inspectors of good and bad behaviour<sup>o</sup>—the dream sent by Zeus to deceive Agamemnon (in the second book of the *Iliad*) and the charge made by Thetis in *Æschylus* against Apollo, of having deceived her and killed her son Achilles<sup>p</sup>—the violent amorous impulse of Zeus, in the fourteenth book of the *Iliad*—the immoderate laughter among the Gods, when they saw the lame Hephæstus busying himself in the service of the banquet. Plato will not permit the realm of Hades to be described as odious and full of terrors, because the Guardians will thereby learn to fear death.<sup>q</sup> Nor will he tolerate the Homeric pictures of heroes or semi-divine persons, like Priam or Achilles, plunged into violent sorrow for the death of friends and relatives:—since a thoroughly right-minded man, while he regards death as no serious evil to the deceased, is at the same time most self-sufficing in character, and least in need of extraneous sympathy.<sup>r</sup>

<sup>n</sup> Plato, *Repub.* ii. pp. 378-379. Plutarch observes about Chrysippus—*ὅτι τῷ θεῷ καλὰς μὲν ἐπικλήσεις καὶ φιλανθρώπους ἀεὶ, ἄγρια δ' ἔργα καὶ βαρβάρη καὶ Γαλατικὰ προστίθῃσιν* (*De Stoicorum Repugnant.* c. 32, p. 1049 B).

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Republ.* ii. p. 380 B. Plato in the beginning of his *Sophistês* treats this doctrine of the appearances of the Gods with greater respect. Lucretius argues that the Gods, being in a state of perfect happiness and exempt from all want, cannot change; *Lucret.* v. 170, compared with Plato, *Repub.* ii. p. 381 B.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Republ.* ii. pp. 380-381-383.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iii. p. 380 C.

<sup>r</sup> *Timæus* Tyrius (*Diss.* xxiv. c. 5) remarks, that upon the principles here laid down by Plato, much of what occurs in the Platonic dialogues respecting the erotic vehemence and enthusiasm of Sokrates ought to be excluded from education.

Plato, *Republic*, iii. p. 387 D. *ὁ*

*πῶς ἐπεικεῖ, οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ τεθνάναι οὐ δεινὸν*

*ἡγήσεται—Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπὲρ γε ὡς δεινόν τι πεπονθότος ὀδυροῖτ'*  
'*Ἀλλὰ μὴν—ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα εἰ αὐτῷ αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων, ἥκιστα ἑτέρου προσδεῖται—Ἡκιστ' ἄρα αὐτῷ δεινὸν στερηθῆναι υἱέος, ἢ ἀδέλφου, ἢ χρημάτων, ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων, &c.*

The doctrine of Epikurus, as laid down by Lucretius (*iii.* 844-920), coincides here with that of Plato:—

*Tu quidem ut es letho sopitus, sic eris ævi  
Quod superest, cunctis privatus' doloribus ægris:*

*At nos horripito cinefactum te propé busto  
Insatiabiliter deflebitis, æternumque  
Nulla dies nobis mororem pectore demet.  
Illud ab hoc igitur querendum est, quid sit  
amari*

*Tantopere, ad somnum si res redit atque  
quietem*

*Cur quisquam æterno possit tabescere luctu?*

Plato insists, not less strenuously than Lucretius, upon preserving the minds of his Guardians from the frightful pictures of Hades, which terrify all hearers—*φρίττειν δὲ ποιεῖ*

These and other condemnations are passed by Plato upon the current histories respecting Gods, and respecting heroes the sons or immediate descendants of Gods. He entirely forbids such histories, as suggesting bad examples to his Guardians. He prohibits all poetical composition, except under his own censorial supervision. He lays down, as a general doctrine, that the Gods are good; and he will tolerate no narrative which is not in full harmony with this predetermined type. Without giving any specimens of approved narratives—which he declares to be the business not of the lawgiver, but of the poet—he insists only that all poets shall conform in their compositions to his general standard of orthodoxy.<sup>a</sup>

Type of

tales of  
Gods &  
Heroes.

Applying such a principle of criticism, Plato had little difficulty in finding portions of the current mythology offensive to his ideal type of goodness. Indeed he might have found many others, yet more offensive to it than some of those which he has selected.<sup>t</sup> But the extent of his variance with the current views reveals itself still more emphatically, when he says that the Gods are not to be represented as the cause of evil things to us, but only of good things. Most persons (he says) consider the Gods as causes of all things, evil as well as good: but this is untrue:<sup>u</sup> the Gods dispense only the good things, not the evil; and the good things are few in number compared with the evil. Plato therefore

ὡς οἶόν τε πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας, iii. p. 387:—

"metus ille foras præceps Acheruntis agendus Funditus, humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo" (iii. 38).

<sup>a</sup> Compare also Plato de Legg. x. p. 886 C, xii. p. 941 B.

<sup>t</sup> As one example, Plato cites the story in the Iliad, that Achilles cut off his hair as an offering to the deceased Patroklos, after his hair had been consecrated by vow to the river Spercheius (Rep. iii. p. 391). If we look at the Iliad (xxiii. 150), we find that the vow to the Spercheius had been originally made by Peleus, conditionally upon the return of Achilles to his native land. Now Achilles had been

already forewarned that he would never return thither, consequently the vow to Spercheius was void, and the execution of it impracticable.

Plato does not disbelieve the legend of Hippolytus; the cruel death of an innocent youth, brought on by the Gods in consequence of the curse of his father Theseus (Legg. xi. p. 931 B).

Plato, Republ. ii. p. 379 D. Οὐδ' ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν,

ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολ-  
αἴτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω  
τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν. Καὶ τῶν

αἰτίων,

requires the poet to ascribe all good things to the Gods and to no one else; but to find other causes, apart from the Gods, for sufferings and evils. But if the poet chooses to describe sufferings as inflicted by the Gods, he must at the same time represent these sufferings as a healing penalty or real benefit to the sufferers.\*

The principle involved in these criticisms of Plato deserves notice, in more than one point of view.

That which he proposes for his commonwealth is hardly of less than a new religious creed, retaining merely old names of the Gods and old ceremonies. He intends it to consist of a body of premeditated fictitious stories, prepared by poets under his inspection and controul. He does not set up any pretence of historical truth for these stories, when first promulgated: he claims no traditionary evidence, no divine inspiration, such as were associated more or less with the received legends, in the minds both of those who recited and of those who heard them. He rejects these legends, because they are inconsistent with his belief and sentiment as to the character of the Gods. Such rejection we can understand:—but he goes a step farther, and directs the coinage of a new body of legends, which have no other title to credence, except that they are to be in harmony with his belief about the general character of the Gods, and that they will produce a salutary ethical effect upon the minds of his Guardians. They are deliberate fictions, the difference between fact and fiction being altogether neglected: they are pious frauds, constructed upon an authoritative type, and intended for an orthodox purpose. The exclusive monopoly of coining and circulating

\* Plato, Rep. ii. p. 380 B. Plutarch Consolat. ad Apollonium (107 c. 115 E), citation from Pindar—ἐν παρ' ἑσθλὸν σὺνδύο δαίονταί βροτοῖς

(sc. ἀγαθὰ) μόγῃς καὶ

In the Sept. cont. Thebas of Æschylus, Eteokles complains of this doctrine as a hardship and unfairness

to the chief. If (says he) we defend the city successfully, our success will be ascribed to the Gods; if, on the contrary, we fail, Eteokles alone will be the person blamed for it by all the citizens:—

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πράξαιμεν, αἶτ' Εἰ δ' αὖθ', ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, συμφορὰ εἰς μόνος

fictions is a privilege which Plato exacts for himself as founder, and for the Rulers, after his commonwealth is founded.<sup>y</sup> All the narrative matter circulating in his community is to be prepared with reference to his views, and stamped at his mint. He considers it not merely a privilege, but a duty of the Rulers, to provide and circulate fictions for the benefit of the community, like physicians administering wholesome medicines.<sup>z</sup> This is a part of the machinery essential to his purpose. He remarks that it had already been often worked successfully by others, for the establishment of cities present or past. There had been no recent example of it, indeed, nor will he guarantee the practicability of it among his own contemporaries. Yet, unless certain fundamental fictions can be accredited among his citizens, the scheme of his commonwealth must fail. They must be made to believe that they are all earthborn and all brethren; that the earth which they inhabit is also their mother: but that there is this difference among them—the Rulers have gold mingled with their constitution, the other Guardians have silver, the remaining citizens have brass or iron. This bold fiction must be planted as a fundamental dogma, as an article of unquestioned faith, in the minds of all the citizens, in order that they may be animated with the proper sentiments of reverence towards the local soil as their common mother—of universal mutual affection among themselves as brothers—and of deference, on the part of the iron and brazen variety, towards the gold and

<sup>y</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iii. p. 389 B; compare ii. p. 382 C.

Dähne (*Darstellung der Jüdisch-Alexandrin. Religions Philosophie*, i. pp. 48-50) sets forth the motives which determined the new interpretations of the Pentateuch by the Alexandrine Jews, from the translators of the Septuagint down to Philo. In the view of Philo there was a double meaning: the literal meaning, for the vulgar: but also besides this, there was an allegorical, the real and true meaning, discoverable only by sagacious judges. Moses (he said) gave the literal meaning, though not true, πρὸς τὰ τῶν πολλῶν διδασκαλίαν. Μανθάνεωσαν οὖν τοιοῦτοι τι

εἰ μὴ δύνανται δι'

ἀληθείας σωφρονίζεσθαι (Philo, *Quæst.* in *Genesin* ap. Dähne, p. 50). Compare also Philo, on the *καρόνες καὶ νόμοι τῆς ἀλληγορίας*, Dähne, pp. 60-68.

Herakleitus (*Allegoriæ Homericæ* ed. Mehler, 1851) defends Homer warmly against the censorial condemnation of Plato. Herakleitus contends for an allegorical interpretation, and admits that it is necessary to find one. He inveighs against Plato in violent terms. Ἐρρίφθω δὲ καὶ Πλάτων δ κόλαξ, &c.

Isokrates (*Orat. Panathen.* s. 22-28) complains much of the obloquy which he incurred, because some opponents alleged that he depreciated the poets, especially Homer and Hesiod.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, *Repub.* iii. pp. 389 B, 414 C.

silver. At least, such must be the established creed of all the other citizens except the few Rulers. It ought also to be imparted, if possible, to the Rulers themselves: but *they* might be more difficult to persuade.<sup>a</sup>

Plato fully admits the extreme difficulty of procuring a  
 Difficulty of introduction and establishment for this new  
 article of faith, which nevertheless is indispensable  
 to set his commonwealth afloat. But if it can be  
 once established, there will be no difficulty at all in  
 continuing and perpetuating it.<sup>b</sup> Even as to the  
 first commencement, difficulty is not to be con-  
 mitted. founded with impossibility: for the attempt has  
 already been made with success in many different places,  
 though there happens to be no recent instance.

We learn hence to appreciate the estimate which Plato formed of the ethical and religious faith, prevalent in the various societies around him. He regards as fictions the accredited stories respecting Gods and Heroes, which constituted the matter of religious belief among his contemporaries; being familiarised to all through the works of poets, painters, and sculptors, as well as through votive offerings, such as the robe annually worked by the women of Athens for the Goddess Athênê. These fictions he supposes to have originally obtained credence either through the charm of poets and narrators, or through the deliberate coinage of an authoritative lawgiver; presupposing in the community a vague emotional belief in the Gods—invisible, quasi-human agents, of whom they knew nothing distinct—and an entire ignorance of recorded history, past as well as present. Once received into the general belief, which is much more an act of emotion than of reason, such narratives retain their hold

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 414 C. τίς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν μηχανὴ γένοιτο τῶν  
 δῶν τῶν ἐν δέοντι γιγνομένων, ὧν  
 ν, γενναῖόν τι δὲ οὐ γεγονὸς οὐδ' οἶδα εἰ γινόμενον ἂν,  
 πείσαι δὲ συχνῆς πειθοῦς; Compare  
 De Legib. pp. 663-664.

Plato, Republ. iii. p. 415 D.  
 πείσαι, μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὐτοὺς τὸν οὖν τὸν μῦθον ὅπως ἂν ἰ  
 τοὺς ἔρχοντας—εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἰ  
 Ποῖόν τι; Μηδὲν καὶνόν, ἂν αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ὅπως μὲντ' ἂν οἱ  
 Φοινικικόν τι, πρότερον μὲν ἢ δὴ τοῦτων νίεις καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι  
 πολλαχοῦ γεγονὸς, ὥς φασιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὑστερον.

both by positive teaching and by the self-operating transmission of this emotional faith to each new member of the community, as well as by the almost entire absence of criticism: especially in earlier days, when men were less intelligent but more virtuous than they are now (in Plato's time)—when among their other virtues, that of unsuspecting faith stood conspicuous, no one having yet become clever enough to suspect falsehood.<sup>c</sup> This is what Plato assumes as the natural mental condition of society, to which he adapts his improvements. He disapproves the received fictions, not because they are fictions, but because they tend to produce a mischievous ethical effect, from the acts which they ascribe to the Gods and Heroes. These acts were such, that many of them (he says) even if they had been true, ought never to be promulgated. Plato does not pretend to substitute truth in place of fiction; but to furnish a better class of fictions in place of a worse.<sup>d</sup> The religion of the Commonwealth, in his view, is to furnish fictions and sanctions to assist the moral and political views of the lawgiver, whose duty it is to employ religion for this purpose.<sup>e</sup>

We read in a poetical fragment of Kritias (the contem-

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 679 C-E.  
 ἀγαθοὶ μὲν δὴ διὰ ταῦτά τε ἦσαν καὶ  
 διὰ τὴν λεγομένην εὐθθειαν· ἃ γὰρ  
 ἤκουον καλὰ καὶ αἰσχροῖα, εὐθθεῖς ὄντες  
 ἡγούοντο ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι καὶ ἐπεί-  
 θοντο· ψεῦδος γὰρ ὑπονοεῖν οὐδεὶς ἠπί-  
 στατο διὰ σοφίαν, ὥσπερ τανῦν,  
 ἀλλὰ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ  
 λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ νομίζοντες ἔζων κατὰ  
 ταῦτα—τῶν νῦν ἀτεχνότεροι μὲν καὶ  
 «—εὐθηέστεροι δὲ καὶ ἀν-  
 καὶ ἅμα σωφρονέστεροι καὶ

blaming Thucydides for the choice of his subject, goes so far as to say "that the Peloponnesian war, a period of ruinous discord in Greece, ought to have been left in oblivion, and never to have passed into history" (Dion. H. ad Cn. Pomp. de Præc. Histor. Judic. p. 708, Reisk.)

See a note at the beginning of chap. 38 of my 'History of Greece.'

<sup>e</sup> Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, ix. 54, p. 562. Compare Polybius, vi. 56; Dionys. Hal. ii. 13; Strabo, i. p. 19.

These three, like Plato, consider the matters of religious belief to be fictions prescribed by the lawgiver for the purpose of governing those minds which are of too low a character to listen to truth and reason. Strabo states, more clearly than the other two, the employment of μῦθοι by the lawgiver for purposes of education and government; he extends this doctrine to πᾶσα θεο-

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 603 E.

This carelessness about historical matter of fact, as such—is not uncommon with ancient moralists and rhetoricians. Both of them were apt to treat history not as a series of true matters of fact, exemplifying the laws of human nature and society, and enlarging our knowledge of them for future inference—but as if it were a branch of fiction, to be handled so as to please our taste or improve our morality. Dionysius of Halikarnassus,

(p. 19).

porary of Plato, though somewhat older) an opinion advanced —that even the belief in the existence of the Gods sprang originally from the deliberate promulgation of lawgivers, for useful purposes. The opinion of Plato is not exactly the same, but it is very analogous: for he holds that all which the community believe, respecting the attributes and acts of the Gods, must consist of fictions, and that accordingly it is essential for the lawgiver to determine what the accredited fictions in his own community shall be: he must therefore cause to be invented and circulated such as conduce to the ethical and political results which he himself approves. Private citizens are forbidden to tell falsehood; but the lawgiver is to administer falsehood, on suitable occasions, as a wholesome medicine.<sup>f</sup>

Plato lays down his own individual preconception respecting the characters of the Gods, as orthodoxy for his Republic: directing that the poets shall provide new narratives conformable to that type. What is more, he establishes a peremptory censorship to prevent the circulation of any narratives dissenting from it. As to truth or falsehood, all that he himself claims is that his general preconception of the character of the Gods is true, and worthy of their dignity; while those entertained by his contemporaries are false; the particular narratives are alike fictitious in both cases. Fictitious as they are, however, Plato has fair reason for his confident assertion, that if they could once be imprinted on the minds of his citizens, as portions of an established creed, they would maintain themselves for a long time in unimpaired force and credit. He guards them by the artificial protection of a censorship, stricter than any real Grecian city exhibited: over and above the self-supporting efficacy, usually sufficient without farther aid, which inheres in every established religious creed.

Plato, *Republ.* iii. p. 389 B. *ἐν*

Compare *De Legg.* ii.

p. 663 D.

Eusebius enumerates this as one of the points of conformity between Plato and the Hebrew records; in which, Eusebius says, you may find number-

less similar fictions (*μύθια τοιαῦτα*), such as the statements of God being jealous or angry or affected by other human passions, which are fictions recounted for the benefit of those who require such treatment (*Euseb. Præpar. Evan.* xii. 31).

The points upon which Plato here chiefly takes issue with his countrymen, are—the general character of the Gods—and the extent to which the Gods determine the lot of human beings. He distinctly repudiates as untrue, that which he declares to be the generally received faith: though in other parts of his writings, we find him eulogising the merit of uninquiring faith—of that age of honest simplicity when every one believed what was told him from his childhood, and when no man was yet clever enough to suspect falsehood.<sup>g</sup>

Main points of dissent between Plato and his countrymen, in respect to religious doctrine.

The discord on this important point between Plato and the religious faith of his countrymen, deserves notice the rather, because the doctrines in the Republic are all put into the mouth of Sokrates, and are even criticised by Aristotle under the name of Sokrates.<sup>h</sup> Most people, and among them the historical Sokrates, believed in the universal agency of the Gods.<sup>i</sup> No—(affirms Plato) the Gods are good beings, whose nature is inconsistent with the production of evil: we must therefore divide the course of events into two portions, referring the good only to the Gods and the evil to other causes. Moreover—since the evil in the world is not merely considerable, but so considerable as greatly to preponderate over good, we must pronounce that most things are produced by these other causes (not farther particularised by Plato) and comparatively few things by the Gods. Now Epikurus (and some contemporaries<sup>k</sup> of Plato even before Epikurus) adopted these

Theology of Plato compared with that of Epikurus—Neither of them satisfied the exigencies of a believing religious mind of that day.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 679; compare x. p. 887 C, xi. p. 913 C.

So again in the Timæus (p. 40 E), he accepts the received genealogy of the Gods, upon the authority of the sons and early descendants of the Gods. These sons must have known their own fathers; we ought therefore "to follow the law and believe them" (*ἐπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον*) though they spoke without either probable or demonstrative proof (*ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν*

expressly name the poets. Julian in his remark on the passage (Orat. vii. p. 237) understands the poets to be meant, and their credibility to be upheld, by Plato—*καὶ ταῦτα ἕτερα ἐν γὰρ*

*, ὅσα ὑπὲρ φασὶν οἱ ποιηταί.* See

Lindau's note on this passage in his edition of the Timæus, p. 62.

<sup>h</sup> Aristotel. Politic. ii. 1, &c. Compare the second of the Platonic Epistles, p. 314.

<sup>i</sup> *Ζεὺς παναίτιος, πανεργέτας, &c.* Æschyl. Agamem. 1453. Xenophon, Memorab. i. 1, 8-9.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. x. pp. 899 D, 883 C.

That which Plato here enjoins to be believed is the genealogy of Hesiod and other poets, though he does not

same premisses as to the preponderance of evil—but drew a different inference. They inferred that the Gods did not interfere at all in the management of the universe. Epikurus conceived the Gods as immortal beings living in eternal tranquillity and happiness; he thought it repugnant to their nature to exchange this state for any other—above all, to exchange it for the task of administering the universe, which would impose upon them endless vexation without any assignable benefit. Lastly, the preponderant evil, visibly manifested in the universe, afforded to his mind a positive proof that it was not administered by them.<sup>1</sup>

Comparing the two doctrines, we see that Plato, though he did not reject altogether, as Epikurus did, the agency of the Gods in the universe,—restricted it here nevertheless so as to suit the ethical exigencies of his own mind. He thus discarded so large a portion of it, as to place himself, or rather his spokesman Sokrates, in marked hostility with the received religious faith. If Melêtus and Anytus lived to read the Platonic Republic (we may add, also the dialogue called Euthyphron), they would probably have felt increased persuasion that their indictment against Sokrates was well-grounded:<sup>m</sup> since he stood proclaimed by the most eminent of his companions as an innovator in matters of religion, and as disbelieving a very large portion of what was commonly received by pious Athenians. With many persons, it

He intimates that there were no inconsiderable number of persons who then held the doctrine, compare p. 891 B.

<sup>1</sup> Lucretius, R. N. ii. 180, v. 107-196, vi. 68:—

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse creatam  
Naturam rerum, quæ tantâ 'st prædita culpâ—

ii. 1092:—

Nam—proh sancta Deum tranquillâ pectora  
pace,

Quæ placidum degunt ævum, vitamque sere-  
nam—

Immensi summam, quis habere  
proiundi

Indu manu validas potis est moderanter ha-

This was the form of the indictment against Sokrates. The Republic of Plato certainly shows ground for the first part of it. Sokrates did not introduce new names and persons of Gods, but he preached new views about their characters and agency, and (what probably would cause the greatest offence) he emphatically blames the received views. The Republic of Plato here embodies what we read in the Platonist Maximus Tyrius (ix. 8) as the counter-indictment of Sokrates against the Athenian people—*ἡ δὲ Σωκράτους κατὰ Ἀθηναίων*

Xenoph. Memorab. i. 1.

οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς, ἕτερα  
ἕτερα δὲ  
καὶ

θεοὺς, οὐ

τοὺς νέους δια-

was considered a species of sacrilege to disbelieve any narrative which had once been impressed upon them respecting the Gods or the divine agency: the later Pythagoreans laid it down as a canon, that this was never to be done.<sup>a</sup>

Now the Gods, as here conceived by Plato conformably to his own ethical exigencies, are representatives of abstract goodness, or of what he considers as such<sup>o</sup>—but they are nothing else. They have no other human emotions: they are invoked for the purposes of the schoolmaster and the lawgiver, to distribute prizes, and inflict chastisements, on occasions which Plato thinks suitable. But Gods with these restricted functions were hardly less at variance with the current religious belief than the contemplative, theorising, Gods of Aristotle—or the perfectly tranquil and happy Gods of Epikurus. The Gods of the popular faith were not thus specialised types, embodiments of one abstract, ethical, idea. They were concrete personalities, many-sided and many-coloured, endowed with great variety of dispositions and emotions: having sympathies and antipathies, preferences and dislikes, to persons, places, and objects: sensitive on the score of attention paid to themselves, and of offerings tendered by men, jealous of any person who appeared to make light of them, or to put himself upon a footing of independence or rivalry: connected with particular men and cities by ties of family and residence.<sup>p</sup>

Plato conceives the Gods according to the exigencies of his own mind—complete discord with those of the popular mind.

<sup>a</sup> Jamblichus, Vit. Pythag. c. 138-148. Adhortatio ad Philosophiam, p. 324, ed. Kiessling. See chapt. xxxvii. of my 'History of Greece,' p. 345, last edit.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 379.

<sup>p</sup> In the sixteenth chapter of my 'History of Greece' (see p. 504 seq.) I have given many remarks on the ancient Grecian legends, and on the varying views entertained in ancient times respecting them, considered chiefly in reference to the standard of historical belief. I here regard them more as matters of religious belief and emotion.

<sup>p</sup> Nowhere is the relation between men and the Gods, and the all-covering variety of divine agency, in ancient Grecian belief, more instructively

illustrated than in the Hippolytus of Euripides. Hippolytus, a youth priding himself on piety and still more upon inexorable continence (1140-1305), is not merely the constant worshipper of the goddess Artemis, but also her companion; she sits with him, hunts with him; he hears her voice and converses with her; he knows her presence by the divine odour, though he does not see her (σύνθαιε, συγκύναγε, 1093-1391-87). But he disdains to address a respectful word to Aphrodité, or to yield in any way to her influence, though he continually passes by her statue which stands at his gates; he even speaks of her in disparaging terms (13-101). Aphrodité becomes deeply indignant with him, not because he is devoted to

They corresponded with all the feelings of the believer; with his hopes and fears, his joys and sorrows, his pride or his shame, his love or preference towards some persons or institutions, his hatred and contempt for others. They were sometimes benevolent, sometimes displeased and unpropitious, according to circumstances. They were indeed believed to interfere for the protection of what the believer accounted innocence or merit, and for the avenging of what he called wrong. But this was only one of many occasions on which they interfered. They dispensed alternately evil and good, out of the two casks mentioned in that Homeric verse<sup>a</sup> which Plato so emphatically censures. Nay, it was as much a necessity of the believer's imagination to impute marked and serious suffering to the envy or jealousy of the Gods, as good fortune and prosperity to their kindness. Such a turn of thought is not less visible in Herodotus, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Lykurgus, &c., than in Homer and the other poets whom Plato rebukes. Moreover it is frequently expressed or implied in the answers or admonitions delivered from oracles.<sup>r</sup>

Artemis, but because he neglects and despises herself (20): for the Gods take offence when they are treated with disrespect, just as men do (0-94). His faithful attendant laments this misguided self-sufficiency, and endeavours in vain to reason his master out of it (see the curious dialogue 87-120, also 445). Aphrodité accordingly resolves to punish Hippolytus for this neglect by inspiring Phædra, his step-mother, with an irresistible passion for him: she foresees that this will prove the destruction of Phædra as well as of Hippolytus, but no such consideration can be allowed to countervail the necessity of punishing her enemies. She accordingly smites Phædra with love-sickness, which, since Phædra will not reveal the cause, the chorus ascribes to the displeasure and visitation of some unknown divinity, Pan, Hekaté, Kybelé, &c. (142-238). The course of this beautiful drama is well known: Aphrodité proves herself a Goddess and something more (359); Phædra and Hippolytus both perish; Theseus is struck

down with grief and remorse (1402): while Artemis, who appears at the end to console the dying Hippolytus and reprove Theseus, laments that it was not in her power, according to the established etiquette among the Gods, to interpose for the protection of Hippolytus against the anger of Aphrodité, but promises to avenge him by killing with her unerring arrows some marked favourite of Aphrodité (1327-1421). "Non esse curæ Diis securitatem nostram, esse ultionem."—Tacitus.

<sup>a</sup> Homer, *Iliad* xxiv. 525.

<sup>r</sup> The opinion is memorable, which Herodotus puts into the mouth of the wisest and best man of his age—Solon. "Ὁ Κροῖσε, ἐπιστάμενός με τὸ θεῖον παν ἔδν φθονερόν τε καὶ παραχῶδες, τὰς με τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράξεις περὶ; (Herod. i. 32). Krossus was overtaken by a terrible divine judgment because he thought himself the happiest of men (i. 34). The Gods strike at persons of high rank and position; they do not suffer any one except themselves to indulge in self-exaltation (vii. 10). Herodotus ascribes

When therefore the Platonic Sokrates in this treatise affirms authoritatively,—and affirms without any proof—his restricted version of the agency of the Gods, calling upon his countrymen to reject all that large portion of their religious belief, which rested upon the assumption of a wider agency, as being unworthy of the real attributes of the Gods,—he would confirm, in the minds of ordinary Athenians, the charge of culpable innovation in religion, preferred against him by his accusers. To set up *à priori* a certain type (either Platonic or Epikurean) of what the Gods *must* be, different from what they were commonly believed to be,—and then to disallow as unworthy and incredible, all that was inconsistent with this type, including a full half of the narratives consecrated in the emotional belief of the public—all this could not but appear as “impious rationalism,” on the part of “the Sophist Sokrates.”\* It would be not less repugnant to the feelings of ordinary Greeks, and would appear not more conclusive to their reason, than the arguments of rationalizing critics upon many narratives of the Old Testament appear to orthodox readers of modern times—when these critics disallow as untrue many acts therein ascribed to God, on the ground that such acts are unworthy of a just and good being.

Repugnance of ordinary Athenians, in regard to the criticism of Sokrates on the religious legends.

the like sentiment to another man distinguished for prudence—Amasis king of Egypt (iii. 40-44-125). Compare Pausanias, ii. 33 and Æschyl. Pers. 93, Supplices, 388, Hermann. Herodotus and Pausanias proclaim the envy and jealousy of the Gods more explicitly than other writers. About the usual disposition to regard the jealousy of the Gods as causing misfortunes and suffering, see Thucyd. ii. 54, vii. 77; especially when a man by rash speech or act brings grave misfortune on himself, he is supposed to be under a misguiding influence by the Gods, expressed by Herodotus in the remarkable word *θεοβλαβής* (Herodot. i. 127, viii. 137; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 3; Soph. (Ed. Kol. 371). The poverty in which Xenophon found himself when he quitted the Cyreian army, is ascribed by himself, at the suggestion of the prophet Eukleides, to his having omitted to sacrifice to

Zeus Meilichius during the whole course of the expedition and retreat. The next day Xenophon offered an ample sacrifice to this God, and good fortune came upon him immediately afterwards; he captured Asidates the Persian, receiving a large ransom, with an ample booty, and thus enriched himself (Xenoph. Anab. vii. 8, 4-23). Compare about *θεῶν φθόνος*, Pindar. Pyth. x. 20-44; Demosthenes cont. Timokratem, p. 738; Nägelsbach, Die Nach-Homerische Theologie der Griechen, pp. 330-355.

\* Æschines cont. Timarch.

*κράτη τὸν σοφιστὴν—*

Lucretius, i. 82.

Illud in his rebus vereor, ne fortè rearis  
Impla te rationis inire elementa, viamque  
Endogredi sceleris—

Plato, in Leges, v. 738 B, recognises the danger of disturbing the established and accredited religious *φῆμαι*, as well as the rites and ceremonies.

Though the Platonic Sokrates, repudiating most of the narratives believed respecting Gods and Heroes, as being immoral and suggesting bad examples to the hearers, proposes to construct a body of new fictions in place of them—yet, if we turn to the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, we shall find that the old fashioned and unphilosophical Athenian took quite the opposite view. He connected immoral conduct with the new teaching, not with the old: he regarded the narratives respecting the Gods as realities of an unrecorded past, not as fictions for the purposes of the training-school: he did not imagine that the conduct of Zeus, in chaining up his father Kronus, was a proper model to be copied by himself or any other man: nay, he denounced all such disposition to copy, and to seek excuse for human misconduct in the example of the Gods, as abuse and profanation introduced by the sophistry of the freethinkers.<sup>t</sup> In his eyes, the religious traditions were part and parcel of the established faith, customs and laws of the state; and Sokrates, in

<sup>t</sup> Aristophan. *Nubes*, 358. λεπτοτάτων λήρων ἱερεῦ—885, γυνώμας καὶ ἀς ἐξευρίσκων.

1381.—

ὡς ἡδὺ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ δεξιόις ὁμιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν καθεστῶτων νόμον ὑπερφρονεῖν δύνασθαι.

(894. "Ἀδικος Λόγος.)—

Πῶς δὴ τὰ δίκης ὁσις, ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, τὸν πατέρ' αὐτοῦ δῆσας; (Δίκ' Λόγος) αἰβοῖ, τοῦτ' καὶ δὴ χωρεῖ τὸ κακόν· δότε μοι λεκάνην.

1061.—

γὰρ ἦν τύχης ἁλοῦς, τὰδ' ἄντε-  
αὐτὸν,  
ὃδὲν ἡδίκηκας· εἴτ' εἰς τὸν Δί'

ἔστι καὶ

γυναικῶν.

While Aristophanes introduces the freethinker as justifying unlawful acts by the example of Zeus, Plato (in the dialogue called *Euthyphron*) represents Euthyphron as indicting his father for murder, and justifying himself by the analogy of Zeus; Euthyphron being a very religious man, who believed all the divine matters commonly received, and more besides (p. 6). This exhibits the opposition between the Platonic and the Aristophanic point of view. In the *Eumenides* of

Æschylus (632,) these Goddesses reproach Zeus with inconsistency, after chaining up his old father Kronus, in estimating so highly the necessity of avenging Agamemnon's death, as to authorise Orestes to kill Klytemnestra.

An extract from Butler's *Analogy*, in reply to the objections offered by Deists against the Old Testament, will serve to illustrate the view which pious Athenians took of those ancient narratives which Plato censures. Butler says: "It is the province of Reason to judge of the morality of the Scriptures; i.e. not whether it contains things different from what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being, but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to Wisdom, Justice, or Goodness; to what the light of nature teaches us about God. And I know of nothing of the sort objected against Scripture, unless in such objections as are formed upon the supposition that the constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness: which most certainly it is not. Indeed there are some particular precepts in Scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions which would be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see that all these are of such a kind,

discrediting the traditions, set himself up as a thinker above the laws. As to this feature, the Aristophanic Sokrates in the

as that the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of the action : and both constitutes and shows *that* not to be immoral which, prior to the precept, must have appeared and really been so ; which may well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If it were commanded to cultivate the principles, and act from the spirit, of treachery, ingratitude, or cruelty, the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action, in any of these instances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing an external action : for instance, taking away the life or property of any. For men have no right to either, but what arises solely from the gift of God : when this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right to either : and when this revocation is made known, as surely it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts which, without command, would be immoral, must make an immoral habit—yet a few detached commands have no such natural tendency.

"I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture precepts requiring, not vicious actions, but actions which would have been vicious but for such precepts : because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts but what arises from their being offences—*i.e.*, from their being liable to be perverted, as indeed they are, to serve the most horrid purposes, by wicked, designing, men : and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are not objections against Revelation, but against the whole notion of Religion, as a trial, and against the whole constitution of Nature." (Butler's Analogy, Part ii. ch. 3, p. 230.)

I do not here propose to examine the soundness of this argument (which has been acutely discussed in a good pamphlet by Miss Hennell—*Essay on the Sceptical Tendency of Butler's Analogy*, p. 15, John Chapman, 1850). It appeared satisfactory to an able reasoner like Butler : and believers at Athens would have found satisfaction

in similar arguments, when the narratives in which they believed were pronounced by Sokrates mischievous and incredible, as imputing to the Gods unworthy acts. For example—Zeus and Athene instigate Pandarus to break the sworn truce between the Greeks and Trojans : Zeus sends Oneirus, or the Dream-God, to deceive Agamemnon (Plat. Rep. ii. pp. 379-383). Here are acts (the orthodox reasoner would say) which would be immoral if it were not for the special command : but Agamemnon and the Greeks had no right to life or property, much less to any other comforts or advantages, except what arose from the gift of the Gods. Now the Gods, on this particular occasion, thought fit to revoke the right which they had granted, making known such revocation to Pandarus ; who, accordingly, in that particular case, committed no injustice in trying to kill Menelaus, and in actually wounding him. The Gods did not give any general command "to cultivate the spirit and act upon the principles" of perjury and faithlessness ; they merely licensed the special act of Pandarus—*hic et nunc*—by making known to him that they had revoked the right of the Greeks to have faith observed with them, at that particular moment. When any man argues—"Pandarus was instigated by Zeus to break faith : therefore faithlessness is innocent and authorised : therefore *I* may break faith"—this is "a perversion by wicked and designing men for a horrid purpose, and can mislead only the weak and enthusiastic."

Farther, If the Gods may by special mandates cause the murder or impoverishment of particular men by other men to be innocent acts, without sanctioning any inference by analogy—much more may the same be said respecting the acts of the Gods among themselves, which Sokrates censures, viz. their quarrels, violent manifestations by word and deed, amorous gusts, hearty laughter, &c. These too are particular acts, not intended to lead to consequences in the way of example. The Gods have not issued any general command. "Be quarrelsome, be violent," &c. If they are quarrelsome themselves on particular occasions,

Clouds, and the Platonic Sokrates in the Republic, perfectly agree—however much they differ in other respects.

In reviewing the Platonic Republic, I have thought it necessary to appreciate the theological and pædagogic doctrines, not merely with reference to mankind in the abstract, but also as they appeared to the contemporaries among whom they were promulgated.

**Heresies**  
ascribed to  
Sokrates by  
his own  
friends—Un-  
popularity  
of his name  
from this cir-  
cumstance.

To all the abovementioned restrictions imposed by Plato upon the manifestation of the poet, both as to thoughts, words, and manner of recital—we must add those which he provides for music in its limited sense: the musical modes and instruments, the varieties of rhythm. He allows only the lyre and the harp, with the panspipe for shepherds tending their flocks. He forbids both the flute and all complicated stringed instruments. Interdicting the lugubrious, passionate, soft, and convivial, modes of music, he tolerates none but the Dorian and Phrygian, suitable to a sober, resolute, courageous, frame of mind: to which also all the rhythm and movement of the body is to be adapted.<sup>u</sup> Each particular manifestation of speech, music, poetry, and painting, having a natural affinity

**Restrictions**  
imposed by  
Plato upon  
musical  
modes and  
reciters.

they have a right to be so; just as they have a right to take away any man's life or property whenever they choose: but *you* are not to follow their example, and none but wicked men will advise you to do so.

To those believers who denounced Sokrates as a freethinker (Pl. Euthyp. p.6 A) such arguments would probably appear satisfactory. "*Sunt Superis sua jura*" is a general principle, flexible and wide in its application. Of arguments analogous to those of Butler, really used in ancient times by advocates who defended the poets against censures like those of Plato, we find an illustrative specimen in the Scholia on Sophokles. At the beginning of the Elektra (35-50), Orestes comes back with his old attendant or tutor to Argos, bent on avenging the death of his father. He has been stimulated to that enterprise by the Gods (70), having consulted Apollo at Delphi, and having been directed by him to accomplish it not by armed force but by deceptions (*δόλοισι κλέψαι*, 36.)

Keeping himself concealed, he sends the old attendant into the house of Ægisthus, with orders to communicate a false narrative that he (Orestes) is dead, having perished by an accident in the Pythian chariot-race: and he directs the attendant to certify this falsehood by oath (*ἄγγελλε δ' ὄρκῳ προστιθεῖς*, 47). Upon which last words the Scholiast observes as follows:—"We must not take captious exception to the poet, as if he were here exhorting men to perjure themselves. For Orestes is bound to obey the God, who commands him to accomplish the whole by deceit; so that while he appears to be impious by swearing a false oath, he by that very act shows his piety, since he does it in obedience to the God"—*μη σμικρολό-*

*ῶς*

*δεῖ γὰρ*

*πράσ-*

*σειν παρακελευομένῳ ὥστε ἐν οἷς*

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 399-400.

with some particular emotional and volitional state—emanating from it in the mind of the author and suggesting it in other minds—nothing is to be tolerated except what exhibits goodness and temperance of disposition,—grace, proportion, and decency of external form.\* Artisans are to observe the like rules in their constructions: presenting to the eye nothing but what is symmetrical. The youthful Guardians, brought up among such representations, will have their minds imbued with correct æsthetical sentiment; they will learn even in their youngest years, before they are competent to give reasons, to love what is beautiful and honourable—to hate what is ugly and mean.†

All these enactments and prohibitions have for their purpose the ethical and æsthetical training of the Guardians: to establish and keep up in each individual Guardian, a good state of the emotions, and a proper internal government—that is, a due subordination of energy and appetite to Reason.‡ Their bodies will also be trained by a good and healthy scheme of gymnastics, which will at the same time not only impart to them strength but inspire them with courage. The body is here considered, not (like what we read in Phædon and Philébus) as an inconvenient and depraving companion to the mind: but as an indispensable co-operator, only requiring to be duly reined.

All these restrictions intended for the emotional training of the Guardians.

The Guardians, of both sexes, thus educated and disciplined, are intended to pass their whole lives in the discharge of their duties as Guardians: implicitly obeying the orders of the Few Philosophical chiefs, and quartered in barracks under strict regulations. Among these regulations, there are two in particular which have always provoked more surprise and comment than any other features in the commonwealth; first, the prohibition of separate property—next, the prohibition of separate family—including the respective position of the two sexes.

Regulations for the life of the Guardians, especially the prohibition of separate property and family.

\* Plato, *Repub.* iii. pp. 400-401.  
τὸ πᾶν τῆς λέξεως—τῷ τῆς

Plato, *Repub.* x. p. 608.  
ᾧ πολιτείας δεδιότι—  
οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ

Plato, *Repub.* iii. pp. 401-402 A.

The directions of Plato on these two points not only hang together, but are founded on the same reason and considerations. He is resolved to prevent the growth of any separate interest, affections, or aspirations, in the mind of any individual Guardian. Each Guardian is to perform his military and civil duties to the Commonwealth, and to do nothing else. He must find his happiness in the performance of his duty: no double functions or occupations are tolerated. This principle, important in Plato's view as regards every one, is of supreme importance as applying to the Guardians,<sup>a</sup> in whom resides the whole armed force of the Commonwealth and by whom the orders of the Chiefs or Elders are enforced. If the Guardians aspire to private ends of their own, and employ their force for the attainment of such ends, nothing but oppression and ruin of the remaining community can ensue. A man having land of his own to cultivate, or a wife and family of his own to provide with comforts, may be a good economist, but he will never be a tolerable Guardian.<sup>b</sup> To be competent for this latter function, he must neither covet wealth nor be exposed to the fear of poverty: he must desire neither enjoyments nor power, except what are common to his entire regiment. He must indulge neither private sympathies nor private antipathies: he must be inaccessible to all motives which could lead him to despoil or hurt his fellow-citizens the producers. Accordingly the hopes and fears involved in self-maintenance—the feelings of buyer, seller, donor, or receiver—the ideas of separate property, house, wife, or family—must never be allowed to enter into his mind. The Guardians will receive from the productive part of the community a constant provision, sufficient, but not more than sufficient, for their reasonable maintenance. Their residence will be in public barracks and their meals at a common mess: they must be taught to regard it as a disgrace to meddle in any way with gold and silver.<sup>c</sup> Men and women will live all together, or distributed in a few fractional companies, but always in companionship, and under perpetual drill; beginning from the earliest years with both sexes.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iv. pp. 421 A-423 D.      <sup>b</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iii. p. 417 A-B.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iii. pp. 416-417.

Boys and girls will be placed from the beginning under the same superintendence: and will receive the same training, as well in gymnastic as in music. The characters of both will be exposed to the same influences and formed in the same mould. Upon the maintenance of such early, equal, and collective training, especially in music, under the orders of the Elders,—Plato declares the stability of the Commonwealth to depend.<sup>d</sup>

The purpose being, to form good and competent Guardians, the same training which will be best for the boys will also be best for the girls. But is it true that women are competent to the functions of Guardians? Is the female nature endued with the same aptitudes for such duties as the male? Men will ridicule the suggestion (says Plato) and will maintain the negative. They will say that there are some functions for which men are more competent, others for which women are more competent than men: and that women are unfit for any such duty as that of Guardians. Plato dissents from this opinion altogether. There is no point on which he speaks in terms of more decided conviction. Men and women (he says) can perform this duty conjointly, just as dogs of both sexes take part in guarding the flock. It is not true that the female, by reason of the characteristic properties of sex—parturition and suckling—is disqualified for out-door occupations and restricted to the interior of the house.<sup>e</sup> As in the remaining animals generally, so also in the human race. There is no fundamental difference between the two sexes other than that of the sexual attributes themselves. From that difference no consequences flow, in respect to aptitude for some occupations, inaptitude for others. There are great individual differences between one woman and another, as there are between one man and another: this woman is peculiarly fit for one task, that woman for something else. But speaking of women generally and collectively, there is not a single profession for which they are peculiarly fit, or more fit than men. Men are superior to women in everything; in one occupation as well as in another. Yet among

Common life, education, drill, collective life, and duties, for Guardians of both sexes. Views of Plato respecting the female character and aptitudes.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iv. pp. 423-424 D-425 A-C.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, *Republ.* v. p. 451 D.

both sexes, there are serious individual differences, so that many women, individually estimated, will be superior to many men: no women will equal the best men, but the best women will equal the second-best men, and will be superior to the men below them.<sup>f</sup> Accordingly, in order to obtain the best Guardians, selection must be made from both sexes indiscriminately. For ordinary duties, both will be found equally fit: but the heaviest and most difficult duties, those which require the maximum of competence to perform, will usually devolve upon men.<sup>g</sup>

Those who maintain (continues Plato) that because women are different from men, therefore the occupations of the two ought to be different—argue like vexatious disputants who mistake verbal distinctions for real: who do not enquire what is the formal or specific distinction indicated by a name, or whether it has any essential bearing on the matter under discussion.<sup>h</sup> Long-haired men are different from bald-heads: but shall we conclude, that if the former are fit to make shoes, the latter are unfit? Certainly

His arguments  
against the  
ordinary  
doctrine.

<sup>f</sup> See this remarkable argument—Republic, v. pp. 453-456—*γυναῖκες μόντοι πολλὰ πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν βελτίους εἰς πολλὰ: τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἔχει ὡς σὺ λέγεις*—Οὐδὲν ἔρα ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν πόλιν διοικούντων γυναικὸς διότι γυνή, οὐδ' ἀνδρὸς διότι ἀνὴρ—ἀλλ' ὁμοίως διεσπαρμέναι αἱ φύσεις ἐν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ζώοις, καὶ πάντων μὲν μετέχει γυνὴ ἐπιτηδευμάτων κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων δὲ ἀνὴρ: ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς (p. 455 D). It would appear (from p. 455 C) that those who maintained the special fitness of women for certain occupations and their special unfitness for others, cited, as examples of occupations in which women surpassed men, weaving and cookery. But Plato denies this emphatically as a matter of fact; pronouncing that women were inferior to men (*i.e.* the best women to the best men) in weaving and cookery no less than in other things. We should have been glad to know what facts were present to his mind as bearing out such an assertion, and what observations were open to him of weaving as performed by males. In Greece, weaving was the occupation of women very generally, whether exclusively or not we can hardly say; in Phœnicia, during

the Homeric times, the finest robes were woven by Sidonian women (*Iliad*, vi. 289): in Egypt, on the contrary, it was habitually performed by men, and Herodotus enumerates this as one of the points in which the Egyptians differed from other countries (*Herodot.* ii. 35; *Soph. Œdip.* Col. 340, with the Scholia, and the curious citation contained therein from the *Βαρβαρικά* of Nymphodorus). The process of weaving was also conducted in a different manner by the Egyptians. Whether Plato had seen finer webs in Egypt than in Greece we cannot say.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, *Republ.* v. p. 457 A.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Republic*, v. p. 454 A. διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιροῦμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. P. 455 B. ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δὲ οὐδ' ὀπρῶν, τί εἶδος τὸ τῆς ἐτέρας καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως, καὶ πρὸς τί τείνον ὠριζόμεθα τότε, ὅτε τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἄλλη φύσει ἄλλα, τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἀπεδίδομεν. Xenophon is entirely opposed to Plato on this point. He maintains emphatically the distinct special aptitudes of man and woman. *Œconom.* vii. 2-38; compare Euripid. *Elektra*, 74.

not: for when we enquire into the formal distinction connoted by these words, we find that it has no bearing upon such handicraft processes. So again the formal distinction implied by the terms *male*, *female*, in the human race as in other animals, lies altogether in the functions of sex and procreation.<sup>1</sup> Now this has no essential bearing on the occupations of the adult; nor does it confer on the male, fitness for one set of occupations—on the female, fitness for another. Each sex is fit for all, but the male is most fit for all: in each sex there are individuals better and worse, and differing one from another in special aptitudes. Men are competent for the duties of Guardians, only on condition of having gone through a complete musical and gymnastical education. Women are competent also, under the like condition; and are equally capable of profiting by the complete education. Moreover, the chiefs must select for those duties the best natural subjects. The total number of such is very limited: and they must select the best that both sexes afford.<sup>k</sup>

The strong objections, generally entertained against thus assigning to women equal participation in the education and functions of the Guardians, were enforced by saying—That it was a proceeding contrary to Nature. But Plato not only denies the validity of this argument: he even retorts it upon the objectors, and affirms that the existing separation of functions between the two sexes is contrary to Nature, and that his proposition alone is conformable thereunto.<sup>1</sup> He has shown that the specific or formal distinction of the two has no essential bearing on the question, and therefore that no argument can be founded upon it. The specific or formal characteristic, in the case of males, is doubtless superior, taken abstractedly: yet in particular men it is embodied or manifested with various degrees of perfection, from very good to very bad. In the case of females, though inferior abstractedly, it is in its best particular embodiments equal to all except the

Opponents  
appealed to  
Nature as an  
authority  
against Plato.  
He invokes  
Nature on  
his own side  
against them.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republ. v. p. 455 C-D.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republ. v. p. 456.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republ. v. p. 456 C.

ἐνομοθετοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ περ  
ταῦτα γινόμενα παρὰ  
ὡς εἶκε, γίγνεται.

best males, and superior to all such as are inferior to the best. Accordingly, the true dictate of Nature is, not merely that females *may be* taken, but that they *ought to be* taken, conjointly with males, under the selection of the Rulers, to fulfil the most important duties in the Commonwealth. The select females must go through the same musical and gymnastic training as the males. He who ridicules them for such bodily exercises, prosecuted with a view to the best objects, does not know what he is laughing at. "For this is the most valuable maxim which is now, or ever has been, proclaimed—What is useful, is honourable. What is hurtful, is base." <sup>m</sup>

Plato now proceeds to unfold the relations of the sexes as intended to prevail among the mature Guardians, after all have undergone the public and common training from their earliest infancy. He conceives them as one thousand in total number, composed of both sexes in nearly equal proportion: since they are to be the best individuals of both sexes, the male sex, superior in formal characteristic, will probably furnish rather a greater number than the female. It has already been stated that they are all required to live together in barracks, dining at a common mess-table, with clothing and furniture alike for all. There is no individual property or separate house among them: the collective expense, in a comfortable but moderate way, is defrayed by contributions from the producing class. Separate families are unknown: all the Guardians, male and female, form one family, and one only: the older are fathers and mothers of all the younger, the younger are sons and daughters of all the older: those of the same age are all alike brothers and sisters of each other: those who, besides being of the same age, are within the limits of the nuptial age and of different sexes, are all alike husbands and wives of each other.<sup>n</sup> It is the principle of the Platonic Common-

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Republ.* v. p. 457. Ὁ δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ γυμναῖς γυναιξί, τοῦ βελτίστου ἔνεκα γυμναζομέναις, ἀτελεῖ τοῦ γελοῦ σοφίας δρέπων κάρπον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφ' ὃ γελᾷ οὐδ' ὅ, τι πράττει κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέγεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέ-

λιμον καλόν—τὸ

<sup>n</sup> Plato, *Republic*, v. p. 457 C.

γυναικας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν πάντων πάσας εἶναι κοινὰς, ἰδίᾳ δὲ μὴδεμίαν συνοικεῖν· καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὐτῶν κοινούς, καὶ μήτε γονέα ἐκγονοῦ εἶδέναι τὸν αὐτοῦ μήτε παῖδα γονέα.

wealth that the affections implied in these family words, instead of being confined to one or a few exclusively, shall be expanded so as to embrace all of appropriate age.

But Plato does not at all intend that sexual intercourse shall take place between these men and women Restrictions promiscuously, or at the pleasure of individuals.

On the contrary, he expressly denounces and interdicts it.<sup>o</sup> A philosopher who has so much general tions.

disdain for individual impulse or choice, was not likely to sanction it in this particular case. Indeed it is the special purpose of his polity to bring impulse absolutely under the controul of reason, or of that which he assumes as such. This purpose is followed out in a remarkable manner as to procreation. What he seeks as lawgiver is, to keep the numbers of the Guardians nearly stationary, with no diminution and scarcely any increase:<sup>p</sup> and to maintain the breed pure, so that the children born shall be as highly endowed by nature as possible. To these two objects the liberty of sexual intercourse is made subservient. The breeding is regulated, like that of noble horses or dogs by an intelligent proprietor: the best animals of both sexes being brought together, and the limits of age fixed beforehand.<sup>q</sup> Plato prescribes, as the limits of age, from twenty to forty for females—from thirty to fifty-five for males—when the powers of body and mind are at the maximum in both. All who are younger as well as all who are older, are expressly forbidden to meddle in the procreation *for the city*: this being a public function.<sup>r</sup> Between the ages above named, couples will be invited to marry in such numbers as the Rulers may consider expedient for ensuring a supply of offspring sufficient and not more than sufficient—having regard to wars, distempers, or any other recent causes of mortality.<sup>s</sup>

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Republ. v. p. 458 E. ἀτάκτως μὲν μίγνυσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἄλλο δτιοῦν ποιεῖν οὔτε δσιον ἐν εὐδαιμόνων πόλει οὐτ' ἐδάσουςιν οἱ ἄρχοντες.

Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 A. τὸ δὲ τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι

τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν πολέμους τε καὶ νόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ ἀποσκοποῦντες, καὶ

γί-

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Repub. v. p. 459.

<sup>r</sup> This is his phrase, repeated more than once—τίκτειν τῇ τῇ πόλει—τῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν (pp. 460-461).

What Lucan observes about Cato of Utica, is applicable to the Guardians of the Platonic Republic:—

“Venerisque huic maximus usus Progenies: Urbis pater est, Urbique maritus.”

(ii. . . .)

Plato, Republ. v. p. 460 A.

There is no part of the Platonic system in which individual choice is more decidedly eliminated, and the intervention of the Rulers made more constantly paramount, than this respecting the marriages: and Plato declares it to be among the greatest difficulties which they will have to surmount. They will establish festivals, in which they bring together the brides and bridegrooms, with hymns, prayer, and sacrifices, to the Gods: they will determine by lot what couples shall be joined, so as to make up the number settled as appropriate: but they will arrange the sortition themselves so cleverly, that what appears chance to others will be a result to them predetermined. The best men will thus always be assorted with the best women, the inferior with the inferior: but this will appear to every one, except themselves, the result of chance.<sup>†</sup> Any young man (of thirty and upwards) distinguished for bravery or excellence will be allowed to have more than one wife; since it is good not merely to recompense his merit, but also to multiply his breed.<sup>‡</sup>

In the seventh month, or in the tenth month, after the ceremonial day, offspring will be born from these unions. But the children, immediately on being born, will be taken away from their mothers, and confided to nurses in an appropriate lodgment. The mothers will be admitted to suckle them, and wet-nurses will also be provided, as far as necessary: but the period for the mother to suckle will be abridged as much as possible, and all other trouble required for the care of infancy will be undertaken, not by her, but by the nurses. Moreover the greatest precautions will be taken that no mother shall know her own child: which is considered to be practicable, since many children will be born at nearly the same time.<sup>§</sup> The children in infancy will be examined by the Rulers and other good judges, who will determine how many of them are sufficiently well constituted to promise fitness for the duties of Guardians. The children of the good and vigorous couples, except in any case of bodily deformity, will be brought up and placed under the public training for

<sup>†</sup> Plato, *Republ.* v. p. 460.

<sup>‡</sup> Plato, *Republ.* v. pp. 460 B, 468 C.  
In the latter passage it even appears

that he is allowed to make a choice.

<sup>§</sup> Plato, *Republ.* v. pp. 460 D, 461 D.

Guardians: the unpromising children, and those of the inferior couples, being regarded as not fit subjects for the public training, will be secretly got rid of, or placed among the producing class of the Commonwealth.<sup>y</sup>

What Plato here understands by marriage, is a special, solemn, consecrated, coupling for the occasion, with a view to breed for the public. It constitutes no permanent bond between the two persons coupled: who are brought together by the authorities under a delusive sortition, but who may perhaps never be brought together at any future sortition, unless it shall please the same authorities. The case resembles that of a breeding stud of horses and mares, to which Plato compares it: nothing else is wanted but the finest progeny attainable. But this, in Plato's judgment, is the most important of all purposes: his Commonwealth cannot maintain itself except under a superior breed of Guardians. Accordingly, he invests his marriages with the greatest possible sanctity. The religious solemnities accompanying them are essential to furnish security for the goodness of the offspring. Any proceeding, either of man or woman, which contravenes the provisions of the rulers on this point, is peremptorily forbidden: and any child, born from unauthorised intercourse without the requisite prayers and sacrifices, is considered as an outcast. Within the limits of the connubial age, all persons of both sexes hold their procreative powers exclusively at the disposition of the lawgiver. But after that age is past, both men and women may indulge in intercourse with whomsoever they please, since they are no longer in condition to procreate for the public. They are subject only to this one condition: not to produce any children, or if perchance they do, not to bring them up.<sup>z</sup> There is moreover one restriction upon the personal liberty of intercourse, after the connubial limits of age. No intercourse is permitted between father and daughter, or

Procreative powers of individual Guardians required to be held at the disposal of the rulers, for purity of breed.

<sup>y</sup> Compare Republic, v. pp. 459 D, 460 C, 461 C, with Timæus, p. 19 A. In Timæus, where the leading doctrines of the Republic are briefly recapitulated, Plato directs that the children considered as unworthy shall be secretly distributed among the re-

maining community, i. e. not among the Guardians: in the Republic itself, his language, though not clear, seems to imply that they shall be exposed and got rid of.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 C.

between mother and son. But how can such restriction be enforced, since no individual paternity or maternity is recognised in the Commonwealth? Plato answers by admitting a collective paternity and maternity. Every child born in the seventh month or in the tenth month after a couple have been solemnly wedded will be considered by them as their son or daughter, and will consider himself as such.<sup>a</sup>

Besides all these direct provisions for the purity of the breed of Guardians, which will succeed (so Plato anticipates) in a large majority of cases—the Rulers will keep up an effective supervision of detail, so as to exclude any unworthy exception, and even to admit into the Guardians any youth of very rare and exceptional promise who may be born among the remaining community. For Plato admits that there may be accidental births both ways: brass and iron may by occasional accident give birth to gold or silver—and *vice versa*.

It is in this manner that Plato constitutes his body of Guardians: one thousand adult persons of both sexes,<sup>b</sup> in nearly equal numbers, together with a small proportion of children—the proportion of these latter must be very small, since the total number is not allowed to increase. His end here is to create an intimate and equal sympathy among them all, like that between all the members of the same bodily organism: to abolish all independent and exclusive sympathies of particular parts: to make the city One and Indivisible—a single organism, instead of many distinct conterminous organisms: to provide that the causes of pleasure and pain shall be the same to all, so that a man shall have no feeling of mine or thine, except in reference to his own body and that of another, which Plato notes as the greatest good—instead of each individual struggling apart for his own objects and rejoicing on occasions when his neighbour sorrows, which Plato regards as the greatest evil.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Republ.* v. p. 461-D.

<sup>b</sup> This number of 1000 appears stated by Aristotle (*Polit.* ii. 6, p. 1265, a. 9), and is probably derived from *Republic*, iv. p. 423 A; though that passage appears scarcely sufficient to prove that Plato meant to declare the number 1000 as pre-emptory. How-

ever the understanding of Aristotle himself on the point is one material evidence to make us believe that this is the real construction intended by Plato.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Republic*, v. pp. 462-463-464 D. διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἴδιον ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δὲ ἅλλα κοινὰ. Compare Plato, *Legg.* v. p. 739 C.

Purpose to create an intimate and equal sympathy among all the Guardians, but to prevent exclusive sympathy of particular members.

All standing causes of disagreement or antipathy among the Guardians are assumed to be thus removed. But if any two hotheaded youths get into a quarrel, they must fight it out on the spot. This will serve as a lesson in gymnastics:—subject however to the interference of any old man as by-stander, whom they as well as all other young men are bound implicitly to obey.<sup>d</sup> Moreover all the miseries, privations, anxiety, and dependance, inseparable from the life of a poor man under the system of private property, will disappear entirely.<sup>e</sup>

Such are the main features of Plato's Republic, in reference to his Guardians. They afford a memorable example of that philosophical analysis, applied to the circumstances of man and society, which the Greek mind was the first to conceive and follow out. Plato lays down his ends with great distinctness, as well as the means whereby he proposes to attain them. Granting his ends, the means proposed are almost always suitable and appropriate, whether practicable or otherwise.

The Platonic scheme is communism, so far as concerns the Guardians; but not communism in reference to the entire Commonwealth. In this it falls short of his own ideal, and is only a second best: the best of all would be, in his view, a communion that should pervade all persons and all acts and sentiments, effacing altogether the separate self.<sup>f</sup> Not venturing to soar so high, he confined his perfect communion to the Guardians. Moreover his communism differs from modern theories in this. They contemplate individual producers and labourers, handing over the produce to be distributed among themselves by official authority; they contemplate also a regulation not merely of distribution, but of reserved capital and productive agency, under the same authority. But the Platonic Guardians are not producers at all. Everything which they consume is found for them. They are in the nature of paid functionaries, exempted from all cares and anxiety of self-maintenance, either present or future. They are all comfortably provided, without hopes

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Republic, v. pp. 464-465.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republ. v. p. 465 C.

<sup>f</sup> See Plato, De Legibus, v. p. 737 D.

The Republic is *second best*; that which appears sketched in the treatise De Legibus is *third best*

Platonic  
scheme—  
partial com-  
munism.

of wealth or fear of poverty: moreover they are all equally comfortable, so that no sentiment can grow up among them, arising from comparison of each others' possessions or enjoyments. Among such men and women, brought up from infancy as Plato directs, the sentiment of property, with all the multifarious associations derived from it, would be unknown. No man's self-esteem, no man's esteem of others, would turn upon it.

In this respect, the remaining members of the city, apart from the Guardians, and furnishing all the subsistence of the Guardians, are differently circumstanced. They are engaged in different modes of production, each exclusively in one mode. They exchange, buy, and sell, with each other: there exist therefore among them gradations of strength, skill, perseverance, frugality, and good luck—together with the consequent gradations of wealth and poverty. The substance or capital of the Commonwealth is maintained altogether by the portion of it which is extraneous to the Guardians; and among that portion there is no communism. The maintenance of the Guardians is a tax which these men have to pay: but after paying it, they apply or enjoy the rest of their produce as they please, subject to the requirements of the Rulers for public service.\*

Nevertheless we are obliged to divine what Plato means about the condition of the producing classes in his Commonwealth. He himself tells us little or nothing about them; though they must constitute the large numerical majority. And this defect is in him the less excusable, since he reckons them as component members of his Commonwealth; while Aristotle, in his ideal Commonwealth, does not reckon them as component members or citizens, but merely as indispensable adjuncts, in the same manner as slaves. All that we know about the producers in the Platonic Commonwealth is, that each man is to have only one business—that for which he is most fit:—and that all are to be under the administration of the Rulers through the Guardians.

\* Aristotle, in his comments upon the Platonic Republic (*Politic.* ii. 5, p. 1262, b. 42 seq.), advances arguments just in themselves, in favour of individual property, and against community of property. But these arguments have little application to the Republic.

The enlistment of soldiers, apart from civilians, and the holding of them under distinct laws and stricter discipline, is a practice familiar to modern ideas, though it had little place among the Greeks of Plato's day. There prevailed also in Egypt<sup>b</sup> and in parts of Eastern Asia, from time immemorial, a distinction of castes: one caste being soldiers, invested with the defence of the country, and enjoying certain lands by the tenure of such military service: but in other respects, private proprietors like the rest—and receiving no special discipline, training, or education. In Grecian Ideas, military duties were a part, but only a part, of the duties of a citizen. This was the case even at Sparta. Though in practice, the discipline of that city tended in a preponderant degree towards military aptitude, yet the Spartan was still a citizen, not exclusively a soldier.

Soldiership as a separate profession has acquired greater development in modern times.

It was from the Spartan institutions (and the Kretan, in many respects analogous) that the speculative political philosophers in Greece usually took the point of departure for their theories. Not only Plato did so, but Xenophon and Aristotle likewise. The most material fact which they saw before them at Sparta was, a public discipline both strict and continued, which directed the movements of the citizens, and guided their thoughts and feelings, from infancy to old age. To this supreme controul the private feelings, both of family and property, though not wholly suppressed, were made to bend: and occasionally in a way quite as remarkable as any restrictions proposed by either Plato or Xenophon.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the Spartan institutions were of immemorial antiquity; believed to have been suggested or sanctioned originally by Apollo and the Delphian oracle, as the Kretan institutions were by Zeus.<sup>k</sup> They had lasted longer than other Hellenic institutions without forcible subversion: they obtained universal notice, admiration, and deference, throughout Greece. It was this conspicuous fact which emboldened the Grecian

Spartan institutions—great impression which they produced upon speculative Greek minds.

<sup>b</sup> Aristot. Politic. vii. 10. Herodot. ii. 164. Plato alludes (Timæ. 24 A) to the analogy of Egyptian castes.

<sup>1</sup> See Xenophon, Hellenic. vi. 4, 16,

the account of what passed at Sparta after the battle of Leuktra, related also in my 'History of Greece,' chap. 78, vol. x. p. 253.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. i. pp. 632 D, 634 A.

theorists to postulate for the lawgiver that unbounded controul, over the life and habits of citizens, which we read not merely in the Republic of Plato but in the Cyropædia of Xenophon, and to a great degree even in the Politica of Aristotle. To an objector, who asked them how they could possibly expect that individuals would submit to such unlimited interference, they would have replied—"Look at Sparta. You see there interference, as constant and rigorous as that which I propose, endured by the citizens not only without resistance, but with a tenacity and long continuance such as is not found among other communities with more lax regulations. The habits and sentiments of the Spartan citizen are fashioned to these institutions. Far from being anxious to shake them off, he accounts them a necessity as well as an honour." This reply would have appeared valid and reasonable, in the fourth century before the Christian era. And it explains—what, after all, is the most surprising circumstance to a modern reader—the extreme boldness of speculation, the ideal omnipotence, assumed by the leading Grecian political theorists: much even by Aristotle, though his aspirations were more limited and practical—far more by Xenophon—most of all by Plato. Any theorist, proceeding avowedly *κατ' εὐχὴν*, considered himself within bounds when he assumed to himself no greater influence than had actually been exercised by Lykurgus.

Assuming such influence, however, he intended to employ it for ends approved by himself: agreeing with Lykurgus in the general principle of forming the citizen's character by public and compulsory discipline, but not agreeing with him in the type of character proper to be aimed at. Xenophon departs least from the Spartan type: Aristotle and Plato greatly more, though in different directions. Each of them applies to a certain extent the process of abstraction and analysis both to the individual and to the community: considering both of them as made up of component elements working simultaneously either in co-operation or conflict. But in Plato the abstraction is carried farthest: the wholeness of the individual Guardian is completely effaced, so that each consti-

*Plans of these  
speculative  
minds com-  
pared with  
Spartan—  
Different  
types of cha-  
racter con-  
templated.*

tutes a small fraction or wheel of the real Platonic whole—the Commonwealth. The fundamental Platonic principle is, that each man shall have one function, and one only: an extreme application of that which political economists call the division of labour. Among these many different functions, one, and doubtless the most difficult as well as important, is that of directing, administering, and defending the community: which is done by the Guardians and Rulers. It is to this one function that all Plato's treatise is devoted: he tells us how such persons are to be trained and circumstanced. What he describes, therefore, is not properly citizens administering their own affairs, but commanders and officers watching over the interests of others: a sort of military *bureaucracy*, with chiefs at its head, directing as well as guarding a multitude beneath them. And what mainly distinguishes the Platonic system, is the extreme abstraction with which this public and official character is conceived: the degree to which the whole man is merged in the performance of his official duties: the entire extinction within him of the old individual Adam—of all private feelings and interests.

Both in Xenophon and in Aristotle, as well as at Sparta, the citizen is subjected to a public compulsory training, severe as well as continuous: but he is still a citizen as well as a functionary. He has private interests as well as public duties:—a separate home, property, wife, and family. Plato, on the contrary, contends that the two are absolutely irreconcilable: that if the Guardian has private anxieties for his own maintenance, private house and lands to manage, private sympathies and antipathies to gratify—he will become unfaithful to his duties as Guardian, and will oppress instead of protecting the people.<sup>1</sup> You must choose between the two (he says): you cannot have the self-caring citizen and the public-minded Guardian in one.<sup>m</sup>

Looking to ideal perfection, I think Plato is right. If the Rulers and Guardians have private interests of their own, those interests will corrupt more or less the

Plato carries abstraction farther than Xenophon or Aristotle.

Anxiety shown by Plato for the

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 416-417.

<sup>m</sup> See the contrary opinion asserted by Nikias in his speech at Athens, Thucyd. vi. 9.

good treatment of the Demos, greater than that shown by Xenophon and Aristotle.

discharge of their public duties. The evil may be mitigated, by forms of government (representative and other arrangements), which make the continuance of power dependant upon popular estimation of the functionaries: but it cannot be abolished. Neither Xenophon, nor Aristotle, nor the Spartan system, provided any remedy for this difficulty. They scarcely even recognise the difficulty as real. In all the three, the proportion of trained citizens to the rest of the people, would be about the same (so far as we can judge) as the proportion of the Platonic Guardians to the Demos or rest of the people. But when we look to see what security either of the three systems provide for good behaviour on the part of citizens towards non-citizens, we find no satisfaction; nor do they make it, as Plato does, one prominent object of their public training. Plato shows extreme anxiety for the object: as is proved by his sacrificing, in order to ensure it, all the private sources of pleasure to his Guardians. Aristotle reproaches him with doing this, so as to reduce the happiness of his Guardians to nothing: but Plato, from his own point of view, would not admit the justice of such reproach, since he considers happiness to be derived from and proportional to, the performance of duty.

This last point must be perpetually kept in mind, in following Plato's reasoning. But though he does not consider himself as sacrificing the happiness of his Guardians to their duty, we must give him credit for anxiety, greater than either Aristotle or Xenophon has shown, to ensure a faithful discharge of duty on the part of the Guardians towards the rest of the people. In Aristotle's theory,<sup>n</sup> the rest of the people are set aside as not members of the Commonwealth, thus counting as a secondary and inferior object in his estimation; while the citizens, who alone are members, are trained to practise virtue for its own sake and for their own happiness. In Plato's theory, the rest of the people are not only proclaimed as members of the Commonwealth,<sup>o</sup> but are the ultimate and

<sup>n</sup> Aristotle, *Politic.* vii. 9, p. 1328, b. 40, p. 1329, a. 25.

<sup>o</sup> Aristotle, *Politic.* ii. 5, p. 1264, a. 12-26, respecting the Platonic Commonwealth, *καίτοι σχεδόν τόγε πλῆθος*

*τῆς πόλεως τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γίγνεται πλῆθος, &c.*

*Ποιεῖ γὰρ (Plato) τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἷον φρουροὺς, τοὺς δὲ γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς*

capital objects of all his solicitude. It is in protecting, governing, and administering them, that the lives of the Rulers and Guardians are passed. Though they (the remaining people) receive no public training, yet Plato intends them to reap all the benefit of the laborious training bestowed on the Guardians. This is a larger and more generous conception of the purpose of political institutions, than we find either in Aristotle or in Xenophon.

There is however another objection, which seems grave and well founded, advanced by Aristotle against the Platonic Republic. He remarks that it will be not one city, but two cities, with tendencies more or less adverse to each other:<sup>p</sup> that the Guardians, educated under the very peculiar training and placed under the peculiar relations prescribed to them, will form one city—while the remaining people, who have no part either in the one or the other, but are private proprietors with separate families—will form another city. I do not see what reply the Platonic Republic furnishes to this objection. Granting full success to Plato in his endeavours to make the Guardians One among themselves, we find nothing to make them One with the remaining people, nor to make the remaining people One with them.<sup>q</sup> On the contrary, we observe such an extreme divergence of sentiment, character, pursuit, and education, as to render mutual sympathy very difficult, and to open fatal probabilities of mutual alienation: probabilities hardly less, than if separate proprietary interests had been left to subsist among the Guardians. This is a source of mischief which Plato has not taken into his account. The entire body of Guardians cannot fail to carry in their bosoms a sense of extreme pride in their own training, and a proportionally mean estimate of the untrained multitude alongside of them.

Objection urged by Aristotle against the Platonic Republic, that it will be two cities. Spiritual pride of the Guardians—contempt for the Demos.

<sup>p</sup> Aristotel. Politic. ii. 5, p. 1204, a. 24.

ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πόλει δύο πόλεις

εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ὑπεραντίας

The most forcible of the objections urged by Aristotle against the Platonic Republic, are those contained in this chapter respecting the relations between the Guardians and the rest of

the community.

<sup>q</sup> The oneness, which Plato proclaims as belonging to his whole city, belongs in reality only to the body of Guardians; of whom he sometimes speaks as if they were the whole city, which however is not his real intention, see Republic, v. p. 462-463 A.

The sentiment of the gold and silver men, towards the brass and iron men, will have in it too much of contempt to be consistent with civic fraternity: like the pride of the Twice-Born Hindoo Brahmin, when comparing himself with the lower Hindoo castes: or like that of the Pythagorean brotherhood, who “regarded the brethren as equal to the blessed Gods, but held all the rest to be unworthy of any account.”<sup>r</sup> The Spartan training appears to have produced a similar effect upon the mind of the citizens who went through it. And indeed such an effect appears scarcely avoidable, under the circumstances assumed by Plato. He himself is proud of his own ideal training, so as to ascribe to those who receive it a sentiment akin to that of the Olympic victors; while he employs degrading analogies to signify the pursuits and enjoyments of the untrained multitude, who are assimilated to the appetite or lower element in the organism, existing only as a mutinous crew necessary to be kept down.<sup>s</sup> That spiritual pride, coupled with spiritual contempt, should be felt by the Guardians, is the natural result; as it is indeed the essential reimbursement to their feelings, for the life of drill and self-denial which Plato imposes upon them. And how, under such a sentiment, the two constituent elements in his system are to be competent to work out his promised result of mutual happiness, he has not shown.<sup>t</sup>

<sup>r</sup> *Τοὺς μὲν ἐταίρους ἤγεν ἴσους μακρὰ  
ρεσσι θεοῖσιν,  
Τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἡγεῖτ' οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ  
οὐτ' ἐν ἄριθμῳ.*

<sup>s</sup> Plato, *Republ.* v. 465 D.

Aristotle says (in the *Nikom. Ethics*, i. 5) when discussing the various ideas entertained about happiness—*Οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδῶεις φαίνονται βосκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι*. This is much the estimation which the Platonic Guardians would be apt to form respecting the *Demos*.

<sup>t</sup> The foregoing remarks are an expansion, and a sequel, of Aristotle's objection against the Platonic Republic—That it is not One City, but two discordant cities in that which is nominally One. I must however add that the same objection may be urged against the Xenophontic constitution of a city; and also, in substance, even against the

proposition of Aristotle himself for the same purpose. Xenophon, in his *Cyropædia*, proposes a severe, life-long drill and discipline like that of the Spartans, from which indeed he does not formally exclude any citizens, but which he announces to be actually attended only by the wealthy, since they alone can afford to attend continuously and habitually, the poorer men being engaged in the cares of maintenance. All the functions of the state, civil and military, are performed exclusively by those who go through the public discipline. We have here the two cities in One, which Aristotle objects to in Plato; with the consequent loss of civic fraternity between them. And when we look to that which Aristotle himself suggests, we find him evading the objection by a formal sanction of the very mischief upon which the objection is founded. He puts the husbandmen and artisans

In explanation of the foregoing remarks, I will add that Plato fails in his purpose not from the goodness of the training which he provides for his select Few, but from leaving the rest of his people without any training—without even so much as would enable them properly to appreciate superior training in the few who obtain it—without any powers of self-defence or self-helpfulness. His fundamental postulate—That every man shall do only one thing—when applied to the Guardians, realises itself in something great and considerable: but when applied to the ordinary pursuits of life, reduces every man to a special machine, unfit for any other purpose than its own. Though it is reasonable that a man should get his living by one trade, and should therefore qualify himself peculiarly and effectively for that trade—it is not reasonable that he should be altogether impotent as to everything else: nor that his happiness should consist, as Plato declares that it ought, exclusively in the performance of this one service to the commonwealth. In the Platonic Republic, the body of the people are represented not only as without training, but as machines rather than individual men. They exist partly as producers to maintain, partly as governable matter to obey, the Guardians; and to be cared for by them.

Plato's scheme fails, mainly because he provides no training for the Demos.

Aristotle, when speaking about the citizens of his own ideal commonwealth (his citizens form nearly the same numerical proportion of the whole population, as the Platonic Guardians) tells us—"Since the End for which the entire City exists is One, it is obviously necessary that the education of all the citizens should be one and the same, and that the care of such education should be a public duty—not left in private

Principle of Aristotle—That every citizen belongs to the city, not to himself.—applied by Plato to women.

altogether out of the pale of his city, which is made to include the disciplined citizens or Guardians alone. His city may thus be called One, inasmuch as it admits only homogeneous elements, and throws out all such as are heterogeneous; but he thus avowedly renounces as insoluble the problem which Plato and Xenophonty, though unsuccessfully, to solve. If there be discord and alienation among the constituent members of the Pla-

tonic and Xenophontic city—there will subsist the like feelings, in Aristotle's proposition, between the members of the city and the outlying, though indispensable, adjuncts. There will be the same mischief in kind, and probably exaggerated in amount: since the abolition of the very name and idea of fellow-citizen tends to suppress altogether an influence of tutelary character, however insufficient as to its force.

hands as it is now, for a man to teach his children what he thinks fit. Public exigencies must be provided for by public training. Moreover, we ought not to regard any of the citizens as belonging to himself, but all of them as belonging to the city: for each is a part of the city: and nature prescribes that the care of each part shall be regulated with a view to the care of the whole."<sup>u</sup>

The broad principle thus laid down by Aristotle is common to him with Plato, and lies at the bottom of the schemes of polity imagined by both. Each has his own way of applying it.

Plato clearly perceives that it cannot be applied with consistency and effect, unless women are brought under its application as well as men. And to a great extent, Aristotle holds the same opinion too. While commending the Spartan principle, that the character of the citizen must be formed and upheld by continued public training and discipline—Aristotle blames Lykurgus for leaving the women (that is, a numerical half of the city) without training or discipline; which omission produced (he says) very mischievous effects, especially in corrupting the character of the men. He pronounces this to be a serious fault, making the constitution inconsistent and self-contradictory, and indeed contrary to the intentions of Lykurgus himself: who had tried to bring the women under public discipline as well as the men, but was forced to desist by their strenuous opposition.<sup>x</sup> Such remarks from Aristotle are the more remarkable, since it appears as matter of history, that the maidens at Sparta (though not the married women) did to a great extent go

<sup>u</sup> Aristotel. Politic. viii. 1, p. 1337, a. 21. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῷ τέλος τῇ πόλει πάσῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι πάντων,

καὶ μὴ κατ' ἑκάστην οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ μάθησιν ἣν ἂν δόξῃ διδάσκων. Ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας δ' ἐπιμέλεια

ὁλοῦ ἐπ

Aristotel. Politic. ii. 7, p. 1269,

b. 12. Ἐτι δὲ, ἡ περὶ τὰς

πολιτείας βλαβερὰ, καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἵσ'—Ὡστ' ἐν ὕσαιο

ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας τῆς πόλεως δεῖ νομίζειν ἅ τῃτον.

Ὅπερ ἐκεῖ (at Sparta)

ὅλην γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι βουλόμενος καρτερικὴν, κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἄνδρας φανερός ἐστι τοιοῦτος ὢν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξημέληκε, &c. Τὰ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἔοικεν οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πόλεως αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαι τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν.

Plato has a similar remark, Legg. vi. pp. 780-781.

through gymnastic exercises along with the young men.<sup>y</sup> These exercises, though almost a singular exception in Greece, must have appeared to Aristotle very insufficient. What amount or kind of regulation he himself would propose for women, he has not defined. In his own ideal commonwealth, he lays it down as alike essential for men and women to have their bodies trained and exercised so as to be adequate to the active duties of free persons (as contrasted with the harder preparation requisite for the athletic contests, which he disapproves), but he does not go into further particulars.<sup>z</sup> The regulations which he proposes, too, with reference to marriage generally and to the maintenance of a vigorous breed of citizens, show, that he considered it an important part of the lawgiver's duty to keep up by positive interference the physical condition both of males and females.<sup>a</sup>

In principle therefore, Aristotle agrees with Plato,<sup>b</sup> as to the propriety of comprehending women as well as men under

<sup>y</sup> Stallbaum (in his note on Plato, Legg. i. p. 638 C, τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν παρ' ὑμῶν ἄνεσιν) observes—"Lacernarum licentiam, quum ex aliis institutis patriis, tum ex gymnicarum exercitationum usu repetendam, Plato carpit etiam infra," &c. This is a mistake. Plato does not blame the gymnastic exercises of the Spartan maidens: the four passages to which Stallbaum refers do not prove his assertion. They even countenance the reverse of that assertion. Plato approves of gymnastic and military exercises for maidens in the Laws, and for all the female Guardians in the Republic.

Stallbaum also refers to Aristotle as disapproving the gymnastic exercises of the Spartan maidens. I cannot think that this is correct. Aristotle does indeed blame the arrangements for women at Sparta, but not, as I understand him, because the women were subjected to gymnastic exercise: his blame is founded on the circumstance that the women were not regulated, but left to do as they pleased, while the men were under the strictest drill. This I conceive to be the meaning of γυναικῶν ἄνεσις. Euripides indeed has a very bitter passage condemning the exercises of the Spartan maidens, but neither Plato

nor Aristotle shared this view.

Respecting the Spartan maidens and their exercises, see Xenophon, Republ. Laced. i. 4; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 14.

<sup>z</sup> Aristotel. Politic. vii. 10, p. 1335, b. 8. Πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἕξιν, πεπονημένην δὲ πόνοις μὴ βιαίσις, μηδὲ πρὸς ἓνα μόνον, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἕξις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐλευθέρων πράξεις. Ὁμοίως δὲ δεῖ ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν ἀνδράσι καὶ γυναιξί. Compare also i. 8, near the end of the first book.

<sup>a</sup> Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16, p. 1335, a. 20, b. 15.

<sup>b</sup> If we take the sentence from Aristotle's Politics, cited in a note immediately preceding, to the effect that all the citizens belonged to the city, and that each was a part of the city (viii. 1, p. 1337, a. 28) in conjunction with another passage in the Politics (i. 3, p. 1254, a. 10)—Τό τε γὰρ μόριον, οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἅλλου—it is difficult to see how he can, consistently with these principles, assign to his citizens any individual self-regarding agency. Plato denies all such to his Guardians, and in so doing he makes deductions consistent with the principles of Aristotle, who lays down his principles too absolutely for the use which he afterwards makes of them.

public training and discipline: but he does not follow out the principle with the same consistency. He maintains the Platonic Commonwealth to be impossible.<sup>c</sup>

If we go through the separate objections which Aristotle advances as justifying his verdict, we shall find them altogether inadequate for the purpose. He shows certain inconveniences

Aristotle  
declares the  
Platonic  
Common-  
wealth im-  
possible.—In  
what sense  
this is true.

and difficulties as belonging to it,—which are by no means all real, but which, even conceding them in full force, would have to be set against the objections admitted by himself to bear against other actual societies, before we can determine whether they

are sufficiently weighty to render the scheme to which they belong impossible. The Platonic commonwealth, and the Aristotelian commonwealth, are both of them impossible, in my judgment, for the same reason: that all the various communities of mankind exist under established customs, beliefs, and sentiments, in complete discordance with them: and that we cannot understand from whence the force is to come, tending and competent to generate either of these two new systematic projects. Both of them require a simultaneous production of many reciprocally adapted elements: both therefore require an express initiative force, exceptional and belonging to some peculiar crisis—something analogous to Zeus in Krete, and to Apollo at Sparta. This is alike true of both: though the Platonic Republic, departing more widely from received principles and sentiments than the Aristotelian, would of course require a more potent initiative.<sup>d</sup> In the treatises of the two philosophers, each explains and vindicates the principles of his system, without including in the hypothesis any specification of a probable source from whence it was to acquire its first start. Where is the motive, operative, demiurgic force, ready to translate such an idea into reality?<sup>e</sup> But if we assume that either of them had once

Aristotel. Polit. ii. 3, p. 1269, b. 29.

ἔστιν πάντων ἀδύνατος ὁ βίος.

<sup>d</sup> Plato indeed in one place tells us that a single despot becoming by inspiration or accident a philosopher, and having an obedient city, would accomplish the primary construction of his commonwealth (Republic, vi. p.

502 B). That despot (Plato supposes) will send away all the population of his city above ten years old, and will train up the children in the Platonic principles (vii. pp. 540-541).

This is little better than an εὐχῇ, whatever Plato may say to deprecate the charge of uttering εὐχάς, p. 540 D.

<sup>e</sup> Aristotel. Metaphys. A. p. 991,

begun, there is no reason why it might not have continued. The causes which first brought about the Spartan constitution and discipline must have been very peculiar, though we have no historical account what they were. At any rate they never occurred a second time; for no second Sparta was ever formed, in spite of the admiration inspired by the first. If Sparta had never been actually established, and if Aristotle had read a description of it as a mere project, he would probably have pronounced it impracticable: though when once brought into reality, it proved eminently durable. In like manner the laws, customs, beliefs, and feelings prevalent in Egypt,—which astonished so vehemently Herodotus and other observing Greeks—would have been declared to be impossible, if described simply in project: yet when once established they were found to last longer without change than those of other nations.

The Platonic project is submitted, however, not to impartial judges comparing different views on matters yet undetermined, but to hearers with a canon of criticism already fixed and anti-Platonic "*animis consuetudine imbutis*." It appears impossible, because it contradicts sentiments conceived as fundamental and consecrated, respecting the sexual and family relations. The supposed impossibility is the mode of expressing strong disapprobation and repugnance: like that which Herodotus describes as manifested by the Greeks on one side and by the

The real impossibility of the Platonic Commonwealth, arises from the fact that discordant sentiments are already established.

a. 22. τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον,  
: τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον;

We find Aristotle arguing, in the course of his remarks on the Platonic Republic, that it is useless now to promulgate any such novelties; a long time has elapsed, and such things would already have been found established if they had been good (Polit. ii. 5, p. 1264, a. 2). This would have applied (somewhat less in degree, yet with quite sufficient force) to the ideal commonwealth of Aristotle himself, as well as to that of Plato.

Because such institutions have never yet been established anywhere as those proposed by Plato or Aristotle, you cannot fairly argue that they would not be good, or that they would not stand if established. What you may fairly argue is, that they are not at all likely to be established; no originating

force will be forthcoming adequate to the first creation of them. Existing societies have fixed modes of thinking and feeling on social and political matters; each moves in its own groove, and the direction in which it will henceforward move will be a consequence and continuance of the direction in which it is already moving, by virtue of powerful causes now in operation. New originating force is a very rare phenomenon. Overwhelming enemies or physical calamities may destroy what exists, but they will not produce any such innovations as those under discussion.

Plato himself makes this very remark in the *Treatise De Legibus* (viii. p. 839 D) in defending the practicability of some of the ordinances therein recommended.

Indians on the other—when Darius, having asked each of them at what price they would consent to adopt the practice of the other respecting the mode of treating the bodies of deceased parents, was answered by a loud cry of horror at the mere proposition.<sup>g</sup> The reasons offered to prove the Platonic project impossible, are principally founded upon the very sentiment above adverted to, and derive all their force from being associated with it. Such is the character of many among the Aristotelian objections.<sup>h</sup> The real, and the truly forcible, objection consists in the sentiment itself. If that be deeply rooted in the mind, it is decisive. To those who feel thus, the Platonic project would be both intolerable and impossible.

But we must recollect that it is these very sentiments,

Plato has strong feelings of right and wrong about sexual intercourse, but referring to different objects.

which Plato impugns and declares to be inapplicable to his Guardians: so that an opponent who, not breaking off at once with the cry of horror uttered by the Indians to Darius, begins to discuss the question with him, is bound to forego objections

<sup>g</sup> Herodot. iii. 38. οἱ δὲ, ἀμβώσαντες μέγα, εὐφημέειν μιν ἐκέλευον.

Plato in a remarkable passage of the *Leges* (i. 638 B), deprecates and complains of this instantaneous condemnation without impartial hearing of argument on both sides.

<sup>h</sup> See the arguments urged by Aristotle, *Politie*. ii. 4, p. 1262, a. 25 et seq. His remarks upon the fictions which Plato requires to be impressed on the belief of his Guardians are extremely just. There are, however, several objections urged by him which turn more upon the Platonic language than upon the Platonic vein of thought, and which, if judged by Plato from his own point of view, would have appeared admissions in his favour rather than objections. In reply to Plato, whose aim it is that all or many of the Guardians shall say *mine* in reference to the same persons or the same things, and not in reference to different persons and different things, Aristotle contends that the word *mine* will not then designate any such strong affection as it does now, when it is special, exclusive, and concentrated on a few persons or things: that each Guardian, having many persons whom he called *brother* and many persons whom he called *father*, would not feel

towards them as persons now feel towards brothers and fathers; that the affection by being disseminated would be weakened, and would become nothing more than a "*diluted friendship*"—φιλία ὑδαρής. See Aristotle, *Politie*. ii. 3, p. 1261, b. 22, ii. 4, p. 1262, b. 15.

Plato if called upon for an answer to this reasoning, would probably have allowed it to be just; but would have said that the "*diluted friendship*" pervading all the Guardians was apt and sufficient for his purpose, as bringing the whole number most nearly into the condition of one organism. Strong exclusive affections, upon whatever founded, between individuals, he wishes to discourage: the hateful or unfriendly sentiments he is bent on rooting out. What he desires to see preponderant, in each Guardian, is a sense of duty to the public: subordinate to that, he approves moderate and kindly affections, embracing all the Guardians; towards the elders as fathers, towards those of the same age as brothers. Aristotle's expression—φιλία ὑδαρής—describes such a sentiment fairly enough. See *Republic*, v. pp. 462-463. It must be conceded, however, that Plato's language is open to Aristotle's objection.

and repugnances springing as corollaries from a basis avowedly denied. Plato has earnest feelings of right and wrong, in regard both to the functions of women and to the sexual intercourse: but his feelings dissent entirely from those of readers generally. That is right, in his opinion, which tends to keep up the excellence of the breed and the proper number of Guardians, as well as to ensure the exact and constant fulfilment of their mission: that is wrong, which tends to defeat or abridge such fulfilment, or to impair the breed, or to multiply the number beyond its proper limit. Of these ends the Rulers are the proper judges, not the individual person. All the Guardians are enjoined to leave the sexual power absolutely unexercised until the age of thirty for men, of twenty for women—and then only to exercise it under express sanction and authorisation, according as the Rulers may consider that children are needed to keep up the legitimate number.

Marriage is regarded as holy, and celebrated under solemn rites—all the more because both the ceremony is originated, and the couples selected, by the magistrates, for the most important public purpose: which being fulfilled, the marriage ceases and determines. It is not celebrated with a view to the couple themselves, still less with a view to establish any permanent exclusive attachment between them: which object Plato not only does not contemplate, but positively discountenances; on the same general principle as the Catholic Church forbids marriage to priests: because he believes that it will create within them motives and sentiments inconsistent with the due discharge of their public mission.

It is clear that among such a regiment as that which Plato describes in his Guardians, a sentiment would grow up, respecting the intercourse of the sexes, totally different from that which prevailed elsewhere around him. The Platonic restriction upon that intercourse (until the ulterior limits of age) would be far more severe: but it would be applied with reference to different objects. Instead of being applied to enforce the exclusive consecration of one woman to one man, choosing each other or chosen by fathers, without any limit on the

Different sentiment which would grow up in the Platonic Commonwealth respecting the sexual relations.

multiplication of children,—and without any attention to the maintenance or deterioration of the breed—it would be directed to the obtaining of the most perfect breed and of the appropriate number, leaving the Guardians, female as well as male, free from all permanent distracting influences to interfere with the discharge of their public duties. In appreciating the details of the Platonic community, we must look at it with reference to this form of sexual morality; which would generate in the Guardians an appreciation of details consistent with itself, both as to the women and as to the children. The sentiment of obligation, of right and wrong, respecting the relations of the sexes, is everywhere very strong; but it does not everywhere attach to the same acts or objects. The important obligation for a woman never to show her face in public, which is held sacred through so large a portion of the Oriental world, is noway recognised in the Occidental: and in Plato's time, when mankind were more disseminated among small independent communities, the divergence was yet greater than it is now. The Spartans were not induced, by the censures or mockery of persons in other Grecian cities,<sup>1</sup> to suppress the gymnastic exercises practised by their maidens in conjunction with the young men: nor is Plato deterred by the ridicule or blame which others may express, from proclaiming his conviction, that the virtue of his female Guardians is the same as that of the male—consisting in the faithful performance of their duty as Guardians, after going through all the requisite training, gymnastic and musical. And he follows this up by the general declaration, one of the most emphatic in all his writings, “The best thing which is now said or ever has been said, is, that what is profitable is honourable—and what is hurtful, is base.”<sup>k</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Euripid. *Andromach.* 598.

The criticisms of Xenophon in the first chapter of his treatise, *De Laced. Republ.*, exhibit a point of view on many points analogous to that of Plato respecting the female sex, and differing from that which he puts into the mouth of Ischomachus in his

See above, p. 200, note h. Among the lost treatises of

Kleanthes, successor of Zeno as Scholarch of the Stoic school, one was composed expressly to show “Ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός. *La.* vii. 175.)

<sup>k</sup> Plato, *Republ.* v. p. 457. Ἀποδύτον δὴ ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων ἐπειπερ ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ ἰματίῳ σονται, καὶ κοινωνητέον πολιτῆς ἅλλης φυλάκῃς τῆς περὶ

Plato in truth reduces the distinction between the two sexes to its lowest terms: to the physical difference in regard to procreation—and to the general fact, that the female is every way weaker and inferior to the male; while yet, individually taken, many women are superior to many men, and both sexes are alike improveable by training. He maintains that this similarity of training and function is the real order of Nature, and that the opposite practice, which insists on a separation of life and functions between the sexes, is unnatural:<sup>1</sup> which doctrine he partly enforces by the analogy of the two sexes in other animals.<sup>m</sup> Aristotle disputes this reasoning altogether: declaring that Nature prescribes a separation of life and functions between the two sexes—that the relation of man to woman is that of superiority and command on one side, inferiority and obedience on the other, like the relation between father and child, master and slave, though with a difference less in degree—that virtue in a man, and virtue in a woman, are quite different, imposing diverse obligations.<sup>n</sup> It shows how little stress can be laid on arguments based on the word *Nature*, when we see two such distinguished thinkers completely at issue as to the question, what Nature indicates, in this important case. Each of them decorates by that name the rule which he himself approves; whether actually realised anywhere, or merely recommended as a reform of something really existing. In this controversy, Aristotle had in his favour the actualities around him, against Plato: but Aristotle himself is far from always recognising experience and practice as authoritative interpreters of the dictates of Nature, as we may see by his own ideal commonwealth.

How strongly Plato was attached to his doctrines about the capacity of women—how unchanged his opinion continued

καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρακτέον τούτων δ' αὐ-  
τῶν τὰ ἐλαφρότερα ταῖς γυναῖξιν ἢ τοῖς  
ἄνδράσιν, διὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους  
οὐκ  
του  
γυναικῶν

ρὸν, αἰσχροδόν.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, v. pp. 456 C, 400 D. τὰ νῦν παρὰ ταῦτα.

<sup>m</sup> μᾶλλον, &c.

Compare a similar appeal to the analogy of animals, as proving the *ἐρωτας ἀρρένων* to be unnatural, Plato Legg. viii. p. 836 C.

<sup>n</sup> Aristotel. Politic. i. 13, p. 1260, a. 20-30.

οἶκεν, ἐφ' ᾧ γὰρ οὐδ' ὁ, τι πράττει.  
τοῦτο καὶ λέ-  
καὶ λέλεξεταί, ὅτι τὸ μὲν

about the mischief of separating the training and functions of the two sexes, and of confining women to indoor occupations, or to what he calls “a life of darkness and fear”<sup>o</sup>—may be seen farther by his Treatise *De Legibus*. Although in that treatise he recedes (perforce and without retracting) from the principles of his Republic, so far as to admit separate properties and families for all his citizens—yet he still continues to enjoin public gymnastic and military training, for women and men alike; and he still opens, to both sexes alike, superintending social functions to a great extent, as well as the privilege of being honoured by public hymns after death, in case of distinguished merit.<sup>p</sup> Respecting military matters, he speaks with peculiar earnestness. That women are perfectly capable of efficient military service, if properly trained, he proves not only by the ancient legends, but also by facts actual and contemporary, the known valour of the Scythian and Sarmatian women. Whatever doubts persons may have hitherto cherished (says Plato), this is now established matter of fact:<sup>q</sup> the cowardice and impotence of women is not less disgraceful in itself than detrimental to the city, as robbing it of one-half of its possible force.<sup>r</sup> He complains bitterly of the repugnance felt even to

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 781 D. εἰθισμέ-  
νον γὰρ δεδοικὸς καὶ σκοτεινὸν ζῆν, &c.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Legg.* vii. pp. 795 C, 796 C,  
802 A.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, *Legg.* vii. pp. 803-805-806.  
ἀκούων γὰρ δὴ μύθους παλαιούς πέπεισ-  
μαι, τὰ δὲ νῦν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οἶδα ὅτι  
μυριάδες ἀναριθμητοὶ γυναικῶν εἰσὶ τῶν  
περὶ τὸν Πόντον, ὥς Σαυροματίδας  
καλοῦσιν, αἷς οὐχ ἵππων μόνον ἀλλὰ  
καὶ τόξων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὕπλων κοι-  
νωνία καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἴση προστεταγ-  
μένη ἴσως ἀσκεῖται. We may doubt  
whether Plato knew anything of the  
brave and skilful Artemisia queen of  
Halikarnassus, who so greatly distin-  
guished herself in the expedition of  
Xerxes against Greece (Herod. vii. 99,  
viii. 87), and, indeed, whether he had  
ever read the history of Herodotus.  
His argument might have been  
strengthened by another equally per-  
tinent example, if he could have  
quoted the original letter addressed  
by the Emperor Aurelian to the

Roman Senate, attesting the courage,  
vigour, and prudence, of Zenobia  
queen of Palmyra. Trebellius Pollio,  
*Vitæ Triginta Tyrannorum* in *Histor.*  
August. p. 198. “Audio, P. C., mihi  
objici, quod non virile munus imple-  
verim, Zenobiam triumphando. Nam,  
illi qui me reprehendunt, satis lauda-  
rent, si scirent qualis est illa mulier,  
quam prudens in consiliis, quam con-  
stans in dispositionibus, quam erga  
milites gravis, quam larga cum neces-  
sitas postulet, quam tristis cum severi-  
tas poscat. Possum dicere illius esse  
quod Odenatus Persas vicit, et Ctesiphontem usque fugato Saporem pervenit.  
Possum asserere, tanto apud Orientales  
et Ægyptiorum populos timore mulie-  
rem fuisse, ut se non Arabes, non  
Sarraceni, non Armeni, commoverent.  
Nec ego illi vitam conservassem, nisi  
eam scissem multum Romanæ Rei-  
publicæ profuisse, cum sibi vel liberis  
suis Orientis servaret imperium.”

<sup>r</sup> Plato, *Legg.* vii. pp. 813-814.

the discussion of this proposition.<sup>a</sup> Most undoubtedly, there were ancient legends which tended much to countenance his opinion. The warlike Amazons, daughters of Arês, were among the most formidable forces that had ever appeared on earth; they had shown their power once by invading Attica and bringing such peril on Athens, that it required all the energy of the great Athenian hero Theseus to repel them. We must remember that these stories were not only familiarised to the public eye in conspicuous painting and sculpture, but were also fully believed as matters of past history.<sup>t</sup> Moreover the Goddess Athênê, patroness of Athens, was the very impersonation of intelligent terror-striking might—constraining and subduing Arês<sup>u</sup> himself: the Goddess Enÿo presided over war, no less than the God Arês:<sup>v</sup> lastly Artemis, though making war only on wild beasts, was hardly less formidable in her way—indefatigable as well as rapid in her movements—and unerring with her bow, as Athênê was irresistible with her spear. Here were abundant examples in Grecian legend, to embolden Plato in his affirmations respecting the capacity of the female sex for warlike enterprise and laborious endurance.

The two Goddesses, Athênê and Artemis, were among the few altogether insensible to amorous influences and to the inspirations of Aphroditê: who is the object of contemptuous sarcasm on the part of Athênê, and of repulsive antipathy on the part of Artemis.<sup>x</sup> This may supply an illustration for the Republic of Plato. As far as one can guess what the effect of his institutions would have been, it is probable that the influence of Aphroditê would have been at its minimum among his Guardians of both sexes: as it was presented in the warlike dramas of Æschylus.<sup>y</sup> There would have been everything

In a Commonwealth like the Platonic, the influence of Aphroditê would probably have been reduced to a minimum.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 781 D.

<sup>t</sup> Plutarch, *Theseus*, c. 27; Æschylus, *Eumenid.* 682; Isokrates, *Panegy.* ss. 76-78. How popular a subject the Amazons were for sculptors, we learn from the statement of Pliny (*xxxiv.* 8, 19) that all the most distinguished sculptors executed Amazons; and that this subject was the only one upon which a direct comparison could be made between them.

<sup>u</sup> Homer, *Iliad* xv. 123.

<sup>v</sup> Homer, *Iliad* v. 333-592.

<sup>x</sup> Homer, *Hymn. ad Venerem.* 10; *Iliad* v. 425; Euripid. *Hippolyt.* 1400-1420.

Athênê combined the attributes of φιλοπόλεμος and φιλόσοφος. Plato, *Timæus*, p. 24 D; compare *Kritias*, p. 109 D.

<sup>y</sup> See Aristophan. *Ranæ*, 1042.

*Eurip.* Μὰ Δὲ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης οὐδέν σοι.

*Æschyl.* Μηδέ γ' ἐπέειπεν. Ἄλλ' ἐπὶ σοὶ τοι καὶ τοῖς σοῖσιν πολλὰ πολλοῦ πικρῶσιντο.

to deaden it, with an entire absence of all provocatives. The muscular development, but rough and unadorned bodies, of females—

Sabina qualis, aut perusta solibus  
Pernicis uxor Appuli—(Hor. *Epod.* ii. 42).

the indiscriminate companionship, with perfect identity of treatment and manners, between the two sexes from the earliest infancy—the training of both together for the same public duties, the constant occupation of both throughout life in the performance of those duties, under unceasing official supervision—the strict regulation of exercise and diet, together with the monastic censorship on all poetry and literature—the self-restraint, equal and universal, enforced as the characteristic feature and pride of the regiment, and seconded by the jealous espionage of all over all, the more potent because privacy was unknown—such an assemblage of circumstances would do as much as circumstances could do to starve the sexual appetite, to prevent it from becoming the root of emotional or imaginative associations, and to place it under the full controul of the lawgiver for purposes altogether public. Such was probably Plato's intention: since he more generally regards the appetites as enemies to be combated and extirpated so far as practicable—rather than as sources of pleasure, yet liable to accompaniments of pain, requiring to be regulated so as to exclude the latter and retain the former.

The public purposes, with a view to which Plato sought to controul the sexual appetite in his Guardians, were three, as I have already stated. 1. To obtain from each of them individually, faithful performance of the public duties, and observance of the limits, prescribed by his system. 2. To ensure the best and purest breed. 3. To maintain unaltered the same total number, without excess or deficiency.

The first of these three purposes is peculiar to the Platonic system. The two last are not peculiar to it. Aristotle recognises them<sup>2</sup> as ends, no less than Plato, though he does not approve Plato's means for attaining them. In reference to the limitation of number,

Other pur-  
also.  
Law of population expounded by Malthus—  
Three distinct checks

<sup>2</sup> Aristotel, *Politie.* vii. 16.

Aristotle is even more pronounced than Plato. The great evil of over-population forced itself upon these philosophers; living as both of them did among small communities, each with its narrow area hedged in by others—each liable to intestine dispute, sometimes caused, always aggravated, by the presence of large families and numerous poor freemen—and each importing bought slaves as labourers. To obtain for their community the quickest possible increase in aggregate wealth and population, was an end which they did not account either desirable or commendable. The stationary state, far from appearing repulsive or discouraging, was what they looked upon as the best arrangement<sup>a</sup> of things. A mixed number of lots of land, indivisible and inalienable, is the first principle of the Platonic community in the treatise *De Legibus*. Not to encourage wealth, but to avert, as far as possible, the evils of poverty and dependance, and to restrain within narrow limits the proportion of the population which suffered those evils—was considered by Plato and Aristotle to be among the gravest problems for the solution of the statesman.<sup>b</sup> Consistent with these conditions, essential to security and tranquillity, whatever the form of government might be, there was only room for the free population then existing: not always for that (seeing that the proportion of poor citizens was often uncomfortably great), and never for any sensible increase above that. If all the children were born and brought up, that it was possible for adult couples to produce, a fearful aggravation of poverty, with all its accompanying public troubles and sufferings, would have been inevitable.<sup>c</sup> Accordingly both Plato (for the Guardians

<sup>a</sup> Compare the view (not unlike though founded on different reasons) of the stationary state taken by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in a valuable chapter of his *Principles of Political Economy*, Book iv. cap. 6. He says (s. 2, p. 319):—"The best state for human nature is that in which, while no one is poor, no one desires to be richer, nor has any reason to fear being thrust back by the efforts of others to push themselves forward." This would come near to the views of Plato and Aristotle.

<sup>b</sup> See a striking passage in Plato,

Legg. v. pp. 742-743. He speaks of rich men as they are spoken of in some verses of the Gospels—a very rich man can hardly be a good man. Wealth and poverty are both of them evils, p. 744 D. *Republ.* iv. p. 421.

Pheidon the Corinthian, an ancient lawgiver (we do not know when or where), prescribed an unchangeable number both of lots (of land) and of citizens, but the lots were not to be all equal. *Aristotel. Politic.* ii. 6, p. 1265, b. 14.

<sup>c</sup> *Aristot. Politic.* ii. 6, p. 1265, b. 10. Τὸ δὲ ἀφείσθαι (τὴν τεκνοποιῶν στον) καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πλείταις π

in the Republic) and Aristotle agree in opinion that a limit must be fixed upon the number of children which each couple is permitted to introduce. If any objector had argued that each couple, by going through the solemnity of marriage acquired a natural right to produce as many children as they could, and that others were under a natural obligation to support those children—both philosophers would have denied the plea altogether. But they went even farther. They considered procreation as a duty which each citizen owed to the public, in order that the total of citizens might not fall below the proper minimum—yet as a duty which required controul, in order that the total might not rise above the proper maximum.<sup>d</sup> Hence they did not even admit the right of each couple to produce as many children as their private means could support. They thought it necessary to impose a limit on the number of children in every family, binding equally on rich and poor: the number prescribed might be varied from time to time, as circumstances indicated. As the community could not safely admit more than a certain aggregate of births, these philosophers commanded all couples indiscriminately, the rich not excepted, to shape their conduct with a view to that imperative necessity.

Plato in his Republic (as I have already mentioned) assumes for his Archons the privilege of selecting (by a pretended sortition) the couples through whom the legitimate amount of breeding shall be accomplished: in the semi-Platonic commonwealth (De Legibus), he leaves the choice free, but prescribes the limits of age, rendering marriage a peremptory duty between twenty and thirty-five years of age, and adding some emphatic exhortations, though not peremptory enactments, respecting the principles which ought to guide individual choice.<sup>e</sup> In the

σιν, πενίας ἀναγκαῖον αἴτιον γίνεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις· ἡ δὲ πενία, στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργίαν. Compare *ibid.* ii. 7, p. 1266, b. 8.

<sup>d</sup> Aristotel. *Politic.* vii. 16, p. 1335, b. 28-38. *λειτούργειν πρὸς τεκνοπο*  
τῆς

Plato, *Republic*, v. pp. 460-461. *τίκτειν τῇ πόλει—γεννᾶν τῇ πόλει—τῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γεννήσεων.*

<sup>e</sup> Plato, *Legg.* vi. pp. 772-773-774. The wording is characteristic of the view taken by these philosophers, and

of the extent to which they subordinated individual sentiment to public considerations. *κατὰ παντὸς εἰς ἕστω*

*γάμου—τὸν γὰρ  
ἐνυμφέροντα μνηστεύειν γάμο  
οὐ*

*πὺς ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν πῶς πρὸς τὸν  
τατον αὐτῷ, &c.* P. 773 B. In marriage (he says) the natural tendency is that like seeks like; but it is good for the city that like should be coupled to unlike, rich to poor, hasty tempers with sober tempers, &c., in order that the specialties may be blended to-

same manner too he deals with procreation: recognising the necessity of imposing a limit on individual discretion, yet not naming that limit by law, but leaving it to be enforced according to circumstances by the magistrates: who (he says), by advice, praise, and censure, can apply either effective restraints on procreation, or encouragements if the case requires.<sup>f</sup> Aristotle blames this guarantee as insufficient: he feels so strongly the necessity of limiting procreation, that he is not satisfied unless a proper limit be imposed by positive law. Unless such a result be made thoroughly sure (he says), all other measures of lawgivers for equalising properties, or averting poverty and the discontents growing out of it—must fail in effect.<sup>g</sup> Aristotle also lays it down as a part of the duty of the lawgiver to take care that the bodies of the children brought up shall be as good as possible: hence he prescribes the ages proper for marriage, and the age after which no parents are to produce any more children.<sup>h</sup>

The paramount necessity of limiting the number of children born in each family, here enforced by Plato and Aristotle, rests upon that great social fact which Malthus so instructively expounded at the close of the last century. Malthus, enquiring specially into the law of population, showed upon what conditions the increase of population depends, and what were the causes constantly at work to hold it back—checks to population. He ranged these causes under three different heads,

gether and mitigated. He does not pretend to embody this in a written law, but directs the authorities to obtain it as far as they can by exhortation. P. 773 E. Compare the Politikus, p. 311.

Plato, Legg. v. p. 740 D. *ποριζέτω αἱ πεντα-*

*ἀεὶ μόνον ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπισχέσεις γενέσεως, οἷς ἂν εὐρους εἴη γενέσεις, καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπιμέλειαι καὶ σπουδαὶ πλήθους γεννημάτων εἶσιν, &c.*

Aristotel. Politic. ii. 6, p. 1264, a. 38, ii. 7, p. 1266, b. 10, vii. 16.

Aristotle has not fully considered all that Plato says, when he blames him for inconsistency in proposing to keep properties equal, without taking pains to impose and maintain a constant limit on offspring in families. *Ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα*

(Plato), τὸ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ' ἀφεῖναι τὴν τεκνοποιῖαν ἀόριστον, &c.

What Plato really directs is stated in my text and in my note immediately preceding.

<sup>h</sup> Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16, p. 1334, b. 39. *εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομῶν δεῖ, ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ γένηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν πότε καὶ πόλους τινὰς ὄντας χρῆ ποιέεισθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμίλιαν, &c.* He names thirty-seven as the age proper for a man, eighteen for a woman, to marry. At the age of fifty-five a man becomes unfit to procreate for the public, and none of his children are to appear (*ἀφείσθαι τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερόν γεννήσεως*, vii. 16, p.

though the two last are multiform in detail. 1. Moral or prudential restraint—the preventive check. 2. Vice, and 3. Misery—the two positive checks. He farther showed that though the aggregate repressive effect of these three causes is infallible and inevitable, determined by the circumstances of each given society—yet that mankind might exercise an option through which of the three the check should be applied: that the effect of the two last causes was in inverse proportion to that of the first—in other words, that the less there was of prudential restraint limiting the number of births, the more there must be of vice or misery, under some of their thousand forms, to shorten the lives of many of the children born—and *é con- verso*, the more there was of prudential restraint, the less would be the operation of the other checks tending to shorten life.

Three distinct facts—preventive restraint, vice, and misery—  
Plato and Aristotle saw the same law as Malthus, but arranged the facts under a different point of view. having nothing else in common, are arranged under one general head by Malthus, in consequence of the one single common property which they possess—that of operating as checks to population. To him, that one common property was the most important of all, and the most fit to be singled out as the groundwork of classification, having reference to the subject of his enquiry. But Plato and Aristotle looked at the subject in a different point of view. They had present to their minds the same three facts, and the tendency of the first to avert or abate the second and third: but as they were not investigating the law of population, they had nothing to call their attention to the one common property of the three. They did not regard vice and misery as causes tending to keep down population, but as being in themselves evils; enemies among the worst which the lawgiver had to encounter, in his efforts to establish a good political and social condition—and enemies which he could never successfully encounter, without regulating the number of births. Such regulation they considered as an essential tutelary measure to keep out disastrous poverty. The inverse proportion, between regulated or unregulated number of births on the one hand, and diminution or increase of poverty on the other, was seen as clearly by Aristotle and Plato as by Malthus.

But these two Greek philosophers ordain something yet

more remarkable. Having prescribed both the age of marriage and the number of permitted births, so as to ensure both vigorous citizens and a total compatible with the absence of corrupting poverty—they direct what shall be done if the result does not correspond to their orders. Plato in his Republic (as I have already stated) commands that all the children born to his wedded couples shall be immediately consigned to the care of public nurses—that the offspring of the well-constituted parents shall be brought up, that of the ill-constituted parents not brought up—and that no children born of parents after the legitimate age shall be brought up.<sup>1</sup> Aristotle forbids the exposure of children, wherever the habits of the community are adverse to it: but if after any married couple have had the number of children allowed by law, the wife should again become pregnant, he directs that abortion shall be procured before the commencement of life or sense in the fœtus: after such commencement, he pronounces abortion to be wrong.<sup>k</sup> On another point Plato and Aristotle agree: both of them command that no child born crippled or deformed shall be brought up:<sup>l</sup> a practice actually adopted at Sparta under the Lykurgian institutions, and even carried farther, since no child was allowed to be brought up until it had been inspected and approved by the public nurses.<sup>m</sup>

Regulations of Plato and Aristotle as to number of births, and new-born children.

We here find both these philosophers not merely permitting, but enjoining—and the Spartan legislation, more admired than any in Greece, systematically realising—practices which modern sentiment repudiates and punishes. Nothing can more strikingly illustrate—what Plato and Aristotle have them-

Such regulations disapproved and forbidden by modern sentiment—Variability of ethical sentiment as to

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Republ.* v. pp. 459 D, 460 C, 461 C.

<sup>k</sup> Aristotel. *Politic.* vii. 16, 10, p. 1335, b. 20. Compare Plato, *Theætét.* 149 C.

Περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ τροφῆς τῶν γιγνομένων, ἔστω νόμος, μηδὲν πεπηρωμένον τρέφειν διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, ἐὰν ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύῃ, μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων ὄρισται γὰρ δὴ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος, ἐὰν δὲ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθῆσιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ οἰεῖσθαι δεῖ τῇ

γὰρ τῇ καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται. For the

text of this passage I have followed Bekker and the Berlin edition. As to the first half of the passage there are some material differences in the text and in the MSS.; some give ἐθῶν instead of ἐθῶν, and ὄρισθαι γὰρ δεῖ instead of ὄρισται γὰρ δὴ.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, *Republic*, v. p. 460 C. τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρῶν (τέκνα), καὶ ἐὰν τι τῶν

Aristot. *ut supra*,

<sup>m</sup> Plutarch, *Lykurgus*, c. 16.

objects approved or disapproved. selves repeatedly observed<sup>n</sup>—how variable and indeterminate is the *matter* of ethical sentiment, in different ages and communities, while the *form* of ethical sentiment is the same universally: how all men agree subjectively, in that which they feel—disapprobation and hatred of wrong and vice, approbation and esteem of right and virtue—yet how much they differ objectively, as to the acts or persons which they designate by these names and towards which their feelings are directed. It is with these emotions as with the other emotions of human nature: all men are moved in the same manner, though in different degree, by love and hatred—hope and fear—desire and aversion—sympathy and antipathy—the emotions of the beautiful, the sublime, the ludicrous; but when we compare the objects, acts, or persons, which so move them, we find only a very partial agreement, amidst wide discrepancy and occasionally strong opposition.<sup>o</sup> The present case is one of the strongest opposition. Practices now abhorred as wrong, are here directly commanded by Plato and Aristotle, the two greatest authorities of the Hellenic world: men differing on many points from each other, but agreeing in this: men not only of lofty personal character, but also of first-rate intellectual force, in whom the ideas of virtue and vice had been as much developed by reflection as they ever have been in any mind: lastly, men who are extolled by the commentators as the champions of

<sup>n</sup> Aristotel. Politic. viii. 2, p. 1337, b. 2. Περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐθὲν ἔστιν ὁμολογούμενον· καὶ γὰρ τὴν οὐ

αι καὶ πρὸς τὴν

Ethica Nikomach. i. 3, p. 1094, b. 15. Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ἧ

διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή.

<sup>o</sup> The extraordinary variety and discrepancy of approved and consecrated customs prevalent in different portions of the ancient world, is instructively set forth in the treatise of the Syrian Christian Bardisanes in the time of the Antonines. A long extract from this treatise is given in Eusebius, *Præparat. Evang.* vi. 10; it has been also published by Orelli, annexed to his edition (Zurich, 1824)

of the argument of Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Fato*, p. 202. Compare Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* iv. 30.

Bardisanes is replying to the arguments of astrologers and calculators of nativities, who asserted the uniform and uncontrollable influence of the heavenly bodies, in given positions, over human conduct. As a proof that mankind are not subject to any such necessity, but have a large sphere of freewill (*αὐτεξούσιον*), he cites these numerous instances of diverse and contradictory institutions among different societies. Several of the most conspicuous among these differences relate to the institutions concerning sex and family, the conduct and occupations held obligatory in men and women, &c.

Compare Sextus Empiric. *Pyrrhon. Hypotyp.* iii. 8. 198 seqq.

religion and sound morality, against what are styled the unprincipled cavils of the Sophists.

It is, in my judgment, both curious and interesting to study the manner in which these two illustrious men—Plato and Aristotle—dealt with the problem of population. Grave as that problem is in all times, it was peculiarly grave among the small republics of antiquity. Neither of them were disposed to ignore or overlook it: nor to impute to other causes the consequences which it produces: nor to treat as indifferent the question, whether poor couples had a greater or less family, to share subsistence already scanty for themselves. Still less were these philosophers disposed to sanction the short-sighted policy of some Hellenic statesmen, who under a mistaken view of increasing the power of the state, proclaimed encouragement and premium simply to the multiplication of male births, without any regard to the comfort and means of families. Both Plato and Aristotle saw plainly, that a married couple, by multiplying their offspring, produced serious effects not merely upon their own happiness but upon that of others besides: up to a certain limit, for good—beyond that limit, for evil. Hence they laid it down, that procreation ought to be a rational and advised act, governed by a forecast of those consequences—not a casual and unforeseen result of present impulse. The same preponderance of reason over impulse as they prescribed in other cases, they endeavoured to enforce in this. They regarded it too, not simply as a branch of prudence, but as a branch of duty; a debt due by each citizen to others and to the commonwealth. It was the main purpose of their elaborate political schemes, to produce a steady habit and course of virtue in all the citizens: and they considered every one as greatly deficient in virtue, who refused to look forward to the consequences of his own procreative acts—thereby contributing to bring upon the state an aggravated measure of poverty, which was the sure parent of discord, sedition, and crime. That the rate of total increase should not be so great as to produce these last-mentioned effects—and that the limit of virtue and prudence should be made operative on all the separate families—was in their judgment one of the most important cares of the lawgiver.

Plato and Aristotle required subordination of impulse to reason and duty—they applied this to the procreative impulse, as to others.

We ought to disengage this general drift and purpose, common both to Plato and Aristotle, on the subject of population, from the various means—partly objectionable, partly impossible to be enforced—whereby they intended to carry the purpose into effect.

I pass from Plato's picture of the entire regiment of Guardians, under the regulations above described—  
Training of the few select philosophers to act as chiefs. to his description of the special training whereby the few most distinguished persons in the regiment (male or female, as the case may be) are to be improved, tested, and exalted to the capacity of philosophers: qualified to act as Rulers or Chiefs.<sup>p</sup> These are the two marked peculiarities of Plato's Republic. The Guardians are admirable as instruments, but have no initiative of their own: we have now to find the chiefs from whom they will receive it. How are philosophers to be formed? None but a chosen Few have the precious gold born with them, empowering them to attain this elevation. To those Few, if properly trained, the privilege and right to exercise command belongs, by Nature. For the rest, obedience is the duty prescribed by Nature.<sup>q</sup>

I have already given, in Chap. XXXIII., a short summary  
Comprehensive curriculum for aspirants to philosophy—consummation by means of Dialectic. of the peculiar scientific training which Sokrates prescribes for ripening these heroic aspirants into complete philosophers. They pass years of intellectual labour, all by their own spontaneous impulse, over and above the full training of Guardians. They study Arithmetic, Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy, Acoustics, &c., until the age of thirty: they then continue in the exercise of Dialectic, with all the test of question and answer, for five years longer: after which they enter upon the duties of practice and administration, succeeding ultimately to the position of chiefs if found competent. It is assumed that this long course of study, consummated by Dialectic, has operated within them that great mental revolution which Plato calls, turning the eye from the shadows in the cave to the realities

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 473, vi. p. 503 B. τοὺς

Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 474 B.

<sup>q</sup> P. 476 B. πάντοις ἐν εἶναι, vi. 503, vii. 535. They are to be ἐκ προκρίτων πρόκριτοι, vii. 537 D.

, ἡγεμονεύειν τ' ἐν πόλει τοῖς

of clear daylight: that they will no longer be absorbed in the sensible world or in passing phenomena, but will become familiar with the unchangeable Ideas or Forms of the intelligible world, knowable only by intellectual intuition. Reason has with them been exalted to its highest power: not only strengthening them to surmount all intellectual difficulties and to deal with the most complicated conjunctures of practice—but also ennobling their dispositions, so as to overcome all the disturbing temptations and narrow misguiding prejudices inherent in the unregenerate man. Upon the perfection of character, emotional and intellectual, imparted to these few philosophers, depends the Platonic Commonwealth.

The remarks made by Plato on the effect of this preparatory curriculum, and on the various studies composing it, are highly interesting and instructive—even when they cannot be defended as exact. Much of what he so eloquently enuntiates respecting philosophy and the philosophical character, is in fact just and profound, whatever view we may take as to Universals; whether we regard them (like Plato) as the only Real Entia, cognizable by the mental eye, and radically disparate from particulars—or whether we hold them to be only general Concepts, abstracted and generalised more or less exactly from particulars. The remarks made by Plato on the educational effect produced by Arithmetic and the other studies, are valuable and suggestive. Even the discredit which he throws on observations of fact, in Astronomy and Acoustics—the great antithesis between him and modern times—is useful as enabling us to enter into his point of view.<sup>r</sup>

Valuable remarks on the effects of these preparatory studies.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Rep. vii. p. 529 C D.

The manner in which Plato here depreciates astronomical observation is not easily reconcileable with his doctrine in the *Timæus*. He there tells us that the rotations of the *Nous* (intellective soul) in the interior of the human cranium, are cognate or analogous to those of the cosmical spheres, but more confused and less perfect: our eyesight being expressly intended for the purpose, that we might contemplate the perfect and unerring rotations of the cosmical spheres, so as to correct thereby the disturbed rota-

tions in our own brain (*Timæus*, pp. 46-47).

Malebranche shares the feeling of Plato on the subject of astronomical observation. *Recherche de la Vérité* lib. iv. a. iii. vol. ii. p. 219, ed. 1772.

“Car enfin qu’y a-t-il de grand dans la connoissance des mouvemens des planètes? et n’en savons nous pas assez présentement pour régler nos mois et nos années? Qu’avons nous tant à faire de savoir, si Saturne est environné d’un anneau ou d’un grand nombre de petites lunes, et pourquoi prendre parti là-dessus? Pourquoi se

But his point of view in the Republic differs materially from that which we read in other dialogues: especially in two ways.

Differences between the Republic and other dialogues—no mention of reminiscence, nor of the Elenchus.

First, The scientific and long-continued Quadrivium, through which Plato here conducts the student to philosophy, is very different from the road to philosophy as indicated elsewhere. Nothing is here said about reminiscence—which, in the Menon, Phædon, Phædrus, and elsewhere, stands in the foreground of his theory, as the engine for reviving in the mind Forms or Ideas. With these Forms it had been familiar during a prior state of existence, but they had become buried under the sensible impressions arising from its conjunction with the body. Nor do we find in the Republic any mention of that electric shock of the negative Elenchus, which (in the Theætétus, Sophistès, and several other dialogues) is declared indispensable for stirring up the natural mind not merely from ignorance and torpor, but even from a state positively distempered—the false persuasion of knowledge.

Different

the Republic about Dialectic—and different place assigned to it.

Secondly, following out this last observation, we perceive another discrepancy yet more striking, in the directions given by Plato respecting the study of Dialectic. He prescribes that it shall upon no account be taught to young men: and that it shall come last of all in teaching, only after the full preceding Quadrivium.

He censures severely the prevalent practice of applying it to young men, as pregnant with mischief. Young men (he says) brought up in certain opinions inculcated by the lawgiver, as to what is just and honourable, are interrogated on these subjects, and have questions put to them. When asked What is the just and the honourable, they reply in the manner which they have learnt from authority: but this reply, being exposed to farther interrogatories, is shown to be untenable and inconsistent, such as they cannot defend to their own satisfaction. Hence they lose all respect for the established ethical creed,

glorifier d'avoir prédit la grandeur d'une éclipse, où l'on a peut-être mieux rencontré qu'un autre, parce qu'on a été plus heureux? Il y a des personnes

observer les astres; contentons nous de leurs observations. Nous devons être pleinement satisfaits sur une matière qui nous touche si peu, lorsqu'ils nous font partie de leurs découvertes."

which however stands opposed in their minds to the seductions of immediate enjoyment: yet they acquire no new or better conviction in its place. Instead of following an established law, they thus come to live without any law.<sup>a</sup> Besides, young men when initiated in dialectic debate, take great delight in the process, as a means of exposing and puzzling the respondent. Copying the skilful interrogators whom they have found themselves unable to answer, they interrogate others in their turn, dispute everything, and pride themselves on exhibiting all the negative force of the Elenchus. Instead of employing dialectic debate for the discovery of truth, they use it merely as a disputatious pastime, and thus bring themselves as well as philosophy into discredit.<sup>t</sup>

Accordingly, we must not admit (says Plato) either young men, or men of ordinary untrained minds, to dialectic debate. We must admit none but mature persons, of sedate disposition, properly prepared: who will employ it not for mere disputation, but for the investigation of truth.<sup>u</sup>

Now the doctrine thus proclaimed, with the grounds upon which it rests—That dialectic debate is unsuitable and prejudicial to young men—distinctly contradicts both the principles laid down by himself elsewhere, and the frequent indications of his own dialogues: not to mention the practice of Sokrates as described by Xenophon. In the Platonic Parmenidēs and Theætētus, the season of youth is expressly pronounced to be that in which dialectic exercise is not merely appropriate, but indispensable to the subsequent attainment of truth.<sup>x</sup> Moreover, Plato puts into the mouth of

Contradiction with the spirit of other dialogues—Parmenidēs, &c.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 538-539. ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ἔλθον ἐρώτημα, τί ἐστὶ τὸ καλὸν, καὶ ἀποκρινάμενος δὲ τοῦ νομοθετοῦ ἤκουεν ἐξελεγχῆ λόγους, καὶ πολλάκις καὶ πολλαχῇ οὐκ εἰς δόξαν καταβαλὼν ὡς τοῦτο μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, καὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀδίκου, καὶ ἀνὴρ ἐν τιμῇ, &c.

Plato, Republ. vii. p. 539 B.

Plato, Republ. vii. p. 539 D.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Parmenidēs, pp. 135 D, 137 B. Theætēt. 146 A.

Proklus, in his Commentary on the Parmenidēs (p. 778, Stallbaum), adverts to the passage of the Republic here discussed, and endeavours to show

that it is not inconsistent with the Parmenidēs. He states that the exhortation to practise dialectic debate in youth, as the appropriate season, must be understood as specially and exclusively addressed to a youth of the extraordinary mental qualities of Sokrates; while the passage in the Republic applies the prohibition only to the general regiment of Guardians. But this justification is noway satisfactory; for Plato in the Republic makes no exception in favour of the most promising Guardians. He lays down the position generally. Again, in the Parmenidēs, we find the encouragement to dialectic debate ad-

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Parmenides a specimen intentionally given to represent that dialectic exercise which will be profitable to youth. The specimen is one full of perplexing, though ingenious, subtleties: ending in establishing, by different trains of reasoning, the affirmative, as well as the negative, of several distinct conclusions. Not only it supplies no new positive certainty, but it appears to render any such consummation more distant and less attainable than ever.<sup>7</sup> It is therefore eminently open to the censure which Plato pronounces, in the passage just cited from his Republic, against dialectic as addressed to young men. The like remark may be made upon the numerous other dialogues (though less extreme in negative subtlety than the Parmenidês), wherein the Platonic Sokrates interrogates youths (or interrogates others, in the presence of youths) without any positive result: as in the Theætêtus, Charmidês, Lysis, Alkibiadês, Hippias, &c., to which we may add the conversations of the Xenophontic Sokrates with Euthydemus and others.<sup>8</sup>

In fact, the Platonic Sokrates expressly proclaims himself (in the Apology as well as in the other dialogues just named) to be ignorant and incapable of teaching anything. His mission was to expose the ignorance of those, who fancy that they know without really knowing: he taught no one anything, but he cross-examined every one who would submit to it, before all the world, and in a manner especially interesting to young men. Sokrates mentions that these young men not only listened with delight, but tried to imitate him as well as they could, by cross-examining others in the same manner:<sup>a</sup> and in mentioning the fact, he expresses neither censure nor regret, but satisfaction in the thought that the chance would be thereby increased, of exposing that false persuasion of knowledge which prevailed so widely everywhere. Now Plato, in the passage just cited

dressed not merely to the youthful Sokrates, but to the youthful Aristoteles (p. 137 B). Moreover, we are not to imagine that all the youths who are introduced as respondents in the Platonic dialogues are implied as equal to Sokrates himself, though they are naturally represented as superior and promising subjects. Compare Plato, Sophistês, p. 217 E; Politikus, p. 257 E.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Parmenid. p. 166 ad fin. εἰρησθω τοῖνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς εἰκεν, ἐν εἴ᾽ ἔστιν, εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πάντα πάντως ἔστι τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται. Ἀληθέστατα.

<sup>a</sup> Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23 D, c. 22, p. 33 C, c. 27, p. 37 E, c. 30, p. 39 C.

from the Republic, blames this contagious spirit of cross-examination on the part of young men, as a vice which proved the mischief of dialectic debate addressed to them at that age. He farther deprecates the disturbance of "those opinions which they have heard from the lawgiver respecting what is just and honourable." But it is precisely these opinions which, in the *Alkibiadès*, *Menon*, *Protagoras*, and other dialogues, the Platonic Sokrates treats as untaught, if not unteachable:—as having been acquired, no man knew how, without the lessons of any assignable master and without any known period of study:—lastly, as constituting that very illusion of false knowledge without real knowledge, of which Sokrates undertakes to purge the youthful mind, and which must be dispelled before any improvement can be effected in it.<sup>b</sup>

We thus see, that the dictum forbidding dialectic debate with youth—cited from the seventh book of the Republic, which Plato there puts into the mouth of Sokrates—is decidedly anti-Socratic; and anti-Platonic, in so far as Plato represents Sokrates. It belongs indeed to the case of *Melétus* and *Anytus*, in their indictment against Sokrates before the Athenian dikastery. It is identical with their charge against him, of corrupting youth, and inducing them to fancy themselves superior to the authority of established customs and opinions heard from their elders.<sup>c</sup> Now the Platonic Sokrates is here made to declare explicitly, that dialectic debate addressed to youth does really tend to produce this effect:—to render them lawless, immoral, disputatious. And when we find him forbidding all such discourse at an earlier age than thirty years—we remark as a singular coincidence, that this is the exact prohibition which *Kritias* and *Charikles* actually imposed upon Sokrates himself, during the shortlived dominion of the Thirty Oligarchs at Athens.<sup>d</sup>

The matter to which I here advert, illustrates a material

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Sophist*. p. 230.

<sup>c</sup> Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2, 19-49. Compare Aristophanes, *Nubes*, 1042-1382.

<sup>d</sup> Xenophon. *Memorab.* i. 2, 33-38.

Isokrates complains that youthful students took more delight in disputa-

tion than he thought suitable; nevertheless he declares that youth, and not mature age, is the proper season for such exercises, as well as for Geometry and Astronomy (*Orat.* xii. *Panathen.* s. 29-31, p. 239).

The remarks here made upon the effect of Dialectic upon youth coincide with the accusation of *Melétus* against Sokrates.

distinction between some writings of Plato as compared with others, and between different points of view which his mind took on at different times. In the Platonic Apology, we find Sokrates confessing his own ignorance, and proclaiming himself to be isolated among an uncongenial public falsely persuaded of their own knowledge. In several other dialogues, he is the same: he cannot teach anything, but can only cross-examine, test, and apply the spur to respondents. But the Republic presents him in a new character. He is no longer a dissenter amidst a community of fixed, inherited, convictions.<sup>e</sup> He is himself in the throne of King Nomos: the infallible authority, temporal as well as spiritual, from whom all public sentiment emanates, and by whom orthodoxy is determined. Hence we now find him passing to the opposite pole; taking up the orthodox, conservative, point of view, the same as Melêtus and Anytus maintained in their accusation against Sokrates at Athens. He now expects every individual to fall into the place, and contract the opinions, prescribed by authority; including among those opinions deliberate ethical and political fictions, such as that about the gold and silver earthborn men. Free-thinking minds, who take views of their own, and enquire into the evidence of these beliefs, become inconvenient and dangerous. Neither the Sokrates of the Platonic Apology, nor his negative Dialectic, could be allowed to exist in the Platonic Republic.

One word more must be said respecting a subject which figures conspicuously in the Republic—the Idea or Form of Good. The chiefs alone (we read) at the end of their long term of study, having ascended gradually from the phenomena of sense to intellectual contemplation and familiarity with the unchangeable Ideas—will come to discern and embrace the highest of all Ideas—the Form of Good:<sup>f</sup> by the help of which alone, Justice, Temperance, and the other virtues, become useful and profitable.<sup>g</sup> If the Archons do not know how and why just and honourable things are good, they will not be fit

Idea of Good  
—The Chiefs  
alone know  
what it is—  
If they did  
not they  
would be un-  
fit for their  
functions.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. p. 541.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Republ. vii. pp. 533-534.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Republ. vi. p. 505 A.

for their duty.<sup>h</sup> In regard to Good (Plato tells us) no man is satisfied with mere appearance. Here every man desires and postulates that which is really good: while as to the just and the honourable, many are satisfied with the appearance, without caring for the reality.<sup>i</sup>

Plato proclaims this Real Good, as distinguished from Apparent Good, to be the paramount and indispensable object of knowledge, without which all other knowledge is useless. It is that which every man divines to exist, yearns for, and does everything with a view to obtain; but which he misses, from not knowing where to seek; missing also along with it that which gives value to other acquisitions.<sup>k</sup> What then is this Real Good—the Noumenon, Idea, or Form of Good?

What is the Good? Plato does not know; but he requires the Chiefs to know it. Without this the Republic would be a

This question is put by Glaukon to Sokrates, with much earnestness, in the dialogue of the Republic. But unfortunately it remains unanswered. Plato declines all categorical reply; though the question is one, as he himself emphatically announces, upon which all the positive consequences of his philosophy turn.<sup>l</sup> He conducts us to the chamber wherein this precious and indispensable secret is locked up, but he has

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 A.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 D.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 A-E.

πράττει,  
τί εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ  
λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ'

τάλλα, διὰ τοῦτο  
τῶν ἄλλων εἴτι ὕφελος ἦν, &c.

<sup>l</sup> Certainly when we see the way in which Plato deals with the ἰδέα ἀγαθοῦ, we cannot exempt him from the criticism which he addresses to others, vi. p. 493 E. ὡς δὲ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ταῦτα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἥδη οὐ

dentem; mirantem Almamunum quævisse, quisnam ille esset? responsum, Aristotelem esse. Quo audit, Chalifam ab eo quævisse, Quidnam Bonum esset? respondisse Aristotelem: Quod sapientiores probarent. Quærenti Chalifæ quid hoc esset? Quod lex divina probat—dixisse. Interroganti porro illi, Quid hoc? Quod omnes probarent—respondisse: *neque alii ultra quæstioni respondere voluisse*. Quo somnio permotum Almamunum à Græcorum imperatore veniam petiisse, ut libri philosophici in ipsius regno quærerentur; hujusque rei gratiâ viros doctos misisse." Ernest Renan, *De Philosophiâ Peripateticâ apud Syros*, commentatio Historica, p. 57; Paris, 1852.

We may illustrate this procedure of Plato by an Oriental fable, cited in an instructive Dissertation of M. Ernest Renan.

"Aristoteles primum sub Almamuno (13-833, A.D.) arabicè factus est. Somniumque effictum à credulis hominibus: vidisse Almamunum in somno virum aspectu venerabili, solio insi-

Among the various remarks which might be made upon this curious dream, one is, that Bonum is always determined as having relation to the appreciative apprehension of some mind—the Wise Men, the Divine Mind, the Mind of the general public. *Bonum* is that which some mind or

no key to open the door. In describing the condition of other men's minds—that they divine a Real Good—*Αὐτὸ-ἀγαθὸν* or Bonum *per se*—do everything in order to obtain it, but puzzle themselves in vain to grasp and determine what it is<sup>m</sup>—he has unconsciously described the condition of his own.

minds conceive and appreciate as such. The word has no meaning except in relation to some apprehending Subject.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Republ.* vi. p. 505 E.

τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' στίλ, &c.

The remarks of Aristotle in impugning the Platonic *ιδέαν ἀγαθοῦ* are very instructive, *Ethic. Nikom.* i. p. 1096-1097; *Ethic. Eudem.* i. p. 1217-1218.

He maintains that there exists nothing corresponding to the word; and that even if it did exist, it would neither be *πρακτὸν* nor *κτητὸν ἀνθρώπου*. Aristotle here looks upon Good as being essentially relative or phenomenal: he understands τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν to mean τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπου- (Eth. Nik. iii. p. 1113, b. 16-32). But he does not uniformly adhere to this meaning.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

## TIMÆUS AND KRITIAS.

THOUGH the Republic of Plato appears as a substantive composition, not including in itself any promise of an intended sequel—yet the Timæus and Kritias are introduced by Plato as constituting a sequel to the Republic. Persons and scheme of the Timæus and Kritias. Timæus the Pythagorean philosopher of Lokri, the Athenian Kritias, and Hermokrates, are now introduced, as having been the listeners while Sokrates was recounting his long conversation of ten Books, first with Thrasymachus, next with Glaukon and Adeimantus. The portion of that conversation, which described the theory of a model commonwealth, is recapitulated in its main characteristics: and Sokrates now claims from the two listeners some requital for the treat which he has afforded to them. He desires to see the citizens, whose training he has described at length, and whom he has brought up to the stage of mature capacity—exhibited by some one else as living, acting, and affording some brilliant evidence of courage and military discipline.<sup>a</sup> Kritias undertakes to satisfy his demand, by recounting a glorious achievement of the ancient citizens of Attica, who had once rescued Europe from an inroad of countless and almost irresistible invaders, pouring in from the vast island of Atlantis in the Western Ocean. This exploit is supposed to have been performed nearly 10,000 years before; and though lost out of the memory of the Athenians themselves, to have been commemorated and still preserved in the more ancient records of Sais in Egypt, and handed down through Solon by a family tradition to Kritias. But it is agreed between Kritias and Timæus,<sup>b</sup> that before the former enters upon his quasi-historical or mythical recital about the invasion from Atlantis, the latter shall deliver an expository discourse, upon

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 20 B.<sup>b</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 27 A.

a subject very different and of far greater magnitude. Unfortunately the narrative promised by Kritias stands before us only as a fragment. There is reason to believe that Plato never completed it.<sup>c</sup> But the discourse assigned to Timæus was finished, and still remains, as a valuable record of ancient philosophy.

For us, modern readers, the Timæus of Plato possesses a species of interest which it did not possess either for the contemporaries of its author, or for the ancient world generally. We read in it a system—at least the sketch of a system—of universal philosophy, the earliest that has come to us in the words of the author himself. Among the many other systems, anterior or simultaneous—those of Thales and the other Ionic philosophers, of Herakleitus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, Demokritus—not one remains to us as it was promulgated by its original author or supporters. We know all of them only in fragments and through the criticisms of others: fragments always scanty—criticisms generally dissentient, often harsh, sometimes unfair, introduced by the critic to illustrate opposing doctrines of his own. Here, however, the Platonic system is made known to us, not in this fragmentary and half-attested form, but in the full exposition which Plato himself deemed sufficient for it. This is a remarkable peculiarity.

Timæus is extolled by Sokrates as combining the character of a statesman with that of a philosopher: as being of distinguished wealth and family in his native city (the Epizephyrian Lokri), where he had exercised the leading political functions:—and as having attained besides, the highest excellence in science, astronomical as well as physical.<sup>d</sup> We know from other sources (though Plato omits to tell us so, according to his usual undefined manner of designating contemporaries) that he was of the Pythagorean school. Much of the exposition assigned to him is founded on Pythagorean principles, though blended by Plato with other

The Timæus is the earliest ancient physical theory, which we possess in the words of its author.

Position and character of the Pythagorean Timæus.

<sup>c</sup> Plutarch, Solon, c. 33.

Another discourse appears to have been contemplated by Plato, to be delivered by Hermokrates after Kritias

had concluded (Plato, Timæus, p. 20 A; Kritias, p. 108). But nothing of this was probably ever composed.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Timæus, pp. 20 A, 27 A.

doctrines, either his own or borrowed elsewhere. Timæus undertakes to requite Sokrates by giving a discourse respecting "The Nature of the Universe;" beginning at the genesis of the Kosmos, and ending with the constitution of man.<sup>e</sup> This is to serve as an historical or mythical introduction to the Platonic Republic recently described; wherein Sokrates had set forth the education and discipline proper for man when located as an inhabitant of the earth. Neither during the exposition of Timæus, nor after it, does Sokrates make any remark. But the commencement of the Kritias (which is evidently intended as a second part or continuation of the Timæus) contains, first, a prayer from Timæus that the Gods will pardon the defects of his preceding discourse and help him to amend them—next an emphatic commendation bestowed by Sokrates upon the discourse: thus supplying that recognition which is not found in the first part.<sup>f</sup>

In this Hymn of the Universe (to use a phrase of the rhetor Menander<sup>g</sup> respecting the Platonic Timæus) the prose of Plato is quite as much the vehicle of poetical imagination as the hexameters of Hesiod, Empedokles, or Parmenides. The Gods and Goddesses, whom Timæus invokes at the commencement,<sup>h</sup> supply him with superhuman revelations, like the Muses to Hesiod, or the Goddess of Wisdom to Parmenides. Plato expressly recognises the multiplicity of different statements current, respecting the Gods and the generation of the Universe. He claims no superior credibility for his own. He professes to give us a new doctrine, not less probable than the numerous dissentient opinions already advanced by others, and more acceptable to his own mind. He bids us be content with such a measure of probability, because the limits of our human nature preclude any fuller approach to certainty.<sup>i</sup> It

Poetical imagination displayed by Plato. He pretends to nothing more than probability. Contrast with Sokrates, Isokrates, Xenophon.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 27 A. ἔδοξε γὰρ ἡμῖν Τίμαιον μὲν, ἅτε ἀστρονομικώτατον ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ φύσεως τοῦ παντὸς εἰδέναι μάλιστα ἔργον.

τῆς

... ἢ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Kritias, p. 108 B.

<sup>g</sup> Menander, De Eucomiis, i. 5, p. 39. Compare Karsten, De Empedoclis

Vitâ, p. 72; De Parmenidis Vitâ, p. 21.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 27 D; Hesiod, heogon, 22-35-105.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Timæus, pp. 29 D, 28 D, 59 C-D, 68 C, 72 D.

<sup>v</sup>, p. In many parts of the dialogue he repeats that he is delivering his *own opinion*—that he is affirming what is probable. In the Phædon, however,

is important to note the modest pretensions here unreservedly announced by Plato as to the conviction and assent of hearers: so different from the confidence manifested in the Republic, where he hires a herald to proclaim his conclusion—and from the overbearing dogmatism which we read in his Treatise De Legibus, where he is providing a catechism for the schooling of citizens, rather than proofs to be sifted by opponents. He delivers, respecting matters which he admits to be unfathomable, the theory most in harmony with his own religious and poetical predispositions, which he declares to be as probable as any other yet proclaimed. The Xenophontic Sokrates, who disapproved all speculation respecting the origin and structure of the Kosmos, would probably have granted this equal probability, and equal absence of any satisfactory grounds of preferential belief—both to Plato on one side and to the opposing theorists on the other. And another intelligent contemporary, Isokrates, would probably have considered the Platonic Timæus as one among the same class of unprofitable extravagancies, to which he assigns the theories of Herakleitus, Empedokles, Alkmæon, Parmenides, and others.<sup>k</sup> Plato himself (in the Sophistēs)<sup>l</sup> characterises the theories of these philosophers as fables recited to an audience

we find that εἰκότες λόγοι are set aside as deceptive and dangerous, Phædon, p. 92 D. In the remarkable passage of the Timæus, p. 48 C-D, Plato intimates that he will not in the present discourse attempt to go to the bottom of the subject—τὴν μὲν περὶ πάντων εἶτε

περί, τὸ νῦν οὐ ρητέον—but that he will confine himself to εἰκότες λόγοι—τὸ δὲ κατ’

λόγων  
πειράσομαι μηδενὸς ἥττον εἰ-  
κότα, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἀπ’  
ἐκείστων καὶ ξυ

What these *principia* are, which Plato here keeps in the background, I do not clearly understand. Susemihl (*Entwicklung der Plat. Phil.* ii. p. 405) and Martin (*Études sur le Timée*, ii. p. 173, note 56) have both given elucidations of this passage, but neither of them appear to me satisfactory. Simplikios says:—Ὁ Πλάτων τὴν

καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης συμμαρτυρεῖ, Schol.

Aristot. Phys. 325, a. 23, Brandis.

<sup>k</sup> Isokrates, De Permutatione, Or. xv. s. 287-288-304. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ τὰς τοιαύτας περιττολογίας εἶναι ταῖς θανατοποιαῖς ταῖς

πε-

is γιγνομένας.

τοὺς δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀναγκαίων ι-  
τας, τὰς δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν σ-  
τεροτολογίας ἀγαπῶντας, φιλοσο

Compare another passage of Isokrates, the opening of Orat. x. Encomium Helenæ; in which latter passage he seems plainly to notice one of the main ethical doctrines advanced by Plato, though he does not mention Plato's name, nor indeed the name of any living person.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Sophist. pp. 242-243. Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος αὐτῶν φαίνεται διηγείσθαι ὡς οὖσαν ἡμῖν ὁ μὲν, ὡς τρία τὰ ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἅττα πρ, τότε δὲ καὶ γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ

of children, without any care to ensure a rational comprehension and assent. *They* would probably have made the like criticism upon his *Timæus*. While he treats it as fable to apply to the Gods the human analogy of generation and parentage—they would have considered it only another variety of fable, to apply to them the equally human analogy of constructive fabrication or mixture of ingredients. The language of *Xenophon* shows that he agreed with his master *Sokrates* in considering such speculations as not merely unprofitable, but impious.<sup>m</sup> And if the mission from the Gods—constituting *Sokrates* Cross-Examiner general against the prevailing fancy of knowledge without the reality of knowledge—drove him to court perpetual controversy with the statesmen, poets, and Sophists of Athens; the same mission would have compelled him, on hearing the sweeping affirmations of *Timæus*, to apply the test of his *Elenchus*, and to appear in his well-known character of confessed<sup>n</sup> but inquisitive ignorance. The Platonic *Timæus* is positively anti-Socratic. It places us at the opposite or dogmatic pole of *Plato's* character.<sup>o</sup>

*Timæus* begins by laying down the capital distinction between—I. Ens or the Existent, the eternal and un-  
changeable, the world of Ideas or Forms, apprehended

Fundamental  
distinction  
between Ens  
and Fientia.

<sup>m</sup> *Xenophon*, *Memorab.* i. 1, 11-14. | *θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον φάμεν οὔτε*

*οὔτε πράττοντος*  
*εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν· οὐδὲ*  
*γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως,*  
*ἡπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι, διελέγετο,*  
*σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλοῦμενος ὑπὸ*

*αἰτίας ἐρευνῶντας· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅσιν*  
*εἶναι· τὸ δ' ἔοικε πᾶν τούτου τοῦναντίον*  
*γιγνόμενον ὁρθῶς ἂν γίγνεσθαι.* This  
last passage is sometimes cited as if  
the word *φάμεν* expressed the opinion  
of the principal speaker, or of *Plato*  
himself—which is a mistake;  
here expresses the opinion which the  
principal speaker is about to con-  
vert.

*ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται*  
*ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας*  
*τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε.*

*Lucretius*, i. 80:—

*Illud in his rebus vereor, ne fortè rearis*  
*Implicare rationis inire elementa, vlamque*  
*Endogredi sceleris, &c.*

The above cited passage of *Xenophon* shows that the term *Κόσμος* was in his time a technical word among philosophers, not yet accepted in that meaning by the general public. The aversion to investigation on the *Kosmos*, on the ground of impiety, entertained by *Sokrates* and *Xenophon*, is expressed by *Plato* in the *Leges* (vii. 821 A) in the following words of the principal speaker,—*τὸν μέγιστον*

<sup>n</sup> See above, vol. i. ch. vii. of the present work, where the Platonic Apology is reviewed.

<sup>o</sup> “*Quocirca Timæus non dialecticè disserens inducitur, sed loquitur ut hierophanta, qui mundi arcana aliunde accepta grandi ac magnificè oratione pronunciat: quin etiam quæ experientiae suspicionem superant, mythorum ac symbolorum involueris obteggit, eoque modo quam ea certa sint, legentibus non obscurè significat.*”—*Stallbaum*, *Prolegg. ad Platon.*—*c. iv. p. 37.*

only by mental conception or Reason, but the object of infallible cognition. 2. The Generated and Perishable—the sensible, phenomenal, material world—which never really exists, but is always appearing and disappearing; apprehended by sense, yet not capable of becoming the object of cognition, nor of anything better than opinion or conjecture. The Kosmos, being a visible and tangible body, belongs to this last category. Accordingly, it can never be really known: no true or incontestable propositions can be affirmed respecting it: you can arrive at nothing higher than opinion and probability.

Plato seems to have had this conviction, respecting the uncertainty of all affirmations about the sensible world or any portions of it, forcibly present to his mind.

He next proceeds to assume or imply, as postulates, his eternal Ideas or Forms—a coeternal chaotic matter or indeterminate Something—and a Demiurgus or Architect to construct, out of this chaos, after contemplation of the Forms, copies of them as good as were practicable in the world of sense. The exposition begins with these postulates. The Demiurgus found all visible matter, not in a state of rest, but in discordant and irregular motion. He brought it out of disorder into order. Being himself good (says Plato), and desiring to make everything else as good as possible, he transformed this chaos into an orderly Kosmos.<sup>p</sup> He planted in its centre a soul spreading round, so as to pervade all its body—and reason in the soul: so that the Kosmos became animated, rational—a God.

The Demiurgus of Plato is not conceived as a Creator,<sup>q</sup> but a Constructor or Artist. He is the God Prometheus, conceived as pre-kosmical, and elevated to primacy of the Gods: instead of being subordinated to Zeus, as depicted by Æschylus and others. He represents provident intelligence or art, and beneficent purpose, contending with a force superior

Postulates of  
Plato. The  
Demiurgus—  
The Eternal  
Ideas—Chao-  
tic Materia

mentum.  
The Kosmos  
is a living  
being and a  
God.

<sup>p</sup>—  
Kosmos

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 29-30.  
<sup>q</sup> "The notion of absolute Creation is unknown to Plato, as it is to all

Grecian and Roman antiquity" (Brandis, *Gesch. der Griech. Röm. Philos.* vol. ii. part 2, p. 306).

and irresistible, so as to improve it as far as it will allow itself to be improved.<sup>1</sup> This pre-existing superior force Plato denominates Necessity—"the erratic, irregular, random, causality," subsisting prior to the intervention of the Demiurgus; who can only work upon it by persuasion, but cannot coerce or subdue it.<sup>2</sup> The genesis of the Kosmos thus results from a combination of intelligent force with the original, primordial Necessity; which was persuaded, and consented, to have its irregular agency regularised up to a certain point, but no farther. Beyond this limit the systematising arrangements of the Demiurgus could not be carried; but all that is good or beautiful in the Kosmos was owing to them.<sup>3</sup>

We ought here to note the sense in which Plato uses the word Necessity. This word is now usually understood as denoting what is fixed, permanent, unalterable, knowable beforehand. In the Platonic *Timæus* it means the very reverse:—the indeterminate, the inconstant, the anomalous, that which can neither be understood nor predicted. It is Force, Movement, or Change, with the negative attribute of not being regular, or intelligible, or determined by any knowable antecedent or condition—*Vis consili expers*. It coincides, in fact, with that which is meant by *Freewill*, in the modern metaphysical argument between Freewill and Necessity: it is the undetermined or self-determining, as

cessity—he  
only per-  
suades.

Meaning of  
Necessity in  
Plato.

<sup>1</sup> The verbs used by Plato to describe the proceedings of the Demiurgus are *ξυνεκταίνετο*, *ξυνεκράδατο* &c., and such like.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 47-48.

δείκται τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα  
δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ δι' ἀνάγκης γιγνόμενα τῷ  
λόγῳ παραθέσθαι. Μεμιγμένη γὰρ οὖν  
ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
τε καὶ νοῦ ἐυστάσεως ἐγενήθη· νοῦ δὲ  
ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν  
τῶν γιγνόμενων τὰ πλείστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλ-  
τιστον ἄγειν, ταύτην κατὰ ταῦτά τε δι'  
ὑπὸ πείθους

οὕτω κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐξίστατο τόδε  
τὸ πᾶν. Εἴ τις οὖν ἡ γέγονε, κατὰ  
ταῦτα ὅπως ἔρει, μικτέον καὶ τὸ τῆς

Compare p. 56 B.

ἀνάγκης πείσει

φύσις ὑπείκει, pp. 68 E, 75 B, 30 A.

δ' ἀνάγκης ἀσθενεστέ

says Prometheus in Æschylus (P.V. 514). He identifies 'Ανάγκη with the Μοῖραι: and we read in Herodotus (i. 91) of Apollo as trying to persuade the Fates to spare Kresus, but obtaining for him only a respite of three years—οὐκ οἶόν τε ἐγένετο παραγαγεῖν μοῖρας, ὅσον δὲ ἐνέδωκαν αὐταί, ἠνύσατο καὶ ἐχαρίσατό οἱ. This is the language used by Plato about 'Ανάγκη and the Demiurgus. A valuable exposition of the relations believed to subsist between the Gods and Μοῖρα is to be found in Naegelsbach, *Homerische Theologie* (chap. iii. pp. 113-131).

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch reproduces this theory (Phokion, c. 2) of God governing the Kosmos, not by superior force, but by reason and persuasion—ἢ καὶ τὸν μόνον ὁ θεὸς λέγεται διοικεῖν, οὐ βίβητοι καὶ λόγῳ παράγων

contrasted with that which depends upon some given determining conditions, known or knowable. The Platonic Necessity<sup>u</sup> is identical with the primeval Chaos, recognised in the Theogony or Kosmogony of Hesiod. That poet tells us that Chaos was the primordial Something: and that afterwards came Gæa, Eros, Uranus, Nyx, Erebus, &c., who intermarried, males with females, and thus gave birth to numerous divine persons or kosmical agents—each with more or less of definite character and attributes. By these supervening agencies, the primeval Chaos was modified and regulated, to a greater or less extent. The Platonic Timæus starts in the same manner as Hesiod, from an original Chaos. But then he assumes also, as coæval with it, but apart from it, his eternal Forms or Ideas: while, in order to obtain his kosmical agents, he does not have recourse, like Hesiod, to the analogy of intermarriages and births, but employs another analogy equally human and equally borrowed from experience—that of a Demiurgus or constructive professional artist, architect, or carpenter; who works upon the model of these Forms, and introduces regular constructions into the Chaos. The antithesis present to the mind of Plato is that between disorder or absence of order, announced as Necessity,—and order or regularity, represented by the Ideas.<sup>v</sup> As the mediator between these two primeval opposites, Plato assumes Nous, or Reason, or artistic skill personified in his Demiurgus: whom he calls essentially good—meaning thereby that he is the regularising agent by whom order, method, and symmetry, are copied from the Ideas and partially realised among the intractable data of Necessity. Good is something which Plato in other works often talks about, but never determines: his language implies sometimes that he knows what it is, sometimes that he does not know. But so far as we

<sup>u</sup> In the Symposium (pp. 195 D, 197 B) we find Eros panegyrised as having amended and mollified the primeval empire of Ἀνάγκη.

The Scholiast on Hesiod, Theogon. 119, gives a curious metaphysical explanation of Eros, mentioned in the Hesiodic text—τήν

ἢν αἰτίαν ἐκάστω  
καθ' ἣν ἐφίεται ἕκαστος

εἶναι.

<sup>v</sup> In the Philæbus, p. 23 C D, these three are recognised under the terms:

1. Πέρας. 2. Ἀπειρον. 3. Αἰτία  
τῆς ξυμμίξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν.

Compare a curious passage of Plutarch, Symposiacon. viii. 2, p. 719 E, illustrating the Platonic phrase—τὸν θεὸν αἰεὶ γεωμετρῶν.

can understand him, it means order, regularity, symmetry, proportion—by consequence, what is ascertainable and predictable.\* I will not say that Plato means this always and exclusively, by Good: but he seems to mean so in the *Timæus*. Evil is the reverse. Good or regularity is associated in his mind exclusively with rational agency. It can be produced, he assumes, only by a reason, or by some personal agent analogous to a reasonable and intelligent man. Whatever is not so produced, must be irregular or bad.

These are the fundamental ideas which Plato expands into a detailed Kosmology. The first application which he makes of them is, to construct the total Kosmos. The total is here the logical Prius, or anterior to the parts in his order of conception. The Kosmos is one vast and comprehensive animal: just as in physiological description, the leading or central idea is, that of the animal organism as a whole, to which each and all the parts are referred. The Kosmos is constructed by the Demiurgus according to the model of the *Αὐτοζῶον*,†—(the Form or Idea of Animal—the eternal Generic or Self-Animal,)—which comprehends in itself the subordinate specific Ideas of different sorts of animals. This Generic Idea of Animal comprehended four of such specific Ideas: 1. The celestial race of animals, or Gods, who occupied the heavens: 2. Men. 3. Animals living in air—Birds. 4. Animals living on land or in water.‡ In order that the Kosmos might approach near to its model the Self-animal, it was required to contain all these four species. As there was but one Self-Animal, so there could only be one Kosmos.

We see thus, that the primary and dominant idea, in Plato's mind, is, not that of inorganic matter, but that of organised and animated matter—life or soul embodied. With him, biology comes before physics.

The body of the Kosmos was required to be both visible

\* Plato, *Timæus*, p. 30 A. Compare the *Republic*, vi. p. 506, *Philēbus*, pp. 65-66, and the investigation in the *Euthydēmus*, pp. 279-293, which ends

οὐν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας τῷ δ' ἔ-  
οιαι τε ἐνεῖσι καὶ ὄσαι, καθορᾷ,  
καὶ τοσαύτας διανοήθη δεῖν καὶ  
Εἰσι δὲ τέτταρες, μία

† Plato, *Timæus*, p. 30 D.

‡ Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 39-40.

καὶ

and tangible: it could not be visible without fire: it could not be tangible without something solid, nor solid without earth. But two things cannot be well put together by themselves, without a third to serve as a bond of connection: and that is the best bond which makes them One as much as possible. Geometrical proportion best accomplishes this object. But as both Fire and Earth were solids and not planes, no one mean proportional could be found between them. Two mean proportionals were necessary. Hence the Demiurgus interposed air and water, in such manner, that as fire is to air, so is air to water: and as air is to water, so is water to earth.<sup>a</sup> Thus the four elements, composing the body of the Kosmos, were bound together in unity and friendship. Of each of the four, the entire total was used up in the con-

\* Plato, Tim. pp. 31-32. The comment of Macrobius on this passage (Somn. Scip. i. 6, p. 30) is interesting, if not conclusive. But the language in which Plato lays down this doctrine about mean proportionals is not precise and has occasioned much difference of opinion among commentators. Between two solids (he says) (that is, solid numbers, or numbers generated out of the product of three factors) no one mean proportional can be found. This is not universally true. The different suggestions of critics to clear up this difficulty will be found set forth in the elaborate note of M. Martin (Études sur le Timée, vol. i. note xx. pp. 337-345), who has given what seems a probable explanation. Plato (he supposes) is speaking only of prime numbers and their products. In the language of ancient arithmeticians *linear numbers*, *par excellence* or properly so-called, were the prime numbers, measurable by unity only; *plane numbers* were the products of two such linear numbers or prime numbers; *solid numbers* were the products of three such. Understanding solid numbers in this restricted sense, it will be perfectly true that between any two of them you can never find *any one* solid number or any whole number which shall be a mean proportional, but you can always find *two* solid numbers which shall be mean proportionals. One mean proportional will never be sufficient. On the contrary, one mean proportional will be

sufficient between two plane numbers (in the restricted sense) when these numbers are squares, though not if they are not squares. It is therefore true, that in the case of two *solid* numbers (so understood) one such mean proportional will never be sufficient, while two can always be found; and that between two *plane* numbers (so understood) one such mean proportional will in certain cases be sufficient and may be found. This is what is present to Plato's mind, though in enunciating it he does not declare the restriction under which alone it is true. M. Boeckh (Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon, p. 17) approves of Martin's explanation. At the same time M. Martin has given no proof that Plato had in his mind the distinction between prime numbers and other numbers, for his references in p. 338 do not prove this point; moreover, the explanation assumes such very loose expression, that the phrase of M. Cousin in his note (p. 334) is, after all, perfectly just:—"Platon n'a pas songé à donner à sa phrase une rigueur mathématique:" and the more simple explanation of M. Cousin (though Martin rejects it as unworthy) may perhaps include all that is really intended. "Si deux surfaces peuvent être unies par un seul terme intermédiaire, il faudra deux termes intermédiaires pour unir deux solides; et l'union sera encore plus parfaite si la raison des deux proportions est la même."

struction: so that there remained nothing of them apart, to hurt the Kosmos from without, nor anything as raw material for a second Kosmos.<sup>b</sup>

The Kosmos was constructed as a perfect sphere, rounded, because that figure both comprehends all other figures, and is, at the same time, the most perfect, and most like to itself.<sup>c</sup> The Demiurgus made it perfectly smooth on the outside, for various reasons.<sup>d</sup> First, it stood in no need of either eyes or ears, because there was nothing outside to be seen or heard. Next, it did not want organs of respiration, inasmuch as there was no outside air to be breathed:—nor nutritive and excrementory organs, because its own decay supplied it with nourishment, so that it was self-sufficing, being constructed as its own agent and its own patient.<sup>e</sup> Moreover the Demiurgus did not furnish it with hands, because there was nothing for it either to grasp or repel—nor with legs, feet, or means of standing, because he assigned to it only one of the seven possible varieties of movement.<sup>f</sup> He gave to it no other movement except that of rotation in a circle, in one and the same place: which is the sort of movement that belongs most to reason and intelligence, while it is impracticable to all other figures except the spherical.<sup>g</sup>

The Kosmos, one and only-begotten, was thus perfect as to

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 32 E.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 33 B. κυκλο-  
ο, &c.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 33 D. λεῖον δὲ  
κύκλῳ πᾶν ἔξωθεν αὐτὸ ἀπηκριβοῦτο,

Aristotle also maintains that the sphericity of the Kosmos is so exact that no piece of workmanship can make approach to it, *De Cælo*, ii. p. 287, b. 15.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 33 E. On this point the Platonic *Timæus* is not Pythagorean, but the reverse. The Pythagoreans recognised extraneous to the Kosmos, τὸ ἀπειρον πνεῦμα or τὸ κενόν. The Kosmos was supposed to inhale this vacuum, which penetrating into the interior, formed the separating interstices between its constituent parts (*Aristotel. Physic.* iv. p. 213, b. 22).

<sup>f</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 34 A. ἐπὶ  
τὴν περιόδον ταύτην, ἅτ' οὐδὲν

δεόν, ἀσκελὲς καὶ ἄπουν αὐτὸ ἐγέν-  
νησεν.

Plato reckons six varieties of rectilinear motion, neither of which was assigned to the Kosmos—forward, backward, upward, downward, to the right, to the left.

<sup>g</sup> Plat. *Tim.* p. 34 A. κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκίαν, τῶν ἑπτα τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὔσαν. This predicate respecting circular motion belongs to Plato and not to Aristotle; but Aristotle makes out, in his own way, a strong case to show that circular motion *must belong* to the Πρῶτον σῶμα, as being the first among all varieties of motion, the most dignified and privileged, the only one which can be for ever uniform and continuous. *Aristot. Physic.* ix. p. 205, a. 15; *De Cælo*, i. pp. 209-270, ii. p. 284, a. 10.

its body, including all existent bodily material,—smooth, even, round, and equidistant from its centre to all points of circumference.<sup>b</sup> The Demiurgus put together at the same time its soul or mind; which he planted in the centre and stretched throughout its body in every direction,—so as not only to reach the circumference, but also to enclose and wrap it round externally. The soul, being intended to guide and govern the body, was formed of appropriate ingredients, three distinct ingredients mixed together: 1. The Same—The Identical—The indivisible, and unchangeable essence of Ideas. 2. The Different—The Plural—The divisible essence of bodies or of the elements. 3. A third compound, formed of both these ingredients melted into one.—These three ingredients—Same, Different, Same and Different in one,—were blended together in one compound, to form the soul of the Kosmos: though the Different was found intractable and hard to conciliate.<sup>i</sup> The mixture was divided, and the portions blended together, according to a scale of harmonic numerical proportion complicated and difficult to follow.<sup>k</sup> The soul of the Kosmos was thus harmonically constituted. Among its constituent elements, the Same, or Identity, is placed in an even and undivided rotation of the outer or sidereal sphere of the Kosmos,—while the Different, or Diversity, is distributed among the rotations, all oblique, of the seven interior or planetary spheres—that is, the five planets, Sun, and Moon. The outer sphere revolved towards the right: the interior spheres in an opposite direction towards the left. The rotatory

Plat. Tim. p. 31 A.

ἡς οὐρανός, &c.

<sup>i</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 35 A.

—θάτερον — τὸ

τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίας εἶδος.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Timæus, pp. 35-36. The pains which were taken by commentators in antiquity to expound and interpret this numerical scale may be seen especially illustrated in Plutarch's Treatise, *De Animæ Procreatione* in Timæo, pp. 1012-1030, and the Epitome which follows it. There were two fundamental τετρακτίες or quaternions, one on a binary, the other on a ternary scale of progression, which

were arranged by Krantor (Plutarch, p. 1027 E) in the form of the letter A, as given in Macrobius (Somn. Scrip. i. 6, p. 35). The in-

tervals between these figures are described by Plato as filled up by intervening harmonic fractions, so as to constitute an harmonic or musical diagram or scale of four octaves and a major sixth, Boeckh's *Untersuch. p. 19*. M. Boeckh has expounded this at length in his *Dissert. Ueber die Bildung der Welt-Seele im Timæos*. Other expositors after him.

force of the Same (of the outer Sphere) being not only one and undivided, but connected with and dependant upon the solid revolving axis which traverses the diameter of the Kosmos—is far greater than that of the divided spheres of the Different; which, while striving to revolve in an opposite direction, each by a movement of its own—are overpowered and carried along with the outer sphere, though the time of revolution, in the case of each, is more or less modified by its own inherent counter-moving force.<sup>1</sup>

In regard to the constitution of the kosmical soul, we must note, that as it is intended to know Same, Different, and Same and Different in one—so it must embody these three ingredients in its own nature: according to the received axiom. Like knows like—Like is known by like.<sup>m</sup> Thus began, never to end, the rotatory movements of the living Kosmos or great kosmical God. The invisible soul of the Kosmos, rooted at its centre and stretching from thence so as to pervade and enclose its visible body, circulates and communicates, though without voice or sound, throughout its own entire range, every impression of identity and of difference which it encounters either from essence ideal and indivisible, or from that which is sensible and divisible. Information is thus circulated, about the existing relations between all the separate parts and specialties.<sup>n</sup> Reason and Science are propagated by the circle of The Same: Sense and Opinion, by those of the Different. When these last-mentioned Circles are in right movement, the opinions circulated are true and trustworthy.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 36 C.

ταύτου φύσεως, τὴν δ' ἐντός, τῆς  
βατέρου. τὴν μὲν δὲ ταύτου κατὰ

βατέρου κατὰ διάμετρον ἐπ'

For the meaning of κατὰ and κατὰ διάμετρον, referring to the equator and the ecliptic, see the explanation and diagram in Boeckh, *Untersuchungen*, p. 25, also in the note of Stallbaum. The allusion in Plato to the letter χι is hardly intelligible without both a commentary and a diagram.

<sup>m</sup> Aristotel. *De Animâ*, i. 2, 7, i. 3,

11, (pp. 404, b. 16-406 b. 26) with Trendelenburg's note, pp. 227-253; Stallbaum, not. ad *Timæum*, pp. 136-157. See also the interpretation of Plato's opinion by Krantor, as given in Plutarch, *De Animæ Procreatione* in *Timæo*, p. 1012 E. We learn from Plutarch, however, that the passage gave much trouble to commentators.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 36-37.

διὰ πάσης ἐαυτῆς, ὅτι τ' ἂν  
τι ταῦτ' ἦ, καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον, πρὸς  
δ, τι τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅπρ καὶ ὅπως καὶ  
κατὰ τὰ  
ἐκαστὰ εἶναι καὶ  
πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταῦτα

With the rotations of the Kosmos, began the course of Time—years, months, days, &c. Anterior to the Kosmos, there was no time: no past, present, and future: no numerable or mensurable motion or change. The Ideas are eternal essences, without fluctuation or change: existing *sub specie æternitatis*, and having only a perpetual present, but no past or future.<sup>o</sup> Along with them subsisted only the disorderly, immeasurable, movements of Chaos. The nearest approach which the Demiurgus could make in copying these Ideas, was, by assigning to the Kosmos an eternal and unchanging motion, marked and measured by the varying position of the heavenly bodies. For this purpose, the sun, moon, and planets, were distributed among the various portions of the circle of Different: while the fixed stars were placed in the Circle of the Same, or the outer Circle, revolving in one uniform rotation and in unaltered position in regard to each other. The interval of one day was marked by one revolution of this outer or most rational Circle:<sup>p</sup> that of one month, by a revolution of the moon: that of one year, by a revolution of the sun. Among all these sidereal and planetary Gods the Earth was the first and oldest. It was packed close round the great axis which traversed the

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 37-38. Lassalle, in his copious and elaborate explanation of the doctrine of Hera-  
kleitus (*Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunkeln*, Berlin, 1858, vol. ii. p. 210, s. 26), represents this doctrine of Plato respecting Time as “durch und durch heraklitisch.” To me it seems quite distinct from, or rather the inversion of, that which Lassalle himself sets down as the doctrine of Hera-  
kleitus. Plato begins with τὸ αἰώνιον or αἰώνιον, an eternal sameness or duration, without succession, change, generation or destruction,—this passes into perpetual succession or change, with frequent generation and destruction. Hera-  
kleitus, on the other hand,

The ideal λόγος or law of Hera-  
kleitus is that of unremitting process, flux, revolution, implication of Ens with Non-Ens: the real world is an imperfect manifestation of this law, because each particular clings to existence, and thereby causes temporary halts in the process. Now Plato’s starting point is τὸ αἰώνιον τὸ ἀει-  
ώσαυτως ἔχον τὸ ὄντως ὄν: the perish-  
able world of sense and particulars is the world of process, and is so far degenerate from the eternal uniformity of primordial Ens. See Lassalle, pp. 39-292-319.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 39 B. ἡ τῆς μίας καὶ φρονιμωτάτης κυκλήσεως περί-  
δος. Plato remarks that there was a particular interval of time measured  
and designated by the revolution

state, in which there is temporary duration and sameness of particulars—the flux being interrupted. un-  
kind.

centre of the Kosmos, by the turning of which axis the outer circle of the Kosmos was made to revolve, generating night and day. The Earth regulated the movement of this great kosmical axis, and thus became the determining agent and guarantee of night and day.<sup>9</sup>

It remained for the Demiurgus,—in order that the Kosmos might become a full copy of its model the Generic Animal or Idea of Animal,—to introduce into it those various species of animals which that Idea contained. He first peopled it with Gods: the eldest and earliest of whom was the Earth, planted in the centre as sentinel over night and day: next the fixed stars, formed for the most part of fire, and annexed to the circle of the Same or the exterior circle, so as to impart to it light and brilliancy. Each star was of spherical figure and had two motions,—one, of uniform rotation peculiar to itself,—the other, an uniform forward movement of translation, being carried along with the great outer circle in its general rotation round the axis of the Kosmos.<sup>r</sup> It is thus that the sidereal orbs, animated beings eternal and divine, remained constantly turning round in the same relative position: while the sun, moon, and planets, belonging to the inner circles of the Different, and trying to revolve by their own effort in the opposite direction to the outer sphere, be-

Divine tenants of the Kosmos. Primary and Visible Gods — Stars and Heavenly Bodies.

<sup>9</sup> My explanation of this much controverted sentence differs from that of previous commentators. I have given reasons for adopting it in a separate Dissertation ('Plato and the Rotation of the Earth,' Murray), to which I here refer. In that Dissertation I endeavoured to show cause for dissenting from the inference of M. Boeckh; who contends that Plato cannot have believed in the diurnal rotation of the Earth, because he (Plato) explicitly affirms the diurnal rotation of the outer celestial sphere, or Aplanes. These two facts nullify each other, so that the effect would be the same as if there were no rotation of either. My reply to this argument was, in substance, that though the two facts really are inconsistent—the one excluding the other—yet we cannot safely conclude that Plato must

have perceived the inconsistency; the more so as Aristotle certainly did not perceive it. To hold incompatible doctrines without being aware of the incompatibility, is a state of mind sufficiently common even in the present advanced condition of science, which I could illustrate by many curious examples if my space allowed. It must have been much more common in the age of Plato than it is now.

Batteux observes (*Traduction et Remarques sur Ocellus Lucanus*, ch. iv. p. 116):—"Il y a un maxime qu'on ne doit jamais perdre de vue en discutant les opinions des Anciens: c'est de ne point leur prêter les conséquences de leurs principes, ni les principes de leurs conséquences."

As a general rule, I subscribe to the soundness of this admonition.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 40.

came irregular in their own velocities and variable in their relative positions.<sup>a</sup> The complicated movements of these planetary bodies, alternately approaching and receding—together with their occultations and reappearances, full of alarming prognostic as to consequences—cannot be described without having at hand some diagrams or mechanical illustrations to refer to.<sup>t</sup>

Such were all the primitive Gods visible and generated<sup>u</sup> by the Demiurgus, to preside over and regulate the Kosmos. By them are generated, and from them are descended, the remaining Gods.

Respecting these remaining Gods, however, the Platonic Timæus holds a different language. Instead of speaking in his own name and delivering his own convictions, as he had done about the Demiurgus and the kosmical Gods—with the simple reservation, that such convictions could be proclaimed only as probable and not as demonstratively certain—he now descends to the Sokratic platform of confessed ignorance and incapacity. “The generation of these remaining Gods” (he says) “is a matter too great for me to understand and declare. I must trust to those who have spoken upon the subject before me—who were, as they themselves said, offspring of the Gods, and must therefore have well known their own fathers. It is impossible to mistrust the sons of the Gods. Their statements indeed are unsupported either by probabilities or by necessary demonstration; but since they here profess to be declaring family traditions, we must obey the law and believe.<sup>x</sup> Thus then let it stand

Secondary and generated Gods—Plato's dictum respecting them. His acquiescence in tradition.

Plato, Timæus, p. 40 C. ὅς' ἡ τῶν ἀστρῶν ζῶα θεῖα ὄντα καὶ ἀσ.

Plato, Timæus, p. 40 D. τὸ λέγειν ὑ διόφως τούτων αὐ τῶν μιμημάτων, μάταιος ἂν εἴη πόνος. Plato himself here acknowledges the necessity of diagrams: the necessity was hardly less in the preceding part of his exposition.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Timæ. p. 40 D. θεῶν ὄρα- τῶν

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Timæus, pp. 40-41.

τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν καὶ γινῶ- ναι τὴν γένεσιν μείζον ἢ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ δὲ τοῖς  
μὲν θεῶν οὖσιν, σαφῶς δὲ πού

τούς γε αὐτῶν προγόνους ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παῖσιν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἄνευ τε εἰ- κότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδεί-

ίσκουσιν ἀπαγγέλλειν, ἐπο- μένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον. Οὕτως οὖν κατ' ἐκείνους ἡμῖν ἡ περὶ τούτων τῶν θεῶν

So, too, in the Platonic Epinomis, attached as an appendix to the Treatise De Legibus, we find (p. 984) Plato—after arranging his quintuple scale of elemental animals (fire, æther, air, water, earth), the highest and most divine, being the stars or visible Gods,

and be proclaimed, upon their authority, respecting the generation of the remaining Gods. The offspring of Uranus and Gæa were, Okeanus and Tethys: from whom sprang Phorkys, Kronus, Rhea, and those along with them. Kronos and Rhea had for offspring Zeus, Hêrê, and all those who are termed their brethren: from whom too, besides, we hear of other offspring. Thus were generated all the Gods, both those who always conspicuously revolve, and those who show themselves only when they please.”<sup>y</sup>

The passage above cited serves to illustrate both Plato's own canon of belief, and his position in regard to his countrymen. The question here is, about the Gods of tradition and of the popular faith: with the paternity and filiation ascribed to them, by Hesiod and the other poets, from whom Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. learnt their Theogony.<sup>z</sup> Plato was a man both competent and willing to strike out a physical theology of his own, but not to follow passively in the track of orthodox tradition. I have stated briefly what he has affirmed about the kosmical Gods (Earth, Stars, Sun, Planets) generated or constructed by the Demiurgus as portions or members of the Kosmos: their bodies, out of fire and other elements,—their souls out of the Forms or abstractions called Identity and Diversity; while the entire Kosmos is put together after the model of the Generic Idea or Form of Animal. All this, combined with supposed purposes, and fancies of arithmetical proportion dictating the proceedings of the Demiurgus, Plato

Remarks on  
Plato's Canon  
of Belief.

the lowest being man, and the three others intermediate between the two; after having thus laid out the scale, he leaves to others to determine, *ὅπῃ τις θέλει*, in which place Zeus, Hêrê, and the other Gods, are to be considered as lodged. He will not contradict any one's feeling on that point; he strongly protests (p. 985 D) against all attempts on the part of the lawgiver to innovate (*καινοτομεῖν*) in contravention of ancient religious tradition (This is what Aristophanes in the Nubes, and Molêtus before the Dikasts, accuse Sokrates of doing), but he denounces harshly all who will not acknowledge with worship and sacrifice the sublime divinity of the

Sun, Moon, Stars, and Planets.

The Platonic declaration given here illustrated in the lines of Euripides, Bacchæ, 202,—

*κατ' ὅλους*

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Timæe. p. 41 A. *ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ πάντες ὅσοι τε περιπολοῦσι φανερώς, καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι,*

<sup>z</sup> Herodot. ii. 53.

does not hesitate to proclaim on his own authority and as his own belief—though he does not carry it farther than probability.

But while the feeling of spontaneous belief thus readily arises in Plato's mind, following in the wake of his own constructive imagination and ethical or æsthetical sentiment (*fingunt simul creduntque*)—it does not so readily cleave to the theological dogmas in actual circulation around him. In the generation of Gods from Uranus and Gæa—which he as well as other Athenian youths must have learnt when they recited Hesiod with their schoolmasters—he can see neither proof nor probability: he can find no internal ground for belief.<sup>a</sup> He declares himself incompetent: he will not undertake to affirm any thing upon his own judgment: the mystery is too dark for him to penetrate. Yet on the other hand, though it would be rash to affirm, it would be equally rash to deny. Nearly all around him are believers, at least as well satisfied with their creed as he was with the uncertified affirmations of his own Timæus. He cannot prove them to be wrong, except by appealing to an ethical or æsthetical sentiment which they do not share. Among the Gods said to be descended from Uranus and Gæa, were all those to whom public worship was paid in Greece,—to whom the genealogies of the heroic and sacred families were traced,—and by whom cities as well as individuals believed themselves to be protected in dangers, healed in epidemics, and enlightened on critical emergencies through seasonable revelations and prophecies. Against an established creed thus avouched, it was dangerous to raise any doubts. Moreover Plato could not have forgotten the fate of his master Sokrates;<sup>b</sup> who was indicted both for not acknowledging the Gods whom the city

<sup>a</sup> The remark made by Condorcet upon Buffon is strikingly applicable to Plato:—"On n'a reproché à M. de Buffon que ses hypothèses. Ce sont aussi des espèces de fables—mais des fables produites par une imagination active qui a besoin de créer, et non par une imagination passive qui cède à des impressions étrangères" (Condorcet, *Eloge de Buffon*, ad fin.)

(Homer, *Odyss.* xxii. 347)—the declaration of the bard Phemius.

<sup>b</sup> Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 1. Ἀδικεῖ οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει, οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ κατὰ δαιμόνια.

The word δαιμόνια may mean matters, or persons, or both together.

acknowledged, and for introducing other new divine matters and persons. There could be no doubt that Plato was guilty on this latter count: prudence therefore rendered it the more incumbent on him to guard against being implicated in the former count also. Here then Plato formally abnegates his own self-judging power, and submits himself to orthodox authority. "It is impossible to doubt what we have learnt from witnesses, who declared themselves to be the offspring of the Gods, and who must of course have known their own family affairs. We must obey the law and believe." In what proportion such submission, of reason to authority, embodied the sincere feeling of Pascal and Malebranche, or the irony of Bayle and Voltaire, we are unable to determine.<sup>c</sup>

Having thus, during one short paragraph, proclaimed his deference, if not his adhesion, to inspired traditions, Plato again resumes the declaration of his own beliefs and his own book of Genesis, without any farther appeal to authority, and without any intimation that he is touching on mysteries too great for his reason. When these Gods, the visible as well as the invisible,<sup>d</sup> had all been constructed or generated, he (or Timæus) tells us that the Demiurgus addressed them and informed them that they would be of immortal duration—not indeed in their own nature, but through his determination: that to complete the perfection of the newly-begotten Kosmos, there were three other distinct races of animals, all mortal, to be added: that he could not himself undertake the construction of these three, because they would thereby be rendered immortal, but that he confided such construction to them (the Gods): that he would himself supply, for the best of these three new races, an immortal element as guide and superintendant, and that they

Address and  
order of the  
the generated  
Gods.

<sup>c</sup> M. Martinsupposes Plato to speak ironically, or with a prudent reserve, *Études sur le Timée*, ii. p. 146.

What Plato says here about the Gods who bore personal names, and were believed in by the contemporary public—is substantially equivalent to the well-known profession of ignorance enunciated by the Sophist Protagoras, introduced by him at the beginning of one of his treatises. *Περὶ δὲ*

*εἶσιν, οὐθ' ὁποῖοι τινές εἰσιν, λέγειν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστι τὰ δ' μὲ* (Sextus Emp. adv. Mathem. ix. 56); a declaration which, circumspect as it was (see the remark of the sillographer Timon in Sextus), drew upon him the displeasure of the Athenians, so that his books were burnt, and himself forced to leave the city.

Plato, *Timæus*, p. 41 A.

were to join along with it mortal and bodily accompaniments, to constitute men and animals; thus imitating the power which he had displayed in the generation of themselves.<sup>o</sup>

After this address (which Plato puts into the first person, in Homeric manner), the Demiurgus compounded together, again and in the same bowl, the remnant of the same elements out of which he had formed the kosmical soul, but in perfection and purity greatly inferior. The total mass thus formed was distributed into souls equal in number to the stars. The Demiurgus placed each soul in a star of its own, carried it round thus in the kosmical rotation, and explained to it the destiny intended for all. For each alike there was to be an appointed hour of birth, and of conjunction with a body, as well as with two inferior sorts or varieties of soul or mind. From such conjunction would follow, as a necessary consequence, implanted sensibility and motive power, with all its accompaniments of pleasure, pain, desire, fear, anger, and such like. These were the irrational enemies, which the rational and immortal soul would have to controul and subdue, as a condition of just life. If it succeeded in the combat so as to live a good life, it would return after death to the abode of its own peculiar star. But if it failed, it would have a second birth into the inferior nature and body of a female: if, here also, it continued to be evil, it would be transferred after death to the body of some inferior animal. Such transmigration would be farther continued from animal to animal, until the rational soul should acquire thorough controul over the irrational and turbulent. When this was attained, the rational soul would be allowed to return to its original privilege and happiness, residing in its own peculiar star.<sup>f</sup>

It was thus that the Demiurgus confided to the recently-generated Gods the task of fabricating both mortal bodies, and mortal souls, to be joined with these immortal souls in their new stage of existence—and of guiding and governing the new mortal animal in the best manner, unless in so far as the

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 41 C.  
κατὰ φύσιν

τὴν

<sup>f</sup> ἐπὶ τῇ  
Plato, *Timæus*, p. 42 B-D.

latter should be the cause of mischief to himself. The Demiurgus decreed and proclaimed this beforehand, in order (says Plato) that he might not himself be the cause of any of the evil which might ensue<sup>s</sup> to individual men.

Accordingly the Gods, sons of the Demiurgus, entered upon the task, trying to imitate their father. Borrowing from the Kosmos portions of the four elements, with engagement that what was borrowed should one day

Proceedings of the generated Gods—they fabricate the cranium, as miniature

Plato, *Timæus*, p. 42 D-E. Δια-θεσμοθετήσας δὲ πάντα αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, ἵνα τῆς ἔπειτα εἴη κακίας ἀναίτιος,—παρέδωκε θεοῖς σώματα πλάττειν θνητὰ, τό τε ἐπίλοιπον ὅσον ἔτ' ἦν ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης δέον προσγενέσθαι, τοῦτο πᾶν' ὅσα ἀκόλουθα ἐκείνοις ἀπερ-

τι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν ἂν ζῶον, ὃ, τι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ γίγνεται

We have here the theory, intimated but not expanded by Plato, that man is, by misconduct or folly, the cause of all the evil suffered on earth. That the Gods are not the cause of any evil, he tells us in *Republ.* ii. p. 379. It seems, however, that he did not remain satisfied with the theory of the *Timæus*, because we find a different theory in the treatise *De Legibus* (x. p. 896 E)—two kosmical souls, one good, the other evil.

Moreover, the recital of the *Timæus* itself (besides another express passage in it, pp. 86 D-87 A) plainly contradicts the theory, that man is the cause of his own sufferings and evil. The Demiurgus himself is described as the cause, by directing immortal souls to be joined with mortal bodies. The Demiurgus had constructed a beautiful Kosmos, with perfect and regular rotations—with the Gods, sidereal, planetary, and invisible—and with immortal souls distributed throughout the stars and earth, understanding and appreciating the kosmical rotations. So far all is admirable and faultless. But he is not satisfied with this. He determines to join each of these immortal souls with two mortal souls and with a mortal body. According to Plato's own showing, the immortal soul incurs nothing but corruption, disturbance, and stupidity, by such junction: as Empedokles and Hera-klitus had said before, Plutarch, *Sol.*

*Animal.* 7, p. 964 E. It is at first deprived of all intelligence (*άνους*); from this stupefaction it gradually but partially recovers; yet nothing short of the best possible education and discipline will enable it to contend, and even then imperfectly, against the corruption and incumbrance arising out of its companion the body; lastly, if it should contend with every success, the only recompense which awaits it is to be re-transferred to the star from whence it came down. What reason was there for removing the immortal soul from its happy and privileged position, to be degraded by forced companionship with an unworthy body and two inferior souls? The reason assigned is, that the Demiurgus required the Kosmos to be enlarged into a full and exact copy of the *Αὐτόζωον* or Generic Animal, which comprehended four subordinate varieties of animals; one of them good (the Gods)—the other three inferior and corrupt, Men, Birds, Fishes. But here, according to Plato's own exposition, it was the Demiurgus himself and his plan that was at fault. What necessity was there to copy the worst parts of the Generic Animal as well as the best? The Kosmos would have been decidedly better, though it might have been less complete, without such unenviable accompaniments. When Plato constructs his own community, (*Republic* and *Legg.*) he does not knowingly train up defective persons, or prepare the foundation for such, in order that every variety of character may be included. We may add here, that according to Plato himself, *Νοῦς* (intelligence or reason) belongs not to all human beings, but only to a small fraction of them (*Timæus*, p. 51 E). Except in these few, the immortal soul is therefore irrecoverably debased by its union with the body.

of the Kosmos, with the rational soul rotating within it.

be paid back, they glued them together, and fastened them by numerous minute invisible pegs into one body. Into this body; always decaying and requiring renovation, they introduced the immortal soul, with its double circular rotations—the Circles of the Same and of the Diverse: embodying it in the cranium, which was made spherical in exterior form like the Kosmos, and admitting within it no other motion but the rotatory. The head, the most divine portion of the human system, was made master; while the body was admitted only as subject and ministerial. The body was endowed with all the six varieties of motive power, forward, backward—upward, downward—to the right, to the left.<sup>h</sup> The phenomena of nutrition and sensation began. But all these irregular movements and violent multifarious agitations, checked or disturbed the regular rotations of the immortal soul in the cranium, perverting the arithmetical proportion, and harmony belonging to them. The rotations of the Circles of Same and Diverse were made to convey false and foolish affirmation. The soul became utterly destitute of intelligence, on being first joined to the body, and for some time afterwards.<sup>i</sup> But in the course of time the violence of these disturbing currents abates, so that the rotations of the Circles in the head can take place with more quiet and regularity. The man then becomes more and more intelligent. If subjected to good education and discipline, he will be made gradually sound and whole, free from corruption: but if he neglect this precaution, his life remains a lame one, and he returns back to Hades incomplete and unprofitable.<sup>k</sup>

The Gods, when they undertook the fabrication of the body, foresaw the inconvenience of allowing the head—with its intelligent rotations, and with the immortal soul enclosed in it—to roll along the ground, unable to get over a height, or out of a hollow.<sup>l</sup> Accordingly they mounted it upon a tall body; with arms and

The cranium  
don  
y—

—Light.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Timæus, pp. 43 B, 44 D.

Plato supposes an etymological connection between *αἰσθήσεις* and *αἰσσω*, p. 43 C.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 44 B. καὶ διὰ ὅθ' πάντα ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα, κατ'

ον, ὅταν εἰς σῶμα ἐνδελ.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 44 C.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 44 E.

τὸ πρῶν | ὀχλήμ' αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ εὐπορίαν ἔδωκεν.

legs as instruments of movement, support, and defence. They caused the movements to be generally directed forward and not backward; since front is more honourable and more commanding than rear. For the same reason, they placed the face, with the organs of sense, in the fore part of the head. Within the eyes, they planted that variety of fire which does not burn, but is called light, homogeneous with the light without. We are enabled to see in the daytime, because the light within our eyes pours out through the centre of them, and commingles with the light without. The two, being thus confounded together, transmit movements from every object which they touch, through the eye inward to the soul; and thus bring about the sensation of sight. At night no vision takes place: because the light from the interior of our eyes, even when it still comes out, finds no cognate light in the air without, and thus becomes extinguished in the darkness. All the light within the eye would thus have been lost, if the Gods had not provided a protection: they contrived the eyelids which drop and shut up the interior light within. This light being prevented from egress, diffuses itself throughout the interior system, and tranquillises the movements within so as to bring on sleep: without dreams, if all the movements are quenched—with dreams, corresponding to the movements which remain, if there are any such.<sup>m</sup>

Such are the auxiliary causes (continues Plato), often mis-

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 45. The theory of vision here given by Plato is interesting. A theory, similar in the main, had been propounded by Empedoklés before him. Aristotél. *De Sensu*, p. 437 b.; Theophrast. *De Sensu*, cap. 5-9, p. 88 of Philipson's *Τῆς Ἀνθρωπίνης*. Aristotle himself impugns the theory. It is reported and discussed in Galen, *De Hippocratis et Platonis Dogmat.* vii. 5, 6, p. 619 seqq. ed Kühn.

The different theories of vision among the ancient philosophers anterior to Aristotle are thus enumerated by E. H. von Baumhauer (*De Sententiis Veterum Philosophorum Græcorum de Visu, Lumine, et Coloribus*, Utrecht, 1843, p. 137):—"De videndi modo tres apud antiquos primarias theorias invenimus: et primam quidem, emanatione lucis ex oculis ad corpora externa,

ejusque reflexu ad oculos (Pythagorei, Alemæon): alteram emanationibus e corporibus, quæ per oculos veluti per canales ad animum penetrent (Eleatici, Heraclitus, Gorgias): quam sententiam Anaxagoras et Diogenes Apolloniates catenus mutarunt, quod dicerent pupillam quasi speculum esse quod imagines acceptas ad animum rejiciat. Tertia theoria, orta è conjunctione duarum priorum, statuebat tam ex oculis quam è corporibus emanationes fieri, et amborum illarum concursu visum effici, quum conformata imago per meatus ad animum perveniat (Empedocles, Protagoras, Plato). Huic sententiæ etiam Democritus annumerari potest; qui eam planè secundum materiam, ut dicunt, exposuit."

The theory of Plato is described in the same treatise, pp. 106-112.

taken by others for principal causes, which the Gods employed to bring about sight. In themselves, they have no regularity of action: for nothing can be regular in action without mind and intelligence.<sup>n</sup> But the most important among all the advantages of sight is, that it enables us to observe and study the rotations of the Kosmos and of the sidereal and planetary bodies. It is the observed rotations of days, months, and years, which impart to us the ideas of time and number, and enable us to investigate the universe. Hence we derive philosophy, the greatest of all blessings. Hence too we learn to apply the celestial rotations as a rule and model to amend the rotations of intelligence in our own cranium—since the first are regular and unerring, while the second are disorderly and changeful.<sup>o</sup> It was for the like purpose, in view to the promotion of philosophy, that the Gods gave us voice and hearing. Both discourse and musical harmony are essential for this purpose, Harmony and rhythm are presents to us, from the Muses, not, as men now employ them, for unreflecting pleasure and recreation—but for the same purpose of regulating and attuning the disorderly rotations of the soul, and of correcting the ungraceful and unmeasured movements natural to the body.<sup>p</sup>

Principal advantages of sight and hearing. Observations of the rotation of the Kosmos.

At this point of the exposition, the Platonic Timæus breaks off the thread, and takes up a new commencement. Thus far (he says) we have proceeded in explaining the part of Reason or Intelligence in the fabrication of the Kosmos. We must now explain the part of Necessity: for the genesis of the Kosmos results from co-operation of the two. By Necessity (as has been said before) Plato means random, indeterminate, chaotic, pre-existent, spontaneity of movement or force: spontaneity (ἡ πλανωμένη αἰτία) upon which Reason works by persuasion up to a certain point, prevailing upon it to submit to some degree of fixity and regularity.<sup>q</sup> Timæus had described the body of the Kosmos as being constructed by the Demiurgus

The Kosmos is product of joint action of Reason and Necessity. The four visible and tangible elements are not primitive.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 46 D-E.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Timæus, pp. 47 B-C, 90 C.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 47 D. ἡ δὲ ῥημονία—ξύμμαχος ὑπὸ Μουσῶν δίδεται καὶ ῥυθμὸς αὐ—ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν

Here we see Plato, in the usual Hellenic vein, particularising the functions and attributes of the different Gods and Goddesses.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 48 A.

out of the four elements: thus assuming fire, air, earth, water, as pre-existent. But he now corrects himself, and tells us that such assumption is unwarranted. We must (he remarks) give a better and fuller explanation of the Kosmos. No one of these four elements is either primordial, or permanently distinct and definite in itself.

The only primordial reality is, an indeterminate, all-recipient *fundamentum*: having no form or determination of its own, but capable of receiving any form or determination from without.

In the second explanation now given by Plato of the Kosmos and its genesis, he assumes this invisible *fundamentum* (which he had not assumed before) as “the mother or nurse of all generation.” He assumes, besides, the eternal Forms or Ideas, to act upon it and to bestow determination or quality. These forms fulfil the office of father: the offspring of the two is—the generated, concrete, visible, objects,<sup>r</sup> imitations of the Forms or Ideas, begotten out of this mother. How the Ideas act upon the Materia Prima, Plato cannot well explain: but each Form stamps an imitation or copy of itself upon portions of the common *Fundamentum*.<sup>s</sup>

Forms or  
Ideas and  
Materia  
Prima—  
Forms of the  
Elements—  
Place, or Re-  
ceptivity.

But do there really exist any such Forms or Ideas—as Fire *per se*, the Generic Fire—Water *per se*, the Generic Water, invisible and intangible?<sup>t</sup> Or is this mere unfounded speech? Does there exist nothing really anywhere, beyond the visible objects which we see and touch?<sup>u</sup>

We must assume (says Plato, after a certain brief argument which he himself does not regard as quite complete) the Forms or Ideas of Fire, Air, Water, Earth, as distinct and self-existent, eternal, indestructible, unchangeable—neither visible nor tan-

<sup>r</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 51 A. τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὁρατοῦ καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ

<sup>s</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 50-51. θέντα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ δύσφραστον καὶ θαυμαστόν. P. 51 A. εἶδος τι καὶ

ἀπορώτατά τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ

<sup>t</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 51 C.

<sup>u</sup> Ueberweg, in a learned Dissertation, Ueber die Platonische Weltseele

(pp. 52-53), seeks to establish a greater distinction between the Phædrus, Phædon, and *Timæus*, in respect to the way in which Plato affirms the separate substantiality of Ideas, than the language of the dialogues warrants. He contends that the separate substantiality of the Platonic Ideas is more *peremptorily* affirmed in the *Timæus* than in the Phædrus. But this will not be found borne out if we look at Phædrus, p. 247, where the

gible, but apprehended by Reason or Intellect alone—neither receiving anything else from without, nor themselves moving to anything else. Distinct from these—images of these, and bearing the same name—are the sensible objects called Fire, Water, &c.—objects of sense and opinion—always in a state of transition—generated and destroyed, but always generated in some place and destroyed out of some place. There is to be assumed, besides, distinct from the two preceding—as a third *fundamentum*—the place or receptacle in which these images are localised, generated, and nursed up. This Place, or formless primitive receptivity, is indestructible, but out of all reach of sense, and difficult to believe in, inasmuch as it is only accessible by a spurious sort of ratiocination.\*

Anterior to the construction of the Kosmos, the Forms or

Primordial  
Chaos—  
Effect of  
intervention  
by the De-  
miurgus.

Ideas of the four elements had already begun to act upon this primitive recipient or receptacle, but in a confused and irregular way. Neither of the four could impress itself in a special and definite manner: there were some vestiges of each, but each was incomplete: all were in stir and agitation, yet without any measure or fixed rule. Thick and heavy, however, were tending to separate from thin and light, and each particle thus tending to occupy a place of its own.<sup>†</sup> In this condition (the primordial moving chaos of the poets and earlier philosophers), things were found by the Demiurgus, when he undertook to construct the Kosmos. There was no ready-made Fire, Water, &c. (as Plato had assumed at the opening of the *Timæus*), but an agitated *imbroglio* of all, with the portions tending to separate from each other, and to ag-

affirmation is quite as peremptory as that in the *Timæus*; correlating too, as it does in the *Timæus*, with *Noûs* as the contemplating subject. Indeed the point may be said to be affirmed more positively in the *Phædrus*, because the *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος* is assigned to the Ideas, while in the *Timæus* all *τόπος* or local existence is denied to them (p. 52 B-C). Sensible objects are presented in the *Phædrus* as faint resemblances of the archetypal Ideas (p. 250 C), just as they are in the *Timæus*: on the other hand, τὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ occurs in the *Timæus* (p. 51 A), equivalent to *μετέχειν*, which Ueberweg states

to be discontinued.

\* Plato, *Timæus*, p. 52 B. αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀνασθησίας ἀπτὸν λογισμῷ τινι

Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 52-53.

τέτταρα γένη σείόμενα . . . μένης, κινουμένης αὐτῆς ὡς ὄργανου σεισμὸν παρέχοντος, τὰ μὲν ἀνομοιότατα πλείστον αὐτὰ ἀφ' αὐτῶν ὀρίζειν, τὰ δ' ὁμοιότατα μάλιστα εἰς ταύτην ξυνωθεῖν·  
καὶ

παν  
P. 57 C. δι  
γὰρ τοῦ γένους ἐκάστου τὰ  
τόπον  
P. 58 C.

glomerate each in a place of its own. The Demiurgus brought these four elements out of confusion into definite bodies and regular movements. He gave to each a body, constructed upon the most beautiful proportions of arithmetic and geometry, as far as this was possible.<sup>2</sup>

Respecting such proportions, the theory which Plato here lays out is admitted by himself to be a novel one; but it is doubtless borrowed, with more or less modification, from the Pythagoreians. Every solid body is circumscribed by plane surfaces: every plane surface is composed of triangles: all triangles are generated out of two—the right-angled isosceles triangle—and the right-angled scalene or oblong triangle. Of this oblong there are infinite varieties: but the most beautiful is a right-angled triangle, having the hypotenuse twice as long as the lesser of the two other sides.<sup>3</sup> From this sort of oblong triangle are generated the tetrahedron or pyramid—the octahedron—and the eikosihedron: from the equilateral triangle is generated the cube. The cube, as the most stable and solid, was assigned by the Demiurgus for the fundamental structure of earth: the pyramid for that of fire: the octahedron for that of air: the eikosihedron for that of water. The purpose was that the four should be in continuous geometrical proportion: as Fire to Air, so Air to Water: as Air to Water, so Water to Earth. Lastly, the Dodekahedron was assigned as the basis of structure for the spherical Kosmos itself or universe.<sup>4</sup> Upon

Geometrical theory of the elements—fundamental triangles—regular solids.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 53. τὸ δὲ ἢ δυνατόν ὡς κάλλιστα ἄριστά τε ἐξ οὐχ οὕτως ἐχόντων τὸν θεὸν αὐτὰ ξυμίσταναι, παρὰ πάντα ἡμῖν, ὡς, αἰεὶ, τοῦτο λεγόμενον ὑπαρχέτω.

This is the hypothesis pervading all the *Timæus*—construction the best and finest which the case admitted. The limitations accompany the assumed purpose throughout.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 53-54. ἀθεῖ λόγῳ δηλοῦν.

<sup>4</sup> That Plato intended, by this elaborate geometrical construction, to arrive at a continuous geometrical proportion between the four elements, he tells us (p. 30 A-B), adding the qualifying words *κάθ' ὅσον ἢν δυνατόν*. M. Boeckh, however (*De Platonici Corporis Mundani Fabricâ*, pp. viii.-

xxvi.), has shown that the geometrical proportion cannot be properly concluded from the premisses assumed by Plato:—"Platonis elementorum doctrinam et parum sibi constare, neque omnibus numeris absolutam esse, immo multis incommotis laborare, et divini ingenii lusui magis quam disciplinæ severitati originem debere fatebimur; nec profundiorum et abstrusiorum naturæ cognitionem in eâ sitam esse suspicabimur—in quem errorem etiam Joh. Keplerus, summi ingenii homo, incidit."

Respecting the Dodekahedron, see Zeller, *Gesch. der Philos.* ii. p. 513, ed. 2nd. There is some obscurity about it. In the *Epinomis* (p. 981 C) Plato gives the Æther as a fifth element, besides the four commonly

this arrangement each of the three elements—fire, water, air—passes into the other; being generated from the same radical triangle. But earth does not pass into either of the three (nor either of these into earth), being generated from a different radical triangle. The pyramid, as thin, sharp, and cutting, was assigned to fire as the quickest and most piercing of the four elements: the cube, as most solid and difficult to move, was allotted to earth, the stationary element. Fire was composed of pyramids of different size, yet each too small to be visible by itself, and becoming visible only when grouped together in masses: the earth was composed of cubes of different size, each invisible from smallness: the other elements in like manner, each from its respective solid,<sup>c</sup> in exact proportion and harmony, as far as Necessity could be persuaded to tolerate. All the five regular solids were thus employed in the configuration and structure of the Kosmos.<sup>d</sup>

Such was the mode of formation of the four so-called elemental bodies.<sup>e</sup> Of each of the four there are diverse species or varieties: and that which distinguishes one variety of the same element from another variety is, that the constituent triangles, though all similar, are of different magni-

known and recited in the Timæus. It appears that Philolaus, as well as Xenokrates, conceived the Dodekahedron as the structural form of Æther (Schol. ad Aristot. Physic. p. 427, a. 16, Brandis): and Xenokrates expressly says, that Plato himself recognised it as such. Zeller dissents from this view, and thinks that nothing more is meant than the implication, that the Dodekahedron can have a sphere described round it more readily than any of the other figures named.

Opponents of Plato remarked that he κατεβαθμητικεῖσατο τὴν φύσιν, Schol. ad Aristot. Metaph. A. 985, 23, p. 539, Brandis. Aristotle devotes himself in many places to the refutation of the Platonic doctrine on this point, see De Cælo, iii. 8, 306-307, and elsewhere.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 56 C.

φύσις

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Timæus, pp. 55-56.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 57 C. *ἄσα ἔκκρατα καὶ πρῶτα σώματα.*

The Platonist Attikus (ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xv. 7) blames Aristotle for

dissenting from Plato on this point, and for recognising the celestial matter as a fifth essence distinct from the four elements. Plato (he says) followed both anterior traditions and self-evident sense (τῇ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐναργείᾳ) in admitting only the four elements, and in regarding all things as either compounds or varieties of these. But Aristotle, thinking to make parade of superior philosophical sagacity, προσκατηρήθησε τοῖς φαινομένοις τέτταρσι σώμασι τὴν πέμπτην οὐσίαν, πάνυ λαμπρῶς καὶ φιλοδώρως τῇ φύσει χρησάμενος, μὴ συνιδῶν δέ, ὅτι οὐ νο-φυσιολογοῦντα, τῆς φύσεως ἐξιστορεῖν.

This last precept is what we are surprised to read in a Platonist of the third century B.C. "When you are philosophising upon Nature, do not lay down the law, but search out the real facts of Nature." It is truly Baconian: it is justly applicable as a caution to Aristotle, against whom Atticus directs it; but it is still more eminently applicable to Plato, against whom he does not direct it.

tudes. The diversity of these combinations, though the primary triangles are similar, is infinite: the student of Nature must follow it out, to obtain any probable result.<sup>f</sup>

Plato next enumerates the several varieties of each element—fire, water, earth.<sup>g</sup> He then proceeds to mention the attributes, properties, affections, &c., of each: which he characterises as essentially relative to a sentient Subject: nothing being absolute except the constituent geometrical figures. You cannot describe these attributes (he says) without assuming (what has not yet been described) the sensitive or mortal soul, to which they are relative.<sup>h</sup> Assuming this provisionally, Plato gives account of Hot and Cold, Hard and Soft, Heavy and Light, Rough and Smooth, &c.<sup>i</sup> Then he describes, first, the sensations of pleasure and pain, common to the whole body—next those of the special senses, sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch.<sup>k</sup> These descriptions are very curious and interesting. I am compelled to pass them

<sup>f</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 57 D.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 58-61 C.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 61 C. *Πρῶτον οὖν ὑπάρχειν αἰσθησιν δεῖ τοῖς αἰεὶ σαρκὸς*

*καὶ τῶν περὶ σάρκα οὕτω διεληλύθαμεν. Τυγ-  
τὰντα*

*τὰ παθήματα ὅσα αἰσθητικά, οὐτ' ἐκεῖνα ἄνευ τούτων δυνατὰ ἰκανῶς λεχθῆναι. τὸ δὲ ἄμα σχεδὸν οὐ δυνατόν. Ὑποθετέον δὴ πρότερον θάτερα, τὰ δὲ ὕστερα ὑποτεθέντα ἐπάνυμεν αὖθις. Ὅτι οὖν ἐξῆς τὰ παθήματα λέγεται τοῖς γένεσιν, πρότερα ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ*

*ψυχῆν ὄντα.*

<sup>i</sup> Plato, *Tim.* pp. 62-64 B. Demokritus appears to have held on this point an opinion approaching to that of Plato. See *Demo. Frag.* ed. Mullach, pp. 204-215: *Aristot. Metaph.* i. p. 985, b. 15; *De Sensu*, s. 62-65; *Sextus Empiric. adv. Math.* vii. 135.

*Περὶ μὲν οὖν βαρέος καὶ κούφου καὶ σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ, ἐν τούτοις τῶν δ' ἄλλων*

*εἶναι φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα πάθη τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀλλοιούμενης.* We may remark that Plato includes hardness and softness, the different varieties of resistance, among the secondary or relative qualities of matter; all that he seems to conceive as absolute are extension and figure, the geometrical conception of matter. In the view of most modern philosophers, resistance is

considered as the most obviously and undeniably *absolute* of all the attributes of matter, as that which serves to prove that matter itself is absolute. Dr. Johnson refuted the doctrine of Berkeley by knocking a stick against the ground; and a similar refutation is adopted in words by Reid and Stewart (see *Mill's System of Logic*, Book vi. ad finem, also Book i. ch. 3, s. 7-8). To me the fact appealed to by Johnson appears an evidence in favour of Berkeley's theory rather than against it. The Resistant (ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν τινα, *Plato, Sophist.* p. 246 A) can be understood only as a correlate of something which is resisted: the fact of sense called Resistance is an indivisible fact, involving the implication of the two. In the first instance it is the resistance experienced to our own motions (*A. Bain, The Senses and the Intellect*, pp. 371-372, 1st ed.), and thus involves the feeling of our own spontaneous muscular energy.

The *Timæus* of Plato is not noticed by Sir W. Hamilton in his very learned and instructive *Dissertation on the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Body* (notes to his edition of *Reid's Works*, p. 826), though it bears upon his point more than the *Theætétus*, which he mentions.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 65-69 E.

over by want of space, and shall proceed to the statements respecting the two mortal souls and the containing organism—which belong to a vein more analogous to that of the other Platonic dialogues.

The Demiurgus, after having constructed the entire Kosmos, together with the generated Gods, as well as Necessity would permit—imposed upon these Gods the task of constructing Man: the second best of the four varieties of animals whom he considered it necessary to include in the Kosmos. He furnished to them as a basis an immortal rational soul (diluted remnant from the soul of the Kosmos); with which they were directed to combine two mortal souls and a body.<sup>1</sup> They executed their task as well as the conditions of the problem admitted. They were obliged to include in the mortal souls pleasure and pain, audacity and fear, anger, hope, appetite, sensation, &c., with all the concomitant mischiefs. By such uncongenial adjuncts the immortal rational soul was unavoidably defiled. The constructing Gods however took care to defile it as little as possible.<sup>m</sup> They reserved the head as a separate abode for the immortal soul: planting the mortal soul apart from it in the trunk, and establishing the neck as an isthmus of separation between the two. Again the mortal soul was itself not single but double: including two divisions, a better and a worse. The Gods kept the two parts separate; placing the better portion in the thoracic cavity nearer to the head, and the worse portion lower down, in the abdominal cavity: the two being divided from each other by the diaphragm, built across the body as a wall of partition: just as in a dwelling-house, the apartments of the women are separated from those of the men. Above the diaphragm and near to the neck, was planted the energetic, courageous, contentious, soul; so placed as to receive orders easily from the head, and to aid the rational soul in keeping under constraint the mutinous soul of appetite, which was planted below the diaphragm.<sup>n</sup> The immortal soul<sup>o</sup> was fastened or anchored

of man—  
imposed by  
the Demi-  
urgus upon  
the second-  
ary Gods.  
Triple Soul.  
Distribution  
thereof in  
the body.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Tim. p. 69 C.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Tim. p. 69 D. ξυγ

τ' αὐτὰ ἀναγκαίως τὸ

γένος ξυνέθεσαν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ

σεβόμενοι μάλινεν τὸ  
ση, &c.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Timæus, pp. 69-70.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 73 B-D.

in the brain, the two mortal souls in the line of the spinal marrow continuous with the brain: which line thus formed the thread of connection between the three. The heart was established as an outer fortress for the exercise of influence by the immortal soul over the other two. It was at the same time made the initial point of the veins,—the fountain from whence the current of blood proceeded to pass forcibly through the veins round to all parts of the body. The purpose of this arrangement is, that when the rational soul denounces some proceeding as wrong (either on the part of others without, or in the appetitive soul within), it may stimulate an ebullition of anger in the heart, and may transmit from thence its exhortations and threats through the many small blood channels to all the sensitive parts of the body; which may thus be rendered obedient everywhere to the orders of our better nature.<sup>p</sup>

In such ebullitions of anger, as well as in moments of imminent danger, the heart leaps violently, becoming overheated and distended by excess of fire. The Gods foresaw this, and provided a safeguard against it by placing the lungs close at hand with the windpipe and trachea. The lungs were constructed soft and full of internal pores and cavities like a sponge; without any blood,<sup>q</sup>—but receiving, instead of blood, both the air inspired through the trachea, and the water swallowed to quench thirst. Being thus always cool, and soft like a cushion, the lungs received and deadened the violent beating and leaping of the heart; at the same time that they cooled down its excessive heat, and rendered it a more equable minister for the orders of reason.<sup>r</sup>

The third or lowest soul, of appetite and nutrition, was placed between the diaphragm and the navel. This region of the body was set apart like a manger for containing necessary food: and the appetitive soul

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 70 B-C.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 70 D. *τὴν τοῦ πλεῦμονος ἰδέαν ἐνεφύτευσαν, πρῶτον μὲν μαλακὴν καὶ ἁναιμον, εἴτα σφραγίτας ἐντὸς ἔχουσαν ὅλον σπόγγου κατατετρημένας.*

Aristotle notices this opinion as held

by some persons (not naming Plato), but impugns it as erroneous. He affirms that the lungs have more blood in them than any of the other viscera. *Histor. Animal.* i. 17, p. 496, b. 1-8; *De Respirat.* c. 15, p. 478, a. 13.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 70.

was tied up to it like a wild beast; indispensable indeed for the continuance of the race, yet a troublesome adjunct, and therefore placed afar off, in order that its bellowings might disturb as little as possible the deliberations of the rational soul in the cranium, for the good of the whole. The Gods knew that this appetitive soul would never listen to reason, and that it must be kept under subjection altogether by the influence of phantoms and imagery. They provided an agency for this purpose in the liver, which they placed close upon the abode of the appetitive soul.<sup>3</sup> They made the liver compact, smooth, and brilliant, like a mirror reflecting images:—moreover, both sweet and bitter on occasions. The thoughts of the rational soul were thus brought within view of the appetitive soul, in the form of phantoms or images exhibited on the mirror of the liver. When the rational soul is displeased, not only images corresponding to this feeling are impressed, but the bitter properties of the liver are all called forth. It becomes crumpled, discoloured, dark and rough; the gall bladder is compressed; the veins carrying the blood are blocked up, and pain as well as sickness arise. On the contrary, when the rational soul is satisfied, so as to send forth mild and complacent inspirations,—all this bitterness of the liver is tranquillised, and all its native sweetness called forth. The whole structure becomes straight and smooth; and the images impressed upon it are rendered propitious. It is thus through the liver, and by means of these images, that the rational soul maintains its ascendancy over the appetitive soul; either to terrify and subdue, or to comfort and encourage it.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, the liver was made to serve another purpose.

The liver is made the seat of the prophetic agency. Function of the spleen.

It was selected as the seat of the prophetic agency; which the Gods considered to be indispensable, as a refuge and aid for the irrational department of man. Though this portion of the soul had no concern with sense or reason, they would not shut it out altogether

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 71 A. εἰδότες εἰδῶλων καὶ φαντασμάτων νυκτός τε καὶ μέθης  
<sup>4</sup> οὐκ ἐμφυτον αὐτῷ αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ ἥπατος ἰδέαν ζυγεῖται  
 εἴσοιτο λόγων, ὑπὸ τε  
<sup>5</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 71 C-D.

from some glimpse of truth. The revelations of prophecy were accordingly signified on the liver, for the instruction and within the easy view of the appetitive soul: and chiefly at periods when the functions of the rational soul are suspended—either during sleep, or disease, or fits of temporary extacy. For no man in his perfect senses comes under the influence of a genuine prophetic inspiration. Sense and intelligence are often required to interpret prophecies, and to determine what is meant by dreams or signs or prognostics of other kinds: but such revelations are received by men destitute of sense. To receive them, is the business of one class of men: to interpret them, that of another. It is a grave mistake, though often committed, to confound the two. It was in order to furnish prophecy to man, therefore, that the Gods devised both the structure and the place of the liver. During life, the prophetic indications are clearly marked upon it: but after death they become obscure and hard to decypher."

The spleen was placed near the liver, corresponding to it on the left side, in order to take off from it any impure or excessive accretions or accumulations, and thus to preserve it clean and pure.<sup>x</sup>

Such was the distribution of the one immortal and the two mortal souls, and such the purposes by which it was dictated. We cannot indeed (says Plato) proclaim this with full assurance as truth, unless the Gods would confirm our declarations. We must take the risk of affirming what appears to us probable—and we shall proceed with this risk yet further.<sup>y</sup> The following is the plan and calculation according to which it was becoming that our remaining bodily frame should be put together.

The Gods foresaw that we should be intemperate in our appetite for food and drink, and that we should thus bring upon ourselves many diseases injurious to life.

Length of the intestinal canal, in order that food

<sup>y</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 71-72.

γὰρ ἔννοους ἐφάπτεται

Plato, *Timæus*, p. 72 D.

Plato, *Timæus*, p. 72 E.

ἥ' ἂν  
ζοίμεθα· τὸ γε μὴν εἰκὸς  
καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀνασκόπουσι  
διακινδυνεύειν τὸ φάναι—καὶ π  
ἔκ δὲ λογισμοῦ τοιοῦδε ξυνί  
μάλιστα' ἂν αὐτὸ πάντων πρέποι.

might not be  
frequently  
needed.

To mitigate this mischief, they provided us with a great length of intestinal canal, but twisted it round so as to occupy but a small space, in the belly. All the food which we introduce remains thus a long time within us, before it passes away. A greater interval elapses before we need fresh supplies of food. If the food passed away speedily, so that we were constantly obliged to renew it, and were therefore always eating—the human race would be utterly destitute of intelligence and philosophy. They would be beyond the controul of the rational soul.<sup>z</sup>

Bone and flesh come next to be explained. Both of them derive their origin from the spinal marrow: in which the bonds of life are fastened, and soul is linked with body—the root of the human race. The origin of the spinal marrow itself is special and exceptional. Among the triangles employed in the construction of all the four elements, the Gods singled out the very best of each sort. Those selected were combined harmoniously with each other, and employed in the formation of the spinal marrow, as the universal seed ground (*πανσπερμίαν*) for all the human race. In this marrow the Gods planted the different sorts of souls; distributing and accommodating the figure of each portion of marrow to the requirements of each different soul. For that portion (called the encephalon, as being contained in the head) which was destined to receive the immortal soul, they employed the spherical figure and none other: for the remaining portion, wherein the mortal soul was to be received, they employed a mixture of the spherical and the oblong. All of it together was called by the same name *marrow*, covered and protected by one continuous bony case, and established as the holding ground to fasten the whole extent of soul with the whole extent of body.<sup>a</sup>

Nails—  
Mouth—  
Teeth.  
Plants pro-  
duced for  
nutrition of  
man.

Plato next explains the construction of ligaments and flesh —of the mouth, tongue, teeth, and lips: of hair and nails.<sup>b</sup> These last were produced with a long-sighted providence: for the Gods foresaw that the lower animals would be produced from the degeneration

<sup>z</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 73 A.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 73 C.D.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Tim.* pp. 75-76.

of man, and that to them nails and claws would be absolutely indispensable: accordingly, a sketch or rudiment of nails was introduced into the earliest organisation of man.<sup>c</sup> Nutrition being indispensable to man, the Gods produced for this purpose plants (trees, shrubs, herbs, &c.)—with a nature cognate to that of man, but having only the lowest of the three human souls.<sup>d</sup> They then cut ducts and veins throughout the human body, in directions appropriate for distributing the nutriment everywhere. They provided proper structures (here curiously described) for digestion, inspiration, and expiration.<sup>e</sup> The constituent triangles within the body, when young and fresh, overpower the triangles, older and weaker, contained in the nutritive matters swallowed, and then appropriate part of them to the support and growth of the body: in old age, the triangles within are themselves overpowered, and the body decays. When the fastenings, whereby the triangles in the spinal marrow have been fitted together, are worn out and give way, they let go the fastenings of the soul also. The soul, when thus released in a natural way, flies away with delight. Death in this manner is pleasurable: though it is distressing, when brought on violently, by disease or wounds.<sup>f</sup>

Here Plato passes into a general survey of diseases and the proper treatment of them. “As to the source from whence diseases arise” (he says) “this is a matter evident to every one. They arise from un-  
General view of Diseases and their Causes.
natural excess, deficiency, or displacement, of some one or more of the four elements (fire, air, water, earth) which go to compose the body.”<sup>g</sup> If the element in excess be fire, heat and continuous fever are produced: if air, the fever comes on alternate days: if water (a duller element) it is a tertian fever: if earth, it is a quartan—since earth is the dullest and most sluggish of the four.<sup>h</sup>

Having dwelt at considerable length on the distempers of

<sup>c</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 76 E. *ἔθεν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐθὺς γιγνομένοις ὑπετυπώσαντο τὴν τῶν δυνάμεων γέ.*

<sup>d</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 77 B-C.

<sup>e</sup> Plat. Tim. pp. 78-79.

<sup>f</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 81.

<sup>g</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 81 E. *τὸ δὲ τῶν νόσων ἔθεν ξυνίσταται, δῆλόν που καὶ παντί.*

<sup>h</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 86 A. *τὸ δὲ*

the body, the Platonic Timæus next examines those of the soul, which proceed from the condition of the body.<sup>i</sup>

mind—wickedness is a disease—no man is voluntarily

The generic expression for all distemper of the soul is, irrationality—unreason—absence of reason or intelligence. Of this there are two sorts—madness

and ignorance. Intense pleasures and pains are the gravest cause of madness.<sup>k</sup> A man under either of these two influences—either grasping at the former, or running away from the latter, out of season—can neither see nor hear anything rightly. He is at that moment mad and incapable of using his reason. When the flow of sperm round his marrow is overcharged and violent, so as to produce desires with intense throes of uneasiness beforehand and intense pleasure when satisfaction arrives,—his soul is really distempered and irrational, through the ascendancy of his body. Yet such a man is erroneously looked upon in general not as distempered, but as wicked voluntarily, of his own accord. The truth is, that sexual intemperance is a disorder of the soul arising from an abundant flow of one kind of liquid in the body, combined with thin bones or deficiency in the solids. And nearly all those intemperate habits which are urged as matters of reproach against a man—as if he were bad willingly,—are urged only from the assumption of an erroneous hypothesis. No man is bad willingly, but only from some evil habit of body and from wrong or perverting treatment in youth; which is hostile to his nature, and comes upon him against his own will.<sup>l</sup>

Again, not merely by way of pleasures, but by way of pains also, the body operates to entail evil or wickedness on the soul. When acid or salt phlegm—when bitter and bilious humours—come to spread through the body, remaining pent up therein, without being able to escape by exhalation,—the effluvia which ought to have been exhaled from them become confounded with the rotation of the soul, producing in it all manner of distempers. These

Badness of mind arises from body.

Plato, Timæus, p. 86 B. Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ψυχῆς ἀνοίας  
περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματα ταύτην ἄνο δ' ἀνοίας  
τὰ δὲ περὶ

le.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 86 B.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 86 C-D.

effluvia attack all the three different seats of the soul, occasioning great diversity of mischiefs according to the part attacked—irascibility, despondency, rashness, cowardice, forgetfulness, stupidity. Such bad constitution of the body serves as the foundation of ulterior mischief. And when there supervene, in addition, bad systems of government and bad social maxims, without any means of correction furnished to youth through good social instruction—it is from these two combined causes, both of them against our own will, that all of us who are wicked become wicked. Parents and teachers are more in fault than children and pupils. We must do our best to arrange the bringing up, the habits, and the instruction, so as to eschew evil and attain good.<sup>m</sup>

After thus describing the causes of corruption, both in body and mind, Plato adverts to the preservative and corrective agencies applicable to them. Between the one and the other, constant proportion and symmetry must be imperatively maintained. When the one is strong, and the other weak, nothing but mischief can ensue.<sup>n</sup> Mind must not be exercised alone, to the exclusion of body; nor body alone, without mind. Each must be exercised, so as to maintain adequate reaction and equilibrium against the other.<sup>o</sup> We ought never to let the body be at rest: we must keep up within it a perpetual succession of moderate shocks, so that it may make suitable resistance against foreign causes of movement, internal and external.<sup>p</sup> The best of all movements is, that which is both in itself and made by itself: analogous to the self-continuing rotation both of the Kosmos and of the rational soul in our cranium.<sup>q</sup> Movement in itself, but by an external agent, is less good. The worst of all is, movement neither in itself nor by itself. Among these three sorts of movement, the first is, Gymnastic: the second, propulsion backwards and forwards in a swing, gestation in a carriage: the third is, purgation or

Preservative and healing agencies against disease—well-regulated exercise, of mind and body proportionally.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 87 A-C.

<sup>n</sup> Plat. *Tim.* pp. 87-88 A.

<sup>o</sup> Plat. *Tim.* p. 88 C.

<sup>p</sup> Plat. *Tim.* p. 88 D-E.

<sup>q</sup> Plat. *Tim.* p. 89 A. τῶν δ' ε

| κινήσεων, ἡ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ,  
κίνησις.  
καὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς  
δ' ὑπ' ε

medicinal disturbance.<sup>r</sup> This last is never to be employed, except in extreme emergencies.

We must now indicate the treatment necessary for mind alone, apart from body. It has been already stated, that there are in each of us three souls, or three distinct varieties of soul; each having its own separate place and special movements. Of these three, that which is most exercised must necessarily become the strongest: that which is left unexercised, unmoved, at rest or in indolence,—will become the weakest. The object to be aimed at is, that all three shall be exercised in harmony or proportion with each other. Respecting the soul in our head, the grandest and most commanding of the three, we must bear in mind that it is this which the Gods have assigned to each man as his own special Dæmon or presiding Genius. Dwelling as it does in the highest region of the body, it marks us and links us as akin with heaven—as a celestial and not a terrestrial plant, having root in heaven and not in earth. It is this encephalic or head-soul, which, connected with and suspended from the divine soul of the Kosmos, keeps our whole body in its erect attitude. Now if a man neglects this soul, directing all his favour and development towards the two others (the energetic or the appetitive),—all his judgments will infallibly become mortal and transient, and he himself will be degraded into a mortal being, as far as it is possible for man to become so. But if he devotes himself to study and meditation on truth, exercising the encephalic soul more than the other two—he will assuredly, if he seizes truth,<sup>s</sup> have his mind filled with immortal and divine judgments, and will become himself immortal, as far as human nature admits of it. Cultivating as he does systematically the divine element within him, and having his in-dwelling Genius decorated as perfectly as possible, he will be eminently well-inspired or happy.<sup>t</sup>

<sup>r</sup> Plat. l. c. δευτέρα δὲ, ἡ διὰ τῶν  
ων.

<sup>s</sup> Foes, in the *Œconomia Hippocratica*  
v. Αἰώρα, gives information about these  
*penseiles gestationes*, upon which the

ancient physicians bestowed much  
attention.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 90 C. ἂν περ  
ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεται.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 90 B-D.

The mode of cultivating or developing each soul is the same—to assign to each the nourishment and the movement which is suitable to it. Now the movements which are kindred and congenial to our divine encephalic soul, are—the rotations of the Kosmos and the intellections traversing the kosmical soul. It is these that we ought to follow and study. By learning and embracing in our minds the rotations and proportions of the Kosmos, we shall assimilate the comprehending subject to the comprehended object, and shall rectify that derangement of our own intracranial rotations, which was entailed upon us by our birth into a body. By such assimilation, we shall attain the perfection of the life allotted to us, both at present and for the future.<sup>u</sup>

We must

the rotations of the Kosmos—this is the way to amend the rotations of the rational soul.

We have thus—says the Platonic Timæus in approaching his conclusion—gone through all those matters which we promised at the beginning, from the first construction of the Kosmos to the genesis of man. We must now devote a few words to the other animals. All of these derive their origin from man, by successive degradations. The first transition is from man into woman. Men whose lives had been characterised by cowardice or injustice, were after death and in their second birth born again as women. It was then that the Gods planted in us the sexual impulse, reconstructing the bodily organism with suitable adjustment, on the double pattern, male and female.<sup>v</sup>

Construction of women, birds, quadrupeds, fishes, &c., all from the degradation of primitive man.

Such was the genesis of women, by a partial transformation and diversification of the male structure.

We next come to birds ; who are likewise a degraded birth

ε αὐτὸν εἶδ' ἄλλα κεί  
μένον τὸν δαίμονα ζῶντοικον ἐν

which nevertheless he cannot have known.

It is hardly possible to translate this play upon the word εἰδαιμων.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Timæus, pp. 90 D, 91 C-D. The phrase of Plato in describing the newly introduced mode of procreation

<sup>x</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 91 D. Whoever compares the step of marked degeneration here indicated—in passing from men to women—with that which is affirmed by Plato in the fifth book of the Republic about the character, attributes, and capacities of women, will recognise a material difference between the two.

—is remarkable, as it might be applied to the spermatozoa,

or formation, derived from one peculiar mode of degeneracy in man: hair being transmuted into feathers and wings. Birds were formed from the harmless, but light, airy, and superficial men; who, though carrying their minds aloft to the study of kosmical phenomena, studied them by visual observation and not by reason, foolishly imagining that they had discovered the way of reaching truth.<sup>7</sup>

The more brutal land animals proceeded from men totally destitute of philosophy, who neither looked up to the heavens nor cared for celestial objects: from men making no use whatever of the rotations of their encephalic soul, but following exclusively the guidance of the lower soul in the trunk. Through such tastes and occupations, both their heads and their anterior limbs became dragged down to the earth by the force of affinity. Moreover, when the rotations of the encephalic soul, from want of exercise, became slackened and fell into desuetude, the round form of the cranium was lost, and converted into an oblong or some other form. These men thus degenerated into quadrupeds and multipeds: the Gods furnishing a greater number of feet in proportion to the stupidity of each, in order that its approximations to earth might be multiplied. To some of the more stupid, however, the Gods gave no feet nor limbs at all; constraining them to drag the whole length of their bodies along the ground, and to become Reptiles.<sup>8</sup>

Out of the most stupid and senseless of mankind, by still greater degeneracy, the Gods formed Fishes or Aquatic Animals:—the fourth and lowest genus, after Men, Birds, Land-Animals. This race of beings, from their extreme want of mind, were not considered worthy to live on earth, or to respire thin and pure air. They were condemned to respire nothing but deep and turbid water, many of them, as oysters, and other descriptions of shellfish, being fixed down at the lowest depth or bottom.<sup>9</sup>

It is by such transitions (concludes the Platonic Timæus) that the different races of animals passed originally, and still continue to pass, into each other. The interchange

<sup>7</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 91 E.

<sup>8</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 91-92.

<sup>9</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 92 B.

is determined by the acquisition or loss of reason or irrationality.<sup>b</sup>

The vast range of topics, included in this curious exposition, is truly remarkable: Kosmogony or Theogony, First Philosophy, Physics, (resting upon Geometry and Arithmetic), Zoology, Physiology, Anatomy, Pathology, Therapeutics, mental as well as physical. Of all these, I have not been able to furnish more than scanty illustrations: but the whole are well worthy of study, as the conjectures of a great and ingenious mind in the existing state of knowledge and belief among the Greeks: and all the more worthy, because they form in many respects a striking contrast with the points of view prevalent in more recent times.

Large range  
of topics in-  
troduced in  
the *Timæus*.

The position and functions of the Demiurgus, in the *Timæus*, form a peculiar phase in Grecian philosophy, and even in the doctrine of Plato himself: for the theology and kosmology of the *Timæus* differ considerably from what we read in the *Phædrus*, *Politikus*, *Republic*, *Leges*, &c. The Demiurgus is presented in *Timæus* as a personal agent, pre-kosmical and extra-kosmical: but he appears only as initiating; he begets or fabricates, once for all, a most beautiful Kosmos (employing all the available material, so that nothing more could afterwards be added). The Kosmos having body and soul, is itself a God, but with many separate Gods resident within it, or attached to it. The Demiurgus then retires, leaving it to be peopled and administered by the Gods thus generated, or by its own soul. His acting and speaking is recounted in the manner of the ancient mythes: and many critics, ancient as well as modern, have supposed that he is intended by Plato only as a mythical personification of the *Idea Boni*: the construction described being only an ideal process, like the generation of a geometrical figure.<sup>c</sup> What-

The Demi-  
urgus of the  
Platonic  
*Timæus*—  
how con-  
ceived by  
other philo-  
sophers of  
the same  
century.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 92 B. καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα τότε καὶ νῦν διαμείβεται τὰ ζῶα εἰς ἄλληλα, νοῦ καὶ ἀνοίας ἀποβολῇ καὶ κτήσει μεταβαλλόμενα.

<sup>c</sup> Stallbaum, *Proleg. ad Timæum*, p. 47.

Zeller, *Platonische Studien*, pp. 207-215; also his *Geschichte der Griechisch-Philosophie*, vol. ii. p. 508 seq. ed. 2nd; and Susemihl, *Genetische Entwicklung der Platon. Philosophie*, vol. ii. pp. 322-340. Ueberweg, *Ueber die Platon. Welt-seele*, p. 69, Brandis;

ever may have been Plato's own intention, in this last sense his hypothesis was interpreted by his immediate successors, Speusippus and Xenokrates, as well as by Eudémus.<sup>d</sup> Aristotle in his comments upon Plato takes little notice of the Demiurgus: the hypothesis (of a distinct personal constructive agent) did not fit into his *principia* of the Kosmos, and he probably ranked it among those mythical modes of philosophising which he expressly pronounces to be unworthy of serious criticism.<sup>e</sup> Various succeeding philosophers also, especially the Stoics, while they insisted much upon Providence, conceived this as residing in the Kosmos itself, and in the divine intra-kosmical agencies.

But though the idea of a pre-kosmic Demiurgus found little favour among the Grecian schools of philosophy, before the

Gesch. der Griech. Philos. ii. cx. pp. 357-365.

A good note of Ast (Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 363 seq.) illustrates the analogy between the Platonic Timæus and the old Greek cosmogonic poems.

<sup>d</sup> Respecting Speusippus and Xenokrates, see Aristotel. De Cælo, i. 10, pp. 279-280, with Scholia, 487, b. 37, 488, b. 15-489, a. 10, Brandis. Respecting Eudemus, Krantor, Eudorus, and the majority of the Platonic followers, see Plutarch, De Animæ Procreatione in Timæo, 1012 D, 1013 A, 1015 D, 1017 B, 1028 B.

Plutarch reasons against them; but he recognises their interpretation as the predominant one.

See also the view ascribed to Speusippus and the Pythagoreans by Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 1072, a. 1, b. 30).

<sup>e</sup> Proklus ad Platon. Tim. ii. pp. 138 E, 328, ed. Schn. ἡ γὰρ μόνος ἡ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ προνοῦντος αἰτία κατεχρήσατο, φησὶν ὁ Θεό-

and another reference to Theophrastus, in Pro. p. 417, p. 177, also pp. 118 E, 279, Schn. Ἀριστοτέλης οὖν τὴν ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ τάξιν οὐκ εἰ—ὁ δὲ Πλάτων Ὀρφεὶ συνεπόμενος ἐν πρώτῳ εἶναι

καὶ τὸ πρὸ τῶν μερῶν δλον. For further coincidences between the Platonic Timæus and Orpheus (ὁ θεόλογος) see Proklus ad Timæ. pp. 233-235, Schn. The passage of Aristotle respecting those who blended mythé

and philosophy is remarkable, Metaphys. B. 1000, a. 9-20. Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἡσίοδου, καὶ πάντες ὅσοι θεολόγοι, μόνον ἐφρόντισαν τοῦ πῦθανοῦ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ἡμῶν δὲ ὠλιγώρησαν—Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν μυθικῶς σοφισζομένων οὐκ ἄξιον μετὰ σπουδῆς σκοπεῖν· παρὰ δὲ τῶν δι' ἀποδείξεως λεγόντων δεῖ πυνθάνεσθαι διερωτῶντας, &c. About those whom Aristotle calls οἱ μεμιγμένοι (partly mythé, partly philosophy) see Metaphys. N, 1091, b. 8.

Compare, on Aristotle's non-recognition of the Platonic Demiurgus, a remarkable note of Prantl, ad Aristot. Physica, viii. p. 524, also p. 478, in his edition of that treatise, Leipsic, 1829. Weisse speaks of the same effect in his translation of the Physica of Aristotle, pp. 350-356, Leips. 1829.

Lichtenstädt, in his ingenious work, (Ueber Platon's Lehren auf dem Gebiete der Natur-Forschung und der Heilkunde, Leipsic, 1826), ranks several of the characteristic tenets of the Timæus as only mythical: the pre-existent Chaos, the divinity of the entire Kosmos, even the metempsychosis, though it is affirmed most directly,—see pp. 24, 46, 48, 86, &c. How much of all this Plato intended as purely mythical, appears to me impossible to determine. I agree with the opinion of Ueberweg, that Plato did not draw any clear line in his own mind between the mythical and the real.—Ueber die Platonisch. Weltseele, pp. 70-71.

Christian era—it was greatly welcomed among the Hellenising Jews at Alexandria, from Aristobulus (about B. C. 150) down to Philo. It formed the suitable point of conjunction, between Hellenic and Judaic speculation. The marked distinction drawn by Plato between the Demiurgus, and the constructed or generated Kosmos, with its in-dwelling Gods—provided a suitable place for the Supreme God of the Jews, degrading the Pagan Gods in comparison. The *Timæus* was compared with the book of Genesis, from which it was even affirmed that Plato had copied. He received the denomination of the atticising Moses: Moses writing in Attic Greek.<sup>f</sup> It was thus that the Platonic *Timæus* became the medium of transition, from the Polytheistic theology which served as philosophy among the early ages of Greece, to the omnipotent Monotheism to which philosophy became subordinated after the Christian era.

Adopted and welcomed by the Alexandrine Jews, as a parallel to the Mosaic Genesis.

Of the vast outline sketched in the *Timæus*, no part illustrates better the point of view of the author, than what is said about human anatomy and physiology. The human body is conceived altogether as subservient to an ethical and æsthetical teleology: it is (like the Praxitelean statue of Eros<sup>g</sup>) a work adapted to an archetypal model in Plato's own heart—his emotions, preferences, antipathies.<sup>h</sup> The leading idea in

Physiology of the Platonic *Timæus*—subordinate to Plato's views of ethical teleology. Triple soul—each soul at once material and mental.

<sup>f</sup> The learned work of Gfrörer—*Philo und die Jüdisch-Alexandrin. Theosophie*—illustrates well this coalescence of Platonism with the Pentateuch in the minds of the Hellenising Jews at Alexandria. "Aristobulus maintained, 150 years earlier than Philo, that not only the oldest Grecian poets, Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, &c., but also the most celebrated thinkers, especially Plato, had acquired all their wisdom from a very old translation of the Pentateuch" (Gfrörer, i. p. 308, also ii. 111-118). The first form of Grecian philosophy which found favour among the Alexandrine Jews was the Platonic:—"since a Jew could not fail to be pleased—besides the magnificent style and high moral tone—with a certain likeness between the Oriental Kosmogonies and the *Timæus*, the favourite treatise of all Theosophists," see p. 72. Compare the same work,

pp. 78-80-167-184-314.

Philo calls Sokrates αὐτὰ προτέλεια τῆς σοφίας

he refers to the terminology of the Platonic *Timæus* (Gfrörer, 308-327-328).

Eusebius (Præp. Ev. ix. 6, xi. 10), citing Aristobulus and Numenius, says τί γὰρ ἐστὶ Πλάτων, ἢ Μωϋσῆς ἀπτικίζων; Compare also the same work, xi. 10-25-29, and xiii. 18, where the harmony between Plato and Moses, and the preference of the author for Plato over other Greek philosophers, are earnestly declared.

See also Vacherot, *Histoire Critique de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie*, vol. i. pp. 110-163-319-335.

<sup>g</sup> Πραξιτέλης δὲν ἐπαι

ἔρωτα

ἐξ ἰδῆς ἑλκων

ἰδῆς—(Anthologia).

<sup>h</sup> Plato says (*Tim.* p. 53 E) that in investigating the fundamental con-

his mind is, What purposes would be most suitable to the presumed character of the Demiurgus, and to those generated Gods who are assumed to act as his ministers? The purposes which Plato ascribes, both to the one and to the others, emanate from his own feelings: they are such as he would himself have aimed at accomplishing, if he had possessed demiurgic power: just as the Republic describes the principles on which he would have constituted a Commonwealth, had he been lawgiver or Oekist. His inventive fancy depicts the interior structure, both of the great Kosmos and of its little human miniature, in a way corresponding to these sublime purposes. The three souls, each with its appropriate place and functions, form the cardinal principle of the organism:<sup>1</sup> the unity of which is maintained by the spinal marrow in continuity with the brain; all the three souls having their roots in different parts of this continuous line. Neither of these three souls is immaterial, in the sense which that word now bears: even the encephalic rational soul—the most exalted in function, and commander of the other two—has its own extension and rotatory motion: as the kosmical soul has also, though yet more exalted in its

figuration of the elements you must search for the most beautiful: these will of course be the true ones. Again, p. 72 E, ἐκ δὲ λογισμοῦ τοιοῦδε ξυνίστασθαι μάλιστα' ἂν αὐτῷ πάντων πρέποι. Galen applies an analogous principle of reasoning to explain the structure of apes, whom he pronounces to be a caricature of man. Man having a rational and intelligent soul, Nature has properly attached to it an admirable bodily organism: with equal propriety she has assigned to the ape a ridiculous bodily organism, because he has a ridiculous soul—λέγειεν ἂν ἡ φύσις, γελοίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ζῶν γελοῖαν ἐχρὴν δοθῆναι σώματος κατασκευὴν (De Usu Partium, i. c. 13, pp. 80-81, iii. 16, p. 284, xiii. 2, p. 126, xv. 8, p. 252, Kühn).

<sup>1</sup> Respecting a view analogous to that of Plato, M. Littré observes, in his Proleg. to the Hippocratic treatise *Περὶ Καρδίας* (Œuvres d'Hippocrate T. ix. p. 77):—"Deux fois l'auteur s'occupe des fins de la structure (du cœur) et admire avec quelle habileté elles sont atteintes. La première, c'est

à-propos des valvules sigmoïdes: il est instruit de leur usage, qui est de fermer le cœur du côté de l'artère: et dès-lors, son admiration ne se méprend pas, quand il fait remarquer avec quelle exactitude ils accomplissent leur office. Mais elle se méprend quand, se tournant vers les oreillettes, elle loue la main de l'artiste habile qui les a si bien arrangées pour souffler l'air dans le cœur. Ces déceptions de la téléologie sont perpétuelles dans l'histoire de la science: à chaque instant, on s'est extasié devant des structures que l'imagination seule appropriait à certaines fonctions. 'Cet optimisme' (dit Condorcet dans son *Fragment sur l'Atlantide*) 'qui consiste à trouver tout à merveille dans la nature telle qu'on l'invente, à condition d'admirer également sa sagesse, si par malheur on avait découvert qu'elle a suivi d'autres combinaisons: cet optimisme de détail doit être banni de la philosophie, dont le but n'est pas d'admirer, mais de connaître: qui, dans l'étude, cherche la vérité, et non des motifs de reconnaissance.'"

endowments. All these souls have material properties, and are implicated essentially with other material agents:<sup>k</sup> all are at once material and mental. The encephalic or rational soul has its share in material properties, while the abdominal or appetitive soul also has its share in mental properties: even the liver has for its function to exhibit images impressed by the rational soul, and to serve as the theatre of prophetic representations.<sup>l</sup>

The Platonic doctrine, of three souls in one organism, derives a peculiar interest from the earnest way in which it is espoused afterwards by Galen. This last author represents Plato as agreeing in main doctrines with Hippokrates. He has composed nine distinct Dissertations or Books, for the purpose of upholding their joint doctrines. But the agreement which he shows between Hippokrates and Plato is very vague, and his own agreement with Plato is rather ethical than physiological. What is the essence of the three souls, and whether they are immortal or not, Galen leaves undecided:<sup>m</sup> but that there must be three distinct souls in each human body, and that the supposition of one soul only is an absurdity—he considers Plato to have positively demonstrated. He rejects the doctrine of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Poseidonius, and others, who acknowledged only one soul, lodged in the heart, but with distinct co-existent powers.<sup>n</sup>

So far Galen concurs with Plato. But he connects this triplicity of soul with a physiological theory of his own, which he professes to derive from, or at least to hold in common with, Hippokrates and Plato. Galen recognises three ἀρχαί—*principia*, beginnings, originating and governing organs—in the body: the brain, which is the origin of all the nerves, both of

Triplcity  
of the soul—  
espoused  
afterwards  
by Galen.

Admiration  
of Galen for  
Plato—his  
agreement  
with Plato,  
and his dis-  
sension from  
Plato—his  
improved  
physiology.

<sup>k</sup> Proklus could hardly make out that Plato recognised any ψυχὴν ἀμέθεκτον, ad Tim. ii. pp. 220, 94 A.

<sup>l</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 71 B-C. The criticism of Aristotle (De Partibus Animal. iv. 2, 676, b. 21) is directed against this doctrine, but without naming Plato. But when Aristotle says Οἱ

σῶς τινὸς εἶναι σημεῖον, οὐ λέγουσιν, he substitutes the *bile* in

place of the liver. Plato does not connect the bile with the liver. In Aristotle's mind the two are intimately associated.

<sup>m</sup> Galen, De Fœtuum Formatione, p. 701, Kühn. Περί Οὐσίας τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων, p. 703. Περί τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡθῶν, p. 773.

<sup>n</sup> Galen, De Hipp. et Plat. Dogm. iii. pp. 337-347, Kühn, vi. pp. 515-516, i. p. 200, iv. p. 303, ix. p. 727.

sensation and motion: the heart, the origin of the arteries: the liver, the sanguifacient organ, and the origin of the veins which distribute nourishment to all parts of the body. These three are respectively the organs of the rational, the energetic, and the appetitive soul.<sup>o</sup>

The Galenian theory here propounded (which held its place in physiology until Harvey's great discovery of the circulation of the blood in the seventeenth century), though proved by fuller investigation to be altogether erroneous as to the liver—and partially erroneous as to the heart—is nevertheless made by its author to rest upon plausible reasons, as well as upon many anatomical facts, and results of experiments on the animal body, by tying or cutting nerves and arteries.<sup>p</sup> Its resemblance with the Platonic theory is altogether superficial: while the Galenian reasoning, so far from resembling the Platonic, stands in striking contrast with it.

<sup>o</sup> Galen, *Hip. et Pl. D.* viii. pp. 656-657, Kühn. ἐξ ὧν ἐπεραίνεται ἡ

πάλιν εἶπεται, καὶ τῆς κοινῆς πρὸς τὰ  
εὖς ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ  
ἦντινα δύναμιν ὁ Πλάτων  
Compare

519-572, vii. 600-601.

The same triplicity of ἀρχαὶ in the organism had been recognised by Erasistratus, later than Aristotle, though long before Galen. Καὶ Ἐρασι-  
στράτος δὲ ὡς ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα ὅλου  
σώματος ὑποτιθέμενος τὴν τριπλοκίαν  
τῶν ἀγγείων, νῆυρα, καὶ φλέβας, καὶ  
(Galen, *T.* iv. p. 375, ed.  
Basil). See Littré, *Introduction aux*  
*Œuvres d'Hippocrate*, T. i. p. 203.

Plato does not say, as Galen declares him to say, that the appetitive soul has its primary seat or ἀρχὴ in the liver. It has its seat between the diaphragm and the navel; the liver is placed in this region as an outlying fort, occupied by the rational soul, and used for the purpose of controuling the rebellious tendencies of the appetitive soul. Chrysippus (ap. Galen, *H.* and *P.* iii. p. 288, K.) stated Plato's doctrine about the τριμερὲς ψυχὴ more simply and faithfully than Galen himself. Compare his words *ib.* viii. p. 651, vi. p. 519. Galen represents Plato as saying that nourishment is furnished by the stomach first to the liver, to be there made into blood and sent round

the body through the veins (pp. 576-578). This is Galen's own theory (*De Usu Partium*, iv. p. 208, K.), but it is not to be found in Plato. Whoever reads the *Timæus*, pp. 77-78, will see that Plato's theory of the conversion of food into blood, and its transmission as blood through the veins, is altogether different. It is here that he propounds his singular hypothesis—the interior network of air and fire, and the oscillating ebb and flow of these intense agencies in the cavity of the abdomen. The liver has nothing to do with the process.

So again Galen (p. 573) puts upon the words of Plato about the heart—*πηγὴν τοῦ περιφερομένου σφοδρῶς αἵματος*—an interpretation conformable to the Galenian theory, but noway consistent with the statements of the *Timæus* itself. And he treats the comparison of the cranium and the rotations of the brain within, to the rotations of the spherical *Kosmos*—which comparison weighed greatly in Plato's mind—as an illustrative simile without any philosophical value (Galen, *H.* et *P.* D. ii. 4, p. 230, Kühn; *Plato*, *Tim.* pp. 41 B, 90 A).

<sup>p</sup> Galen (*Hip. Pl. Dogm.* ii. p. 233, K.), καίτοι γε ἡμεῖς, ἀπερ ἐπαγγελλόμεθα λόγῳ, ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ζώων ἀνατομαῖς ἐπιδείκνυμεν, &c. P. 220. Πόθεν οὖν τοῦτο  
ἄλλοθεν, ἢ ἐκ τῶν

Anxious as Galen is to extol Plato, his manner of expounding and defending the Platonic thesis is such as to mark the scientific progress realised during the five centuries intervening between the two. Plato himself, in the *Timæus*, displays little interest or curiosity about the facts of physiology: the connecting principles, whereby he explains to himself the mechanism of the organs as known by ordinary experience, are altogether psychological, ethical, teleological. In the praise which Galen, with his very superior knowledge of the human organism, bestows upon the *Timæus*, he unconsciously substitutes a new doctrine of his own, differing materially from that of Plato.

I have no space here to touch on the interesting comparisons which might be made between the physiology and pathology of the *Timæus*—and that which we read in other authors of the same century—Aristotle and the Hippocratic treatises. More than one allusion is made in the *Timæus* to physicians: and Plato cites Hippokrates in other dialogues with respect.<sup>q</sup> The study and practice of medicine was at that time greatly affected by the current speculations respecting Nature as a whole: accomplished physicians combined both lines of study, implicating kosmical and biological theories:<sup>r</sup> and in the Platonic *Timæus*, the former might properly be comprised in the latter, since the entire Kosmos is regarded as one animated and rational being. Among the sixty treatises in the Hippocratic collection, composed by different authors, there are material differences—sometimes even positive opposition

Physiology and pathology of Plato—compared with that of Aristotle and the Hippocratic treatises.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 270; *Protagoras*, p. 311.

<sup>r</sup> See a remarkable passage, Aristotle. *De Sensu*, 430, a. 21, τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφώτερος τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες, &c.: also *De Respiratione*, ad finem, 480, b. 21, and *Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς*, i. p. 403, a. 5. τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ χαριέντες. Compare Hippokrat. *De Aere, Locis*, &c., c. 2.

M. Littré observes:—

“La science antique, et par conséquent la médecine qui en formait une branche, est essentiellement synthétique. Platon, dans le *Charmide*, dit qu'on ne peut guérir la partie sans le tout. Le philosophe avait pris cette

idée à l'enseignement médical qui se donnait de son temps: cet enseignement partait donc du tout, de l'ensemble. Nous en avons la preuve dans le livre même du *Pronostic*, qui nous montre d'une manière frappante comment la composition des écrits particuliers se subordonne à la conception générale de la science. Ce livre, tel qu'Hippocrate l'a composé, ne pouvait se faire qu'à une époque où la médecine conservait encore l'empreinte des doctrines encyclopédiques qui avaient constitué le fond de tout l'enseignement oriental.” (Littré, *Œuvres D'Hippocrate*, T. ii. p. 66. Argument prefixed to the *Prognostic*.)

—both of doctrine and spirit. Some of them are the work of practitioners, familiar with the details of sickness and bodily injuries, as well as with the various modes of treatment: others again proceed from pure theorists, following out some speculative dogmas more or less plausible, but usually vague and indeterminate. It is to one of this last class of treatises that Galen chiefly refers, when he dwells upon the agreement between Plato and Hippokrates.\* This is the point which the Platonic Timæus has in common with both Hippokrates and Aristotle. But on the other hand, Timæus appears entirely wanting in that element of observation, and special care about matters of fact, which these two last-mentioned authors very frequently display, even while confusing themselves by much vagueness of dogmatising theory. The Timæus evinces no special study of matters of fact: it contains ingenious and fanciful combinations, dictated chiefly from the ethical and theological point of view, but brought to bear upon such limited amount of knowledge as an accomplished man of

\* He alludes especially to the Hippokratic treatise *Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου*, see *De Hipp. et Plat. Dogm.* viii. pp. 674-710, ed Kühn.

In the valuable Hippokratic composition—*Περὶ Ἀρχαίης Ἱητρικῆς*—(vol. i. pp. 570-630, ed. Littré) the author distinguished *ἱητροί*, properly so-called, from *σοφισταί*, who merely laid down general principles about medicine. He enters a protest against the employment, in reference to medicine, of those large and indefinite assumptions which characterised the works of Sophists or physical philosophers such as Empedokles (pp. 570-620, Littré). “Such compositions,” he says, “belong less to the medical art than to the art of literary composition”—*ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων μὲν ὅσα τινὲς εἰρηται σοφιστῇ ἢ ἱητρῷ, ἢ γέγραπται περὶ φύσιος, ἥσων νομίζω τῇ ἱατρικῇ τέχνῃ προσήκειν ἢ τῇ γραφικῇ* (p. 620). Such men cannot (he says) deal with a case of actual sickness: they ought to speak intelligible language—*γνωστὰ λέγειν τοῖσι δημότησι* (p. 572). Again, in the Treatise *De Aere, Locis, et Aquis*, Hippokrates defends himself against the charge of entering upon topics which are *μετεωρόλογα* (vol. ii. p. 14, Littré).

The Platonic Timæus would have been considered by Hippokrates as the work of a *σοφιστής*. It was composed not for professional readers alone, but for the public—*ἐπίστασθαι ἐς ὅσον εἰκὸς ἰδιώτην*—(Hippokrat. *Περὶ Παθῶν*, vol. vi. p. 208, Littré).

The Hippokratic treatises afford evidence of an established art, with traditions of tolerably long standing, a considerable medical literature, and even much oral debate on medical subjects—*ἐναντίον ἀκροατέων* (Hipp. *Περὶ Νούσων*, vol. vi. pp. 140-142-150, Littré). “Ὅς ἂν περὶ ἰήσεως ἐθέλῃ ἐρωτᾶν τε ὁρθῶς καὶ ἐρωτᾶντι ἀποκρινοσθαι, καὶ ἀντιλέγειν ὁρθῶς, ἐνθυμέσθαι χρὴ τάδε—Ταῦτα ἐνθυμηθέντα διαφυλάσσειν δεῖ ἐν τοῖσι λόγοισιν· ὅ, τι ἂν δέ τις τούτων ἀμαρτάνῃ, ἢ λέγων ἢ ἐρωτῶν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος,—ταύτη φυλάσσοντα χρὴ ἐπιτίθεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἀντιλογίᾳ.

The method, which Sokrates and Plato applied to ethical topics, was thus applied by others to medicine and medical dogmas. How the dogmas of the Platonic Timæus would have fared, if scrutinised with oral interrogations in this spirit, by men even far inferior to Sokrates himself in acuteness—I will not say.

Plato's day could hardly fail to acquire without special study. In the extreme importance which it assigns to diet, regimen, and bodily discipline, it agrees generally with Hippokrates: but for the most part, the points of contrast are more notable than those of agreement.

From the glowing terms in which Plato describes the architectonic skill and foresight of those Gods who put together the three souls and the body of man, we should anticipate that the fabric would be perfect, and efficacious for all intended purposes, in spite of interruptions or accidents. But Plato, when he passes from purposes to results, is constrained to draw a far darker picture. He tells us that the mechanism of the human body will work well, only so long as the juncture of the constituent triangles is fresh and tight: after that period of freshness has passed, it begins to fail.<sup>4</sup> But besides this, there exist a formidable catalogues of diseases, attacking both body and mind: the cause of which (Plato says) "is plain to every one:" they proceed from excess, or deficiency, or displacement, of some one among the four constituent elements of the human body." If we enquire why the wise Constructors put together their materials in so faulty a manner, the only reply to be made is, that the counteracting hand of Necessity was too strong for them. In the Hesiodic and other legends respecting anthropogony we find at least a happy commencement, and the deterioration gradually supervening after it. But Plato opens the scene at once with all the suffering reality of the iron age—

Contrast between the admiration of Plato for the constructors of the Kosmos, and the defective results which he describes.

Νοῦσοι δ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἐφ' ἣ

When Plato tells us that most part of the tenants of earth, air, and water—all women, birds, quadrupeds, reptiles, and fishes—are the deteriorated representatives of primitive men, constructed at the beginning with

Plat. Tim. pp. 81-89 B.

Plat. Tim. p. 82. δῆλόν που καὶ παντί.

public, ii. p. 379 C, about the prodigious preponderance of κακὰ over n the life of man.

Compare what Plato says in Re-

the most provident skill, but debased by degeneracy in various directions—this doctrine (something analogous to the theory of Darwin with its steps inverted) indicates that the original scheme of the Demiurgus, though magnificent in its *ensemble* with reference to the entire Kosmos, was certain from the beginning to fail in its details. For we are told that the introduction of birds, quadrupeds, &c., as among the constituents of the Auto-zôon, was an essential part of the original scheme.<sup>x</sup> The constructing Gods, while forming men upon a pure non-sexual type (such as that invoked by the austere Hippolytus) exempt from the temptations of the most violent appetite,<sup>y</sup> foresaw that such an angelic type could not maintain itself:—that they would be obliged to reconstruct the whole human organism upon the bi-sexual principle, introducing the comparatively lower type of woman:—and that they must make preparation for the still more degenerate varieties of birds and quadrupeds, into which the corrupt and stupid portion of mankind would sink.<sup>z</sup> Plato does indeed tell us, that the primitive non-sexual type had the option of maintaining itself; and that it perished by its own fault alone.<sup>a</sup> But since we find that not one representative of it has been able to hold his ground:—and since we also read in Plato, that no man is willingly corrupt, but that corruption and stupidity of mind are like fevers and other diseases, under which a man suffers against his own consent<sup>b</sup>:—we see that the option was surrounded with insurmountable difficulties: and that the steady and continued degradation, under which the human race has sunk from its original perfection into the lower endowments of the animal world, can be ascribed only to the impracticability of the original scheme: that is, in other words, to the obstacles interposed by implacable Necessity, frustrating the benevolent purposes of the Constructors.

However, all these details, attesting the low and poor actual condition of the tenants of earth, water, and air—and

<sup>x</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 41 B-C.

<sup>y</sup> Eurip. Hippol. 615; Medea, 573;  
Milton, Paradise Lost, x. 888.

παῖδας τεκνοῦσθαι, θῆλυ δ' οὐκ εἶναι  
γένος  
ἀνδρὸς οὐκ ἔστι

<sup>z</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 76 D. ὡς γάρ, ποτε  
γυναῖκες καὶ τέλλα θηρία  
ἡπίσταντο οἱ ξυνιστάν  
, &c. Compare pp. 90 E, 91.

<sup>a</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 42.

<sup>b</sup> Plat. Tim. pp. 86-87.

forming so marked a contrast to the magnificent description of the Kosmos as a whole, with the splendid type of men who were established at first alone in its central region—all these are hurried over by Plato, as unwelcome accompaniments which he cannot put out of sight. They have their analogies even in the kosmical agencies: there are destructive kosmical forces, earthquakes, deluges, conflagrations, &c., noticed as occurring periodically, and as causing the almost total extinction of different communities.<sup>c</sup> Though they must not be altogether omitted, he will nevertheless touch them as briefly as possible.<sup>d</sup> He turns aside from this, the shameful side of the Kosmos, to the sublime conception of it with which he had begun, and which he now builds up again in the following poetical doxology—the concluding words of the Timæus:—

Close of the Timæus. Plato turns away from the shameful results, and reverts to the glorification of the primitive types.

“Let us now declare that the discourse respecting the Universe is brought to its close. This Kosmos, having received its complement of animals, mortal and immortal, has become greatest, best, most beautiful and most perfect: a visible animal comprehending all things visible—a perceivable God the image of the cogitable God: this Uranus, one and only begotten.”<sup>e</sup>

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Timæus, pp. 22, 23. Legg. iii. 677. Politikus, pp. 272, 273.

Plat. Tim. p. 90 E. τὰ γὰρ ἅλλα γέγονεν αὐτὸν διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμή τις ἀνάγκη μηκύνειν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐμμετρότερός τις ἂν αὐτῷ δόξειε περὶ τοὺς τούτων λόγους εἶναι.

<sup>e</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 92 C. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τέλος περὶ τοῦ παντὸς νῦν ἤδη τὸν λόγον φῶμεν ἔχειν· θνητὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῶα λαβὼν καὶ συμπληρωθεὶς ὁδε ὁ κόσμος, οὕτω ζῶον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον, εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς καὶ ἀριστος καὶ

Weh! Weh  
Du hast sie zerstört,  
Die schöne Welt,  
Mit mächtiger Faust;  
Sie stürzt, sie zerfällt!  
Ein Halb-Gott hat sie zerschlagen!  
Wir tragen  
Die Trummern ins Nichts hinüber,  
Und klagen  
Ueber die verlorne Schöne!  
Mächtiger  
Der Erdensöhne,  
Prachtiger  
Baue sie wieder,  
In deinem Busen baue sie auf!

(The response of the Geister-Chor, in Goethe's Faust, after the accumulated imprecations uttered by Faust in his despair.)

ὁ οὐρανός;

## KRITIAS.

The dialogue Kritias exists only as a fragment, breaking off abruptly in the middle of a sentence. The ancient Platonists found it in the same condition, and it probably was never finished. We know however the general scheme and purpose for which it was destined.

The proœmium to the Timæus introduces us to three persons<sup>a</sup>:—Kritias and Hermokrates, along with Sokrates. It is to them (as we now learn) that Sokrates had on the preceding day recited the Republic: a fourth hearer having been present besides, whom Sokrates expects to see now, but does not see—and who is said to be absent from illness. In requital for the intellectual treat received from Sokrates, Timæus delivers the discourse which we have just passed in review: Kritias next enters upon his narrative or exposition, now lying before us as a fragment: and Hermokrates was intended to follow it up with a fourth discourse, upon some other topic not specified. It appears as if Plato, after having finished the Republic as a distinct dialogue, conceived subsequently the idea of making it the basis of a Tetralogy, to be composed as follows: 1. *Timæus*: describing the construction of the divine Kosmos, soul and body—with its tenants divine and human; “the diapason ending full in man”—but having its harmony spoiled by the degeneration of man, and the partial substitution of inferior animals. 2. *Republic*: Man in a constituted

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Tim. p. 17 B-C. εἰς, δύο, τρεῖς· ὁ δὲ δὴ τέταρτος ἡμῖν, ὃ φίλει Τίμαιε, ποῦ, τῶν χθές μὲν δαιτυμόνων, τάνῳν δ' ἐστιατόρων;

These are the words with which the Platonic Sokrates opens this dialogue. Proklus, in his Commentary on the Timæus (i. pp. 5-10-14, ed. Schneider), notices a multiplicity of insignificant questions raised by the ancient Platonic critics upon this exordium. The earliest whom he notices is Praxiphanes, the friend of Theophrastus, who blamed Plato for the absurdity of making Sokrates count aloud one, two, three, &c. Porphyry replied to him at length.

We see here that the habit of commenting on the Platonic dialogues began in the generation immediately after Plato's death, that is, the generation of Demetrius Phalereus.

Whom does Plato intend for the fourth person, unnamed and absent? Upon this point the Platonic critics indulged in a variety of conjectures, suggesting several different persons as intended. Proklus (p. 14, Schn.) remarks upon these critics justly—ὡς οὔτε ἄξια ζητήσεως ζητούντας, οὐτ' ἀσφαλές τι λέγοντας. But the comments which he proceeds to cite from his master Syrianus are not at all more instructive (pp. 15-16, Sch.).

society, administered by a few skilful professional Rulers, subject to perfect ethical training, and fortified by the most tutelary habits. 3. *Kritias*: this perfect society, exhibited in energetic action, and under pressure of terrible enemies. 4. *Hermokrates*—subject unknown: perhaps the same society, exhibited under circumstances calculated to try their justice and temperance, rather than their courage. Of this intended tetralogy the first two members alone exist: the third was left unfinished: and the fourth was never commenced. But the Republic appears to me to have been originally a distinct composition. An afterthought of Plato induced him to rank it as second piece in a projected tetralogy.<sup>b</sup>

The subject embraced by the *Kritias* is traced back to an unfinished epic poem of Solon, intended by that poet and lawgiver to celebrate a memorable exploit of Athenian antiquity, which he had heard from the priests of the Goddess Neïth or Athênê at Sais in Egypt. These priests (Plato tells us) treated the Greeks as children, compared with the venerable antiquity of their own ancestors: they despised the short backward reckoning of the heroic genealogies at Athens or Argos. There were in the temple of Athênê at Sais records of past time for 9000 years back: and among these records was one, of that date, commemorating a glorious exploit, of the Athenians as they then had been, unknown to Solon or any of his countrymen.<sup>c</sup> The Athens of 9000 years anterior to Solon,

Subject of  
the *Kritias*.

zens of Platonie Republic are identified with ancient Athenians.

<sup>b</sup> Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 370-371) declares the fragment of the *Kritias* now existing to be spurious and altogether unworthy of Plato. His opinion appears to me unfounded, and has not obtained assent; but his arguments are as good as those upon which other critics reject so many other dialogues. He thinks the *Kritias* an inferior production: therefore it cannot have been composed by Plato. Socher also thinks that the whole allusion, made by Plato in this dialogue to Solon, is a fiction by Plato himself. That the intended epic about Atlantis would have been Plato's own fiction, I do not doubt, but it appears to me that Solon's poems (as they then existed, though fragmentary) must have contained allusions to Egyptian priests

with whom he had conversed in Egypt, and to their abundance of historical anecdote (Plutarch, Solon, c. 26-31). It is not improbable that Solon did leave an unfinished Egyptian poem.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 22-23. The great knowledge of past history (real or supposed) possessed by the Egyptian priests, and the length of their back chronology, alleged by themselves to depend upon records preserved from a period of 17,000 years, are well known from the interesting narrative of Herodotus (ii. 37-43-77-145)—

ες (the priests of Egypt)  
πάντων μάλιστα, λογι  
τῶν ἐγὼ ἐς διάπειραν  
μην—καὶ ταῦτα ἀτρεκέως φασὶν ἐπί-  
στασθαι, αἰεὶ τε λογιζόμενοι, καὶ αἰεὶ  
Herodotus

had been great, powerful, courageous, admirably governed, and distinguished for every kind of virtue.<sup>d</sup> Athênê, the presiding Goddess both of Athens and of Sais, had bestowed upon the Athenians a salubrious climate, fertile soil, a healthy breed of citizens, and highly endowed intelligence. Under her auspices, they were excellent alike in war and in philosophy.<sup>e</sup> The separation of professions was fully realised among them, according to the principle laid down in the Republic as the only foundation for a good commonwealth. The military class, composed of both sexes, was quartered in barrack on the akropolis; which was at that time more spacious than it had since become—and which possessed then, in common with the whole surface of Attica, a rich soil covering that rocky bottom to which it had been reduced in the Platonic age, through successive deluges.<sup>f</sup> These soldiers, male and female, were maintained by contributions from the remaining community: they lived in perpetual drill, having neither separate property, nor separate families, nor gold nor silver: lastly, their procreation was strictly regulated, and their numbers kept from either increase or diminution.<sup>g</sup> The husbandmen and the artizans were alike excellent in their respective professions, to which they were exclusively confined:<sup>h</sup> Hephæstus being the partner of Athênê in joint tutelary presidency, and joint occupation of the central temple on the akropolis. Thus admirably administered, the Athenians were not only powerful at home, but also chiefs or leaders of all

(ii. 143) tells us that the Egyptian priests at Thebes held the same language to the historian Hekateus, as Plato here says that they held to Solon, when he talked about Grecian antiquity in the persons of Phorôneus and Niobê. Hekateus laid before them his own genealogy—a dignified list of sixteen ancestors, beginning from a God—upon which they out-bid him with a counter-genealogy (ἀντεγενεαλόγησαν) of 345 chief priests, who had succeeded each other from father to son. Plato appears to have contracted great reverence for this long duration of unchanged regulations in Egypt, and for the fixed, consecrated, customs, with minute subdivision of professional castes and employments: the hymns,

psalmody, and music, having continued without alteration for 10,000 years (*literally* 10,000—οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστὸν, ἀλλ' ὄντως, Plat. Legg. ii. p. 656 E).

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 23 C-D.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Tim. p. 24 C. ἔτε οὖν φιλοπόλεμος τε καὶ φιλόσοφος ἡ θεὸς οὐσα, &c., p. 23 C.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Kritias, pp. 110 C, 112 B-D.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Krit. p. 112 D. πλήθος δὲ διαφυλάττοντες δ, τι μάλιστα ταῦτ' ἑαυτῶν εἶναι πρὸς τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, &c.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Krit. p. 111 E. ὑπὸ γεωργῶν μὲν ἀληθινῶν καὶ πραττόντων αὐτὸ τοῦτο, γῆν δὲ ἀρίστην καὶ ὕδωρ ἀφθονώτατον ἐχόντων, &c. p. 110 C.

the cities comprised under the Hellenic name: chiefs by the voluntary choice and consent of the subordinates. But the old Attic race by whom these achievements had been performed, belonged to a former geological period: they had perished, nearly all, by violent catastrophe — leaving the actual Athenians as imperfect representatives.

Such was the enviable condition of Athens and Attica, at a period 9400 years before the Christian era. The Platonic Kritias takes pains to assure us that the statement was true, both as to facts and as to dates: that he had heard it himself when a boy of ten years old, from his grandfather Kritias, then ninety years old, whose father Dropides had been the intimate friend of Solon: and that Solon had heard it from the priests at Sais, who offered to show him the contemporary record of all its details in their temple archives.<sup>i</sup> Kritias now proposes to repeat this narrative to Sokrates, as a fulfilment of the wish expressed by the latter to see the citizens of the Platonic Republic exhibited in full action and movement. For the Athenians of 9000 years before, having been organised on the principles of that Republic, may fairly be taken as representing its citizens. And it will be more satisfactory to Sokrates to hear a recital of real history than a series of imagined exploits.<sup>k</sup>

Plato professes that what he is about to recount is matter of history, recorded by Egyptian priests.

Accordingly, Kritias proceeds to describe, in some detail, the formidable invaders against whom these old Athenians had successfully contended: the inhabitants of the vast island Atlantis (larger than Libya and Asia united), which once occupied most of the space now filled by the great ocean westward of Gades and the pillars of Heraklès. This prodigious island was governed by ten kings of a common ancestry: descending respectively from ten sons (among whom Atlas was first-born and chief) of the God Poseidon by the indigenous Nymph Kleito.<sup>l</sup> We read an imposing description of its large population and abundant produce of every kind: grain for man,

Description of the vast island of Atlantis and its powerful kings.

<sup>i</sup> Plat. Tim. pp. 23 E, 24 A-D. τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς περὶ πάντων ἐφεξῆς εἰσαυθὺς κατὰ σχολὴν, αὐτὰ τὰ γράμματα λαβόντες, διέξιμεν.

<sup>k</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 26 D-E.

<sup>l</sup> Plat. Kritias, pp. 113-114

pasture for animals, elephants being abundant among them :<sup>m</sup> timber and metals of all varieties : besides which the central city, with its works for defence, and its artificial canals, bridges, and harbour, is depicted as a wonder to behold.<sup>n</sup> The temple of Poseidon was magnificent and of vast dimensions, though in barbaric style.<sup>o</sup> The harbour, surrounded by a dense and industrious population, was full of trading vessels arriving with merchandise from all quarters.<sup>p</sup>

The Atlantid kings, besides this great power and prosperity at home, exercised dominion over all Libya as far as Egypt, and over all Europe as far as Tyrrhenia. Corruption and wickedness of the Atlantid people. The corrupting influence of such vast power was at first counteracted by their divine descent and the attributes attached to it : but the divine attributes became more and more adulterated at each successive generation, so that the breed was no longer qualified to contend against corruption. The kings came to be intoxicated with wealth, full of exorbitant ambition and rapacity, reckless of temperance or justice. The measure of their iniquity at length became full ; and Zeus was constrained to take notice of it, for the purpose of inflicting the chastisement which the case required.<sup>q</sup> He summoned a meeting of the Gods, at his own Panoptikon in the centre of the Kosmos, and there addressed them.

At this critical moment the fragment called Kritias breaks off. Conjectures as to what the Platonic Kritias would have been—an ethical epic in prose. We do not know what was the plan which Plato (in the true spirit of the ancient epic) was about to put into the mouth of Zeus, for the information of the divine agora. We learn only that Plato intended to recount an invasion of Attica, by an army of Atlantids almost irresistible : and the glorious repulse thereof by Athens and her allies, with very inferior forces. The tale would have borne much resemblance to the Persian invasion of Greece, as recounted by Herodotus : but Plato, while employing the same religious agencies which that historian puts in the foreground, would probably have invested them with a more ethical character, and would have arranged

Plat. Krit. p. 114 E.

Plat. Krit. p. 115 D.

, &c.

Plat. Krit. p. 116 D-E.

Plat. Krit. p. 117 E.

Plat. Krit. p. 121.

the narrative so as to illustrate the triumph of philosophical Reason and disciplined Energy, over gigantic, impetuous, and reckless Strength. He would have described in detail the heroic valour and endurance of the trained Athenian Soldiers, women as well as men: and he would have embodied the superior Reason of the philosophical Chiefs not merely in prudent orders given to subordinates, but also in wise discourses<sup>r</sup> and deliberations such as we read in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon. We should have had an edifying epic in prose, if Plato had completed his project. Unfortunately we know only two small fractions of it: first the introductory prologue (which I have already noticed)—lastly, the concluding catastrophe. The conclusion was, that both the victors and the vanquished disappeared altogether, and became extinct. Terrific earthquakes, and not less terrific deluges, shook and overspread the earth. The whole military caste of Attica were, in one day and night, swallowed up into the bowels of the earth (the same release as Zeus granted to the just *Amphiaraus*)<sup>s</sup> and no more heard of: while not only the population of Atlantis, but that entire island itself, was submerged beneath the Ocean. The subsidence of this vast island has rendered navigation impossible; there is nothing in the Atlantic Ocean but shallow water and mud.<sup>t</sup>

The epic of Plato would thus have concluded with an appalling catastrophe of physical agencies or divine prodigies (such as that which we read at the close of the *Æschylean Prometheus*"), under which both the contending parties perished. These gigantic outbursts of kosmical forces, along with the other facts, Plato affirms to have been recorded in the archives of the Egyptian priests. He wishes us to believe that the whole transaction is historical. As to particular narratives, the line between truth and fiction was obscurely drawn in his mind.

Plato represents the epic *Kritias* as matter of recorded history.

<sup>r</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 19 C-E. κατὰ τε τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις πράξεις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διερμηνεύσεις.

<sup>s</sup> Apollodorus, iii. 6, 6; Pausanias, ix. 8, 2.

<sup>t</sup> Plat. Tim. p. 125 C-D.

γέγονε τὸ ἐκεῖ πῆλαγος, &c.

Respecting the shallow and muddy water of the Atlantic and its unnavigable character, as believed in the age of Plato, see a long note in my 'History of Greece' (ch. xviii. vol. iii. p. 381).

<sup>u</sup> *Æschyl. Prom.* 1086.

καὶ νυκτὸς  
&c. ἄπορον καὶ

Another remark here deserving of notice is, That in this epic of the Kritias, Plato introduces the violent and destructive kosmical agencies (earthquakes, deluges, and the like) as frequently occurring, and as one cause of the periodical destruction of many races or communities. It is in this way that the Egyptian priest is made to explain to Solon the reason why no long-continued past records were preserved in Attica, or anywhere else, except in Egypt.\* This last-mentioned country was exempt from such calamities: but in other countries the thread of tradition was frequently broken, because the whole race (except a few) were periodically destroyed by deluges or conflagrations, leaving only a few survivors miserably poor, without arts or letters. The affirmation of these frequent destructions stands in marked contradiction with the chief thesis announced at the beginning of the *Timæus*—viz., the beauty and perfection of the *Kosmos*.

\* Plato, *Tim.* pp. 22 C-D, 23 B-C.

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

## LEGES AND EPINOMIS.

THE Dialogue, entitled *Leges—De Legibus—The Laws*—distributed into twelve books, besides its Appendix the *Epinomis*, and longer than any other of the Platonic compositions—is presented to us as held in Krete during a walk from the town of Knossus to the temple of Zeus under Mount Ida—between three elderly persons: Megillus, a Spartan—Kleinias, a Kretan of Knossus—and an Athenian who bears no name, but serves as the principal expositor and conductor. That this dialogue was composed by Plato after the *Republic*, we know from the express deposition of Aristotle: that it was the work of Plato's old age—probably the last which he ever composed, and perhaps not completely finished at his death—is what we learn from the scanty amount of external evidence accessible to us. The internal evidence, as far as it goes, tends to bear out the same conclusion, and to show that it was written during the last seven years of his life, when he was more than seventy years of age.<sup>a</sup>

\* The allusions of Aristotle to Plato as the author of the *Laws*, after the *Republic*, occur in *Politica*, ii. b. 1264, b. 26, 1267, b. 5, 1271, b. 1, 1274, b. 9. According to Diogenes Laertius (v. 22) Aristotle had composed separate works *Τὰ ἐκ Νόμων Πλάτωνος γ—Τὰ ἐκ τῆς Πολιτείας β.*

Plutarch (*De Isid. et Osir.* p. 370 E) ascribes the composition of the *Laws* to Plato's old age. In the *Προλεγόμενα εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίαν*, it is said that the treatise was left unfinished at his death, and completed afterwards by his disciple the Opuntian Philippus — (Hermann's Edition of Plato's Works, vol. vi. p. 218).—Diog. Laert. iii. 37.

See the learned *Prolegomena* of

Stallbaum, who collects all the information on this subject, and who gives his own judgment (p. lxxxi.) respecting the tone of senility pervading the *Leges*, in terms which deserve the more attention as coming from so unqualified an admirer of Plato:—"Totum Legum opus nescio quid senile refert, ut profecto etiam hanc ob causam a senio scriptum esse longè verisimilimum videatur." The allusion in the *Laws* (i. p. 638 A) to the conquest of the Epizephyrian Lokrians by the Syracusans, which occurred in 350 B.C., is pointed out by Boeckh as showing that the composition was posterior to that date (Boeckh, *ad Platon. Minoem*, pp.

It is remarkable that Aristotle, in

*Leges*, the longest of Plato's works—Persons of the dialogue.

All critics have remarked the many and important differences between the Republic and the Laws. And it seems certain, that during the interval which separates the two, Plato's point of view must have undergone a considerable change. We know from himself that he intended the *Kritias* as a sequel to the *Timæus* and Republic: a portion of the *Kritias* still exists, as we have just seen—but it breaks off abruptly, and there is no ground for believing that it was ever completed. We know farther from himself that he projected an ulterior dialogue or exposition, assigned to Hermokrates, as sequel to the *Kritias*: both being destined to exhibit in actual working and manifestation, the political scheme, of which the Republic had described the constituent elements.<sup>b</sup> While the *Kritias* was prematurely arrested in its progress towards maturity, the Hermokrates probably was never born. Yet we know certainly that both the one and the other were conceived by Plato, as parts of one comprehensive project, afterwards abandoned. Nay, the *Kritias* was so abruptly abandoned, that it terminates with an unfinished sentence: as I have stated in the last chapter.

To what extent such change of project was brought about by external circumstances in Plato's life, we cannot with certainty determine. But we know that there really occurred circumstances, well calculated to produce a material change in his intellectual character and point of view. His personal adventures and experience, after his sixty-first year, and after the death of the elder Dionysius (B.C. 367), were of an eventful and melancholy character. Among them were included his two visits to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse; together with

Untoward circumstances of Plato's later life—His altered tone in regard to philosophy.

canvassing the opinions delivered by the Ἀθηναῖος ξένος in the Laws, cites them as the opinions of Sokrates (Polit. ii. 1265, b. 11), who, however, does not appear at all in the dialogue. Either this is a lapse of memory on the part of Aristotle; or else (which I think very possible) the Laws were originally composed with Sokrates as the expositor introduced, the change of name being subsequently made from a feeling of impropriety in transporting Sokrates to Krete, and from the dogmatising anti-dialectic tone which pervades the lectures ascribed to him. Some Platonic expositors regarded the Athenian Stranger in Leges as Plato himself (Diogen. L. iii. 52; Schol. ad Leg. 1). Diogenes himself calls him a πλάσμα

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 20-27. Plato, *Kritias*, p. 108.

the earnest sympathy and counsel which he bestowed on his friend Dion; whose chequered career terminated, after an interval of brilliant promise, in disappointment, disgrace, and violent death. Plato not only suffered much distress, but incurred more or less of censure, from the share which he had taken, or was at least supposed to have taken, in the tragedy. His own letters remain to attest the fact.<sup>c</sup> Considering the numerous enemies which philosophy has had at all times, we may be sure that such enemies would be furnished with abundant materials for invidious remark—by the entire failure of Plato himself at Syracuse—as well as by the disgraceful proceedings first of Dion, next, of his assassin Kallippus: both of them pupils, and the former a favourite pupil, of Plato in the Academy. The prospect, which accident had opened, of exalting philosophy into active influence over mankind, had been closed in a way no less mournful than dishonourable. Plato must have felt this keenly enough, even apart from the taunts of opponents. We might naturally expect that his latest written compositions would be coloured by such a temper of mind: that he would contract, if not an alienation from philosophy, at least a comparative mistrust of any practical good to come from it: and that if his senile fancy still continued to throw out any schemes of social construction, they would be made to rest upon other foundations, eliminating or reducing to a minimum that ascendancy of the philo-

<sup>c</sup> See especially the interesting and valuable *Epistola vii.* of Plato; also the life of Dion by Plutarch.

The reader will find a full account of Plato's proceedings in Sicily, and of the adventures of Dion, in chap. 84 of my 'History of Greece.'

The passage of Plato in *Leg. iv.* 709-710 (alluding to the concurrence and co-operation of a youthful despot, sober-minded and moderate, but not exalted up to the level of philosophy, with a competent lawgiver for the purpose of constructing a civic community, furnished with the best laws) is supposed by K. F. Hermann (*System der Platon. Philos.* p. 69) and by Zeller (*Die Philosoph. der Griechen*, vol. ii. p. 310, ed. 2nd.) to allude to the hopes which Plato cherished when he undertook his first visit to the younger

Dionysius at Syracuse. See *Epistol. vii.* pp. 327 C, 330 A-B, 334 C; *Epistol. ii.* 311 B.

Such allusion is sufficiently probable. Yet we must remember that the Magnetic community, described by Plato in the *Treatise De Legibus*, does not derive its origin from any established despot or prince, but from a general resolution supposed to have been taken by the Kretan cities, and from a Decemviral executive Board of Knossian citizens nominated by them. Kleinias, as a chief member of this Board, solicits the suggestion of laws from the Athenian elder (Legg. iii. p. 702 C). This is more analogous to Plato's subsequent counsel, after his attempt to guide the younger Dionysius had failed. See *Epistol. vii.* p. 337 C-E.

sophical mind, which he had once held to be omnipotent and indispensable.

Comparing the Laws with the earlier compositions of Plato, the difference between them will be found to correspond pretty nearly with the change thus indicated in his point of view. If we turn to the Republic, we find Plato dividing the intelligible world (*τὸ νοητὸν*) into two sections: the higher, that of pure and absolute Ideas, with which philosophy and dialectics deal—the lower, that of Ideas not quite pure, but implicated more or less with sensible illustration, to which the mathematician applies himself: the chief use of the lower section is said to consist in its serving as preparation for a comprehension of the higher.<sup>d</sup> But in the Laws, this higher or dialectical section—the last finish or crowning result of the teaching process, is left out; while even the lower or mathematical section is wrapped up with theology. Moreover, the teaching provided in the Laws, for the ruling Elders, is presented as something new, which Plato has much difficulty both in devising and in explaining: we must therefore understand him to distinguish it pointedly from the teaching which he had before provided for the Elders in the Republic.<sup>e</sup> Again, literary occupation is now kept down rather than encouraged: Plato is more afraid lest his citizens should have too much of it than too little.<sup>f</sup> As for the Sokratic Elenchus, it is not merely not commended, but it is even proscribed and denounced by implication, since free speech and criticism generally is barred out by the rigorous Platonic censorship. On the other hand, the ethical sentiment in the Leges, with its terms designating the varieties of virtue, is much the same as in other Platonic compositions: the political and social doctrine also, though different in some material points, is yet very analogous on several others. But

<sup>d</sup> See the passages, Plat. Legg. vii. pp. 811 B-819 A. Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 510-511. *τὰ δύο τμήματα οὐ εἶδη τοῦ νοητοῦ*: vii. p. 534 E. *ὥσπερ τοῖς*

<sup>e</sup> Plat. Legg. p. 966 D, xii. pp. 968 C-E, 969 A. Compare vii. p. 818 E. In p. 966 D, the study of astronomy is enforced on the ground

that it is one of the strongest evidences of natural theology: in p. 818 C, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy are advocated as studies, because, without having gone through them, a man cannot become a God, a Dæmon, or a Hero, competent to exercise effective care over mankind. This is altogether different from the Republic. <sup>f</sup> Plat. Legg. vii. pp. 811 B, 819 A.

these ethical and political doctrines appear in the Laws much more merged in dogmatic theology than in other dialogues. This theology is of Pythagorean character—implicated directly and intimately with astronomy—and indirectly with arithmetic and geometry also. We have here an astronomical religion, or a religious astronomy, by whichever of the two names it may be called. Right belief on astronomy is orthodoxy and virtue: erroneous belief on astronomy is heretical and criminal.

In the *Timæus*, Plato recommended the study of astronomy, in order that the rotations of man's soul in his cranium, which were from the beginning disturbed and irregular, might become regularised, and assimilated by continued contemplation to the perfect uniformity of the celestial and kosmical movements.<sup>g</sup> In the *Leges*, he recommends astronomy to be studied, because without it we fall into blasphemous errors respecting the kosmical movements, and because such kosmical errors are among the three varieties of heresy, to one or other of which the commission of all crimes against society may be traced.<sup>h</sup> Hence we find Plato, in the city here described, consecrating his astronomical views as a part of the state-religion, and prohibiting dissent from them under the most stringent penalties. In the general spirit of the *Treatise de Legibus*, Plato approximates to Xenophon and the Spartan model. He keeps his eye fixed on the perpetual coercive discipline of the average citizen. This discipline, prescribed in all its details by the lawgiver, includes a modicum of literary teaching equal to all; small in quantity, and rigorously sifted as to quality, through the censorial sieve. The intellectual and speculative genius of the community, which other Platonic dialogues bring into the foreground, has disappeared from the *Treatise de Legibus*. We find here no youths pregnant with undisclosed original thought, which Sokrates assists them in bringing forth: such as Theætétus, Charmidès, Kleinias, and others—pictures among the most interesting which the ancient world presents, and lending peculiar charm to the earlier dialogues. Not only no provision is made for them, but severe precautions are taken

<sup>g</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, p. 47 B-C.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Legg.* vii. pp. 821 D, 822 C; x. pp. 885 B, 886 E.

against them. Even in the Republic, Plato had banished poets, or had at least forbidden them to follow the free inspirations of the Muse, and had subjected them to censorial controul. But such controul was presumed to be exercised by highly trained speculative and philosophical minds, for the perpetual succession of whom express provision was made. In the Treatise de Legibus, such speculative minds are no longer admitted. Philosophy is interdicted or put in chains as well as poetry. An orthodox religious creed is exalted into exclusive ascendancy. All crime or immorality is ascribed to a departure from this creed.<sup>1</sup> The early communities (Plato tells us<sup>k</sup>), who were simple and ignorant, destitute of arts and letters, but who at the same time believed implicitly all that they heard from their seniors respecting Gods and men, and adopted the dicta of their seniors respecting good and evil, without enquiry or suspicion—were decidedly superior to his contemporaries in all the departments of virtue—justice, temperance, and courage. This antithesis, between virtue and religious faith on the one side, and arts and letters with an inquisitive spirit on the other, presenting the latter as a depraving influence, antagonistic to the former—is analogous to the Bacchæ of Euripides—the work of that poet's old age<sup>l</sup>—and analogous also to the Nubes of Aristophanes, wherein the literary and philosophical teaching of Sokrates is represented as withdrawing youth from the received religious creed, and as leading them by consequence to the commission of fraud and crime.<sup>m</sup>

The submergence and discredit of letters and philosophy, which pervades the Dialogue de Legibus, is farther indicated by the personages introduced as conversing. In all the other Platonic dialogues, the scene is laid

Scene of the  
Leges, not in  
Athens, but  
in Krete.  
Persons Kre-  
tan and

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 885 B.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 679. Compare p. 689 D.

<sup>l</sup> Lobeck, Aglaophamus, p. 623. "Superest fabula (Euripidis) Bacchæ, dithyrambi quam tragediæ similior, totaque ita comparata, ut contra illius temporis Rationalistas scripta videatur; quâ et Bacchicarum religionum sanctimonia commendatur, et rerum divinarum disceptatio ab eruditorum

judiciis ad populi transfertur suffragia:—

πρᾶξις φρένα τε

(427)."

Compare vv. 200-203 of the same drama.

<sup>m</sup> Aristophan. Nubes, 116-875, c

at Athens, and the speakers are educated citizens of Athens; sometimes visitors, equally or better educated, from other Grecian cities. Generally, they are either adults who have already acquired some intellectual eminence, or youths anxious to acquire it. Nikias and Laches, Melesias and Lysimachus (in the *Lachês*), are among the leaders (past or present) of the Athenian public assembly. Anytus (in the *Menon*) is a man not so much ignorant of letters as despising letters.<sup>a</sup> Moreover Sokrates himself formally disclaims positive knowledge, professing to be only a searcher for truth along with the rest.<sup>o</sup> But the scene of the *Laws* is laid in Krete, not at Athens: the three speakers are not merely all old men, but frequently allude to their old age. One of them only is an Athenian, to whom the positive and expository duty is assigned: the other two are Megillus, a Spartan, and Kleinias, a Kretan of Knossus. Now both Sparta, and the communities of Krete, were among the most unlettered portions of the Hellenic name. They were not only strangers to that impulse of rhetoric, dialectic, and philosophical speculation which, having its chief domicile at Athens, had become diffused more or less over a large portion of Greece since the Persian war—but they were sparingly conversant even with that old poetical culture, epic and lyric, which belonged to the age of Solon and the Seven Wise Men. The public training of youth at Sparta, equal for all the citizens, included nothing of letters and music, which in other cities were considered to be the characteristics of an educated Greek:<sup>p</sup> though probably individual Spartans, more or fewer, acquired these accomplishments for themselves. Gymnastics, with a slight admixture of simple choric music and a still slighter

Spartan, comparatively illiterate.

<sup>a</sup> Tacitus, *Dialog. de Orator.* c. 2. "Aper, communi eruditione imbutus, contemnebat potius literas quam nesciebat."

Nikias is said to have made his son Nikêratus learn by heart the entire *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of Homer; at least this is the statement of Nikêratus himself in the *Symposion* of Xenophon (iii. 5).

This profession appears even in the *Gorgias* (p. 506 A) and in the *Republic* (v. p. 450 D).

See Xenophon, *Republ. Laced.* c. 2.

Compare the description given by Xenophon in the *Cyropædia* (1, 2, 6) of the public training of Persian youth, which passage bears striking analogy to his description of the Spartan training. The public *διδάσκαλοι* are not mentioned as teaching *γυμναστικά*, which belong to Athens and other cities, but as teaching justice, temperance, self-command, obedience, bodily endurance, the use of the bow and the javelin, &c.

admixture of poetry and letters, formed the characteristic culture of Sparta and Krete.<sup>a</sup> In the *Leges*, Plato not only notes the fact, but treats it as indicating a better social condition, compared with Athens and other Greeks—that both Spartans and Kretans were alike unacquainted with the old epic or theological poems (Hesiod, Orpheus, &c.), and with the modern philosophical speculations.<sup>r</sup>

Not simply on this negative ground, but on another positive ground also, Sparta and Krête were well suited to furnish listeners for the Laws.<sup>s</sup> Their gymnastic discipline and military drill, especially the Spartan, were stricter and more continuous than anywhere else in Greece: including toilsome fatigue, endurance of pain, heat, and cold, and frequent conflicts with and without arms between different fractions of citizens. The individual and the family were more thoroughly merged in the community: the citizens were trained for war, interdicted from industry, and forbidden to go abroad without permission: attendance on the public mess-table was compulsory on all citizens: the training of youth was uniform, under official authority: the two systems were instituted, both of them, by divine authority—the Spartan by Apollo, the Kretan by Zeus—Lykurgus and Minos, semi-divine persons, being the respective instruments and mediators. In neither of them was any public criticism tolerated upon the laws and institutions (this is a point capital in Plato's view<sup>t</sup>). No voice was allowed among the young men except that of constant eulogy, extolling the system as not merely excellent but of divine

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Legg.* ii. p. 673 B.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 886 B. εἰσὶν ἡμῖν ἐν γράμμασι λόγοι κείμενοι, οἱ παρ' ὑμῖν οὐκ εἰσὶ δι' ἀρετῆν πολιτείας, ὥς ἐγὼ μανθάνω, οἱ μὲν ἔν τισι μέτροις οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων λέγοντες περὶ θεῶν, οἱ μὲν παλαιότατοι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ πρώτη φύσις οὐράνιοι τῶν τε ἄλλων, προϊόντες τε τῆς  
 λὺν θεογονίαν

τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εἰ μὲν εἰς ἄλλο τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, οὐ βῆδιν ἐπιτιμᾶν παλαιοῖς οὐσι, &c.

<sup>s</sup> Ephorus ap. Strabo, x. 480; Xenophon. *Repub.* Lac. c. 4-6; Isokrates, *Busiris*, *Orat.* xi. s. 19; Aristot. *Politic.*

ii. capp. 9 and 10, pp. 1270-1271, and viii. 9, p. 1338, b. 15; also chap. vi. of the second part of my 'History of Greece,' with the references there given.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 634 E. γὰρ, εἴπερ καὶ μετρίως κατεσκευάσται εἰς τὰ

εἰν ὡς πάντα καλῶς κείται θέντων ὦν, καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλως λέγῃ, μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἀκούοντας, &c.

Compare Demosthen. *adv. Leptin.* p. 489, where a similar affirmation is made respecting Sparta.

origin, and resenting all contradiction: none but an old man was permitted to suggest doubts, and he only in private whisper to the Archon, when no young man was near. Both in Sparta and Krete the public authorities stood forward as the conspicuous, positive, constant, agents; enforcing upon each individual a known type of character and habits. There was thus an intelligible purpose, political and social, as contrasted with other neighbouring societies, in which no special purpose revealed itself.<sup>u</sup> Both Sparta and Krete, moreover, had continued in the main unchanged from a time immemorial. In this, as in numerous other points, the two systems were cognate and similar.<sup>x</sup>

Comparing the Platonic Leges with the Platonic Republic, the difference between them will be illustrated by the theory laid down in the Politikus. We read therein,<sup>y</sup> that the process of governing mankind well is an art, depending upon scientific principles;

Difference between Leges and Republic, illustrated by reference to the Politikus

<sup>u</sup> These other cities are what Plato calls αἱ τῶν εἰκῇ πολιτευομένων πολιτεῖαι (Legg. i. p. 635 E), and what Aristotle calls νόμιμα χυδῆν κείμενα, Polit. vii. 1324, b. 5.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Legg. i. p. 624, iii. pp. 691 E, 696 A, iii. p. 683. Krete and Sparta, ἀδελφοὶ νόμοι.

K. F. Hermann (in his instructive Dissertation, *De Vestigiis Institutorum veterum imprimis Atticorum*, apud Platonem de Legibus) represents Sparta and Krete as types of customs and institutions which had once been general in Greece, but had been discontinued in the other Grecian cities. "Hoc imprimis in Lacedæmoniorum et Cretensium Respublicas cadit, quæ cum et antiquissimæ Græciæ indolem fidelissimè servasse viderentur et moribus ac disciplinâ publicâ optimè fundatæ essent, non mirum est eas Græco philosopho ad eò placuisse ut earum formam et libris de Civitate et Legibus quasi pro fundamento subiceret" (p. 19, compare pp. 13-15-23) "unde (sc. a legitimis Græcarum civitatum principiis) licet plurimi temporum decursu descivissent atque in alia omnia abiissent, nihil tamen Plato proposuit, nisi quod optimus quisque in Græciâ semper expetierat et persecutus erat," p. 15. I think this view is not correct, though it is adopted

more or less by various critics. Sparta and Krete are not specimens (in my judgment) of what all or most Grecian cities once had been—nor of pure Dorism, as K. O. Müller affirms. On the contrary I believe them to have been very peculiar, Sparta especially. So far they resembled all early Greeks, that neither literature nor luxury had grown up among them. But neither the Syssitia nor the *disciplina publica* had ever subsisted among other Greeks; and these were the two characteristic features of Krete and Sparta, more especially of the latter. They were the two features which arrested Plato's attention, and upon which he brought his constructive imagination to bear; constructing upon one principle in his Republic, and upon a different principle in his Dialogue de Legibus. While he copies these two main features from Sparta, he borrows many or most of his special laws from Athens; but the ends with reference to which he puts these elements together, are his own. K. F. Hermann, in his anxiety to rescue Plato from the charge of rashness ("temerario ingenii lusu," p. 18), understates Plato's originality.

<sup>y</sup> See above, vol. ii. ch. xxviii. p. 488

like the art of the physician, the general, the steersman : that it aims at the attainment of a given End, the well-being of the governed—and that none except the scientific or artistic Ruler know either the end or the means of attaining it : that such rulers are the rarest of all artists, never more than one or a very few, combining philosophical aptitude with philosophical training : but that when they are found, society ought to trust and obey their directions without any fixed law : that no peremptory law can be made to fit all contingencies, and that their art is the only law which they ought to follow in each particular conjuncture. If no such persons can be found, good government is an impossibility : but the next best thing to be done is, to establish fixed laws, as good as you can, and to ensure that they shall be obeyed by every one. Now the Platonic Republic aims at realising the first of these two ideal projects : everything in it turns upon the discretionary orders of the philosophical King or Oligarchy, and even the elaborate training of the Guardians serves only to make them perfect instruments for the execution of those orders. But the Platonic Leges or Treatise on Laws corresponds only to the second or less ambitious project—a tolerable imitation of the first and best.<sup>2</sup> Instead of philosophical rulers, one or a few invested with discretionary power, we have a scheme of political constitution—an alternation of powers temporary and responsible, an apportionment of functions and duties—a variety of laws enacted, with magistrates and dikasteries provided to apply them. Plato, or his Athenian spokesman, appears as adviser and as persuader ; but the laws must be such as the body of citizens can be persuaded to adopt. There is moreover a scheme of education embodied in the laws : the individual citizen is placed under dominion at once spiritual and temporal : but the infallibility resides in the laws, and authority is exercised over him only by periodical magistrates who enforce them and determine in their name. It is the Laws which govern—not philosophical Artists of King-Craft.

The three first books of the Leges are occupied with general preliminary discussions on the ends at which laws and poli-

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Politikus, pp. 293 C-297 C.

tical institutions ought to aim—on the means which they ought to employ—and on the ethical effects of various institutions in moulding the character of the citizens. “For private citizens” (the Athenian says), “it is enough to say, in reply to the criticism of strangers, This is the law or custom with us. But what I propose to examine is, the wisdom of the lawgiver from whom the law proceeds.”<sup>a</sup> At the end of book three, Kleinias announces that the Kretans are about to found a new colony on a deserted site at one end of the island, and that they have confided to a committee of ten Knossians (himself among the number), the task of establishing a constitution and laws for the colony. He invites the Athenian to advise and co-operate with this committee. In the fourth book, we enter upon the special conditions of this colonial project, to which the constitution and laws must conform. It is not until the fifth book that the Athenian speaker begins to declare what constitutional provisions, and what legal enactments, he recommends. His recommendations are continued throughout all the remaining Treatise—from the fifth book, to the twelfth or last. They are however largely interspersed with persuasive addresses, expositions, homilies, and comminations, sometimes of extreme prolixity and vehemence,<sup>b</sup> on various topics of ethics and religion: which indeed occupy a much larger space than the Laws themselves.

Large proportion of preliminary discussions and didactic exhortation in the *Leges*.

The Athenian speaker avails himself of the privilege of old age to criticise the Spartan and Kretan institutions more freely than is approved by his two companions; who feel bound to uphold against all dissentients the divine origin of their respective polities.<sup>c</sup> On enquiring from them what is the purpose of their peculiar institutions—the Syssitia or public mess-table—the gymnastic discipline—the military drill—he is

Scope of the discussion laid down by the Athenian speaker—The Spartan institutions are framed only  
—T  
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<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 637 D. πᾶς γὰρ ρινόμενος ἐρεῖ θαυμάζοντι ξένῳ, τὴν αὐτοῖς ἀθήθειαν δρῶντι, Μὴ θαύμαζε ἐνε νόμος ἔσθ' ἡμῖν οὗτος, ἴσως δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἕτερος ἡμῖν δ' νῦν οὐ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν οὐ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν αὐτῶν κακίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς.

<sup>b</sup> This is what Plato alludes to in the *Politikus* (p. 304 A) as “rhetoric enlisted in the service of the Euler,”—  
κοινωνοῦσα ῥητορεία τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι  
<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 630 D, ii. p. 667 A.

informed by both, that the purpose is to ensure habits of courage, strength, and skill, with a view to superiority in war over foreign enemies: war being, in their judgment, the usual and natural condition of the different communities into which mankind are distributed.<sup>d</sup> Such is the test according to which they determine the good constitution of a city. But the Athenian—proclaiming as the scope of his enquiry,<sup>e</sup> What is it which is *right or wrong by nature, in laws?*—will not admit the test as thus laid down. War against foreign enemies (*i.e.* enemies foreign to the city-community) is only one among many varieties of war. There exist other varieties besides:—war among the citizens of the same town—among the constituent villages of the same city-community—among the brethren of the same family—among the constituent elements of the same individual man.<sup>f</sup> Though these varieties of war or discord are of frequent occurrence, they are not the less evils, inconsistent with that *idéal* of the Best which a wise lawgiver will seek to approach.<sup>g</sup> Whenever any of them occur, he ought to ensure to the good and wise elements victory over the evil and stupid. But his *idéal* should be, to obviate the occurrence of war altogether—to adjust harmoniously the relation between the better and worse elements, disposing the latter towards a willing subordination and co-operation with the former.<sup>h</sup> Though courage in war is one indispensable virtue, it stands only fourth on the list—wisdom, justice, and temperance, being before it. *Your* aim is to inculcate not virtue, but only one part of virtue.<sup>i</sup> Many mercenary soldiers, possessing courage in perfection, are unjust, foolish, and worthless in all other respects.<sup>k</sup>

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. i. pp. 625-626. ὅρον τῆς εὖ πολιτευομένης πόλεως, &c.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. i. p. 627 C. ὁρθότητος τε καὶ ἀμαρτίας περὶ νόμων, ἥ τις ποτ' ἐστὶ φύσει. P. 630 E.

Compare the enquiry in the *Kratylus* respecting naming, wherein consists the ὁρθότης φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων. See above, vol. ii. ch. xxix. p. 501 seq.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. i. p. 626.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. i. p. 628 D.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. i. p. 627 E.

<sup>i</sup> τὸν

ἰάσας ἑὴν ἀρχεσθαι ἔκοντας

The *idéal* which Plato here sets

forth coincides mainly with that which Xenophon adopts as his theme both in the *Cyropædia* and in the *Economicus* (see the beginning of the former and the close of the latter) τὸ ἐθελοδύνατον ἀρχεῖν.

<sup>j</sup> Aristotle cites and approves this criticism of Plato, ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις, *Politic.* ii. 9, p. 1271, b. 1. Compare vii. 14, 1333, b. 15.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. i. p. 630 A. The doctrine—that courage is possessed by many persons who have no other virtue—which is here assigned by Plato to his leading speaker the Athenian, appears

If you wish (says the Athenian to Kleinias) to make out a plenary defence and advocacy of the Kretan system, you ought to do it in the following way :

Principles on which the institutions of a state ought to be defended—You must show that its ethical purpose and working is good.

Our laws deserve the celebrity which they have acquired in Greece, because they make us happy, and provide us with all kinds of good things: both with such as are divine and with such as are human. The divine are, Wisdom or Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Courage: the human are, Health, Beauty, Strength, Activity, Wealth. The human depend upon the divine, are certain to follow them, and are not to be obtained without them. All the regulations and precepts of the lawgiver are directed to the attainment and protection of these ends—to establish among the citizens a moral tone of praise and blame favourable to that purpose. He seeks to inculcate on the citizens a body of sentiment, as to what is honourable and not honourable—such as may guide their pleasures and pains, their desires and aversions—and such as may keep their minds right amidst all the disaster (disease, war, poverty, &c.) as well as the prosperity of life. He next regulates the properties, the acquisitions, and the expenditure of the citizens, together with their relations to each other on these heads, upon principles of justice enforced by suitable penalties. Lastly, he appoints magistrates of approved wisdom and right judgment to enforce the regulations. The cementing authority is thus wisdom, following out purposes of temperance and justice, not of ambition or love of money.

Such is the course of exposition (says the Athenian) which ought to be adopted. Now tell me—In what manner are the objects here defined ensured by the institutions of Apollo and Zeus at Sparta and Krete? You two ought to show me: for I myself cannot discern it.<sup>1</sup>

in the Protagoras as advocated by Protagoras and impugned by Sokrates (p. 349 D). But the arguments whereby Sokrates impugns it are (according to Stallbaum) known by Plato himself to be mere captious tricks (*laquei dialectici*—*captiosè et arguté conclusa*, *ad sophistam illudendum et perturbandum*) employed only for the pur-

pose of puzzling and turning into ridicule an eminent Sophist. (See Stallbaum, *not. ad loc.* and *Præf. ad Protag.* p. 28.) I have already remarked elsewhere, that I think this supposition alike gratuitous and improbable.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 632.

This passage is of some value, because it gives us, thus early in the Treatise, a brief summary of that which Plato desiderates in the two systems here noted—and of that which he intends to supply in his own. We see that he looks upon a political constitution and laws as merely secondary and instrumental: that he postulates as the primary and fundamental fabric, a given religious and ethical character implanted in the citizens: that the lawgiver, in his view, combines the spiritual and temporal authority, making the latter subordinate to the former, and determining not merely what laws the citizens shall obey, but how they shall distribute their approval and aversion—religious, ethical, and æsthetical. It is the lawgiver alone who is responsible and who is open to praise or censure: for to the people, of each different community and different system, established custom is always a valid authority.<sup>m</sup>

We Spartans (says Megillus) implant courage in our citizens not merely by our public mess-table and gymnastic, but also by inuring them to support pain and hardship. We cause them to suffer severe pain in the gymnopædia, in pugilistic contests, and other ways: we put them to hardships and privations in the Kryptia and in hunting. We thus accustom them to endurance. Moreover, we strictly forbid all indulgences such as drunkenness. Nothing of the kind is seen at Sparta, not even at the festival of Dionysus; nothing like the drinking which I have seen at Athens, and still more at Tarentum.<sup>n</sup>

How is it (says the Athenian) that you deal so differently

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. i. p. 637 D.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Legg. i. pp. 633 B-637 A.

Plato puts into the mouth of the Athenian a remark that in some other cities (not Sparta or Kretan) these *συσσίτια* or public mess-tables had been found to lead to intestine sedition and disturbance (p. 636 B). He instances the cases of the Boeotians, the Milesians, and the Thurians. It is much to be lamented that we cannot assign the particular events and conjunctures here adverted to. The Spartan and Kretan Syssitia were daily, compulsory, and universal among the citizens, besides the strictness of

the regulations: under such conditions they were peculiar to these two places, as far as our knowledge goes: the Syssitia in Southern Italy (noticed by Aristotle, Polit. vii. 10, p. 1329 b.) are not known and seemingly unimportant. The Syssitia in Boeotia, &c., may probably have been occasional or periodical banquets among members of the same tribe, deme, club, or *θίαιος*—and voluntary besides, neither prescribed nor regulated by law. Such meetings might very probably give occasion to disturbances under particular circumstances.

with pains and pleasures? To make your citizens firm against pain, you expose them designedly to severe pains: if they were kept free from pains, you would have no confidence in their firmness against painful actualities, when any such shall occur. But in regard to pleasures, you are content with simple prohibition. You provide no means for strengthening your citizens against the temptations of pleasure. Are you satisfied that their courage (or self-command) shall be lame or one-sided—good against pains, but not good against pleasures?° In determining about laws, the whole enquiry turns upon pleasures and pains, both in the city and in individual dispositions. These are the two natural fountains, from which he who draws such draughts as is proper, obtains happiness: while every one who draws unwisely and out of season, will fail of obtaining happiness.ᵑ

Why are not the citizens tested in like manner, in regard to resistance against the seductions of pleasure?

Besides, as to drunkenness, we must not be too hasty in condemnation of it. We must not pronounce generally respecting any institution without examining the circumstances, persons, regulations, &c., attending it. Such hasty praise and censure is very misleading. Many other nations act upon the opposite practice. But I (says Plato) shall not pretend to decide the point by witnesses and authority. I shall adopt another course of investigation, and shall show you, in this particular case, a specimen of the way in which all such institutions ought to be criticised and appreciated.ᶞ

Drunkenness forbidden at Sparta, and blamed by the Spartan converser. The Athenian proceeds to enquire how far such unqualified prohibition is justifiable.

Plato here digresses<sup>†</sup> from his main purpose to examine the question of drunkenness. He will not allow it to be set aside absolutely and offhand, by a self-justifying ethical sentiment, without reason assigned, defence tendered, accompanying precautions discussed. Upon this, as upon the social functions

Plato, Legg. i. pp. 633-634 A.  
 ἢν τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

καὶ μύρια ἐπὶ μυρίοις  
 αὐτῶν

Plato, Legg. i. p. 636 D-E.

ᶞ Plato, Legg. i. p. 638 D-E. Τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον ὃν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δεῖν λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου, τῆς πειρώμενος ἀνὰ ἅρα δύναμαι τὴν περὶ πάντων τούτων ὁρθὴν μέθοδον ὑμῖν δηλοῦν,

Here Plato (as in the Sophistēs, Politikus, and elsewhere) announces that the special enquiry is intended to illustrate a general method.

<sup>†</sup> He himself notes it as a digression, iii. p. 682 E.

proper for the female sex, he is a dissenter from the common view. He selects the subject as a case for exhibiting the proper method of criticism respecting social institutions; not without some consciousness that the discussion, if looked at in itself (like the examples of scientific classification or diæresis in the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*), would appear unduly prolonged.<sup>a</sup>

To illustrate his peculiar views<sup>t</sup> on the subject of drunkenness, we may refer to the picture of Sokrates which he presents in the *Symposion*, more especial in the latter half of that dialogue, after the appearance of Alkibiades. In this dialogue the occasion is supposed to be festive and joyous. Eros is in the ascendant, and is made the subject of a panegyric by each of the guests in succession. Sokrates partakes in the temper of the society, proclaiming himself to be ignorant of all other matters except those relating to Love.<sup>u</sup> In all the Platonic writings there is hardly anything more striking than the panegyric upon Eros there pronounced by Sokrates, blending the idea of love with that of philosophical dialectics, and refining the erotic impulse into an enthusiastic aspiration for that generation of new contemplative power, by the colloquial intercourse of two minds reciprocally stimulating each other, which brings them at last into a clear view of the objects of the ideal or intelligible world. Until the appearance of Alkibiades, little wine is swallowed, and the guests are perfectly sober. But Alkibiades, being intoxicated when he first comes in, becomes at once the prominent character of the piece. He is represented as directing the large wine-cooler to be filled with wine (about four pints), first swallowing the whole himself then ordering it to be filled again for Sokrates, who does the like: Alkibiades observing, "Whatever quantity of wine you prescribe to Sokrates, he will drink it without becoming drunk."<sup>x</sup> Alkibiades then, instead of panegyrising Eros,

Description  
of Sokrates  
in the Sym-  
posion—his  
self-com-  
mand under  
abundant  
potations.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Legg.* i. pp. 642 A, 645 D. Compare the *Politikus*, pp. 264 A-286 C-E.

<sup>t</sup> Aristotle especially notes this as one among the peculiarities of Plato (*Politic.* ii. 9, 20).

<sup>u</sup> Plato, *Symp.* p. 177 D. ἐγὼ ὅς οὐδέν φημι ἄλλο ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρω-  
, &c. P. 198 D. εἴφ  
τὰ ἐρωτικά.

Plato, *Symp.* pp. 213-214.

undertakes to pronounce a panegyric on Sokrates: proclaiming that nothing shall be said but what is true, and being relieved from all reserve by his drunken condition.<sup>y</sup> In this panegyric he describes emphatically the playful irony of Sokrates, and the magical influence exercised by his conversation over young men. But though Sokrates thus acquired irresistible ascendancy over others, himself (Alkibiades) included, no one else acquired the least hold over Sokrates. His will and character, under a playful exterior, were self-sufficing and self-determining; independent of influences from without, to such a degree as was almost insulting to any one who sought either to captivate or oblige him.<sup>z</sup> The self-command of Sokrates was unshaken either by seduction on one side, or by pain and hardship on the other. He faced danger with a courage never surpassed; he endured hunger, fatigue, the extremities of heat and cold, in a manner such as none of his comrades in the army could parallel.<sup>a</sup> He was indifferent to the gratifications of love, even when they were presented to him in a manner the most irresistible to Grecian imagination; while at festive banquets, though he did not drink of his own accord, yet if the society imposed obligation to do so, he outdid all in respect to quantity of wine. No one ever saw Sokrates intoxicated.<sup>b</sup> Such is the tenor of the panegyric pronounced by Alkibiades upon Sokrates. A general drinking-bout closes the Symposium, in which Sokrates swallows large draughts of wine along with the rest, but persists all the while in his dialectic cross-examination, with unabated clearness of head. One by one the guests drop asleep, and at daybreak Sokrates alone is left awake. He rises and departs, goes forthwith to the Lykeum, and there passes the whole day in his usual colloquial occupation, without being at all affected by the potations of the preceding night.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Symp. pp. 214-215-217 E.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Symp. pp. 219 C, 222 A,

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Symp. p. 220.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Symp. p. 220 A.

What has been here briefly recapitulated will be found in my twenty-fourth chapter, vol. ii. pp. 225-226 seq.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Sympos. p. 223. Compare what Plato puts into the mouth of Sokrates in the Protagoras (p. 347 D): well educated men will carry on a dialectic debate with intelligence and propriety, "*though they may drink ever so much wine*,"—*κἂν πᾶν πολὺν οἶνον*

I have thus cited the Symposium to illustrate Plato's view of the ideal of character. The self-command of Sokrates is tested both by pain and by pleasure. He resists both of them alike and equally: under the one as well as under the other, his reason works with unimpaired efficacy, and his deliberate purposes are pursued with unclouded serenity. This is not because he keeps out of the way of temptation and seduction: on the contrary, he is frequently exposed to situations of a tempting character, and is always found superior to them.

Now Plato's purpose is, to impart to his citizens the character which he here ascribes to Sokrates, and to make them capable of maintaining unimpaired the controul of reason against the disturbances both of pain and pleasure. He remarks that the Spartan training kept in check the first of these two enemies, but not the second. He thinks that the citizen ought to be put through a regulated system of trials for measuring and testing his competence to contend with pleasure, as the Spartans provided in regard to pain. The Dionysiac festivals<sup>d</sup> afforded occasions of applying these trials of pleasure, just as the Gymnopædia at Sparta were made to furnish deliberate inflictions of pain. But the Dionysiac banquets ought to be conducted under the superintendence of a discreet president, himself perfectly sober throughout the whole ceremony. All the guests would drink largely of wine, and each would show how far and how long he could resist its disturbing tendencies. As there was competition among the youths at the Gymnopædia, to show how much pain each could endure without flinching—honour being shown to those who endured most, and most successfully—so there would be competition at the Dionysia to prove how much wine each could bear without having his reason and modesty overset. The sober president would decide as judge. Each man's self-command, as against seductive influences, would be strengthened by a repetition of such trials, while proof would be afforded how far each man could be counted on.<sup>e</sup>

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. i. pp. 650 A, 637 A. 633 D.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. i. pp. 647 D-E-649 D. Compare the Republic, iii. pp. 412-

This is one mode in which the unmeasured potations (common throughout the Grecian cities, with the exception of Sparta and Krete) might under proper regulation be rendered useful for civic training. But there is another mode also, connected with the general musical and gymnastical training of the city. Plato will not allow Dionysus—and wine, the special gift of that God to mankind—to be censured as absolutely mischievous.<sup>f</sup>

The gifts of Dionysus may, by precautions, be rendered useful—Desultory manner of Plato.

In developing this second topic, he is led into a general theory of ethical and æsthetical education for his city. This happens frequently enough in the desultory manner of the Platonic dialogues. We are sometimes conducted from an incidental and outlying corollary, without warning and through a side door, into the central theory from which it ramifies. The practice is noway favourable to facility of comprehension, but it flows naturally from the unsystematic and spontaneous sequence of the dialogue.

Education of youth consists mainly in giving proper direction to their pleasures and pains—their love and their hatred. Young persons are capable only of emotions, well or ill directed: in this consists their virtue or vice. At that age they cannot bear serious teaching: they are incapable of acquiring reason, or true, firm opinions, which constitute the perfection of the mature man: indeed, if a man acquires these even when old, he may be looked on as fortunate.<sup>g</sup> The young can only have their emotions cultivated so as to conform to reason: they may thus be made to love what reason, personified in and enforced by the lawgiver, enjoins—and to hate what reason forbids—but without knowing wherefore.

Theory of ethical and æsthetical education—Training of the emotions of youth through the influence of the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus. Choric practice and ceremonies.

413, where the same general doctrine is enforced.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 672 A.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 653-659 D-E. παιδεία μὲν ἔσθ' ἡ παιδῶν ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγή πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις καὶ πρεσβυτάτοις δι' ἐμπειρίαν ἐνδεδόγ- μένον, ὡς νόμος ὀρθὸς ἐστίν· ἢ οὐκ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζεται τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ

τοῦ νόμου πεπεισμένοις, ἀλλὰ ξυνέηται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπομένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις οἷσπερ ὁ γέρων, τούτων ἕνεκα, ἃς ψῆδας καλοῦμεν, ὅντως μὲν ἐπιδάιδαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐταὶ νῦν γεγονέναι, πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἣν λέγομεν συμφωνίαν ἐσπουδασμένοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδῆν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχὰς, παιδία τε καὶ ψῆδας καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι, &c.

Unfortunately the hard realities of life are perpetually giving a wrong turn to the emotions. To counteract and correct this, the influence of the Muses, of Apollo, and of Dionysus, are indispensable: together with the periodical festivals of which these Deities are respectively presidents and auxiliaries. Their influence is exercised through the choric ceremony—music, singing, dancing, blended together. Every young man is spontaneously disposed to constant indeterminate movement and exercise of various kinds—running, jumping, speaking, &c. This belongs to man in common with the young of other animals: but what is peculiar to man exclusively is, the sense of rhythm and harmony, as well as of the contrary, in these movements and sounds. Such rhythm and harmony, in song and dance united, is expressed by the chorus at the festivals, in which the Muses and Apollo take part along with the assembled youth. Here we find the only way of properly schooling the emotions.<sup>h</sup> The unschooled man is he who has not gone through a good choric practice; which will require that the matter which he sings shall be good and honourable, while the movements of his frame and the tones of his voice must be rhythmical and graceful. Such choric practice must be universal among the citizens, distributed into three classes: youths, mature men, elders.<sup>i</sup>

But what *is* the good and honourable—or the bad and dishonourable? We must be able to settle this point:—otherwise we cannot know how far the chorus complies with the conditions abovenamed. Suppose a brave man and a coward in the face of danger: the gestures and speech of the former will be strikingly different from those of the latter. So with other virtues and vices. Now the manifestations, bodily and mental, of the virtuous man, are beautiful and honourable: those of the vicious man, are ugly and base. These are the *really beautiful*,—the same universally, or what ought to be beautiful to all: this is the standard of rectitude in music. But they do not always *appear* beautiful to all. There is

Music and dancing—imitation of the voice and movements of brave and virtuous men. Youth must be taught to take delight in this.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 654-660 A.

<sup>i</sup> This triple distribution of classes for choric instruction and practice is

borrowed from Spartan customs, Plutarch, Lykurgus, 21; Schol. ad Legg. p. 633 A.

great diversity in the tastes and sentiments of different persons: what appears to one man agreeable and pleasurable, appears to another disgusting or indifferent.<sup>k</sup> Such diversity is either in the natural disposition, or in the habits acquired. A man's pleasure depends upon the former, his judgment of approbation on the latter. If both his nature and his acquired habits coincide with the standard of rectitude, he will both delight in what is really beautiful, and will approve it as beautiful. But if his nature be in discordance with the standard, while his habits coincide with that standard—he will approve of what is honourable, but he will take no delight in it: he will delight in what is base, but will at the same time disapprove it as base. He will however be ashamed to proclaim his delight before persons whom he respects, and will never indulge himself in the delightful music except when he is alone.<sup>l</sup>

To take delight in gestures or songs which are manifestations of bad qualities, produces the same kind of mischievous effect upon the spectator as association with bad men in real life. His character becomes assimilated to the qualities in the manifestations of which he delights, although he may be ashamed to commend them. This is a grievous corruption, arising from bad musical and choric exhibitions, which the lawgiver must take care to prevent. He must not allow poets to exhibit what they may prefer or may think to be beautiful. He must follow the practice of Egypt, where both the music and the pictorial type has been determined by the Gods or by divine lawgivers from immemorial antiquity, according to the standard of natural rectitude—and where the government allows neither poet nor painter to innovate or depart from this consecrated type.<sup>m</sup> Accordingly, Egyptian compositions of the present day are exactly like what they were ten thousand years ago: neither more nor less beautiful. The lawgiver must follow this example, and fix the type of his musical and choric exhibitions; forbidding all innovation introduced on the plea

Bad musical exhibitions and poetry forbidden by the lawgiver. Songs and dances must be consecrated by public authority. Prizes at the musical festivals to be awarded by select judges.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. p. 655 B.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Legg. pp. 655-656.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 656-657.

of greater satisfaction either to the poet or to the audience. In the festivals where there is competition among poets, the prize must not be awarded by the pleasure of the auditors, whose acclamations tend only to corrupt and pervert the poets. The auditors ought to hear nothing but what is better than their own characters, in order that their tastes may thus be exalted. The prize must be awarded according to the preference of a few elders—or better still, of one single elder—eminent for excellent training and virtue. This judge ought not to follow the taste of the auditors, but to consider himself as their teacher and improver.<sup>n</sup>

Such is the exposition given by the Athenian speaker, respecting the characteristic function, and proper regulating principles, of choric training (poems learnt, music and dancing) for the youth. The Spartan and Kretan cordially concur with him: especially with that provision which fixes and consecrates the old established type, forbidding all novelties and spontaneous inspiration of the poets. They claim this compulsory orthodoxy, tolerating no dissent from the ancient and consecrated canon of music and orchestric, as the special feature of their two states; as distinguishing Sparta and Krete from other Hellenic cities, which were invaded with impunity by novel compositions of every variety.<sup>o</sup>

The Athenian is thus in full agreement with his two companions, on the general principle of subjecting the poets to an inflexible censorship. But the agreement disappears, when he comes to specify the dogmas which the poets are required to inculcate in their hymns. While complimenting his two friends upon their enforcement of an exclusive canon, he proceeds to assume that of course there can be but ONE canon;—that there is no doubt what the dogmas contained in it are to be. He then unfolds briefly the Platonic ethical creed. “You Spartans and Kretans” (he says)<sup>p</sup> “of course constrain your poets to proclaim that the just and temperate man is happy, whether he be tall, strong, and rich—or short, feeble, and poor: and that the bad man is wretched

The Spartan and Kretan agree with the Athenian, That poets must be kept under a strict censorship. But they do not agree as to what the poets are required to conform to.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 659 A, 668 A.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 660 C-D.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 660 E.

and lives in suffering, though he be richer than Midas, and possessor besides of every other advantage in life. Most men appreciate falsely good and evil things. They esteem as good things, health, beauty, strength, perfect sight and hearing, power, long life, immortality: they account the contrary to be bad things. But you and I take a different view.<sup>1</sup> We agree in proclaiming, that all these so-called good things are good only to the just man. To the unjust man, we affirm that health, strength, perfection of senses, power, long life, &c., are not good, but exceedingly bad. This, I presume, is the doctrine which you compel your poets to proclaim, and no other—in suitable rhythm and harmony.<sup>2</sup> You agree with me in this, do you not?"

"We agree with you" (replies Kleinias) "on some of your affirmations, but we disagree with you wholly on others."

"What?" (says the Athenian.) "Do you disagree with me when I affirm, that a man healthy, rich, strong, powerful, fearless, long-lived, exempt from all the things commonly reputed to be evils, but at the same time unjust and exorbitant—when I say that such a man is not happy, but miserable?"

"We *do* disagree with you when you affirm this," answers the Kretan.

"But will you not admit that such a man lives basely or dishonourably?"

"Basely or dishonourably.—Yes, we grant it."

"What then—do you not grant farther, that he lives badly, disagreeably, disadvantageously, to himself?"

"No. We cannot possibly grant you that,"—replies Kleinias.

"Then" (says the Athenian) "you and I are in marked opposition.<sup>3</sup> For to me what I have affirmed appears as

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 661 C. ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ που τάδε λέγομεν, ὡς ταῦτά ἐστι ξύμπαντα δίκαιοις μὲν καὶ ὀσίοις ἀνδράσιν ἕριστα κτήματα, ἀδίκους δὲ κακίστα ξύμπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 661 D. Ταῦτα δὴ λέγειν οἶμαι τοὺς παρ' ὑμῖν ποιητὰς πείσετε καὶ ἀναγκάσετε, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 A-B. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἂν συγχωρήσατε, τό γε

αἰσchrῶς (ἤν). Κλεινίας, Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἀθηναῖος. Τί δέ, τὸ καὶ κακῶς; Κλειν. Οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τοῦθ' ὁμοίως. Ἀθην. Τί δέ; τὸ καὶ ἀηδῶς καὶ μὴ ξυμφερόντως αὐτῷ; Κλειν. Καὶ πῶς ἂν ταῦτά γ' ἔτι συγχωροίμεν; Ἀθην. Ὅπως; εἰ θεὸς ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ φίλοι, δοίη τις συμφωνίαν, ὡς νῦν γε σχεδὸν ἀπάδομεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. Ἔμοι γάρ δὴ φαίνεται ταῦτα οὕτως ἀναγκαῖα, ὡς οὐδὲ Κρήτη νῆσος σαφῶς.

necessary as the existence of Krete is indisputable. If I were  
 lawgiver, I should force the poets and all the citi-  
 Ethical creed zens to proclaim it with one voice: and I should  
 punish most severely every one <sup>t</sup> who affirmed that  
 conform to it. there could be any wicked men who lived agree-  
 ably—or that there could be any course advantageous or  
 profitable, which was not at the same time the most just.  
 These and other matters equally at variance with the opi-  
 nions received among Kretans, Spartans, and mankind  
 generally—I should persuade my citizens to declare unani-  
 mously.—For let us assume for a moment your opinion, and  
 let us ask any lawgiver or any father advising his son.—You  
 say that the just course of life is one thing, and that the  
 agreeable course is another; I ask you which of the two is  
 the happiest? If you say that the agreeable course is the  
 happiest, what do you mean by always exhorting me to be  
 just? Do you wish me not to be happy? <sup>u</sup> If on the con-  
 trary you tell me that the just course of life is happier than  
 the agreeable, I put another question—What is this Good  
 and Beautiful which the lawgiver extols as superior to plea-  
 sure, and in which the just man's happiness consists? What  
 good *can* he possess, apart from pleasure? <sup>x</sup> He obtains praise  
 and honour:—Is *that* good, but disagreeable—and would the  
 contrary, infamy, be agreeable? A life in which a man  
 neither does wrong to others nor receives wrong from others,—  
 is *that* disagreeable, though good and honourable—and would  
 the contrary life be agreeable, but dishonourable? You will  
 not affirm that it is.<sup>y</sup>

“Surely then, my doctrine—which regards the pleasurable,  
 the just, the good, and the honourable, as indissolubly con-  
 nected,—has at least a certain force of persuasion, if it has  
 nothing more, towards inducing men to live a just and holy  
 life: so that the lawgiver would be both base and wanting to  
 his own purposes, if he did not proclaim it as a truth. For no

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 C. ζημίαν  
 τε ὀλίγου μεγίστην ἐπιτιθείην ἂν, εἴ τις  
 ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φθέγγαιτο ὥς εἰσὶ τινες  
 ἄνθρωποι πονηροὶ μὲν, ἡδέως δὲ ζῶντες,  
 &c.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 D-E.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 E. εἰ δ' αὖ

τὸν δικαιοτάτον εὐδαιμονέστατον ἀπο-  
 φαίνοιτο βίον εἶναι, ζητοῖ που πᾶς ἂν ὁ  
 ἀκούων, οἶμαι, τί ποτ' ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ τῆς  
 ἡδονῆς κρείττον ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ ἡ  
 νόμος ἐνὸν ἐπαινεῖ; τί γὰρ δὴ  
 χωριζόμενον ἡδονῆς ἀγαθὸν ἂν γέ-  
 ῃ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 A.

one will be willingly persuaded to do anything which does not carry with it in its consequences more pleasure than pain.<sup>z</sup> There is indeed confusion in every man's vision, when he looks at these consequences in distant outline: but it is the duty of the lawgiver to clear up such confusion, and to teach his citizens in the best way he can, by habits, encouraging praises, discourses, &c., how they ought to judge amidst these deceptive outlines. Injustice, when looked at thus in prospect, seems to the unjust man pleasurable, while justice seems to him thoroughly disagreeable. On the contrary, to the just man, the appearance is exactly contrary: to him justice seems pleasurable, injustice repulsive. Now which of these two judgments shall we pronounce to be the truth? That of the just man. The verdict of the better soul is unquestionably more trustworthy than that of the worse. We must therefore admit it to be a truth, that the unjust life is not merely viler and more dishonourable, but also in truth more disagreeable, than the just life."<sup>a</sup>

Such is the course of proof which Plato's Athenian speaker considers sufficient to establish this ethical doctrine. The Spartan  
But he proceeds to carry the reasoning a step farther, with him.  
as follows:—

“Nay, even if this were not a true position—as I have just shown it to be—any lawgiver even of moderate worth, if ever he ventured to tell a falsehood to youth for useful purposes, could proclaim no falsehood more useful than this, nor more efficacious towards making them disposed to practise justice willingly, without compulsory force.”<sup>b</sup>

“Truth is honourable” (observes the Kretan) “and durable. You will not find it easy to make them believe what you propose.”

“Why, it was found easy” (replies the Athenian) “to

Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 B. Οὐκοῦν

καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν, πιθανός  
τινα

δίκαιον βίῳ

λόγων καὶ ἐναν-  
s, ὅς ταῦτα

γὰρ

τεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτφ μὴ τὸ χαίρειν τοῦ  
λυπεῖσθαι

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 C-D.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 E. Νομο-  
της δ', οὐ τι καὶ  
τοῦτο

ὡτὸ ῥηχ' ὁ λόγος ἔχειν, εἴπερ τι  
ἄλλο ἐτόλμησεν ἂν ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ψεύδειν  
πρὸς τοὺς νέους, ἔστιν δ, τι τοῦτου ψ

καὶ δυνάμενον μᾶλλον ποιεῖν  
τα τὰ δίκαια;

make men believe the mythe respecting Kadmus and the armed men who sprang out of the earth after the sowing of the dragon's teeth—and many other mythes equally incredible. Such examples show conclusively that the lawgiver can implant in youthful minds any beliefs which he tries to implant. He need therefore look to nothing, except to determine what are those beliefs which, if implanted, would be most beneficial to the city. Having determined this, he will employ all his machinery to make all his citizens proclaim these beliefs constantly, with one voice, and without contradiction, in all hymns, stories, and discourses.”<sup>c</sup>

“This brings me to my own proposition. My three Chorus (youthful, mature, elderly) will be required to sing perpetually to the tender minds of children all the honourable and good doctrines which I shall prescribe in detail. But the sum and substance of them will be—The best life has been declared by the Gods to be also the most pleasurable, and it *is* the most pleasurable.<sup>d</sup> The whole city—man, boy, freeman, slave, male, female—will be always singing this doctrine to itself in choric songs, diversified by the poets in such manner as to keep up the interest and satisfaction of the singers.”<sup>e</sup>

Here, then, we have the general doctrine, ethical and social, which is to be maintained in exclusive possession of the voice, ear, and mind, of the Platonic citizens. The imitative movements of the tripartite Chorus must be kept in perfect accordance with it:<sup>f</sup> for all music is imitative, and care must be taken to imitate the right things in a right manner. To ensure such accordance, magistrates must be specially chosen as censors over both poets and singers. But this, in Plato's view, is not enough. He requires, besides, that the choristers should themselves understand both what they ought to imitate, and how it should be imitated. Such understanding cannot be

Elders are required to set an example in keeping up the purity of the music prescribed.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 664 A.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 664 B.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 665 C.

It will be understood that here, as elsewhere, I give the substance of Plato's reasoning, without binding

myself to the translation of the particular words.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 668 A. *Ὁμοῦν* γὰρ

*ἔλαι*

expected from the Chorus of youths—nor even from that of mature men. But it may be expected, and it must be required, in the chorus of Elders: which will thus set an example to the other two, of strict adherence to the rectitude of the musical standard.<sup>g</sup> The purity of the Platonic musical training depends mainly upon the constant and efficacious choric activity of the old citizens.

But how is such activity to be obtained? Old men will not only find it repugnant to their natural dispositions, but will even be ashamed to exhibit themselves in choric music and dance before the younger citizens.

It is here that Plato invokes the aid of wine-drinking and intoxication. The stimulus of wine, drunk by the old men at the Dionysiac banquets, will revive in them a temporary fit of something like juvenile activity, and will supply an antidote to inconvenient diffidence.<sup>h</sup> Under such partial excitement, they will stand forward freely to discharge their parts in the choric exhibitions; which, as performed by them, will be always in full conformity with the canon of musical rectitude, and will prevent it from becoming corrupted or relaxed by the younger choristers. To ensure however that the excitement shall not overpass due limits, Plato prescribes that the president of the banquet shall be a grave person drinking no wine at all. The commendation or reproof of such a president will sustain the reason and self-command of the guests, at the pitch compatible with full execution of their choric duty.<sup>i</sup> Plato interdicts wine altogether to youths, until 18 years of age—allows it only in small quantities until the age of 40—but permits and even encourages elders above 40 to partake of the full inspiration of the Dionysiac banquets.<sup>k</sup>

The Elders require the stimulus of wine, in order to go through the choric duties with spirit.

This manner of regarding intoxication must probably have occurred to Plato at a time later than the composition of the

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 670 B-D, vi. p. 764 C, vii. p. 812 B.

Aristotle directs that the elders shall be relieved from active participation in choric duties, and confined to the function of judging or criticising, Politic. viii. 6, 1340, b. 38.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 666 A-C. ἐπι-

κουρον τῆς τοῦ ἐδωρήσατο (Διόνυσος) οἶνον,

ἐκαστος προθυμότερόν γε, ἦτον αἰσ.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 671.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 666 A.

Republic, wherein we find it differently handled.<sup>1</sup> It deserves attention as an illustration, both of his boldness in following out his own ethical views, in spite of the consciousness<sup>m</sup> that they would appear strange to others—and of the prominent function which he assigns to old men in this dialogue *De Legibus*. He condemns intoxication decidedly, when considered simply as a mode of enjoyment, and left to the taste of the company without any president or regulation. But with most moralists such condemnation is an unreflecting and undistinguishing sentiment. Against this Plato enters his protest. He considers that intoxication, if properly regulated, may be made conducive to valuable ends, ethical and social. Without it the old men cannot be wound up to the pitch of choric activity: without such activity, constant and unfaltering, the rectitude of the choric system has no adequate security against corruption: without such security, the emotional training of the citizens generally will degenerate. Farthermore, Plato takes occasion from drunkenness to lay down a general doctrine respecting pleasures. Men must be trained to self-command against pleasures, as they are against pains, not by keeping out of the way of temptation, but by regulated exposure to temptations, with motives at hand to help them in the task of resistance. Both these views are original and suggestive, like so many others in the Platonic writings: tending to rescue Ethics from that tissue of rhetorical and emotional commonplace in which it so frequently ap-

<sup>1</sup> In the *Republic* (iii. p. 398 E) Plato pronounced intoxication (*μέθη*) to be most unbecoming for his Guardians. He places it in the same class of defects as indolence and effeminacy. He also repudiates those varieties of musical harmony called *Ionian* and *Lydian*, because they were languid, effeminate, symposiac, or suitable for a drinking society (*μαλακαὶ τε καὶ συμποσικαὶ, χαλαραὶ*). Various musical critics of the day (*τῶν περὶ τῆς*—we learn this curious fact from Aristotle, *Polit.* viii. 7, near the end) impugned this opinion of Plato. They affirmed that drunkenness was exciting and stimulating,—not relaxing nor favourable to langour and heaviness: that the effeminate musical modes were not congenial to drunkenness.

When we read the *Treatise De Legibus*, we observe that Plato altered his opinion respecting *μέθη*, and had come round to agree with these musical critics. He treats *μέθη* as exciting and stimulating, not relaxing and indolent; he even applies it as a positive stimulus to wind up the Elders. Moreover, instead of repudiating it absolutely, he defends its usefulness under proper regulations. Perhaps the change of his opinion may have been partly owing to these very criticisms.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, *Legg.* ii. p. 665 B. Old Philokleon, in the *Vespæ* of Aristophanes (1320 seq.), under the influence of wine and jovial excitement, is a pregnant subject for comic humour.

pears;—and to keep present before those who handle it, those ideas of an end to be attained, and of discrimination as to means—which are essential to its pretensions as a science.

But the general ethical discussion—which Plato tells us<sup>a</sup> that he introduces to establish premisses for his enactment respecting drunkenness—is of greater importance than the enactment itself. He prescribes imperatively the doctrine and matter which alone is to be tolerated in his choric hymns or heard in his city. I have given an abstract (p. 322-326) of the doctrine here laid down and the reasonings connected therewith, because they admit of being placed in instructive comparison with his manner of treating the same subject in other dialogues.

General ethical doctrine held by Plato in *Leges*.

What is the relation between Pleasure, Good, and Happiness? Pain, Evil, Unhappiness? Do the names in the first triplet mean substantially the same thing, only looked at in different aspects and under different conditions? Or do they mean three distinct things, separable and occurring the one without the other? This important question was much debated, and answered in many different ways, by Grecian philosophers from the time of Sokrates downward—and by Roman philosophers after them. Plato handles it not merely in the dialogue now before us, but in several others—differently too in each: in *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Philêbus*, &c.<sup>o</sup>

Pleasure—Good—Happiness—What is the relation between them?

Here, in the dialogue *De Legibus* (by incidental allusion, too, in some of the *Epistles*), we have the latest form in which these doctrines about Pleasure, Happiness, Good—and their respective contraries—found expression in Plato's compositions. Much of the doctrines is the same—yet with some material variation. It is here re-asserted, by the Athenian, that the just and temperate man is happy, and that the unjust man is miserable, whatever may befall him: moreover that good things (such as health, strength, sight, hearing, &c.) are good only to the just man, evil to the unjust—while the contrary (such as sickness, weakness, blindness) are good things to the unjust, evil only to the just. To

Comparison of the doctrine laid down in *Leges*.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Legg.* ii. p. 664 D.

<sup>o</sup> See above, vol. ii. ch. xxii. pp. 128-129.

this position both the Spartan and the Kretan distinctly refuse their assent: and Plato himself admits that mankind in general would agree with them in such refusal.<sup>p</sup> He vindicates his own opinion by a new argument which had not before appeared. "The just man himself" (he urges), "one who has been fully trained in just dispositions, will feel it to be as I say: the unjust man will feel the contrary. But the just man is much more trustworthy than the unjust: therefore we must believe what he says to be the truth."<sup>q</sup> Appeal is here made, not to the Wise Man or Artist, but to the just man: whose sentence is invested with a self-justifying authority, wherein Plato looks for his *aliquid inconcussum*. Now it is for philosophy, or for the true Artist, that this pre-eminence is claimed in the Republic,<sup>r</sup> where Sokrates declares, that each of the three souls combined in the individual man (the rational or philosophical, in the head—the passionate or ambitious, between the neck and the diaphragm—and the appetitive, below the diaphragm) has its special pleasures; that each prefers its own; but that the judgment of the philosophical man must be regarded as paramount over the other two.<sup>s</sup> Comparing this demonstration in the Republic with the unsupported inference here noted in the Leges—we perceive the contrast of the oracular and ethical character of the latter, with the intellectual and dialectic character of the former.

Again, here in the Leges, the Athenian puts it to his two companions, Whether the unjust man, assuming him to possess every imaginable endowment and advantage in life, will not live, nevertheless, both dishonourably and miserably? They admit that he will live dishonourably: they deny that he will live miserably.<sup>t</sup> The Athenian replies by reasserting emphatically his own opinion, without any attempt to prove it. Now in the Gorgias, this same issue is raised between Sokrates and Polus: Sokrates refutes his opponent by a dialectic argument, showing that if the first of the two doctrines (the living dishonourably—*αἰσχροῶς*) be granted, the second

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 C.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 C.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Repub. ix. pp. 580 E-583 A.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Repub. ix. p. 583 A.

κη & δ φιλόσοφος τε καὶ δ φ

ἐπαινεῖ, ἀληθέστατα εἶναι—κύριος γοῦν  
τῆς ὧν ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον δ  
ιος.

Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 A.

(the living miserably—*κακῶς*) cannot be consistently denied.<sup>u</sup> The dialectic of Sokrates is indeed more ingenious than conclusive: but still it *is* dialectic—and thus stands contrasted with the oracular emphasis which is substituted for it in Leges.

Farthermore, the distinction between Pleasure and Good, in the language of the Athenian speaker in the Leges, approximates more nearly to the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras, than to his doctrine in the Gorgias, Philébus, and Republic. The Athenian proclaims that he is dealing with men, and not with Gods, and that he must therefore recognise the nature of man, with its fundamental characteristics: that no man will willingly do anything from which he does not anticipate more pleasure than pain: that every man desires the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain, and desires nothing else; that there neither is nor can be any Good, apart from Pleasure or superior to Pleasure: that to insist upon a man being just, if you believe that he will obtain more pleasure or less pain from an unjust mode of life, is absurd and inconsistent: that the doctrine which declares the life of pleasure and the life of justice to lead in two distinct paths, is a heresy deserving not only censure but punishment.<sup>x</sup> Plato here enunciates, as distinctly as Epikurus did after him, that Pleasures and Pains must be regulated (here regulated by the lawgiver), so that each man

Doctrine in Leges about Pleasure and Good—approximates more nearly to the Protagoras than to Gorgias and Philébus.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Gorgias, pp. 474 C, 478 E.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 662 C-D-E, 663 B.

In v. pp. 732 E to 734, the Athenian speaker delivers τὰ ἀνθρώπινα of the general preface or præm to his Laws, after having previously delivered τὰ θεῖα (v. pp. 727-732).

Τὰ θεῖα. These are precepts respecting piety to the Gods, and behaviour to parents, strangers, suppliants; and respecting the duty of rendering due honour, first to the mind, next to the body—of maintaining both the one and the other in a sound and honourable condition. Repeated exhortation is given to obey the enactments whereby the lawgiver regulates pleasures and pains: the

precepts are also enforced by insisting on the suffering which will accrue to the agent if they be neglected. We also read (what is said also in Gorgias) that the δίκη κακουργίας ηἰς τὸ δμοιοῦσθαι κακῶς ἄν- (p. 728 B).

Τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, which follow τὰ θεῖα, indicate the essential conditions of human character which limit and determine the application of such precepts to man. To love pleasure—to hate pain—are the paramount and indefeasible attributes of man; but they admit of being regulated, and they ought to be regulated by wisdom—the μετρητικὴ τέχνη insisted on by Sokrates in the Protagoras (p. 356 E). Compare Legg. i. p. 636 E, ii. p. 653 A.

may attain the maximum of the former with the minimum of the latter: and that Good, apart from maximum of pleasure or minimum of pain accruing to the agent himself,<sup>γ</sup> cannot be made consistent with the nature or aspirations of man.

There is another point too in which the Athenian speaker here recedes from the lofty pretensions of Sokrates in the Republic and the Gorgias. In the second Book of the Republic, we saw Glaukon and Adeimantus challenge Sokrates to prove that justice, apart from all its natural consequences, will suffice *per se* to make the just man happy; <sup>z</sup> *per se*, that is, even though all the society misconceive his character, and render no justice to him, but heap upon him nothing except obloquy and persecution. If (Glaukon urges) you can only recommend justice when taken in conjunction with the requiting esteem and reciprocating justice from others towards the just agent, this is no recommendation of justice at all. Your argument implies a tacit admission, that it will be better still if he can pass himself off as just in the opinion of others, without really being just himself: and you must be understood as recommending to him this latter course—if he can do it successfully. Sokrates accepts the challenge, and professes to demonstrate the thesis tendered to him: which is in substance the cardinal dogma afterwards espoused by the Stoics. I have endeavoured to show (in a former chapter<sup>a</sup>), that his demonstration is altogether unsuccessful: and when we turn to the Treatise De Legibus, we shall see that the Athenian speaker recedes from the doctrine altogether: confining himself to the defence of justice *with* its requiting and reciprocating consequences, not *without* them. The just man, as the Athenian speaker conceives him, is one who performs his obligations towards others, and towards whom others perform their obligations also: he is one who obtains from others that just dealing and that esteem which is his due: and when so conceived, his existence is one of pleasure and happiness.<sup>b</sup> This is, in substance, the Epikurean doctrine substituted for the Stoic. It is that which Glaukon and Adei-

<sup>γ</sup> It is among the tests of a well-disciplined army (according to Xenophon, Cyropæd. i. 6, 26) *ὅποτε τὸ πεῖθεσθαι αὐτοῖς ἡδίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀπειθεῖν*.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 359-367.

<sup>a</sup> See above, chap. xxxiv. p. 127 seq.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 A.

mantus in the Republic deprecate as unworthy disparagement of justice; and which they adjure Sokrates, by his attachment to justice, to stand up and repel.<sup>c</sup> Now even this, the Epikurean doctrine, is true only with certain qualifications: since there are various other conditions essential to happiness, over and above the ethical conditions. Still it is not so utterly at variance with the truth as the doctrine which Sokrates undertakes to prove, but never does prove, in the Republic.

The last point which I shall here remark in this portion of the Treatise De Legibus is, the sort of mistrust manifested by Plato of the completeness of his own proof. Notwithstanding the vehement phrases in which the Athenian speaker proclaims his internal persuasion of the truth of his doctrine, while acknowledging at the same time that not only his two companions, but most other persons also, took the opposite view<sup>d</sup>—he finds it convenient to reinforce the demonstration of the expositor by the omnipotent infallibility of the lawgiver. He descends from the region of established truth to that of useful fiction. “Even if the doctrine (that the pleasureable, the just, the good, and the honourable, are indissoluble) were not true, the lawgiver ought to adopt it as an useful fiction for youth, effective towards inducing them to behave justly without compulsion. The lawgiver can obtain belief for any fiction which he pleases to circulate, as may be seen by the implicit belief obtained for the Theban mythe about the dragon’s teeth, and a thousand other mythes equally difficult of credence. He must proclaim the doctrine as an imperative article of faith; carefully providing that it shall be perpetually recited, by one and all his citizens, in the public hymns, narratives, and discourses, without any voice being heard to call it in question.”<sup>e</sup>

Plato here mistrusts the goodness of his own proof. He falls back upon useful fiction.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Republ. ii. p. 368 B.

κατηγορουμένην μὴ βοηθεῖν.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 B.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 663 B, 664 A.

καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ νόμον ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀποδείκναι, &c. So, in the Bacchæ of Euripides (332), the two old men, Kadmus and Teiresias, after vainly attempting to inculcate upon Pentheus the belief in and the worship of Dionysus, at last

appeal to his prudence, and admonish him of the danger of unbelief:—

καὶ μὴ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος, ὥς σὺ

παρὰ σοὶ λεγέσθω, καὶ

τε τιμὴ παντὶ τῷ γένει προσῆ.

δρᾶς τὸν

μὴ παθῆς σὺ

Deliberate  
ethical fic-  
tion em-  
ployed as  
means of  
governing.

Here is a second attempt on the part of Plato, in addition to that which we have seen in the Republic,<sup>†</sup> to employ deliberate ethical fiction as a means of governing his citizens: first to implant and accredit it—next to prescribe its incessant iteration by all the citizens in the choric ceremonies—lastly to consecrate it, and to forbid all questioners or opponents: all application of the Sokratic Elenchus to test it. In this treatise he speaks of the task as easier to the lawgiver than he had described it to be in his Republic: in which latter we found him regarding a new article of faith as difficult to implant, but as easy to uphold if once it be implanted; while in the Treatise De Legibus both processes are treated as alike achievable and certain. The conception of dogmatic omnipotence had become stronger in Plato's mind during the interval between the two treatises. Intending to postulate for himself the complete regulation not merely of the actions, but also of the thoughts and feelings of his citizens—intending moreover to exclude free or insubordinate intellects—he naturally looks upon all as docile recipients of any faith which he thinks it right to preach. When he appeals, however, as proofs of the facility of his plan, to the analogy of the numerous mythes received with implicit faith throughout the world around him—we see how low an estimate he formed of the process whereby beliefs are generated in the human mind, and of their evidentiary value as certifying the truth of what is believed. People believed what was told them at first by some imposing authority, and transmitted the belief to their successors, even without the extraneous support of inquisitorial restrictions such as the Platonic lawgiver throws round the Magnétic community in the Leges. It is in reference to such self-supporting beliefs that Sokrates stands forth, in the earlier Platonic compositions, as an enquirer into the reasons on which they rested—a task useful as well as unpleasant to those whom he questioned—attracting unpopularity as well as reputation to himself. Plato had then keenly felt the inestimable value of this Elenchus or examining function personified in his master; but in the Treatise De Legibus the master has no place, and

<sup>†</sup> Plato, Republic, iii. p. 414, v. p. 459 D.

the function is severely proscribed. Plato has come round to the dogmatic pole, extolling the virtue of passive recipient minds who have no other sentiment than that which the law-giver issues to them. Yet while he postulates in his own city the infallible authority of the lawgiver, and enforces it by penalties, as final and all-sufficient to determine the ethical beliefs of all the Platonic citizens—we shall find in a subsequent book of this Treatise that he denounces and punishes those who generalise this very postulate; and who declare the various ethical beliefs, actually existing in communities of men, to have been planted each by some human authority—not to have sprung from any unseen oracle called Nature.<sup>g</sup>

Such is the ethical doctrine which Plato proclaims in the *Leges*, and which he directs to be sung by each Chorus among the three (boys, men, elders), with appropriate music and dancing. It is on the constancy, strictness, and sameness of these choric and musical influences, that he relies for the emotional training of youth. If the musical training be either intermitted or allowed to vary from the orthodox canon—if the theatrical exhibitions be regulated by the taste of the general audience, and not by the judgment of a few discerning censors—the worst consequences will arise: the character of the citizens will degenerate, and the institutions of his city will have no foundation to rest upon.<sup>h</sup> The important effects of music, as an instrument in the hands of the lawgiver for regulating the emotions of the citizens, and especially for inspiring a given emotional character to youth—are among the characteristic features of Plato's point of view, common to both the *Republic* and the *Laws*. There is little trace of this point of view either in Xenophon or in Isokrates; but Aristotle embraces it to a considerable extent. It grew out of the practice and tradition of the Grecian cities, in most of which the literary teaching of youth was imparted by making them read, learn, recite, or chaunt the works of various poets; while the use of the lyre was also taught, together with regulated movements in the dance. The powerful ethical effect of musical teaching

Importance of music and chorus as an engine of teaching for Plato. Views of Xenophon and Aristotle compared.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 889-890.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iv. p. 424 C-D; *Legg.* iii. pp. 700-701.

(even when confined to the simplest choric psalmody and dance), enforced by perpetual drill both of boys and men, upon the unlettered Arcadians—may be seen recognised even by a practical politician like Polybius,<sup>1</sup> who considers it indispensable for the softening of violent and sanguinary tempers: the diversity of the effect, according to the different modes of music employed, is noted by Aristotle,<sup>k</sup> and was indeed matter of common repute. Plato, as lawgiver, postulates poetry and music of his own dictation. He relies upon constant supplies of this wholesome nutriment, for generating in the youth such emotional dispositions and habits as will be in harmony, both with the doctrine which he preaches, and with the laws which he intends to impose upon them as adults. Here (as in *Republic* and *Timæus*) he proclaims that the perfection of character consists in willing obedience or harmonious adjustment of the pleasures and pains, the desires and aversions, to the paramount authority of reason or wisdom—or to the rational conviction of each individual as to what is good and honourable. If, instead of obedience and harmony, there be discord—if the individual, though rationally convinced that a proceeding is just and honourable, nevertheless hates it—or if, while convinced that a proceeding is unjust and dishonourable, he nevertheless loves it—such discord is the worst state of stupidity or mental incompetence.<sup>1</sup> We must recollect that

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, iv. pp. 20-21, about the rude Arcadians of Kynætha. He ascribes to this simple choric practice the same effect which Ovid ascribes to "ingenuæ artes," or elegant literature generally;—

Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes  
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.

See the remarkable contention between Æschylus and Euripides in Aristophan. *Ran.* 876 seq., about the function and comparative excellence of poets (also *Nubes*, 955). Aristophanes, comparing Æschylus with Euripides, denounces music as having degenerated, and poetry as having been corrupted, at Athens. So far he agrees with Plato; but he ascribes this corruption in a great degree to the conversation of Euripides with Sokrates (*Ranæ*, 1487); and here Plato would not have gone along with him—at least not when Plato composed his earlier dia-

logues—though the *ἦθος* of the *Treatise De Legibus* is in harmony with this sentiment. Polybius cites, with some displeasure, the remark of the historian Ephorus, who asserted that musical teaching was introduced among men for purposes of cheating and mystification—ἐπ' ἀπάτην καὶ γοητείαν παρεισ-

ζόντα λόγον αὐτῷ ῥίψας (iv. 20). Polybius considers this an unbecoming criticism.

<sup>k</sup> Aristotle, *Polit.* viii. c. 4-5-7, p. 1340, a. 10, 1341, a. 15, 1342, a. 30.

<sup>1</sup> See by these chapters how much the subject was discussed in his day.

The ethical and emotional effects conveyed by the sense of hearing, and distinguishing it from the other senses, are noticed in the *Problemata* of Aristotle, xix. 27-29, pp. 919-920.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 689 A. ἡ με-

(according to the postulate of Treatise De Legibus) the rational convictions of each individual, respecting what is just and honourable, are assumed to be accepted implicitly from the lawgiver, and never called in question by any one. There exists therefore only one individual reason in the community—that of the lawgiver, or Plato himself.

Besides all the ethical prefatory matter, above noticed, Plato gives us also some historical and social prefatory matter, not essential to his constructive scheme (which after all takes its start partly from theoretical principles laid down by himself, partly from a supposed opportunity of applying those principles in the foundation of a new colony), but tending to illustrate the growth of political society, and the abuses into which it naturally tends to lapse. There existed in his time a great variety of distinct communities: some in the simplest, most patriarchal, Cyclopiian condition, nothing more than families—some highly advanced in civilization, with its accompanying good and evil—some in each intermediate stage between these two extremes.—The human race (Plato supposes) has perhaps had no beginning, and will have no end. At any rate it has existed from an indefinite antiquity, subject to periodical crises, destructive kosmical outbursts, deluges, epidemic distempers, &c.<sup>m</sup> A deluge, when it occurs, sweeps away all the existing communities with their property, arts, instruments, &c., leaving only a small remnant, who, finding shelter on the top of some high mountain not covered with water, preserve only their lives. Society, he thinks, has gone through a countless number of these cycles.<sup>n</sup> At the end of each, when the deluge recedes, each associated remnant has to begin its development anew, from the rudest and poorest condition. Each little family or sept exists at first separately, with a patriarch whom all implicitly obey, and peculiar customs of its own. Several of these septs gradually coalesce

Historical retrospect as to the growth of cities—Frequent destruction of established communities with only a small remnant left.

ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, μὴ φιλῇ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 677-678, vi. p. 782 A.

τε  
διαφώνιαν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς  
κατὰ λόγον δόξαν,  
εἶναι τὴν ἐσχάτην. Compare p. 688 A.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Legg. p. 680 A. τοῖς ἐν  
μέρει τῆς  
ν, &c.

together into one community, choosing one or a few law-givers to adjust and modify their respective customs into harmonious order, and submitting implicitly to the authority of such chosen few.<sup>o</sup> By successive coalitions of this kind, operated in a vast length of time,<sup>p</sup> large cities are gradually formed on the plain and on the seaboard. Property and public force is again accumulated; together with letters, arts, and all the muniments of life.

Such is the idea which Plato here puts forth of the natural genesis and development of human society. Having thus arrived at the formation of considerable cities with powerful military armaments, he carries us into the midst of Hellenic legend—the Trojan War, the hostile reception which the victorious heroes found on their return to Greece after the siege, the Return of the Herakleids to Peloponnesus, and the establishment of the three Herakleid brethren, Têmenus, Kresphontês, Aristodêmus, as kings of Argos, Messênê, and Sparta. The triple Herakleid kingdom was originally founded (he affirms) as a mode of uniting and consolidating the force of Hellas against the Asiatics, who were eager to avenge the capture of Troy. It received strong promises of permanence, both from prophets and from the Delphian oracle.<sup>q</sup> But these hopes were frustrated by misconduct on the part of the kings of Argos and Messênê: who, being youths destitute of presiding reason, and without external checks, obeyed the impulse of unmeasured ambition, oppressed their subjects, and broke down their own power.

To conduct a political community well is difficult; for there are inherent causes of discord and sedition which can only be neutralized in their effects, but can never be eradicated. Among the foremost of these inherent causes, Plato numbers the many distinct and conflicting titles to obedience which are found among mankind, all coexistent and co-ordinate. There are seven such titles, all founded in the nature of man and the essential conditions of society:<sup>r</sup>—1. Parents

Historical or  
legendary  
retrospect—  
The Trojan  
war—The  
return of the  
Herakleids.

Difficulties of  
government  
—Conflicts  
about com-  
mand—  
Seven dis-  
tinct titles to  
command  
exist among  
mankind, all  
equally nat-  
ural, and  
liable to con-  
flict.

Plato, Legg. iii. p. 681 C-D.

Plato, Legg. iii. p. 683 A.  
*νοῦ τινὸς μήκεσιν ἀπλέτοις.*

Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 685-686.

Plato, Legg. iii. p. 690 A-D.

over children. 2. Men of high birth and breed (such as the Herakleids at Sparta) over men of low birth. 3. Old over young. 4. Masters over slaves. 5. The stronger man over the weaker. 6. The wiser man over the man destitute of wisdom. 7. The fortunate man, who enjoys the favour of the Gods (one case of this is indicated by drawing of the best lot) over the less fortunate man (who draws an inferior lot).

Of these seven titles to command, coexisting, distinct, and conflicting with each other, Plato pronounces the sixth—that of superior reason and wisdom—to be the greatest, preferable to all the rest, in his judgment: though he admits the fifth—that of superior force—to be the most extensively prevalent in the actual world.\*

Plato thinks it imprudent to found the government of society upon any one of these seven titles singly and separately. He requires that each one of them shall be checked and modified by the conjoint operation of others. Messênê and Argos were depraved and ruined by the single principle: while Sparta

Imprudence of founding government upon any one of these titles separately—Governments of Argos and Messênê ruined by the

θαι, &c. "Ὅσα ἔστι πρὸς ἀρχοντας ἀξιό-  
ἐναντίως.

\* Plato, Legg. iii. p. 690 C.

This enumeration by Plato of seven distinct and conflicting ἀξιώματα τοῦ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι, deserves notice in many ways. All the seven are *natural*: nature is considered as including multifarious and conflicting titles (compare Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 6, 21), and therefore as not furnishing in itself any justification or ground of preference for one above the rest. The ἀξίωμα of superior force is just as *natural* as the ἀξίωμα of superior wisdom, though Plato himself pronounces the latter to be the greatest; that is—greatest, not φύσει but νόμῳ or τέχνῃ, according to his own rational and deliberate estimation. Plato is not uniform in this view, for he uses elsewhere the phrases φύσει and κατὰ φύσιν as if they specially and exclusively belonged to that which he approves, and furnished a justification for it (see Legg. x. pp. 889-890, besides the Republic and the Gorgias). Again the lot, or the process of sortition, is here described as carrying with it both the preference of the Gods and the

principles of justice (τὸ δίκαιότατον αἰ φάμεν). The Gods determine upon whom the lot should fall—compare Homer, Iliad, vii. 179. This is a remarkable view of the lot, and represents a feeling much diffused among the ancient democracies.

The relation of master and slave counts, in Plato's view, among the natural relations, with its consequent rights and obligations.

The force of εὐτυχία, as a title to command, is illustrated in the speech addressed by Alkibiades to the Athenian assembly. Thucyd. vi. 16-17: he allows it even in his competitor Nikias—ἀλλ' ἕως ἐγὼ τε ἔτι ἀκμάζω μετ' αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ Νικίας εὐτυχῆς δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀποχρήσασθε τῇ ἐκατέρου ἡμῶν ὠφελείᾳ. Compare also the language of Nikias himself in his own last speech under the extreme distress of the Athenian army in Sicily, Thucyd. vii. 77.

In the Politikus (p. 293 and elsewhere) Plato admits no ἀξίωμα τοῦ ἀρχεῖν as genuine or justifiable, except Science, Art, superior wisdom, in one or a few Artists of governing; the same in Republic, v. p. 474 C, respecting what he there calls φιλοσοφία.

was preserved and exalted by a mixture of different elements. The kings of Argos and Messênê, irrational youths with nothing to restrain them (except oaths, which they despised), employed their power to abuse and mischief. Such was the consequence of trusting to the exclusive title of high breed, embodied in one individual person. But Apollo and Lykurgus provided better for Sparta. They softened regal insolence by establishing the double line of co-ordinate kings: they introduced the title of old age, along with that of high breed, by founding the Senate of twenty-eight elders: they farther introduced the title of sortition, or something near it, by nominating the annual Ephors. The mixed government of Sparta was thus made to work for good, while the unmixed systems of Argos and Messênê both went wrong.<sup>t</sup> Both the two latter states were in perpetual war with Sparta, so as to frustrate that purpose—union against Asiatics—with a view to which the triple Herakleid kingdom was originally erected in Peloponnesus. Had each of these three kingdoms been temperately and moderately governed, like Sparta, so as to maintain unimpaired the projected triple union—the Persian invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes would never have taken place.<sup>u</sup>

Such is the way in which Plato casts the legendary event, called the Return of the Herakleids, into accordance with a political theory of his own. That event, in his view, afforded the means of uniting Hellas internally, and of presenting such a defensive combination as would have deterred all invasions from Asia, if only the proper principles of legislation and government had been understood and applied. The lesson to be derived from this failure is, that we ought not to concentrate great authority in one hand; and that we ought to blend together several principles of authority, instead of resorting to the exclusive action of one alone.<sup>x</sup> This lesson deserves attention, as a

Plato casts  
Hellenic  
legend into  
accordance  
with his own  
political  
theories.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 691-692.  
<sup>u</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 692 C-D.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 693 A. ὡς ἄρα οὐ δεῖ μεγάλας ἀρχὰς οὔδ' αὐτὴν ἀμικ-  
τους νομοθετεῖν. Compare pp. 685-  
686.

Plato here affirms not only that

Messênê and Argos were and had been constantly at war with Sparta, but that they were so at the time of the Persian invasion of Greece—and that Messênê thus hindered the Spartans from assisting the Athenians at Marathon, pp. 692 E, 698 E. His statement

portion of political theory; but I feel convinced that neither Herodotus nor Thucydides would have concurred in Plato's historical views. Neither of them would have admitted the disunion between Sparta, Argos, and Messênê as a main cause of the Persian invasion of Greece.

A lesson—analogue, though not exactly the same—is derived by Plato from the comparison of the Persian with the Athenian government. Persia presents an excess of despotism: Athens an excess of liberty. There are two distinct primordial forms of government—*mother-polities*, Plato calls them—out of which all existing governments may be said to have been generated or diversified. One of these is monarchy, of which the Persians manifest the extreme: the other is democracy, of which Athens manifests the extreme. Both extremes are mischievous. The wise lawgiver must blend and combine the two together in proper proportion. Without such combination he cannot attain good government, with its three indispensable constituents—freedom, intelligence or temperance, and mutual attachment among the citizens.<sup>v</sup>

Persia and Athens compared—Excess of despotism. Excess of liberty.

that Argos was at least neutral, if not treacherous and philo-Persian, during the invasion of Xerxes, is coincident with Herodotus; but not so his statement that the Lacedæmonians were kept back by the war against Messênê. Indeed at that time the Messenians had no separate domicile or independent station in Peloponnesus. They had been conquered by Sparta long before, and their descendants in the same territory were Helots (Thucyd. i. 101). It is true that there always existed struggling remnants of ex-patriated Messenians, who maintained the name, and whom Athens protected and favoured during the Peloponnesian war; but there was no independent Messenian government in Peloponnesus until the foundation of the city of Messênê by Epaminondas in 369 B.C., two years after the battle of Leuktra: there had never been any *city* of that name in Peloponnesus before.

Now Plato wrote his Treatise De Legibus after the foundation of this city of Messênê and the re-establishment of an independent Messenian community in Peloponnesus. The new city was peopled partly by returning

Messenian exiles, partly by enfranchised Helots. It is probable enough that both these classes might be disposed to disguise (as far as they could) the past period of servitude—and to represent the Messenian name and community as never having been wholly effaced in the neighbourhood of Ithômê, though always struggling against an oppressive neighbour. Traditions of this tenor would become current, and Plato has adopted one of them in his historical sketch.

If we look back to what Plato says about the Kretan prophet Epimenides, we shall see that here too he must have followed erroneous traditions. He makes Epimenides contemporary with the invasion of Greece by Darius, instead of contemporary with the Kylonian sacrilege (B.C. 612). When a prophet had got reputation, a great many new prophecies were fathered upon him (as upon Bakis and Musæus) with very little care about chronological consistency. Plato may well have been misled by one of these fictions (Legg. i. p. 642, iii. p. 677).

<sup>v</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 693 B-C. Aristotle (Politic. ii. 6, pp. 1265-1266)

The Persians, according to Plato, at the time when they made their conquests under Cyrus, were not despotically governed, but enjoyed a fair measure of freedom under a brave and patriotic military chief, who kept the people together in mutual attachment. But Cyrus, though a great military chief, had neither received a good training himself, nor knew how to secure it for his own sons.<sup>2</sup> He left them to be educated by the women in the harem, where they were brought up with unmeasured indulgence, acquiring nothing but habits of insolence and caprice. Kambyses became a despot; and after committing great enormities, was ultimately deprived of empire by Smerdis and the Medians. Darius, not a born prince, but an usurper, renovated the Persian empire, and ruled it with as much ability and moderation as Cyrus. But he made the same mistake as Cyrus, in educating his sons in the harem. His son Xerxes became thoroughly corrupted, and ruled despotically. The same has been the case with all the successive kings, all brought up as destined for the sceptre, and morally ruined by a wretched education. The Persian government has been

alludes to this portion of Plato's doctrine, and approves what is said about the combination of diverse political elements; but he does not approve the doctrine which declares the two "mother-forms" of government to be extreme despotism or extreme democracy. He says that these two are either no governments at all, or the very worst of governments. Plato gives the same opinion about them, yet he thinks it convenient to make them the starting-points of his theory. The objection made by Aristotle appears to be dictated by a sentiment which often influences his theories—Τὸ τέλειον πρότερόν ἐστι τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀτελοῦς. The perfect is prior in order of nature to the imperfect. He does not choose to take his theoretical point of departure from the worst or most imperfect.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Legg. p. 694 C. Μαντεύομαι περί γε Κύρου τὰ μὲν ἄλλ' αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ θῆς οὐχ

τοπαράπαν.

I think it very probable that these words are intended to record Plato's

dissent from the Κύρου Παιδεία of Xenophon. Aulus Gellius (xiv. 3) had read that Xenophon composed the Cyropædia in opposition to the two first books of the Platonic Republic, and that between Xenophon and Plato there existed a grudge (*simultas*) or rivalry; so also Athenæus, xi. p. 504. It is possible that this may have been the case, but no evidence is produced to prove it. Both of them selected Sokrates as the subject of their descriptions; in so far there may have been a literary competition between them: and various critics seem to have presumed that there could not be *emulatio* without *simultas*. Each of them composed a Symposium for the purpose of exhibiting Sokrates in his joyous moments. The differences between the two handlings are interesting to notice; but the evidences which some authors produce, to show that Xenophon in his Symposium alluded to the Symposium of Plato, are altogether uncertain. See the Preface of Schneider to his edition of the Xenophontic Symposium, and his extract from Cornarius.

nothing but a despotism ever since Darius.<sup>a</sup> All freedom of action or speech has been extinguished, and the mutual attachment among the subjects exists no more.<sup>b</sup>

While the Persian government thus exhibits despotism in excess, that of Athens exhibits the contrary mis- chief—liberty in excess. This has been the growth of the time subsequent to the Persian invasion. At the time when that invasion occurred, the govern- ment of Athens was an ancient constitution with a quadruple scale of property, according to which scale political privilege and title to office were graduated: while the citizens generally were then far more reverential to authority, and obedient to the laws, than they are now. Moreover, the invasion itself, being dangerous and terrific in the extreme, was enough to make them obedient and united among themselves, for their own personal safety.<sup>c</sup> But after the invasion had been repelled, the government became altered. The people acquired a great increase of political power, assumed habits of independence and self-judgment, and became less reverential both to the magistrates and to the laws.

Changes for the worse in government of Athens, after the Persian invasion of Greece.

The first department in which this change was wrought at Athens was the department of music: from whence it gradually extended itself to the general habits of the people. Before the invasion, Music had been distributed, according to ancient practice and under the sanction of ancient authority, under four fixed categories—Hymns, Dirges, Pæans, Dithyrambs.<sup>d</sup> The ancient canons in regard to each were strictly enforced: the musical exhibitions were superintended, and the prizes adjudged by a few highly-trained elders; while the general body of citizens listened in respectful silence, without uttering a word of acclamation, or even conceiving themselves competent to judge what they heard. Any manifestations on their part were punished by blows from the sticks of the attendants.<sup>e</sup> But this docile submission of the Athenians to

This change began in music, and the poets introduced new modes of composition—they appealed to the judgment of the people, and corrupted them.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 694-695.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 697 D.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 698-699.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 700 A. ὕμνοι—θρήνοι—παιᾶνες—διθύραμβος.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 700 B. τὸ δὲ κῦρος τούτων γινῶναι τε καὶ ἅμα γινόντα διδάσκει, ζημιῶν τε αὖ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον, οὐ σύριγξ ἦν οὐδὲ τινες ἄμουςι βοᾷ πλῆθους, καθάπερ τὰ νῦν, οὐδ'

authority became gradually overthrown, after the repulse of the Persians, first in the theatre, next throughout all social and political life. The originators of this corruption were the poets: men indeed of poetical genius, but ignorant of the ethical purpose which their compositions ought to aim at, as well as of the rightful canons by which they ought to be guided and limited. These poets, looking to the pleasure of the audience as their true and only standard, exhibited pieces in which all the old musical distinctions were confounded together—hymns with dirges, the pæan with the dithyramb, and the flute with the harp. To such irregular rhythm and melody, words equally irregular were adapted. The poet submitted his compositions to the assembled audience, appealing to them as competent judges, and practically declaring them to be such. The audience responded to the appeal. Acclamation in the theatre was substituted for silence; and the judgment of the people became paramount instead of that pronounced by the enlightened few according to antecedent custom. Hence the people—having once shaken off the reverence for authority, and learnt to exercise their own judgment, in the theatre<sup>f</sup>—began speedily to do the same on other matters also. They fancied themselves wise enough to decide everything for themselves, and contracted a shameless disregard for the opinion of better and wiser men. An excessive measure of freedom was established, tending in its ultimate consequences to an anarchical or Titanic nature: indifferent to magistrates, laws, parents, elders, covenants, oaths, and the Gods themselves.<sup>g</sup>

αὐ κρότοι ἐπαίνους ἀποδιδόντες, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παιδευσιν δεδογμένον ἀκούειν ἢν αὐτοῖς μετὰ σιγῆς διὰ τέλους. παῖσι δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὕλῃ ράβδου κοσμοῦσης ἢ νουθέτησις ἐγένετο.

The testimony here given by Plato respecting the practice of his own time is curious and deserves notice: respecting the practice of the times anterior to the Persian invasion he could have had no means of accurate knowledge.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 701 B. νῦν δὲ ἤρξε μὲν ἡμῖν ἐκ μουσικῆς ἢ πάντων εἰς πάντα σοφίας δόξα καὶ παρανομία, ξυνεφέσπετο δὲ ἐλευθερία.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 701. Ἐφεξῆς

δὴ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν τοῖς ἀρχουσι δουλεύειν γίγνοιτ' ἅν.

The phrase here employed by Plato affirms inferential tendencies—not facts realised. How much of the tendencies had passed into reality at Athens, he leaves to the imagination of his readers to supply. It is curious to contrast the faithless and lawless character of Athens, here insinuated by Plato—with the oration of Demosthenes adv. Leptinem (delivered B.C. 355, near upon the time when the Platonic *Leges* were composed), where the main argument which the orator brings to bear upon the Dikasts, emphatically and

The opinion here expressed by Plato—that the political constitution of Athens was too democratical, and that the changes (effected by Perikles and others during the half-century succeeding the Persian invasion) whereby it had been rendered more democratical, were mischievous—was held by him in common with a respectable and intelligent minority at Athens. That minority had full opportunity of expressing their disapprobation—as we may see by the language of Plato himself; though he commends the Spartans for not allowing any such opportunity to dissenters at Sparta, and expressly prohibits any open expression of dissent in his own community. But his assertion, that the deterioration at Athens was introduced and originated by an innovation in the established canon of music and poetry—is more peculiarly his own. The general doctrine of the powerful revolutionizing effect wrought by changes in the national music, towards subverting the political constitution, was adopted by him from the distinguished musical teacher Damon,<sup>h</sup> the contemporary and companion of Perikles. The fear of such danger to the national institutions is said to have operated on the authorities at Sparta, when they forbade the musical innovations of the poet Timotheus, and destroyed the four new strings which he had just added to the established seven strings of his lyre.<sup>i</sup>

Danger of changes in the national music—declared by Damon, the musical teacher.

repeatedly, to induce them to reject the proposition of Leptines, is—τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἥθος ἀψεudes καὶ χρηστὸν, οὐ τὸ λυσιτελέστατον πρὸς ἀργύριον σκοπῶν ἀλλὰ τι καὶ καλὸν πρᾶξαι (p. 461) οἷδ' ὁ πλείστος λόγος ἔμοιγε περὶ . . . ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ πονηρὸν ἔθος εἰσάγειν τὸν νόμον, καὶ τοιοῦτον δὲ οὐ παντ' ἅπιστ' ὅσα δὲ δῆμος δίδωσιν ἔσται, also pp. 500-507, and indeed throughout nearly the whole oration. So also in the other discourses, not only of Demosthenes but of the other orators also—good faith, public and private, and respectful obedience to the laws, are constantly invoked as primary and imperative necessities.

Indeed, in order to find a contradiction to the picture here presented by Plato, of Athenian tendencies since the Persian war, we need not go farther than Plato himself. We have only to read the Menexenus, wherein he professes to describe and panegyrise the

achievements of Athens during that very period which he paints in such gloomy colours in the *Leges*—the period succeeding the Persian invasion. Who is to believe that the people, upon whose virtue he pronounces these encomiums, had thrown off all reverence for good faith, obligation, and social authority? As for the *Τιτανικὴ φύσις* to which Plato represents the Athenians as approximating, the analogy is principally to be found in the person of the Titan Promêtheus, with his philanthropic disposition (see Plato, *Menexenus*, pp. 243 E, 244 E), and the beneficent suggestions which he imparted to mankind in the way of science and art (*Æsch. Prom.* 440-507—Πᾶσαι τέχναι βροτοῖσιν ἐκ Προμηθέως).

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iv. p. 424 D.

<sup>i</sup> Cicero, *De Legib.* ii. 15; Pausanias, iii. 12.

Cicero agrees with Plato as to the

Of this general doctrine, however, Plato makes a particular application in the passage now before us, which he would have found few Athenians, either oligarchical or democratical, to ratify. What he really condemns is, the tragic and comic poetical representations at Athens, which began to acquire importance only after the Persian war, and continued to increase in importance for the next half century. The greatest revolution which Grecian music and poetry ever underwent was that whereby Attic tragedy and comedy were first constituted :—built up by distinguished poets from combination and enlargement of the simpler pre-existent forms—out of the dithyrambic and phallic choruses.<sup>k</sup> The first who imparted to tragedy its grand development and its special novelty of character was Æschylus—a combatant at Marathon as well as one of the greatest among ancient poets: after him, Sophokles carried improvement still farther. It is them that Plato probably means, when he speaks of the authors of this revolution as men of true poetical genius, but ignorant of the lawful purpose of the Muse—as authors who did not recognise any rightful canon of music, nor any end to be aimed at beyond the emotional satisfaction of a miscellaneous audience. The abundance of dramatic poetry existing in Plato's time must have been prodigious (a few choice specimens only have descended to us):—while its variety of ingredients and its popularity outshone those four ancient and simple manifestations, which alone he will tolerate as legitimate. He censures the innovations of Æschylus and Sophokles as a deplorable triumph of popular preference over rectitude of standard and purpose. He tacitly assumes—what Aristotle certainly does not believe, and what, so far as I can see, there is no ground for believing—that the earlier audience were passive, showing no marks of favour or disfavour: and that the earlier poets had higher aims, adapting their compositions to the judgment of a wise few, and careless about giving satisfaction to the general

mischievous tendency of changes in the national music.

<sup>k</sup> Aristotle, *Poetic.* c. 4, p. 1449 a.

The ethical repugnance expressed by Plato against the many-sided and deceptive spirit of tragic and comic

compositions, is also expressed in the censure said to have been pronounced by Solon against Thespis, when the latter first produced his dramas (*Plutarch*, Solon, 29; *Diogen. Laert.* i. 59).

audience. This would be the practice in the Platonic city, but it never was the practice at Athens. We may surely presume that Æschylus stood distinguished from his predecessors not by desiring popularity more, but by greater success in attaining it: and that he attained it partly from his superior genius, partly from increasing splendour in the means of exhibition at Athens. The simpler early compositions had been adapted to the taste of the audience who heard them, and gave satisfaction for the time: until the loftier genius of Æschylus and the other great constructive dramatists was manifested.

However Plato—while he tolerates no poetry except in so far as it produces ethical correction or regulation of the emotions, and blames as hurtful the poet who simply touches or kindles emotion—is in a peculiar manner averse to dramatic poetry, with its diversity of assumed characters and its obligation of giving speech to different points of view. His aversion had been exhibited before, both in the *Republic* and in the *Gorgias*: but it reappears here in the *Treatise De Legibus*, with this aggravating feature—that the revolution in music and poetry is represented as generating cause of a deteriorated character and an ultra-democratical polity of Athens. This (as I have before remarked) is a sentiment peculiar to Plato. For undoubtedly, oligarchical politicians (such as Thucydides, Nikias, Kritias), who agreed with him in disliking the democracy, would never have thought of ascribing what they disliked to such a cause as alteration in the Athenian music and poetry. They would much more have agreed with Aristotle,<sup>m</sup> when he attributes the important change both in the character and polity of the Athenian people after the Persian invasion, to

This aversion peculiar to himself, not shared either by oligarchical politicians, or by other philosophers.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Republ.* iii. pp. 395-396, x. p. 605 B; *Gorgias*, p. 502 B; Legg. iv. p. 719 B.

Aristotle takes a view of tragedy quite opposed to that of Plato: he considers it as calculated to purge or purify the emotions of fear, compassion, &c. (*Aristot. Poet.* c. 13. Compare *Politic.* viii. 7, 9). Unfortunately the *Poetica* exist only as a fragment, so that his doctrine about *κάθαρσις* is

only declared and not fully developed.

Rousseau (in his *Lettre à d'Alembert sur les Spectacles*, p. 33 seq.) impugns this doctrine of Aristotle, and condemns theatrical representations, partly with arguments similar to those of Plato, partly with others of his own.

<sup>m</sup> *Aristotel. Politic.* v. 4, p. 1304, a. 20, ii. 12, p. 1274, a. 12, viii. 6, 1340, a. 30.

the events of that invasion itself—to the heroic and universal efforts made by the citizens, on shipboard as well as on land, against the invading host—and to the necessity for continuing those efforts by organising the confederacy of Delos. Hence arose a new spirit of self-reliance and enterprise—or rather an intensification of what had already begun after the expulsion of Hippias and the reform by Kleisthenes—which rendered the previous constitutional forms too narrow to give satisfaction.<sup>n</sup> The creation of new and grander forms of poetry may fairly be looked upon as one symptom of this energetic general outburst: but it is in no way a primary or causal fact, as Plato wishes us to believe. Nor can Plato himself have supposed it to be so, at the time when he composed his *Menexenus*: wherein the events of the post-Xerxean period are presented in a light very different from that in which he viewed them when he wrote his *Leges*—presented with glowing commendations on his countrymen.

The long ethical prefatory matter<sup>o</sup> which we have gone through, includes these among other doctrines—

Doctrines of Plato in this prefatory matter.

1. That the life of justice, and the life of pleasure, are essentially coincident.
2. That Reason, as declared by the lawgiver, ought to controul all our passions and emotions.
3. That intoxication, under certain conditions, is an useful stimulus to elderly men.
4. That the political constitution of society ought not to be founded upon one single principle of authority, but upon a combination of several.
5. That the extreme of liberty, and the extreme of despotism, are both bad.<sup>p</sup>

Of these five positions, the two first are coincident with the doctrines of the *Republic*: the third is not coincident with them, but indirectly in opposition to them: the fourth and fifth put Plato on a standing point quite different from that of the *Republic*, and different also from that of the *Xenophontic Cyropædia*. In the *Cyropædia*, all government is strictly personal: the sub-

Compared with those of the *Republic* and of the *Xenophontic Cyropædia*.

<sup>n</sup> Herodot. v. 78.

<sup>o</sup> What Aristotle calls *τοῖς ἑξωθεν λόγοις*, in reference to the *Republic* of Plato (*Aris. Polit.* ii. 36, p. 1264, b. 39).

<sup>p</sup> Compare on this point Plato's *Epistol.* viii. pp. 354-355, where this same view is enforced.

jects both obey willingly, and are rendered comfortable, because of the supreme and manifold excellence of one person—their chief, Cyrus—in every department of practical administration, civil as well as military. In the Platonic Republic, the government is also personal: to this extent—that Plato provides neither political checks, nor magistrates, nor laws, nor judicature: but aims only at the perfect training of the Guardians, and the still more elaborate and philosophical training of those few chief or elder Guardians, who are to direct the rest. He demands only a succession of these philosophers, corresponding to the regal Artist sketched in the *Politikus*: and he leaves all ulterior directions to them. Upon their perfect dispositions and competence, all the weal or woe of the community depends. All is personal government; but it is lodged in the hands of a few philosophers, assumed to be super-excellent, like the one chief in the *Xenophontic Cyropædia*. When however we come to the *Leges*, we find that Plato ceases to presume upon such supreme personal excellence. He drops it as something beyond the limit of human attainment, and as fit only for the golden or Saturnian age.<sup>a</sup> He declares that power, without adequate restraints, is a privilege with which no man can be trusted.<sup>r</sup> Nevertheless the magistrates must be vested with sufficient power: since excess of liberty is equally dangerous. To steer between these two rocks,<sup>s</sup> you want not only a good despot but a sagacious lawgiver. It is he who must construct a constitutional system, having regard to the various natural foundations of authority in the minds of the citizens. He must provide fixed laws, magistrates, and a competent judicature: moreover, both the magistrates and the judicature must be servants of the law, and nothing beyond.<sup>t</sup> The lawgiver must frame his laws with singleminded view, not to the happiness of any separate section of the city, but to that of the whole. He must look to the virtue of the whole, in its most compre-

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Legg.* iv. pp. 713-714.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 687 E-iv. p. 713 B, ix. p. 875 C.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, *Legg.* iv. pp. 710-711.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, *Legg.* iv. p. 715 D. τοὺς δ' ἄρχοντας λεγόμενους νῦν ὑπὲρ τὰς τοῖς-

νόμοις ἐκάλεσα, οὐ τι καινοτομίας ἀνομάτων ἕνεκα, ἀλλ'. It appears as if this phrase, calling "magistrates the servants or ministers of the law," was likely to be regarded as a harsh and novel metaphor.

hensive sense, and to all good things, ranked in their triple subordination and their comparative value—that is, First the good things belonging to the mind—Secondly, Those belonging to the body—Thirdly, Wealth and External acquisitions.<sup>u</sup>

We now enter upon this constructive effort of Plato's old age. That a political constitution with fixed laws (he makes the Athenian say) and with magistrates acting merely as servants of the laws, is the only salvation for a city and its people—this is a truth which every man sees most distinctly in his old age, though when younger he was very dull in discerning it.<sup>x</sup> Probably enough what we here read represents the change in Plato's own mind: the acquisition of a new point of view, which was not present to him when he composed his Republic and his Politikus.

Here the exposition assumes a definite shape. The Kretan Kleinias apprises his Athenian companion, that the Knossians with other Kretans are about to establish a new colony on an unsettled point in Krete; and that himself with nine others are named commissioners for framing and applying the necessary regulations. He invites the co-operation of the Athenian: <sup>y</sup> who accordingly sets himself to the task of suggesting such laws and measures as are best calculated to secure the march of the new Magnêtic settlement towards the great objects defined in the preceding programme.

The new city is to be about nine English miles from the sea. The land round it is rough, poor, and without any timber for shipbuilding; but it is capable of producing all supplies absolutely indispensable, so that little need will be felt of importation from abroad. The Athenian wishes that the site were farther from the sea. Yet he considers the general conditions to be tolerably good; inasmuch as the city need not become commercial and maritime, and cannot have the means of acquiring much gold and silver—which is among the greatest evils that can befall a city, since it corrupts justice

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 707 B, 714 B, iii. p. 697 A.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. p. 715 E. Νέος μὲν γὰρ ὂν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀμβλύτατα αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ

<sup>y</sup> Compare vii. pp. 819 D-821 D, for marks of Plato's old age and newly acquired opinions.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Legg. iii. p. 702 C.

and goodness in the citizens.<sup>z</sup> The settlers are all Greeks, from various towns of Krete and Peloponnesus. This (remarks the Athenian) is on the whole better than if they came from one single city. Though it may introduce some additional chance of discord, it will nevertheless render them more open-minded and persuadeable for the reception of new institutions.<sup>a</sup>

The colonists being supposed to be assembled in their new domicile and ready for settlement, Plato, or his Athenian spokesman, addresses to them a solemn exhortation, inculcating piety towards the Gods, celestial and subterranean, as well as to the Dæmons and Heroes—and also reverence to parents.<sup>b</sup> He then intimates that, though he does not intend to consult the settlers on the acceptance or rejection of laws, but assumes to himself the power of prescribing such laws as he thinks best for them—he nevertheless will not content himself with promulgating his mandates in a naked and peremptory way. He will preface each law with a proëm or prologue (*i. e.* a string of preliminary recommendations): in order to predispose their minds favourably, and to obtain from them a willing obedience.<sup>c</sup> He will employ not command only, but persuasion along with or antecedent to command: as the physician treats his patients when they are freemen, not as he sends his slaves to treat slave-patients, with a simple compulsory order.<sup>d</sup> To begin with an introductory proëm or prelude, prior to the announcement of the positive law, is (he says) the natural course of proceeding. It is essential to all artistic vocal performances: it is carefully studied and practised both by the rhetor and the musician.<sup>e</sup> Yet in spite of this analogy, no lawgiver has ever yet been found to prefix proëms to his laws: every one has contented himself with issuing peremptory commands.<sup>f</sup> Here then Plato undertakes to set the example of prefixing such prefatory

The Athenian declares that he will not merely promulgate peremptory laws, but will recommend them to the citizens by discourses.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. p. 705.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. p. 708.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 716-718.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 718-719-723.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. p. 720. This is a curious indication respecting the medical profession and practice at Athens.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 722 D-723 D.  
 ὡς τε ἄλλοι καὶ τῷ μελωδῷ καὶ τῷ ῥητορὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. p. 722 B-E.

The προοίμια δημηγορικὰ of Demosthenes are well known.

introductions. The nature of the case would prescribe that every law, every speech, every song, should have its suitable proëm: but such prolixity would be impolitic. A discretion must be entrusted to the lawgiver, as it is to the orator and the musician. Proëms or prologues must be confined to the great and important laws.<sup>g</sup>

Accordingly, from hence to the end of the Treatise De Legg., Plato proceeds upon the principle here laid down. He either prefixes a prologue to each of his laws—or blends the law with its proëm—or gives what may be called a proëm without a law, that is a string of hortatory or comminatory precepts. There are various points (he says) on which the lawgiver cannot propose any distinct and peremptory enactment, but must confine himself to emphatic censure<sup>h</sup> and declaration of opinion, with threats of displeasure on the part of the Gods: the rather as he cannot hope to accomplish his public objects, without the largest interference with private habits—nor without bringing his regulations to bear upon individual life, where positive law can hardly reach.<sup>i</sup> The Platonic prologues are sometimes expositions of the reasons of the law—*i. e.* of the dangers which it is intended to ward off, or the advantages to be secured by it. But far more frequently, they are morsels of rhetoric—lectures, discourses, or homilies—addressed to the emotions and not to the reason, insisting on the ethical and religious point of view, and destined to operate with persuasive or intimidating effect upon an uninstructed multitude.<sup>k</sup>

It seems that Plato took credit to himself for what he thought a beneficial innovation, in thus blending persuasive exhortation with compulsory command. His assurance, that no Grecian lawgiver had ever done

Great value  
not by Plato  
these pro-  
They

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. p. 723 C-D. About τὰ τῶν νόμων προοίμια, compare what Plato says about his communications with the younger Dionysius, shortly after his (Plato's) second arrival at Syracuse, Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 316 A.

<sup>h</sup> Cicero (De Legg. ii. 6) professes to follow Plato in this practice of prefixing proëms to his Laws. He calls the proëm an encomium upon the law

which in most cases it is—"ut priusquam ipsam legem recitem, de ejus legis laude dicam."

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 780 A.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. p. 722 B. πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ οὐδεὶς ἔοικε διανοηθῆναι πῶς

ἐξδὸν δυοῖν  
, πειθοῖ καὶ  
q, καθ' ὅσον οἶδόν τε ἐπὶ τὸν ἀπειρον  
ἰδείας ὄχλον τῷ ἐτ

so before, is doubtless trustworthy:<sup>1</sup> though we may remark that the confusion of the two has been the general rule with Oriental lawgivers—the Hindoos, the Jews, the Mahomedan Arabs, &c. But with him the innovation serves a farther purpose. He makes it the means of turning rhetoric to account; and of enlisting in his service, as lawgiver, not only all the rhetoric but all the poetry, in his community. His Athenian speaker is so well satisfied with these prologues, that he considers them to possess the charm of a poetical work, and suspects them to have been dictated by inspiration from the Gods.<sup>m</sup> He pronounces them the best and most suitable compositions for the teaching of youth, and therefore prescribes that teachers shall cause the youth to recite and learn them, instead of the poetical and rhetorical works usually employed. He farther enjoins that his prologues shall serve as type and canon whereby all other poetical and rhetorical compositions shall be tried. If there be any compositions in full harmony and analogy with this type, the teachers shall be compelled to learn them by heart, and teach them to pupils. Any teacher refusing to do so shall be dismissed.<sup>n</sup> Nor shall any poet be allowed to compose and publish works containing sentiments contradictory to the declaration of the lawgiver.<sup>o</sup>

are to serve as type for all poets—No one is allowed to contradict them.

As a contrast to this view of Plato in his later years, it is interesting to turn to that which he entertained in an earlier part of his life, in the Gorgias and the Phædrus, respecting rhetoric. In the former dialogue, Gorgias is recognised as a master of the art of persuasion, especially as addressed to a numerous audience, and respecting ethical questions, What is just, and what is unjust? Sokrates, on the contrary, pointedly distinguishes persuasion from teaching—discredits simple persuasion, without teach-

Contrast of Leges with Gorgias and Phædrus.

<sup>1</sup> The testimony of Plato shows that the *πρὸς τοὺς νόμους* ascribed to Zaleukus and Charondas (Diodor. xii. 12-20) are composed by authors later than his time, and probably in imitation of his *πρὸς τοὺς νόμους*: which indeed is probable enough on other grounds. See Heyne, *Opuscula*, vol. ii.; Prolus. i. vi., De Zaleuci et Charondæ Legibus.

Cicero read the *proëms* ascribed to Zaleukus and Charondas as genuine (Legg. ii. 6), so did Diodorus, xii. 17-20; Stobæus, *Serm.* xlii.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 C. οὐκ ἀνευ τινὸς ἐκπινολας θεῶν, ἐμοὶ πάντάσσι ποιήσει τῶν

Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 D-E.

Plato, Legg. p. 811 E.

ing, as merely deceptive—and contends that rhetorical discourse addressed to a multitude, upon such topics, can never convey any teaching.<sup>p</sup> But in the *Leges* we find that the art of persuasion has risen greatly in Plato's estimation. Whether it be a true art, or a mere unartistic knack, he now recognises its efficacy in modifying the dispositions of the uninstructed multitude, and announces himself to be the first lawgiver who will employ it systematically for that purpose. He combines the seductions of the rhetor with the unpalatable severities of the lawgiver: the two distinct functions of Gorgias and his brother the physician Herodikos, when Gorgias accompanied his brother to visit suffering patients, and succeeded by force of rhetoric in overcoming their repugnance to the cutting and burning indispensable for cure.<sup>q</sup> Again, in the *Phædrus*, Plato treats the art of persuasion, when applied at once to a mixed assemblage of persons, either by writing or discourse, as worthless and unavailing.<sup>r</sup> He affirms that it makes no durable impression on the internal mind of the individuals: the same discourse will never suit all. Individuals differ materially in their cast of mind; moreover, they differ in opinion upon ethical topics (just and unjust) more than upon any other. Some men are open to persuasion by topics which will have no effect on others. Accordingly you must go through a laborious discrimination: first, you must discriminate generally the various classes of minds and the various classes of discourse—next, you must know to which classes of minds the individuals of the multitude before you belong. You must then address to each mind the mode of persuasion specially adapted to it. The dialectic philosopher is the only one who possesses the true art of persuasion. Such was Plato's point of view in the *Phædrus*. I need hardly point out how completely it is dropped in his *Leges*: wherein he pours persuasion into the ears of an indiscriminate multitude, through the common channel of a rhetorical lecture, considering it of such impressive efficacy as to justify the supposition of inspiration from the Gods.<sup>s</sup>

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 454-456.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 456 B.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 263 A, 271-272-273 E-275 E-276 A-277 C.

<sup>s</sup> Zeller, in his '*Platonische Studien*' (pp. 66-72-88, &c.), insists much on the rhetorical declamatory prolixity visible throughout the *Treatise De Legibus*,

After this unusual length of preliminaries, Plato enters on the positive regulation of his colony. As to the worship of the Gods, he directs little or nothing of his own authority. The colony must follow the advice of the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and Ammon—together with any consecrated traditions, epiphanies, or inspirations from the Gods belonging to the spot—as to the Gods who shall be publicly worshipped, and the suitable temples and rites. Only he directs that to each portion of the territory set apart for civil purposes, some God, Dæmon, or Hero, shall be specially assigned as Patron,<sup>t</sup> with a chapel

Regulations for the new colony—About religious worship, the oracles of Delphi and Dodona are to be consulted.

as quite at variance with the manner of Plato in his earlier and better dialogues, and even as specimens of what Plato there notes as the rhetorical or sophistical manner. He expresses his surprise that the Athenian should be made to ascribe such discourses to the inspiration of the Gods (p. 107). Zeller enumerates these and many other dissimilarities in the *Treatise De Legibus*, as compared with other Platonic dialogues, as premisses to sustain his conclusion that the treatise is not by Plato. In my judgment they do not bear out that conclusion (which indeed Zeller has since renounced in his subsequent work); but they are not the less real and notable, marking the change in Plato's own mind.

How poor an opinion had Plato of the efficacy of the *νομοθετικὸν εἶδος* at the time when he composed the *Sophistês* (p. 230 A)! What a superabundance of such discourse does he deliver in the *Treatise De Legibus*, taking especial pride in the peculiarity!

<sup>t</sup> Plato, *Legg.* v. p. 738 C-D. *ὅπως ἂν ξύλλογοι ἐκάστων τῶν μερῶν κατὰ χρόνους γιγνόμενοι τοὺς προσταχθέντας—μετὰ θυσίων.*

That such "ordained seasons" for meetings and sacrifices should be punctually attended to—was a matter of great moment, on religious no less than on civil grounds. It was with a view to that object principally that each Grecian city arranged its calendar and its system of intercalation. Plato himself states this (vii. p. 809 D).

Sir George Lewis, in his *Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients*, adverts to the passage of Plato here cited, and gives a very

instructive picture of the state of the Hellenic world as to Calendar and computation of time (see p. 19; also the greater part of chapter i. of his valuable work). The object of all the cities was to adjust lunar time with solar time by convenient intercalations, but hardly any two cities agreed in the method of doing so. Different schemes of intercalation and periods (trietêric, octaetêric, enneadekaetêric) were either adopted by civic authority or suggested by private astronomers, such as Kleostratus and Meton. The practical dissonance and confusion was great, and the theoretical dissatisfaction also.

Now in this dialogue *De Legibus*, Plato recognises both the importance of the object and the problem to be solved, yet he suggests no means of his own for solving it. He makes no arrangement for the calendar of his new Magnêtic city. I confess that this is to me a matter of some surprise. To combine an exertion of authority with an effort of arithmetical calculation, is in his vein; and the exactness of observances as respects the Gods, in harmony with the religious tone of the treatise, depended on some tolerable solution of the problem.

We may perhaps presume that Plato refused to deal with the problem because he considered it as mathematically insoluble. Days, months, and years are not exactly commensurable with each other. In the *Timæus*, (p. 36 C) Plato declares that the rotation of the Circle of the Same, or the outermost sidereal sphere, upon which the succession of day and night depends, is according to the side of a parallelogram (κατὰ πλευρὰν)—while

and precinct wherein all meetings of the citizens of the district shall be held, whether for religious ceremonies, or for recreation, or for political duties.

Plato requires for his community a fixed and peremptory total of 5040 citizens, never to be increased, and never to be diminished: a total sufficient, in his judgment, to defend the territory against invaders, and to lend aid on occasion to an oppressed neighbour. He distributes the whole territory into 5040 lots of land, each of equal value, assigning one lot to each citizen. Each lot is assumed to be sufficient for the maintenance of a family of sober habits, and no more. The total number (5040) is selected because of the great variety of divisors by which it may be divided without remainder.<sup>u</sup>

We thus see that Plato, in laying down his fundamental principle (*ὑπόθεσιν*), recognises separate individual property

the rotations of the Moon and Sun (two of the seven branches composing the Circle of the Different) are according to the diagonal thereof (*κατὰ διάμετρον*): now the side and the diagonal represented the type of incommensurable magnitudes among the ancient reasoners. It would appear also that he considers the rotations of the Moon and Sun to be incommensurable with each other, both of them being members included in the Circle of the Different.

Since an exact mathematical solution was thus unattainable, Plato may probably have despised a merely approximative solution, sufficient for practical convenience—to which last object he generally pays little attention. He might also fancy that even the attempt to meddle with the problem betokened that confusion of the incommensurable with the commensurable, which he denounces in this very treatise (vii. pp. 819-820.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Legg. v. pp. 737-738, vi. p. 771 C.

Aristotle declares this total of 5040 to be extravagantly great, inasmuch as it would require an amount of territory beyond the scale which can be reckoned upon for a Grecian city, to maintain so many unproductive persons, including not merely the 5040 adult citizens, but also their wives,

children, and personal attendants, none of whom would take part in any productive industry (Politic. ii. 6, p. 1265, b. 16).

The remark here cited indicates the small numerical scale upon which the calculations of a Greek politician were framed. But we can hardly be surprised at it, seeing that the new city is intended for the island of Krete, where none even of the existing cities were considerable. Moreover Aristotle had probably present to his mind the analogy of Sparta. The Spartan citizens were in a situation more analogous to the 5040 than any other Grecian residents. But the Spartan citizens could not have been near so numerous as 5040 at that time; not even one-fifth of it—Aristotle tells us, Politic. ii. 9, 1270, a. 31. Aristotle goes on to remark on the definition given by Plato of the size and value of each lot of land sufficient for the citizen and his family to live *σφραγώνως*: it ought to be (says Aristotle) *σφραγώνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως*. These are the two modes of excellence, and the only two, which a man can display in the use of his property (1265, a. 35). But this change would only aggravate the difficulty as to the total area of land required for the 5040. Compare the remark of Aristotle on the scheme of Hippodamus, Polit. ii. 8, 1268, a. 42.

and separate family among his citizens: both of which had been strenuously condemned and strictly excluded, in respect to the Guardians of his Republic. But he admits the principle only with the proviso that there shall be a peremptory limit to number of citizens, to individual wealth, and to individual poverty: moreover, even with this proviso, he admits it only as a second-best, because mankind will not accept and are not sufficiently exalted to work out, what is in itself the best. He reasserts the principle of the Republic, that separate property and separate family are both essentially mischievous: that all individuality, either of interest or sympathy or sentiment, ought to be extinguished as far as possible.\* Though constrained against his will to renounce this object, he will still approximate to it as near as he can in his second-best. Moreover, he may possibly, at some future time (D.V.), propose a third-best. When once departure from the genuine standard is allowed, the departure may be made in many different ways.

Plato re-asserts his adherence to the principle of the Republic, though the repugnance of others hinders him from realising it.

This declaration deserves notice as attesting the undiminished adhesion of Plato to the main doctrines of his Republic. The point here noted is one main difference of principle between the Treatise De Legibus and the Republic: the enactment of written fundamental laws with prologues serving as homilies to be preached to the citizens, is another. Both of them are differences of principle: each gives rise to many subordinate differences or corollaries.<sup>y</sup>

\* Plato, Legg. v. pp. 739-740, vii. p. 807 B.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Legg. v. p. 739 E. ἦν δὲ νυν

πως ἀθανάσιος ἐγγύτατα καὶ ἡ μία δευτέρως· τρίτην δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, εἰάν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, διαπερανοῦμεθα. Upon this passage K. F. Hermann observes: —“Hæc enim est quam ordine tertiam appellat Plato, quæ Aristoteli, Politic. iv. 1, 2, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως πολιτεία dicitur: quod tamen nolim ita accipi, ut à nonnullis factum est, ut hanc quoque olim singulari scripto persecuturum fuisse philosophum credamus, quasi tribus exemplis absolvi rerum publicarum formas censuisset: innumeræ enim pro singularum nationum et urbium for-

tunâ esse possunt,” &c. (De Vestigiis Institutorum Atticorum ap. Platon. De Legg. p. 16).

That Plato *did* intend to compose a *third* work upon an analogous subject appears to me clear from the words,—but it does not at all follow that he thought that three varieties would exhaust all possibility. Upon this point I dissent from Hermann, and also upon his interpretation of Aristotle's phrase ἡ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως πολιτεία. Aristotle's distinguishes three distinct varieties of end which the political constructor may propose to himself:—

πολιτείαν

2.

3. Τὴν

Each citizen proprietor shall hold his lot of land, not as his own, but as part and parcel of the entire territory, which, taken as a whole, is Goddess and Mistress—conjunctly with all the local Gods and Heroes—of the body of citizens generally. No citizen shall either sell or otherwise alienate his lot, nor divide it, nor trench upon its integrity. The total number of lots, the integrity of each lot, and the total number of citizens, shall all remain consecrated in perpetuity, without increase or diminution. Each citizen in dying shall leave one son as successor to his lot: if he has more than one, he may choose which of them he will prefer. The successor so chosen shall maintain the perpetuity of worship of the Gods, reverential rites to the family and deceased ancestors, and obligations towards the city.<sup>2</sup> If the citizen has other sons, they will be adopted into the families of other citizens who happen to be childless: if he has daughters, he will give them out in marriage, but without any dowry. Such family relations will be watched over by a special board of magistrates: with this peremptory condition, that they shall on no account permit either the number of citizen proprietors, or the number of separate lots, to depart from the consecrated 5040.<sup>3</sup> Each

Now K. F. Hermann here maintains, and Boeckh had already maintained before him (ad Platonis Minoem et de Legibus, pp. 66-67), that the city sketched in Plato's treatise De Legibus coincides with No. 2 in Aristotle's enumeration, and that the projected *τρίτη* in Plato coincides with No. 3—*τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*. I differ from them here. There is no ground for presuming that what Plato puts *third* must also be put by Aristotle *third*. I think that the Platonic city De Legibus corresponds to No. 3 in Aristotle and not to No. 2. It is a city *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*, not *ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη*. Plato borrows little or nothing from *τὰ ὑποκείμενα*, and almost everything from his own *ὑπόθεσις* or assumed principle, which in this case is the fixed number of the citizens as well as of the lots of land, the imposition of a limit on each man's proprietary acquisitions, and the recognition of separate family establishments subject to these limits. This is the

*ὑπόθεσις* of Plato's second city, to which all his regulations of detail are accommodated: it is substituted by him (unwillingly, because of the repugnance of others) in place of the *ὑπόθεσις* of his first city or the Republic, which *ὑπόθεσις* is perfect communism among the *φύλακες*, without either separate property or separate family. This last is Plato's *ἀπλῶς*

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Legg. v. p. 740 A-B.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Legg. v. pp. 740 D-742 C. Aristotle remarks that in order to attain the object which Plato here proclaims, restriction ought to be imposed on *τεκνοποιία*. No citizen ought to be allowed to beget more than a certain number of children. He observes that this last-mentioned restriction, if imposed alone and without any others, would do more than all the rest to maintain the permanent 5040 lots, and that without this no other restrictions could be efficacious (Polit. ii. 6, 1265, a. 37, 1266, b. 9).

citizen's name, and each lot of land, will be registered on tablets of cypress wood. These registers will be preserved in the temples, in order that the magistrates may be able to prevent fraud.<sup>b</sup>

The city, with its appropriate accessories, shall be placed as nearly as possible in the middle of the territory. The akropolis, sacred to Hestia and Athênê, will be taken as a centre from whence twelve radiating lines will be drawn to the extremity of the territory, so as to distribute the whole area into twelve sections, not all equal in magnitude, but equalised in value by diminishing the area in proportion to superior goodness of land. The total number of citizens will be distributed also into twelve sections, of 420 each ( $5\frac{9}{12}40$ ), among whom the lots of land contained in each twelfth will be apportioned. This duodecimal division, the fundamental canon of Plato's municipal arrangements, is a sanctified present from the Gods, in harmony with the months and with the kosmical revolutions.<sup>c</sup> Each twelfth, land and citizens together, will be

Position of the city and akropolis—  
Distribution of the territory and citizens into twelve equal sections or tribes.

Plato concurs in this opinion, though he trusts to prudence and the admonition of elders for bringing about this indispensable limitation of births in a family, without legal prohibition. I have already touched upon this matter in my review of Plato's Republic. See above—chap. xxxv. p. 226 seq.

The νόμοι θετικοί of Philolaus at Thebes, regulating τὴν παιδοποιίαν with a view to keep the lots of land unchanged, are only known by the brief allusion of Aristotle, Polit. ii. 12, 1274, b. 4.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. v. p. 741 D. *κυπαρίτρινας μνήμας*, &c.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 771 B. Plato here reckons the different numerical divisions adopted in different cities as being all both natural and consecrated, but he considers his own as the most fortunate and right. He insists much upon the importance of symmetrical distribution, with definite numerical ratio, in all the departments of life: in the various civil subdivisions of the Tribe, such as Phratries, Dêmes, Villages—in the arrangements of the citizens for military service, *τάξεις καὶ ἀγωγάς*—in the coins, weights and measures—in the modulations of the

voice, and in the direction of movements either rectilinear or rotatory. (Whoever looks at Aristophanes, Aves, 1010 seq., will see all such regularity and symmetry derided in the person of Meton.) Nay, he enjoins that all the vessels made for common use shall be exact fractions or exact multiples of each other. This will make it necessary for all the citizens to learn elementary arithmetic, which Plato considers to be of essential value, not only for practical use but as a stimulus to the dormant intelligence. On this point he notes the Egyptians and Phenicians as standing higher than the Greeks (vii. p. 818), but as applying their superior arithmetical knowledge only to a mean and disgraceful thirst for wealth. Against this last defect Plato reckons upon guarding his citizens by other precautions, while he encourages in them the learning of arithmetic (Legg. v. p. 747). Plato here speaks of the Egyptians and Phenicians, much as the Jews have been spoken of in later times. And it is curious that he seems to consider their peculiarities of character as referable to their local domicile. He maintains that one place is intrinsic

constituted a Tribe, and will be consecrated to some God (determined by lot) whose name it will bear, and at whose altar two monthly festivals will be celebrated: one for the tribe, the other for the entire city. The tribes are peremptorily equal in respect to number of citizens; but care shall also be taken to make them as nearly equal as possible in respect to registered property: that is, in respect to property other than land, which each citizen brings with him to the settlement, and which will all be recorded (as well as the land) in the public registers.<sup>d</sup> The lot of land assigned to each citizen will include a portion near the centre, and a portion near the circumference: the most central portion being coupled with the most outlying, and so on in order. Each citizen will thus have two separate residences:<sup>e</sup> one nearer to the city, the other more distant from it.

Plato would be glad if he were able to establish among all the citizens, equality not merely of landed property, but of all other property besides. This, however, he recognises his inability to exact. The colonists will bring with them moveable property—some more, some less: and inequality must be tolerated up to a certain limit. Each citizen is allowed to possess moveable property as far as four times the value of his lot of land, but no more. The maximum of wealth possessed by any citizen will thus be equal to five times the value of his lot of land: the minimum of the poorest citizen will be the lot of land itself, which cannot, under the worst circumstances, be alienated or diminished. If any citizen shall in any way acquire property above the maximum here named, he is directed to make it over to the city and to the Gods. In case of disobedience, he may be indicted before the Nomophylakes; and if found guilty, shall be disgraced, excluded from his share of public distributions, and condemned to pay twice as much—half being assigned as recompense to the prosecutor.<sup>f</sup> The public register kept by the magistrates, in which is enrolled all the property of every kind belonging to

ally different from another in respect to producing good and bad characters; some places are even privileged by  
*θεία ἐπιτρονία καὶ δαιμόνων λήξεις, &c.*

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. v. p. 745.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. v. p. 745, vi. p. 771 D.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. v. pp. 744-745, vi. p.

each citizen, will enable them to enforce this regulation, and will be farther useful in all individual suits respecting money.

In the public census of the city, the citizens will be distributed into four classes, according to their different scales of property. The richest will be four minæ: the other three will be, three minæ, two, and one mina, respectively. Direct taxation will be assessed upon them according to the difference of wealth; to which also a certain reference will be had in the apportionment of magistracies, and in the regulation of the voting privilege.<sup>g</sup>

Census of the citizens—four classes, with graduated scale of property. No citizen to possess gold or silver. No loans or interest. No debts enforced by law.

By this determination of a maximum and minimum, coupled with a certain admitted preference to wealth in the assignment of political power, Plato considers that he has guarded against the intestine dissensions and other evils likely to arise from inequality of property. He accounts great poverty to be a serious cause of evil; yet he is very far from looking upon wealth as a cause of good. On the contrary, he proclaims that great wealth is absolutely incompatible either with great virtue or great happiness.<sup>h</sup> Accordingly, while he aims at preserving every individual citizen from poverty, he at the same time disclaims all purpose of making his community either richer or more powerful.<sup>i</sup> He forbids every private citizen to possess gold and silver. The magistrates must hold a certain stock of it in reserve, in case of public dealing with foreign cities: but they will provide for the daily wants of the community by a special cheap currency, having no value beyond the limits of the territory.<sup>k</sup> Moreover, Plato prohibits all loans on interest. He refuses to enforce by law the restoration even of a deposit. He interdicts all dowry or marriage portion with daughters.<sup>l</sup>

How is the Platonic colony to be first set on its march, and by whom are its first magistrates to be named? By the inhabitants of Knôssus, its mother city—replies Plato. The Knossians will appoint a provisional Board of two hundred: half from their own citizens, half from the elders and most respected

Board of

visors of the laws and their execution—how elected.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. v. p. 744 B, vi. p. 754 E.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. v. pp. 742 E, 743 A, 744.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Legg. v. p. 742 D.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. v. p. 742 A.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Legg. v. p. 742 C.

men among the colonists themselves.<sup>m</sup> This Board will choose the first Nomophylakes, consisting of thirty-seven persons, half Knossians, half colonists. These Nomophylakes are intended as a Council of State, and will be elected by the citizens in the following way, when the colony is once in full march :—All the citizens who perform or have performed military service, either as hoplites or cavalry, will be electors. They will vote by tablets laid upon the altar, and inscribed with the name both of the voter himself and of the person whom he prefers. First, three hundred persons will be chosen by the majority of votes according to this process. Next, out of these three hundred, one hundred will be chosen by a second process of the same kind. Lastly, out of these one hundred, thirty-seven will be chosen by a third similar process, but with increased solemnity: these thirty-seven will constitute the Board of Nomophylakes, or Guardians of the Laws.<sup>n</sup> No person shall be eligible for Guardian until he has attained the age of fifty. When elected, he shall continue to serve until he is seventy, and no longer: so that if elected at sixty, he will have ten years of service.<sup>o</sup> The duties of this Board will be to see that all the laws are faithfully executed: in which function they will have superintendence over all special magistrates and officers.

For the office of General and Minister of War, three persons shall be chosen by show of hands of the military citizens. It shall be the duty of the Nomophylakes to propose three names for this office: but other citizens may also propose different names, and the show of hands will decide. The three Generals, when chosen, shall propose twelve names as Taxiarchs, one for each tribe: other names may also be proposed, and the show of hands of each tribe will determine.<sup>p</sup>

A Council shall be annually chosen, consisting of 360 members, ninety from each of the four proprietary scales in the Census. The mode of electing this Council is highly complicated. First, Plato provides that 360 Councillors shall be chosen out of the first (or richest) class, and as many out

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 752 D,  
754 C.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 753 C-D.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 755 A.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 755 E.

of the second class, by universal suffrage, every citizen being compelled to give his vote: then that 360 Councillors shall be chosen out of the third class, by universal suffrage, but under this condition, that the three richest classes are compelled to vote, while the fourth class may abstain from voting if they please: next, that 360 Councillors shall be chosen out of the fourth class, still by universal suffrage, but with liberty to the third and fourth classes to abstain from voting, while the first and second classes are compelled to vote. Out of the four batches, of 360 names from each class, 180 names from each class are to be chosen by universal suffrage compulsory on all. This last list of 180 names is to be reduced, by drawing lots, to 90 from each class, or 360 in all: who constitute the Council for the year.<sup>q</sup>

Here the evident purpose of Plato is to obtain in the last result a greater number of votes from the rich than from the poor, without absolutely disfranchising the poor. Where the persons to be voted for are all of the richer classes, there the poor are compelled to come and vote as well as the rich: where the persons to be voted for are all of the poorer class, there the rich are compelled to vote, while the poor are allowed to stay away. He seems to look on the vote, not as a privilege which citizens will wish to exercise, but as a duty which they must be compelled by fine to discharge. This is (as Aristotle calls it) an oligarchical provision. It exhibits Plato's mode of attaining the end stated by Livy as proposed in the Servian constitution at Rome, and the end contemplated (without being announced) by the framers of most other political constitutions recorded in history—“*Gradus facti, ut neque exclusus quisquam suffragio videretur, et vis omnis penes primores esset.*”<sup>r</sup> Plato defends it by distinguishing two sorts of

Character of the electoral scheme—  
Plato's views about wealth—he caters partly for the oligarchical sentiment, partly for the democratical.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 756. Compare Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, p. 1266, a. 14.

The passage of Plato is not perspicuous. It appears to me to have been misunderstood by some commentators, who suppose that only 90 βουλευται are to be chosen out of each census in the original voting (see Schneider's Comment. on the passage of Aristotle above alluded to, p. 99).

The number originally chosen from each class must be 360, because it is directed, in the final process, to be reduced first (by election) to 180 from each class, and next (by sortition) to 90 from each class.

<sup>r</sup> Livy i. 43.

Aristotle characterises these regulations of the Platonic community as oligarchical, and remarks that this is

equality : one, complete and undistinguishing, in which all the citizens are put upon a level : the other in which the good and able citizen is distinguished from the bad and incapable citizen, so that he acquires power and honour in proportion to his superior merit.<sup>3</sup> This second sort of equality Plato approves, pronouncing it to be political justice. But such defence tacitly assumes that superiority in wealth, as between the four classes of his census, is to count as evidence of, or as an equivalent for, superior merit : an assumption doubtless received by many Grecian politicians, and admitted in the general opinion of Greece—but altogether at variance with the declared judgment of Plato himself as to the effect of wealth upon the character of the wealthy man. The poorest citizen in the Platonic community must have his lot of land, which Plato considers sufficient for a sober-minded family : the richest citizen can possess only five times as much : and all receive the same public instruction. Here, therefore, there can be no presumption of superior merit in the richer citizen as compared with the poorer, whatever might be said about the case as it stood in actual Grecian communities. We see that Plato in this case forgets his own peculiar mode of thought, and accommodates himself to received distinctions, without reflecting that the principles of *his* own political system rendered such distinctions inapplicable. He bows to the oligarchical sentiment of his contemporaries, by his preferential encouragement to the votes of the rich : he bows to the democratical sentiment, when he consents to employ to a small extent the principle of the lot.<sup>4</sup>

Of the annually-chosen Council, one twelfth part only (or thirty Councillors) will be in constant session in the city : each of their sessions lasting for one month, and the total thus covering the year. The remaining eleven twelfths will be attending to their private

Meetings of  
council—  
other magis-  
trates—  
Agoranomi—  
Astynomi,  
&c.

in contradiction to the principle with which Plato set out—that it ought to be a compound of monarchy and democracy. Aristotle understands this last principle somewhat differently from what Plato seems to have intended (Politic. ii. 6, 1266, a. 10).

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 757 A-B.

Compare a like distinction drawn between two sorts of *ισότης* in Isokrates, Areiopagitic, Orat. vii. s. 23-24 ; also Aristotel. Politic.

Plato, Legg. vi. p. 757 E.

τοῦ

δυσκολίας τῶν πολλῶν ἕνεκα,

&c.

affairs, except when special necessities arise. The Council will have the general superintendence of the city, and controul over all meetings of the citizens.<sup>u</sup> Provision is made for three magistrates called *Astynomi*, to regulate the streets, roads, public buildings, water-courses, &c.: and for five *Agoranomi*, to watch over the public market with its appertaining temples and fountains, and to take cognisance of disputes or offences occurring therein. None but citizens of the two richest classes of the census are eligible as *Astynomi* or *Agoranomi*: first, twice the number required are chosen by public show of hands—next, half of the number so chosen are drawn off by lot. In regard to the show of hands, Plato again decrees, that all citizens of the two richer classes shall be compelled to take part in it, under fine: all citizens of the two poorer classes may take part if they choose, but are not compelled.<sup>x</sup> By this provision, as before, Plato baits for the oligarchical sentiment: by the partial use of the lot, for the democratical.

The defence of the territory is entrusted to the *Agronomi*, five persons selected from each of the twelve tribes, making sixty in all; and assisted by sixty other junior subordinates, selected by the five *Agronomi* (those of each tribe choosing twelve) from their respective tribes. Each of these companies of seventeen will be charged with the care of one of the twelve territorial districts, as may be determined by lot. Each will then pass by monthly change from one district to another, so as to make the entire circuit of the twelve districts in one year, going round in an easterly direction or to the right: each will then make the same circuit backward, during a second year, in a westerly direction or to the left.<sup>y</sup> Their term of service will be two years in all, during which all of them will have become familiarly acquainted with every portion of the territory. A public mess will be provided for these companies, and each man among them will be held to strict continuity of service. Their

Plato, Legg. vi. p. 758 C-D.

Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 763-764.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 760 D. τοὺς τῆς χώρας τόπους μεταλλάττοντας ἀεὶ τῶν ἐξῆς τόπων ἐκάστου μηνὸς ἡγεῖσθαι τοὺς φρουράρχους ἐπὶ δέξια κύκλῳ τὸ

δ'

In reference to omens and auguries the Greek spectator looked towards the north, so that he had the east on his right hand.

duties will be, not merely to keep each district in a condition of defence against a foreign enemy, but also to improve its internal condition: to facilitate the outflow of water where there is too much, and to retard it where there is too little: to maintain, in the precincts sacred to the Gods, reservoirs of spring-water, partly as ornament, partly also as warm baths (for the heating of which large stocks of dry wood must be collected)—to benefit the old, the sick, and the overworked husbandman.<sup>z</sup> Farthermore, these Agronomi will adjudicate upon disputes and offences among the rural population, both slave and free. If they abuse their trust they will be accountable, first to the assembled citizens of the district, next to the public tribunals in the city.

Plato considers that these Agronomi will go through hard work during their two years of service, inasmuch as they will have no slaves, and will have to do everything for themselves: though in the performance of any public work, they are empowered to put in requisition both men and cattle from the neighbourhood.<sup>a</sup> He pronounces it to be a salutary discipline for the young men, whom he admonishes that an apprenticeship in obedience is indispensable to qualify them for command, and that exact obedience to the laws and magistrates will be their best title to posts of authority when older.<sup>b</sup> Moreover, he insists on the necessity that all citizens should become minutely acquainted with the whole territory: towards which purpose he encourages young men in the exercise of hunting. He compares (indirectly) his moveable guard of Agronomi to the Lacedæmonian Krypti, who maintained the police of Laconia, and kept watch over the Helots:<sup>c</sup> though they are also the

Comparison  
with the  
Lacedæmo-  
nian Kryptia.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 761 A-D.

Agreeable and refreshing combinations of springs with shady trees near the precincts of the Gods were frequent. See Xenophon, Hellen. v. 3, 19.

The thermal waters were also generally connected with some precinct of Héraklēs or Asklēpius.

In some temples it was forbidden to use this adjoining water except for sacred rites, Thucyd. iv. 97.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 760 E-763 A.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 762 E.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 763 A-B. εἴτε τις κρυπτοῦς εἴτ' ἀγορανόμους εἴθ' ὅ, τι καλῶν χαίρει, &c. He notes the hardships endured by these Κρυπτοί in their Κρυπτεία, i. p. 633 C.

The phrase seems however to indicate that Plato did not much like to call his Agronomi by the name of Κρυπτοί. The duties performed by the Lacedæmonian Κρυπτοί against the Helots were of the harshest character. See chap. vi. p. 509 of my 'History of Greece.' Schömann, Antiq. Jurisp. Græc. iv. 1-4, p. 111, v. 1, 21, p. 199.

parallel of the youthful Peripoli at Athens, who were employed as Guards for two years round various parts of Attica.

Besides Astynomi and Agoranomi, Plato provides priests for the care of the sacred buildings in the city, and for the service of the Gods. In choosing these priests, as in choosing the other magistrates, election and sortition are to be combined: to satisfy at once the oligarchical and the democratical sentiment. The lot will be peculiarly suitable in a case where priests are to be chosen—because the God may be expected to guide it in a manner agreeable to himself.<sup>d</sup> Plato himself however is not confident on this point, for he enjoins additional precautions: the person chosen must be sixty years old at least, free from all bodily defect, of legitimate birth, and of a family untainted by previous crime. Plato prescribes farther, that laws or canons respecting matters of divine concern shall be obtained from the Delphian oracle: and that certain Exêgêtæ shall be named as authorised interpreters of these canons, as long as they live.<sup>e</sup> Treasurers or stewards shall also be chosen, out of the two richer classes of the census, to administer the landed property and produce belonging to the various temples.<sup>f</sup>

Exêgêtæ—  
Property be-  
longing to  
temples.

In the execution of the duties imposed upon them, the Agoranomi and Astynomi are empowered to fine an offender to the extent of one mina (one hundred drachmæ), each of them separately—and when both sit together, to the extent of two minæ.<sup>g</sup>

*Music and Gymnastic.*—For each of these, two magisterial functions must be constituted: one to superintend the teaching and training—the other, to preside over the matches and distribution of prizes. In regard to the musical matches, one President must be appointed for the monôdic singleheaded exhibitions, another

Superintend-

function.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 749 D.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 759 E.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 760 A.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 764 B.

Here, as in other provisions, Plato copies the practice at Athens, where each individual magistrate was em-

powered to impose a fine of definite amount (*ἐπιβολὴν ἐπιβάλλειν*), though we do not know what that amount was. The Proedri could impose a fine as high as one mina, the Senate as high as five minæ (Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Prozess*, p. 34).

for the choric exhibitions. The President of the former must be not less than thirty years of age. The President of the latter must be not less than forty years of age. In order to appoint a fit person, the Nomophylakes shall constrain all the citizens whom they believe to be conversant with monôdic or choric matters, to assemble and agree on a preliminary list of ten candidates, who shall undergo a Dokimasy or examination, upon the single point of skill and competency, and no other. If they all pass, recourse shall be had to lot, and the one who draws the first lot shall be President for the year. In regard to the gymnastic matches, of men as well as of horses, the citizens of the three richest classes shall be constrained to come together (those of the fourth class may come, or stay away, as they please), and to fix upon twenty suitable persons; who shall undergo the Dokimasy, and out of whom three shall be selected by lot as Presidents of gymnastic contests for the year.<sup>h</sup>

We observe that in the nomination of Presidents for the musical and gymnastic contests, Plato adopts the same doublefaced machinery as before—To please the oligarchical sentiment by treating the votes of the rich as indispensable, the votes of the poor as indifferent—To please the democratical sentiment by a partial application of the lot. But in regard to the President of musical and gymnastic education or training, he prescribes a very different manner of choice. He declares this to be the most important function in the city. Upon the way in which the Minister of Education discharges his functions, the ultimate character of the citizens will mainly turn. Accordingly, this magistrate must be a man of fifty years of age, father of legitimate children—and, if possible, of daughters as well as sons. He must also be one of the thirty-seven Nomophylakes. He will be selected, not by the votes of the citizens generally, but by the votes of all the magistrates (except the annual Councillors and the Prytanes): such votes being deposited secretly in the temple of Apollo. The person who obtains the most of these secret votes will be submitted to a farther Dokimasy by all the voting magistrates (except the Nomo-

Grave duties  
of the Minister  
of Education—pre-  
cautions in  
electing him.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 764-765.

phylakes themselves), and will, if approved, be constituted President of musical and gymnastic education for five years.<sup>i</sup>

From the magisterial authority in his city, Plato now passes to the judicial or dikastic. He remarks that no peremptory line of separation can be drawn between the two. Every magistrate exercises judicial functions on some matters: every dikast, on the days when he sits, decides magisterially.<sup>k</sup> He then proceeds to distinguish (as the Attic forum did) between two sorts of causes:—Private, disputes between man and man, where the persons complaining of being wronged are one or a few individuals—Public, where the party wronged or alleged to be wronged is the state.<sup>l</sup>

In regard to the private causes, he institutes Tribe-Dikasteries, taken by lot out of the citizens of each tribe, and applied without notice to each particular cause as it comes on, so that no one can know beforehand in what cause he is to adjudicate, nor can any one be solicited or bribed.<sup>m</sup> He institutes farthermore a superior court of appeal, formed every year by the various Boards of Magistrates, each choosing out of its own body the most esteemed member, subject to approval by an ensuing Dokimasy.<sup>n</sup> When one citizen believes himself to be wronged by another, he must first submit the complaint to arbitration by neighbours and common friends. If this arbitration fails to prove satisfactory, he must next bring the complaint before the Tribe-Dikastery. Should their decision prove unsatisfactory, the case may be brought (seemingly by either of the parties) before the superior court of appeal, whose decision will be final. Plato directs that this superior Court shall hold its sittings publicly, in presence of all the Magistrates and all the Councillors, as well as of any other citizen who may choose to attend. The members of the Court are to give their votes openly.<sup>o</sup> Should

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 765-766.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767 A.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767 B.

This was the main distinction adopted in the Attic law. 1. Complaint, founded upon injury alleged to be done to the interest of some individual—*ἄγων ἴδιος, δίκη ἰδία, δίκη* in the narrow sense. 2. Complaint, founded upon injury alleged to be

done towards some interest not strictly individual—*ἄγων δημόσιος, δίκη δημοσία, γραφή* (Meier und Schömann, Der Attisch. Prozess, p. 162).

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 B.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767 C-D. *γινέσθω κοινὸν ἀπᾶσι τοῖς τὸ τρίτον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἰδιώταις πρὸς ἀλλήλους.*

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 767 A-D, 768 B. Compare xii. p. 956.

they be suspected of injustice or corruption, they may be impeached before the Nomophylakes; who, if convinced of their guilt, shall compel them to make good the wrong done, and shall impose penalties besides, if the case requires.<sup>p</sup>

In regard to Public Causes, Plato makes unusual concession to a feeling much prevalent in Greece, and especially potent at Athens. Where the wrong done is to the public, he recognises that the citizens generally will not submit to be excluded from the personal cognisance of it: the citizen excluded from that privilege feels as if he had no share in the city.<sup>q</sup> If one citizen accuses another of treason, or peculation, or other wrong towards the public, the accusation shall be originated at first, and decided at last, before the general body of citizens. But after having been originated before this general assembly, the charge must be submitted to an intermediate stage of examination, before three of the principal Boards of Magistrates; who shall sift the allegations of the accuser, as well as the defence of the accused. These commissioners (we must presume) will make a report on the case, which report will be brought before the general assembly; who will then adjudicate upon it finally, and condemn or acquit as they think right.<sup>r</sup>

This proposition deserves notice. Plato proclaims his disapprobation of the numerous Dikasteries in Athens, wherein the Dikasts sat, heard, and voted—perhaps with applause or murmurs, but with no searching questions of their own—leaving the whole speech to the parties and their witnesses. To decide justly (he says), the judicial authority must not remain silent, but must speak more than the parties, and must undertake the substantial conduct of the enquiry. No numerous assembly—nor even any few, unless they be intelligent—are competent to such a duty: nor even an intelligent few, without much

Public Causes must be tried directly by the citizens—strong feeling among Greeks about this.

Plato's way of meeting this feeling—Intermediate inquiry at report by special Commissioner

Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767 E.

Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 B.

ὡν τοῦ

ἡγεῖται τὸ πᾶν οὐ εἶναι. This is a remarkable indication about the tone of Grecian feeling from a very adverse witness.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 A.

βάσανον ἐν ταῖς

&c.

Here the word βάσανος is used in a much more extended sense than usual, so as to include the whole process of judicial enquiry.

time and patience.<sup>5</sup> To secure such an enquiry on these public causes—as far as is possible consistent with the necessity of leaving the final decision to the general assembly—is the object of Plato's last-mentioned proposition. It is one of the most judicious propositions in his whole scheme.

Plato has now constituted the magistrates and the judicial machinery. It is time to specify the laws which they are to obey and to enforce.<sup>6</sup>

What laws the magistrates are to enforce—Many details must be left to the Nomophylakes.

Plato considers the Nomophylakes (together with another Board called the Nocturnal Council, to be hereafter described) as the permanent representatives of himself: destined to ensure that the grand ethical purpose of the lawgiver shall be constantly kept in view, and to supply what may have been left wanting in the original programme.<sup>7</sup> Especially at the first beginning, provision will be found wanting in many details, which the Nomophylakes will take care to supply. In respect to the choric festivals, which are of so much importance for the training and intercourse of young men and maidens, the lawgiver must trust to the Choric Superintendents and the Nomophylakes for regulating, by their experience, much which he cannot foresee. But an experience of ten years will enable them to make all the modifications and additions required; and after that period they shall fix and consecrate in perpetuity the ceremonies as they then stand, forbidding all farther change. Neither in that nor in any other arrangement shall any subsequent change be allowed, except on the unanimous requisition of all the magistrates, all the people, and all the oracles of the Gods.<sup>8</sup>

The choric festivals, in which the youths and maidens will take part, both of them naked as far as a sober modesty will allow, present occasions for mutual acquaintance between them, which serves as foundation for marriage.<sup>9</sup> At the age of twenty-five a young man is permitted to marry; and before the age of thirty-five he is required to marry, under penalty of

Laws—Rich husbands to choose poor wives—No dowries—Costly marriage festivals are forbidden.

<sup>5</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 766 E.

<sup>6</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 E.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 770 C-E.

<sup>8</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 772 C-D.

Plato, Legg. vi. p. 772 A

γυμνὰς μέχρι περ αἰδοῦς σῶφρονος  
ν. &c.

fine and disgrace, if he does not.<sup>z</sup> Plato introduces here a discourse, in the form of a prologue to his marriage law, wherein he impresses on young men the general principles according to which they ought to choose their wives. The received sentiment, which disposes a rich youth to choose his wife from a rich family, is (in Plato's view) altogether wrong. Rich husbands ought to assort themselves with poor wives; and in general the characters of husband and wife ought to be opposite rather than similar, in order that the offspring may not inherit the defects of either.<sup>a</sup> The religious ceremonies antecedent to marriage are to be regulated by the *Exêgêtæ*. A costly marriage feast—and, above all, drunkenness at that feast—are emphatically forbidden. Any offspring begotten when the parent is in this disorderly and insane condition,<sup>b</sup> will probably be vitiated from the beginning. Out of the two residences which every citizen's lot will comprise, one must be allotted to the son when the son marries.<sup>c</sup>

Plato now enters upon his laws respecting property; and

Laws about slavery. Slaves to be well fed, and never treated with cruelty or insolence. The master must not converse with them.

first of all upon the most critical variety of property; that in human beings, or slavery. This he declares to be a subject full of difficulty. There is much difference of opinion on the subject. Some speak of slaves as deserving trust and good treatment, in proof of which various anecdotes of exemplary fidelity on their part are cited: others again regard them as incorrigibly debased, fit for nothing better than the whip and spur, like cattle. Then moreover the modified form of slavery, such as that of the Helots in Laconia, and the *Penestæ* in Thessaly, has been found full of danger and embarrassment, though the Spartans themselves are well satisfied with it.<sup>d</sup> (It will be recollected that the Helots and

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 772 E, 774 A.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 773 C-D.

Compare the *Politikus*, pp. 310-311, where the necessity is insisted on of coupling in marriage two persons of opposite dispositions—*τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἦθος* with *τὸ κόσμιον ἦθος*. There is a natural inclination (Plato says) for the *ἀνδρεῖοι* to intermarry with each other, and for the *κόσμοι* to do the like; but the lawgiver must contend against

this. If this be permitted, each of the breeds will degenerate through excess of its own peculiarity.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 775.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 776 A.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 777. He alludes also to the enslavement of the indigenous population called the *Mariandyni*, by the Grecian colonists of *Herakleia* on the southern coast of the *Euxine*; and to the disturbances

Penestæ were not slaves bought and imported from abroad, as the slaves in Attica were, but conquered Hellenic communities who had been degraded from freedom into slavery, and from the condition of independent proprietorship into that of tributary tenants or serfs; but with the right to remain permanently on their lands, without ever being sold for exportation.) This form of slavery (where the slaves are of the same race and language, with reciprocal bonds of sympathy towards each other) Plato denounces as especially dangerous. Care must be taken that there shall be among the slaves as little fellowship of language and feelings as possible; but they must be well fed: moreover everything like cruelty and insolence in dealing with them must be avoided, even more carefully than in dealing with freemen. This he prescribes partly for the protection of the slave himself, but still more for the interest of the master: whose intrinsic virtue, or want of virtue, will be best tested by his behaviour as a master. The slaves must be punished judicially, when they deserve it. But the master must never exhort or admonish them, as he would address himself to a freeman: he must never say a word to them, except to give an order: above all, he must abstain from all banter and joking, either with male or female slaves.<sup>e</sup> Many foolish masters indulge in such behaviour, which emboldens the slaves to give themselves airs, and renders the task of governing them almost impracticable.<sup>f</sup>

and disorders which had occurred through movements of the slaves in Southern Italy. Probably this last may be connected with that revolt whereby the Bruttians became enfranchised; but we can make out nothing definite from Plato's language.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 777 D-E. *κολά-  
ζειν γε μὴν ἐν δικῇ δούλους ἀεὶ, καὶ μὴ  
νοῦτεσθῆντας ὡς ἐλευθέρους θρῦπτεσθαι  
ποιεῖν. Τὴν δὲ οἰκετοῦ πρόσρησιν χρὴ  
ἐπίταξιν πᾶσαν γίγνεσθαι, μὴ  
ὄντας μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς οἰκεταῖς,  
οὐν θηλείαις μήτ' ἄρρεσιν.*

<sup>f</sup> Aristotle (Polit. vii. p. 1330, a. 27; Econom. i. p. 1344, b. 18) agrees with Plato as to the danger of having slaves who speak the same language and are of the same tribes, with common lineage and sympathies. He disapproves of anything which tends to impart spirit

and independence to the slave's character: and he takes occasion from hence to deduce some objections against various arrangements of the Platonic Republic (Polit. ii. p. 1264, a. 35). These are precautions—*πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν*. But Aristotle dissents from Plato on another point—where Plato enjoins that the master shall not exhort or admonish his slave, but shall address to him no word except the word of command (Arist. Pol. i. p. 1260, b. 5). Aristotle says that there is a certain special and inferior kind of ἀρετὴ which the slave can possess and ought to possess; that this ought to be communicated to him by the admonition and exhortation of the master; and that the master ought to admonish his slaves even more than he admonishes his children. The slave

As to the construction of the city, Plato prescribes that its external contour shall be of circular form, encircling the summit of an eminence, with the agora near the centre. The temples of the Gods shall be planted round it. around the agora, and the buildings for gymnasia and schooling, for theatrical representation, for magistrative, administrative, and judicial business, near at hand. Plato follows the example of Sparta in prohibiting any special outer wall for the fortification of the city, which he treats as an indication of weakness and timidity: nevertheless he suggests that the houses constituting the city may be erected on such a plan, and in such connection, as to be equivalent to a fortification.<sup>a</sup> When once the city is erected, the Astynomi or Ædiles are to be charged with the duty of maintaining its integrity and cleanliness.

Plato next proceeds to regulate the mode of life proper for all his new-married couples. He proclaims broadly that large interference with private and individual life is unavoidable; and that no great public reform can be accomplished without it.<sup>b</sup> He points out that this principle was nowhere sufficiently admitted: not even at Sparta, where it was carried farther than anywhere else. Even the Spartans and Kretans adopted the public mess-table only for males, and not for females.<sup>1</sup> In Plato's view, it is essential for both. He would greatly prefer (as announced already in his Republic) that it should be one and the same for both—males and females taking their meals together.

The newly-married couples are enjoined to bestow their

requires a certain that he may not be hindered from his duty by ἀκολασία or δειλία: but it is an ἀρετή μικρά: the courage required for the slave is ὑπηρετική, that for the master ἀρχική (ib. p. 1260, a. 22-35). This measure of virtue the master must impart to the slave by exhortation, over and above the orders which he gives as to the performance of work. It would appear, however, that in Aristotle's time there were various persons who denied that there was any belonging to a slave—παρὰ τὰς

καὶ καὶ διακονικὰς (p. 1259, b. 23). Upon this last theory is founded the injunction of Plato which Aristotle here controverts.

What Aristotle says about slaves in the fifth chapter of the first book of his *Economica*, is superior to what he says in the *Politica*, and superior to anything which we read in the Platonic Treatise *De Legibus*.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Legg.* vi. pp. 778-779.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 780 A, vii. p. 790 A.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 781 A.

best attention upon the production of handsome and well-constituted children: this being their primary duty to the city for ten years after their marriage. Their conduct will be watched by a Board of Matrons, chosen for the purpose by the Nomophylakes, and assembling every day in the temple of Eileithuia. In case of any dispute, or unfaithful or unseemly conduct, these Matrons will visit them to admonish or threaten, if they see reason. Should such interference fail of effect, the Matrons will apprise the Nomophylakes, who will on their parts admonish and censure, and will at last denounce the delinquents, if still refractory, to the public authority. The delinquents will then be disgraced, and debarred from the public ceremonies, unless they can clear themselves by indicting and convicting their accusers before the public tribunal.<sup>k</sup>

The age of marriage is fixed at from thirty to thirty-five for males, from sixteen to twenty for females. The first ten years after marriage are considered as appropriated to the production of children *for the city*, and are subject to the strict supervision above mentioned. If any couple have no offspring for ten years, the marriage shall be dissolved by authority. After ten years the supervision is suspended, and the couple are left to themselves. If either of them shall commit an infidelity with another person still under the decennial restriction, the party so offending is liable to the same penalty as if he were still himself also under it.<sup>l</sup> But if the person with whom infidelity is committed be not under that restriction, no penalty will be incurred beyond a certain general discredit, as compared with others whose conduct is blameless, and who will receive greater honour. However, Plato advises that nothing shall be said in the law respecting the conduct of married couples after the period of decennial restriction has elapsed, unless there be some grave scandal to call attention to the subject.<sup>m</sup>

Board of  
superintending  
matrons.

Age fixed for  
marriage.  
During the  
first ten  
years the  
couple are  
under obligation  
to procreate for the  
city—  
Restrictions  
during these  
ten years.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 784.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 784-785.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. vi. p. 785 A. καὶ  
μετριαζόντων μὲν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν

θα, &c.

νομοθετηθέντα ταύτη

Plato now proceeds to treat about the children just born.

How infants  
are to be  
brought up—  
Nurses—  
Perpetual  
regulated  
movements  
—useful for  
toning down  
violent emo-  
tions.

The principle of separate family being admitted in the Treatise de Legibus, he refrains from promulgating any peremptory laws on this subject, because it is impossible for the lawgiver or the magistrate to enter into each private house, and to enforce obedience on such minute and numerous details: while it would be discreditable for him to command what he could not enforce, and it would moreover accustom citizens to disobey the law with impunity. Still, however, Plato<sup>n</sup> thinks it useful to deliver some general advice, which he hopes that fathers and mothers will spontaneously follow. He begins with the infant as soon as born, and even before birth. The mother during pregnancy is admonished to take regular exercise; the infant when born must be carried about constantly in the nurse's arms. The invigorating effects of such gestation are illustrated by the practice of Athenian cockfighters, who cause the cocks while under training to be carried about under the arms of attendants in long walks.<sup>o</sup> Besides that the nurses (slaves) must be strong women, there must also be more than one to each infant, in order that he may be sufficiently carried about. He must be kept in swaddling-clothes for the first two years, and must not be allowed to walk until he is three years of age.<sup>p</sup> The perpetual movement and dandling, in the arms of the nurse, produces a good effect not only on the health and bodily force of the infant, but also upon his emotions.<sup>q</sup> The infant ought to be kept (if it were possible) in movement as constant and unceasing as if he were on ship-board. Nurses know this by experience, when they lull to sleep an insomnious child, not by holding him still, but by swinging him about in their arms, and by singing a ditty. So likewise the insane and furious emotions inspired by Dionysus (also by Zeus, by the mother of the Gods, &c.) are appeased

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 788-790 A.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 789.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 789 E, 790 A.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 790 D. λά-  
τοίνυν τούτο οἶον

σώματος τε καὶ

καὶ

ἡ διὰ πάσης νυκ-  
τός τε καὶ ἡμέρας, ὥς  
ἅπασιν μὲν, οὐχ ἡκιστα δὲ τοῖς ὅτι ...  
τάτοισιν, καὶ οἰκεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν ἦν, οἶον  
αἰετῶν, πλέοντας· νῦν δὲ, ὥς ἐγγύτατα  
περὶ

by the regulated movement, dance and music, solemnly performed at the ceremonial worship of the God who excited the emotions. These are different varieties of fear and perturbation: they are morbid internal movements, which we overpower and heal by muscular and rhythmical movements impressed from without, with appropriate music and religious solemnities.<sup>r</sup>

To guard the child, during the first three years of his life, against disturbing fears, or at least to teach him to conquer them when they may spring up, is to lay the best foundation of a fearless character for the future.<sup>s</sup> By extreme indulgence he would be rendered wayward: by extreme harshness his spirit would be broken.<sup>t</sup> A middle course ought to be pursued, guarding him against pains as far as may be, yet at the same time keeping pleasures out of his reach, especially the stronger pleasures: thus shall we form in him a gentle and propitious disposition, such as that which we ascribe to the Gods.<sup>u</sup>

The comparison made here by Plato between the effect produced by these various religious ceremonies upon the mind of the votary, and that produced by the dandling of the nurse upon the perturbed child in her arms, is remarkable. In both, the evil is the same—unfounded and irrational fear—an emotional disturbance within: in both, the remedy is the same—regulated muscular movement and excitement from without: more gentle in the case of the infant, more violent in the case of the adult. Emotion is a complex fact, physical as well as mental? and the physical aspect and basis of it (known to Aristotle<sup>x</sup> as well as to Plato) is here brought to view. To

Choric and orchestric movements, their effect in discharging strong emotions.

Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 790-791. δεινὸν ἔστι που ταύτ' ἀμφοτέρω τὰ ἡ, καὶ ἔστι δειμὰ δι' ἑξιν φύλην τινά. Ὅταν οὖν ἑξωθέν τις τοῖς τοιοῦτοις πάθει τῶν ἑξωθεν κρατεῖ κίνησις προσφερόντος φοβερὰν οὖσαν καὶ κίνησιν, κρατήσασα τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεται ἀπερητῆς περὶ τὰ τῆς καρδίας χαλεπῆς γενομένης ἐκάστων πηδήσεως.

About the effect of the movement, bustle, noise, and solemn exhibitions, &c. of a Grecian festival, in appeasing the over-wrought internal excitement

of those who took part in it, see Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 689.

Compare Euripid. *Hippolyt.* 141, where the chorus addresses the love-sick Phædra:—

σὺ τὰρ' ἔνθεος, ᾧ κούρα  
εἴτ' ἐκ Πανὸς εἴθ' Ἑκάτας,  
ἢ σεμνῶν Κορυβάντων,  
ἢ ματρὸς ὀρέας φοιτᾶς.

also Eurip. *Medea*, 1172 about Πανὸς ὄργας.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 791 C.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 791 D.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 792 C-D.

<sup>x</sup> Aristot. *De Animâ*, i. 1.

speak the language of modern science (with which their views here harmonise, in spite of their imperfect acquaintance with human anatomy), if the energies of the nervous system are overwrought within, they may be diverted into a new channel by bodily movements at once strenuous and measured, and may thus be discharged in a way tranquillising to the emotions. This is Plato's theory about the healing effects of the choric and orchêstic religious ceremonies of his day. The God was believed first to produce the distressing excitement within—then to suggest and enjoin (even to share in) the ceremonial movements for the purpose of relieving it. The votary is brought back from the condition of comparative madness to that of sober reason.<sup>y</sup> Strong emotion of any kind is, in Plato's view, a state of distemper. The observances here prescribed respecting wise regulation of the emotions, especially in young children, are considered by Plato as not being laws in the proper and positive sense, but as the unwritten customs, habits, rules, discipline, &c., upon which all positive laws repose and depend. Though they appear to go into excessive and petty details, yet unless they be well understood and efficaciously realised, the laws enacted will fail to attain their purpose.<sup>z</sup>

Pursuant to this view of the essential dependence of *leges* upon *mores*, Plato continues his directions about the Training of boys and girls. training of children. From the age of three to six, the child must be supplied with amusements, under a gentle but sufficient controul. The children of both sexes will meet daily at the various temples near at hand, with discreet matrons to preside over them, and will find amusement for each other. At six years of age the boys and girls will be separated, and will be consigned to different male and female tutors. The boys shall learn riding, military exercise, and the use of the various weapons of war. The girls shall learn these very same things also, if it be possible. Plato is most

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 791 A.  
εἰργάζεσθαι ἀντὶ μακικῶν ἡμῶν

<sup>z</sup> Servius observes (Not. ad Virgil. Eclog. v. 73):—"Sané, ut in religionibus saltaretur, hæc ratio est, quod

nullam majores nostri corporis partem esse voluerunt, quæ non sentiret religionem. Nam cantus ad animam, saltatio ad mobilitatem pertinet corporis."

Plato, Legg. vii. p. 793 C-D.

anxious that they should learn, but he fears that the feelings of the community will not tolerate the practice.<sup>a</sup> All the teaching will be conducted under the superintendence of teachers, female as well as male: competent individuals, of both sexes, being appointed to the functions of command without distinction.<sup>b</sup> The children will be taught to use their left hands as effectively as their right.<sup>c</sup> Wrestling shall be taught up to a certain point, to improve the strength and flexibility of the limbs; but elaborate wrestling and pugilism is disapproved. Imitative dancing, choric movements, and procession, shall also be taught, but always in arms, to familiarise the youth with military details.<sup>d</sup>

Plato now enters upon the musical and literary teaching proper for the youthful portion of his community. Poetry, music, and dancing, as connected with the service and propitiation of the Gods, are in the first instance recreative and amusing; but they also involve serious consequences.<sup>e</sup> It is most important to the community that these exercises should not only be well arranged, but that when arranged they should be fixed by authority, so as to prevent all innovations or deviations by individual taste. Plato here repeats, with emphasis, his commendation of the Egyptian practice to consecrate all the songs, dances, and festive ceremonies, and to tolerate no others whatever.<sup>f</sup> Change is in itself a most serious evil, and change in one department provokes an appetite for change in all. Plato forbids all innovation, even in matters of detail, such as the shape of vessels or articles of furniture.<sup>g</sup> He allows no poet to circulate any ode except such as is in full harmony with the declaration of the lawgiver respecting good and evil. All the old poems must be sifted and weeded. All new hymns and prayers to the Gods, even before they are shown to a single individual, must be examined by Censors above fifty years of age, in order that it may be seen whether the poet knows what he

Musical and literary teaching for youth—Poetry, songs, music, dances, must all be fixed by authority and never changed—Mischief done by poets aiming to please.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 794 B-D.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 795 D. ἀρχού-  
οις τε καὶ ἀρχουσι. P. 806 E.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 794-795,  
804 D.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 796 C-D.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 803 C-E.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 799.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 797.

ought to praise or blame, and what he ought to pray for. In general the poets do not know what is good and what is evil. By mistaken prayers—especially for wealth, which the law-giver discountenances as prejudicial—they may bring down great mischief upon the city.<sup>h</sup> Different songs must be composed for the two sexes: songs of a bold and martial character for males—of a sober and quiet character for females.<sup>i</sup> But the poet must on no account cultivate “the sweet Muse,” or make it his direct aim to produce emotions delightful to the audience. The sound and useful music will always in the end become agreeable, provided the pupils hear it from their earliest childhood, and hear nothing else.<sup>k</sup> Plato censures the tragic representations exhibited in the Grecian cities (at Athens, more than anywhere else) as being unseemly, and even impious, because, close to the altar where sacrifice was offered to the Gods, choric and dramatic performances of the most touching and pathetic character were exhibited. The poet who gained the prize was he who touched most deeply the tender emotions of the audience, and caused the greatest flow of tears among them. Now, in the opinion of Plato, the exhibition of so much human misery, and the communication of so much sorrowful sympathy, was most unsuitable to the festival day, and offensive to the Gods. It was tolerable only on the inauspicious days of the year, and when exhibited by hired Karian mourners, such as those who wailed loudly at funerals. The music at the festivals ought to have no emotional character, except that of gentle, kindly, auspicious cheerfulness.<sup>l</sup>

At ten years old, the boys and girls (who have hitherto been exercised in recitation, singing, dancing, &c.) are to learn their letters, or reading and writing. They will continue this process until thirteen years

Boys and girls to learn letters and the lyre, from

Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 800 A, 801 B, 802 B.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 802 D-E.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 802 C. *καὶ μὴ ἀρατιθεμένης τῆς γλυκείας Μούσης.*

Plato, Legg. vii. p. 800 B-E. *καὶ τὸ τῆς ψδῆς γένος μὴν πάντῃ πάντως*

This is a remarkable declaration of Plato, condemning the tragic representations at Athens. Compare

Gorgias, p. 501; Republic, x. p. 605: also about the effect on the spectators, Ion. p. 535 E.

The idea of *εὐφημία* is more negative than positive; it is often shown by silence. The *δυσσφήμια*—Sopho. Phil. 11—or *βλασφημία*, as Plato calls it, are the positive act or ill-omened manifestation, Plato, Phædon, p. 117.

old. They will learn the use of the lyre, for three years. The same period and duration is fixed for all of them, not depending at all upon the judgment or preference of the parents.<sup>m</sup> It is sufficient if they learn to read and write tolerably, without aiming to do it either quickly or very well. The boys will be marched to school at daybreak every morning, under the care of a tutor, who is chosen by the magistrate for the purpose of keeping them under constant supervision and discipline.<sup>n</sup> The masters for teaching will be special persons paid for the duty, usually foreigners.<sup>o</sup> They will be allowed to teach nothing except the laws and homilies of the lawgiver, together with any selections from existing poets which may be in full harmony with these.<sup>p</sup> Plato here proclaims how highly he is himself delighted with his own string of homilies: which are not merely exhortations useful to be heard, but also have the charm of poetry, and have been aided by inspirations from the Gods.<sup>q</sup> As for the poets themselves, whether serious or comic, whose works were commonly employed in teaching, being committed wholly or partially to memory—Plato repudiates them as embodying a large proportion of mischievous doctrine which his pupils ought never to hear. Much reading, or much learning, he discountenances as dangerous to youths.<sup>r</sup>

teen years of age. Masters will teach the laws and homilies of the lawgiver, and licensed extracts from the poets.

The teaching of the harp and of music (occupying the three years from thirteen to sixteen, after the three preceding years of teaching letters) will not be suffered to extend to any elaborate or complicated combinations. The melody will be simple: the measure grave and dignified. The imitative movement or dancing will exhibit only the gestures and demeanour suitable to the virtuous man in the various situations of life, whether warlike or

The teaching is to be simple, and common to both sexes.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 810 A.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 808 C, 809 B.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 804 D, 813 E.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 811 E. Any new poet who wishes to exhibit must submit his compositions to the Censors. P. 817 C-D.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 C-D. οὐκ ἄνευ τινὸς ἐπιποίας θεῶν — μάλα ἡσθῆναι. Stallbaum in his note treats

this as said in jest (*facete dicit*). To me it seems sober earnest, and quite in character with the didactic solemnity of the whole treatise. Plato himself would have been astonished (I think) at the note of his commentator.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 810-811, κίνδυνόν φημι εἶναι φέρουσαν τοῖς παισὶ τὴν πολυμαθίαν. Compare p. 819 A.

pacific :<sup>s</sup> the subject-matter of the songs or hymns will be regulated (as above described) by censorial authority. The practice will be consecrated and unchangeable, under the supervision of a magistrate for education.<sup>t</sup>

• All this teaching is imparted to the youth of both sexes : to boys, by male teachers—to girls, by female teachers, both of them paid. The training in gymnastic and military exercises and in arms, is also common to girls and boys.<sup>u</sup> Plato deems it disgraceful that the females shall be brought up timorous and helpless—unable to aid in defending the city when it is menaced, and even unmanning the male citizens by demonstrations of terror.<sup>x</sup>

We next come to arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy.

Rudiments  
of arithmetic  
and geometry  
to be taught.

Plato directs that all his citizens shall learn the rudiments of these sciences—not for the reason urged by most persons, because of the necessities of practical life, (which reason he discards as extravagantly silly, though his master Sokrates was among those who urged it)—but because these are endowments belonging to the divine nature, and because without them no man can become a God, Dæmon, or Hero, capable of watching over mankind.<sup>y</sup> In Egypt elementary arithmetic and geometry were extensively taught to boys—but very little in Greece:<sup>z</sup> though he intimates that both in Egypt, and in the Phenician towns, they were turned only to purposes of traffic, and were joined with sordid dispositions which a good lawgiver ought to correct by other provisions. In

Plato, Legg. vii. p. 812 C-D. Still Plato allows the exhibition, under certain conditions, of low, comic, ludicrous dances ; yet not by any freemen or citizens, but by slaves and hired persons of mean character. He even considers it necessary that the citizens should see such low exhibitions occasionally, in order to appreciate by contrast the excellence of their own dignified exhibitions. Of two opposites you cannot know the one unless you also learn to know the other—*ἄνευ γὰρ*

*ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία* :

*τοιεῖν*

*α*, &c. (p. 816 E).

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 813 A.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 813 C-E, 814-815. *πολεμικὴ ὑρχησις*—*εἰρηρικὴ*

or *ἀπόλεμος* :

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 814 B. See Æschylus, Sept. ad. Thebas, 172-220.

Plato, Legg. vii. p. 818 B-C. *οὗτος τῶν λόγων εὐθεστάτος ἐστι*

*μακρῷ*. In interpreting this curious passage we must remember that regularity, symmetry, exact numerical proportion, &c., are the primary characteristics of the divine agents in Plato's view : of Uranus and the Stars, as the first of them, compare Æsch. Prom. 460.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 818 E, 819 B-D. *ἡσυχύσθην—ὑπὲρ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων*. Compare Legg. v. p. 747 C, and Republic, iv. p. 436 A.

Respecting the distinction between *θεοὶ, δαίμονες, ἥρωες*, see Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp. 104-115.

the Platonic city, both arithmetic and geometry will be taught, so far as to guard the youth against absurd blunders about measurement, and against confusion of incommensurable lines and spaces with commensurable. Such blunders are now often made by Greeks.<sup>a</sup> By a good method, the teaching of these sciences may be made attractive and interesting; so that no force will be required to compel youth to learn.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 819 E, 820 A-C.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 820 D. *μετά*

I transcribe here the curious passage which we read a little before.

Plato, Legg. vii. p. 819 B. *Τόσαδε τοίνυν ἕκαστα χρή φάναι μανθάνειν δεῖν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους, ὅσα καὶ πᾶ μ' ὅλος*

*γράφμασι μανθάνει. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοὺς ἀτεχνῶς παισὶν ἐξευρημένα μαθήματα, μετὰ παιδιᾷ τε καὶ ἡδονῇ μανθάνειν μῆλων τέ τινῶν διανομαὶ καὶ στεφάνων πλειοσιν ἅμα καὶ ἐλάττοσιν, ἀρροτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῶν αὐτῶν—καὶ δὴ καὶ*  
*s, φιάλας ἅμα χρυσοῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ τοιοῦτων ἄλλων κεραυνύντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλως πως διαδιδόντες, ὅπερ εἶπον, εἰς παιδῶν ἐναρμόττοντες τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀριθμῶν χρήσεις, ὥφελούσι τοὺς μανθάνοντας εἰς τε τὰς τῶν στρατοπέδων τάξεις καὶ ἀγωγὰς καὶ στρατείας καὶ εἰς οἰκονομίας αὐτῶν καὶ πάντως χρησιμωτέρους αὐτοὺς*

*ἀνθρώπους ἀπεργάζονται.*

The information here given is valuable respecting the extensive teaching of elementary arithmetic as well as of letters among Egyptian boys, far more extensive than among Hellenic boys. The priests especially, in Egypt a numerous order, taught these matters to their own sons (Diodor. i. 81), probably to other boys also. The information is valuable too in another point of view, as respects the *method* of teaching arithmetic to boys; not by abstract numbers, nor by simple effort of memory in the repetition of a multiplication-table, but by concrete examples and illustrations exhibited to sense in familiar objects. The importance of this concrete method, both in facilitating comprehension and in interesting the youthful learner, are strongly insisted on by Plato, as they

have been also by some of the ablest modern teachers of elementary arithmetic: see Professor Leslie's *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, and Mr. Horace Grant's *Arithmetic for Young Children and Second Stage of Arithmetic*. The following passage from a work of Sir John Herschel (*Review of Whewell's History of Inductive Sciences*, in the *Quarterly Review*, June, 1841) bears a striking and curious analogy to the sentences above transcribed from Plato:—"Number we cannot help regarding as an abstraction, and consequently its general properties or its axioms to be of necessity inductively concluded from the consideration of particular cases. And surely this is the way in which children do acquire their knowledge of number, and in which they learn its axioms. The apples and the marbles are put in requisition (*μῆλων διανομαὶ καὶ στεφάνων, Plato*), and through the multitude of gingerbread nuts their ideas acquire clearness, precision, and generality."

I borrow the above references from Mr. John Stuart Mill, *System of Logic*, Book ii. ch. vi. p. 335, ed. 1. They are annexed as a note to the valuable chapters of his work on *Demonstration and Necessary Truths*, in which he shows that the truths so-called, both in *Geometry and Arithmetic*, rest upon inductive evidence.

"The fundamental truths of the Science of Number all rest upon the evidence of sense: they are proved by showing to our eyes and to our fingers that any given number of objects, ten balls for example, may by separation and re-arrangement exhibit to our senses all the different sets of numbers, the sum of which is equal to ten. All the improved methods of teaching arithmetic to children proceed upon a knowledge of this fact. All who wish to carry the child's *mind* along with them in learning arithmetic—all who (as Dr. Biber in his remarkable *Letters*

Astronomy must also be taught up to a certain point, in order that the youth may imbibe correct belief respecting those great Divinities—Hêlios, Selênê, and the Planets—or may at any rate be protected from the danger of unconsciously advancing false affirmations about them, discreditable to their dignity. The general public consider it impious to study the Kosmos and the celestial bodies, with a view to detect the causes of what occurs: <sup>c</sup> while at the same time they assert that the movements of Hêlios and Selênê are irregular, and they call the planets Wanderers. Regular action is (in Plato's view) the characteristic mark of what is good and perfect: irregularity is the foremost of all defects, and cannot without blasphemy be imputed to any of the celestial bodies. Moreover, many persons also assert untruly, that among the celestial bodies the one which is really the slowest mover, moves the fastest—and that the one which is really the fastest mover, moves the slowest. How foolish would it appear (continues Plato) if they made the like mistake about the Olympic runners, and if they selected the defeated competitor, instead of the victor, to be crowned and celebrated in panegyrical odes! How offensive is such falsehood, when applied to the great Gods in the heavens! Each of them has in reality one uniform circular movement, though they appear to have many and variable movements. Our youth must be taught enough of astronomy to guard against such heresies. The study of astronomy up to this point, far from being impious, is indispensable as a safeguard against impiety.<sup>d</sup> Plato intimates that

Astronomy must be taught, in order that the citizens may not assert libellous falsehoods respecting the heavenly bodies.

on Education expresses it) wish to teach numbers and not mere ciphers—now teach it through the evidence of the senses, in the manner we have described" (p. 335).

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 821 A. We must observe that the Athenian (who here represents Plato himself) does not give this repugnance to astronomical study as his own feeling, but, on the contrary, as a prejudice from which he dissents. There is no ground, therefore, so far as this passage is concerned, for the charge of contradiction advanced by Velleius against Plato

in Cicero De Nat. Deor. i. 12, 30.

Plat. Legg. vii. pp. 821 B-8 2 C.

ὡς ἔπος εἰπείν, πάντες μεγάλων θεῶν, Ἡλίου τε ἅμα καὶ Σελήνης. Περὶ θεῶν τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν τοὺς γε ἡμετέρους πολίτας καὶ τοὺς νέους τὸ μέχρι τοσούτου μαθεῖν, —μέχρι τοῦ μὴ βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτὰ, γὰρ αἱ θεὸντας καὶ ἐν εὐχαίς εὐσεβῶς. The five Planets

were distinguished and named, and their periods to a certain extent understood, by Plato; but by many persons in his day the word Planet was understood more generally as com-

these astronomical truths were of recent acquisition, even to himself.<sup>e</sup>

In regard to hunting, Plato thinks that it is a subject on which positive laws are unsuitable or insufficient, and he therefore gives certain general directions which partake of the nature both of advice and of law. The good citizen (he says) is one who not only obeys

Hunting—  
how far per-  
mitted or  
advised.

prehending all the celestial bodies, sun and moon among them—(except fixed stars) therefore comets also—*τὰ*

*τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορᾷ ὄντα*, Xenoph. Memor. iv. 7, 5, where an opinion is ascribed to Sokrates quite opposed to that which Plato here expresses. See Schaubach, *Geschichte der Astronomie*, pp. 212-477.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 819 D, 821 E. This portion of the *Leges* is obscure, and would be hardly intelligible if it were not illustrated by a passage in the *Timæus* (p. 38). Even with such help it is difficult, and has been understood differently by different interpreters. Proklus (in *Timæum*, pp. 202-203) and Martin (*Études sur le Timée*, ii. note 36, p. 84) interpret it as alluding to the spiral line (*ἐλικά*) described by each planet (Sun and Moon are each counted as planets) round the Earth, arising from the combination of the force of the revolving sidereal sphere or *Aplanês*, carrying all the planets round along with it from East to West, with the counter-movement (contrary, but obliquely contrary) inherent in each planet. The spiral movement of each planet, resulting from combination of these two distinct forces, is a regular movement governed by law; though to an observer who does not understand the law, the movements appear irregular. Compare Derkyllides ap. Theon Smyrn. c. 41, f. 27, p. 330, ed. Martin.

The point here discussed forms one of the items of controversy between Gruppe and Boeckh, in the recent discussion about Plato's astronomical views. Gruppe, *Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen*, pp. 157-168; Boeckh, *Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon*, pp. 45-57.

Gruppe has an ingenious argument to show that the novelty which Plato had in his mind, but was afraid to declare openly because of

existing prejudices, was the heliocentric or Copernican system, which he believes to have been Plato's discovery. Boeckh refutes Gruppe's reasoning; and refutes it, in my judgment, completely. He sustains the interpretation given by Proklus and Martin.

Boeckh also illustrates (pp. 35-38-49-54), in a manner more satisfactory than Gruppe, the dicta of Plato about the comparative velocity of the Planets (Sun and Moon counted among them).

Plato declares the Moon to be the quickest mover among the planets, and Saturn to be the slowest. On the contrary Demokritus pronounced the Moon to be the slowest mover of all; slower than the Sun, because the Sun was farther from the Earth and nearer to the outermost or sidereal sphere. It was the rotation of this last mentioned sphere (according to Demokritus) which carried round along with it the Sun, the Moon, and all the planets: the bodies near to it were more forcibly acted upon by its rotation, and carried round more rapidly, than the bodies distant from it—hence the Moon was the least rapid mover of all (Lucretius, v. 615-635. See Sir George Lewis's *Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients*, ch. ii. pp. 139-140.

It appears to me probable that Plato, in the severe remarks which he makes on persons who falsely affirmed the quickest mover in the heavens to be the slowest, had in view these doctrines of Demokritus. Plato never once mentions Demokritus by name (see Mullah, *Fragment. Demokrit.* p. 25); but he is very sparing in mentioning by name any contemporaries. It illustrates the difference between the manner of Aristotle and Plato, that Aristotle frequently names Demokritus—seventy-eight times according to Mullah, p. 107—even in the works which we possess.

the positive laws prescribed by the lawgiver, but who also conforms his conduct to the general caste of the lawgiver's opinions: practising what is commended therein, abstaining from what is blamed.<sup>f</sup> Plato commends one mode of hunting—the chase after quadrupeds: yet only with horses, dogs, javelins, &c., wherein both courage and bodily strength are improved—but not with nets or snares, where no such result is produced. He blames other modes—such as fishing and bird-snaring (especially by night). He blames still more emphatically theft and piracy, which he regards also as various modes of hunting.<sup>g</sup>

What principally deserves notice here is, the large general idea which Plato conceives to himself under the term

Large general

to the word  
hunting.

Hunting, and the number of diverse particulars comprehended therein. 1. Hunting of quadrupeds; either with dogs and javelins openly, or with snares, by stratagem. 2. Hunting of birds, in the air. 3. Hunting of fishes, in the water. 4. Hunting after the property of other men, in the city or country. 5. Hunting after men as slaves, or after other valuables, by means of piratical vessels. 6. Hunting of public enemies, by one army against an opposite one. 7. Hunting of men to conciliate their friendship or affection, sometimes by fair means, sometimes by foul.<sup>h</sup>

That all these processes—which Plato here includes as so many varieties of hunting—present to the mind, when they are compared, a common point of analogy, is not to be denied. The number of different comparisons which the mind can make between phenomena, is almost unlimited. Analogies may be followed from one to another, until at last, after successive steps, the analogy between the first and the

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 822 E.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 823-824.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. vii. p. 823. *θήρα γὰρ πρᾶγμα*

*ληστικήν, ἀνδραποδιστικήν,*

*ἢ ξύμπασαν τὴν πολε-*

*μῆν ἄλλαν ἑτέραν*

is another variety the  
hunting after men by persuasive or  
seductive means (*τὴν πῖθαι*)

*κατὰ θάλατταν—κλωπείας ἐν χώρᾳ*  
Compare the *Epinomis*,

975 C.

also in the *Sophistês* (pp. 221-222) Plato analyses and distributes the general idea of *θηρευτική*: including under it, as one variety, the hunting after men by violent means (*τὴν*

In the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon also (ii. 6, 29-33), Sokrates expands this same idea—

*θηρατικά*, &c. Compare also the conversation between Sokrates and Theodotê (iii. 11, 8-15).—*θηρώμενος*, ib. i. 2, 24—and Plato *Protag.* init.

last becomes faint or imperceptible. Yet the same word, transferred successively from the first to the last, conceals this faintness of analogy and keeps them all before the mind as one. To us, this extension of the word *hunting* to particular cases dissimilar in so many respects, appears more as poetical metaphor: to intelligent Greeks of the Sokratic school, it seemed a serious comparison: and to Plato, with his theory of Ideas, it ought to have presented a Real Idea or permanent One, which alone remained constant amidst an indefinite multitude of fugitive, shadowy, and deceptive, particulars. But though this is the consistent corollary, from Plato's theory of Ideas, he does not so state it in the Treatise *De Legibus*, and probably he did not so conceive it. Critics have already observed that in this Treatise scarce any mention is made of the theory of Ideas. Plato had passed into other points of view; yet he neither formally renounces the points of view which we find in anterior dialogues, nor takes the trouble of reconciling them with the thoughts of the later dialogues. Whether there exists any Real, Abstract, Idea of Hunting, apart from the particular acts and varieties of hunting—is a question which he does not touch upon. Yet this is the main feature of the Platonic philosophy, and the main doctrine most frequently impugned by Aristotle as Platonic.

Although, in regard to the religious worship of his community, the oracle of Delphi is asked to prescribe what sacrifices are to be offered, and to what Gods—Number of yet the lawgiver will determine the number of such sacrifices and festivals, as well as the times and lawgiver. seasons.<sup>i</sup> Each day in the year, sacrifice will be offered by one of the magistrates to some God or Dæmon. Once in every month, there will be a solemn sacrifice and festival, with matches of music and gymnastics, offered by each tribe to its eponymous God. The offerings to the celestial Gods will be kept distinct from the offerings to the subterranean Gods. Among these last, Pluto will be especially worshipped during the twelfth month of the year. The festivals will be adjusted to the seasons, and there will on proper occasions be festivals for women separately and exclusively.<sup>k</sup>

Plato, *Legg.* viii. p. 828.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, *Legg.* viii. p. 828.

Once a month certainly—and more than once, if the magistrates command—on occasion of one of these festivals, all the citizen population are ordered to attend in military muster—men, women, and children. They will be brought together in such divisions and detachments as the magistrates shall direct. They will here go through gymnastic and military exercises. They will also have fights with warlike weapons, not likely to inflict mortal wounds, yet involving sufficient danger to test their bravery and endurance: one against one, two against two, ten against ten.<sup>1</sup> The victors will receive honorary wreaths, and public encomium in appropriate songs. Both men and women will take part alike in these exercises and contests, and in the composition of the odes to celebrate the victors.<sup>m</sup>

Such monthly musters, over and above the constant daily gymnastics of the youthful population, are indispensable as preliminary training; without which the citizens cannot fight with efficiency and success, in the event of a real foreign enemy invading the territory.<sup>n</sup> No athlete ever feels himself qualified to contend at the public games without the most laborious special training beforehand. Yet Plato expresses apprehension that his proposal of regular musters for warlike exercises with sham-battles, will appear ridiculous. He states that nothing of the kind existed in any Grecian city, by reason of two great corruptions:—First, the general love of riches and money-getting: Secondly, the bad governments everywhere existing, whether democracy, oligarchy, or despotism—each of which was in reality a faction or party-government, *i. e.* government by one part over another unwilling part.<sup>o</sup>

Plato prescribes that the gymnastic training in his community shall be such as to have a constant reference to war;

<sup>1</sup> Plat. Legg. viii. p. 833 E.

<sup>m</sup> Plat. Legg. viii. p. 829 B-E. Τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγω στρατείας τε περὶ καὶ τῆς ἐν ποίησει παύρησίας γυναιξὶ τε καὶ ὁμοίως γίγνεσθαι δεῖν.

<sup>n</sup> ὑποκινδύνους βέλεσι, p. 830 E.

<sup>o</sup> Plat. Legg. viii. p. 830.

<sup>p</sup> Plat. Legg. viii. pp. 831-832.

I read with surprise the declaration

of Plato, that no such military training exercises existed *anywhere* in Greece. How is this to be reconciled with the statements of Xenophon in his *Treatise on the Republic of the Lacedæmonians*, wherein he expressly calls the Spartans *τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν*—or even with the statement of Plato himself about Sparta in the first book of this *Treatise De Legibus*? Compare Thucyd. v. 69.

and that elaborate bodily excellence, for the purpose simply of obtaining prizes at the public games, shall be discouraged. There will be foot-races for men, for boys, and for young women up to twenty years of age—the men always running in full panoply.<sup>p</sup> Horse-racing is permitted, but chariot-racing is discountenanced.<sup>q</sup> There will also be practice with the bow and with other weapons of light warfare, in which the young women are encouraged to take part—yet not constrained, in deference to prevalent sentiment.<sup>r</sup>

Gymnastic training must have reference to war, not to athletic prizes.

In regard to sexual intercourse, Plato recognises that the difficulty of regulating it according to the wisdom of the lawgiver is greater in his city than in any actual city, because of the more free and public life of the women. Neither Krete nor Sparta furnish a good example to follow on this point.<sup>s</sup> He thinks however that by causing one doctrine on the subject to be continually preached, and by preventing any other from being even mentioned, the lawgiver may be able so to consecrate this doctrine as to procure for it pretty universal obedience. The lawgiver may thus be able to suppress pæderasty altogether, and to restrict generally the sexual intercourse to that of persons legally married—or to enforce at least the restriction, that the exceptional cases of sexual intercourse departing from these conditions shall be covered with the veil of secrecy.<sup>t</sup> The constant bodily exercises prescribed in the Platonic community will tend to diminish the influence of such appetites in the citizens: while the example of the distinguished prize combatants at the Olympic games, in whose long-continued training strict continence was practised, shows that even more than what Plato anticipates can be obtained, under the stimulus of sufficient motive.<sup>u</sup>

Regulation of sexual intercourse. Syssitia or public mess.

What is here proposed respecting the sexual appetite finds no approbation from Kleinias, since the customs in Krete were

<sup>p</sup> Plat. Legg. viii. p. 833 B-C.

<sup>q</sup> Plat. Legg. viii. p. 834 B.

<sup>r</sup> Plat. Legg. viii. p. 834 C-D.

<sup>s</sup> Plat. Legg. viii. p. 836 B.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Legg. viii. p. 841.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 840 A, 841 A. Compare the remarks which I have

made above in this volume (page 225) respecting the small probable influence of Aphrodité in the Platonic Republic. A like remark may be made, though not so emphatically, respecting the Platonic community in the Leges.

altogether different. But the Syssitia, or public mess-table for the citizens, are welcomed readily both by the Kretan and the Spartan. The Syssitia existed both in Krete and at Sparta; but were regulated on very different principles in one and in the other. Plato declines to discuss this difference, pronouncing it to be unimportant. But Aristotle informs us what it was; and shows that material consequences turned upon it, in reference to the citizenship at Sparta.\*

Plato enters now upon the economical and proprietary rules proper for his community. As there will be neither gold and silver nor foreign commerce, he is dispensed from the necessity of making laws about shipments, retailing, interest, mine-digging, collectors of taxes, &c. The persons under his charge will be husbandmen, shepherds, bee-keepers, &c., with those who work under them, and with the artisans who supply implements to them.<sup>y</sup> The first and most important of all regulations is, the law of Zeus Horius or Terminalis—Not to disturb or transgress the boundary marks between different properties. Upon this depends the maintenance of those unalterable *fundi* or lots, which is the cardinal principle of the Platonic community. Severe penalties, religious as well as civil, are prescribed for offenders against this rule.<sup>z</sup> Each proprietor is directed to have proper regard to the convenience of neighbours, and above all to abstain from annoying or damaging them, especially in regard to the transit, or retention, or distribution, of water. To intercept the supply, or corrupt the quality of water, is a high crime.<sup>a</sup> Regulations are made about the carrying of the harvest, both of grain and fruit. Disputes arising upon these points are to be decided by the magistrates, up to the sum of three minæ: above that sum, by the public Dikasteries. Many rules of detail will require to be made by the magistrates themselves with a view to fulfil

Regulations  
about landed  
property—  
Boundaries  
—Limited  
power of  
fining by  
magistrates.

Plato, Legg. viii. p. 842 B; Aristot. Politic. ii. 9-10, p. 1271, a. 26, 1272, a. 12. The statement of Aristotle, about the manner in which the cost of the Kretan Syssitia was provided, while substantially agreeing with Ephorus (ap. Strabo. x. p. 480), does not exactly coincide with the account given by Dosiadas of the Kretans in Lyktus (ap. Athenæum, iv. p. 143). Compare Hoeckh, Kreta, vol. iii. pp. 134-138.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 842 D, 846 D.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 842-843.

<sup>a</sup> Plat. Legg. viii. pp. 844 A, 845 E.

the purposes of the lawgiver. So soon as the magistrates think that enough of these regulations have been introduced, they will consecrate the system as it stands, rendering it perpetual and unalterable.<sup>b</sup>

Next, Plato passes to the Demiurgi or Artisans. These are all non-citizens or metics: for it is a peremptory law, that no citizen shall be an artisan in any branch. Nor is any artisan permitted to carry on two crafts <sup>bution of the annual land-produce.</sup> or trades at once.<sup>c</sup> If any article be imperatively required from abroad, either for implements of war or for religious purposes, the magistrates shall cause it to be imported. But there shall be no retailing, nor reselling with profit, of any article.<sup>d</sup>

The distribution of the produce of land shall be made on a principle approaching to that which prevails in Krete.<sup>e</sup> The total produce raised will be distributed into twelve portions, each equivalent to one month's consumption. Each twelfth portion will then be divided into equal thirds. Two of these thirds will be consumed by the citizens, their families, their slaves, and their agricultural animals: the other third will be sold in the market for the consumption of artisans and strangers, who alone are permitted to buy it, all citizens being forbidden to do so. Each citizen will make the apportionment of his own two-thirds among freemen and slaves: a measured quantity shall then be given to each of the working animals.<sup>f</sup> On the first of each month, the sale of barley and wheat will be made in the market-place, and every artisan or stranger will then purchase enough for his monthly consumption: the like on the twelfth of each month, for wine and other liquids—and on the twentieth of each month, for animals and animal products, such as wool and hides. Firewood may be purchased daily by any stranger or artisan, from the proprietors on whose lands the trees grow, and may be resold by him to other artisans: other articles can only be sold at the monthly market-days. The Agoranomi, or regulators of the market, will preside on those days, and will fix

<sup>b</sup> Plat. Legg. viii. p. 846 A-D.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. viii. p. 846 D-E.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. viii. p. 847.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. viii. p. 847 E.

τοῦ Κρητικοῦ νόμου.

Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 847-848.

the spots on which the different goods shall be exposed for sale. They will also take account of the quantity which each man has for sale, fixing a certain price for each article. They will then adjust the entries of each man's property in the public registers according to these new transactions. But if the actual purchases and sales be made at any rate different from what is thus fixed, the Agoranomi will modify their entries in the register according to the actual rate, either in plus or in minus. These entries of individual property in the public register will be made both for citizens and resident strangers alike.<sup>g</sup>

It shall be open to any one who chooses, to come and reside in the city as a stranger or artisan to exercise his craft, without payment of any fee, simply on condition of good conduct; and of being enrolled with his property in the register. But he shall not acquire any fixed settlement. After twenty years, he must depart and take away his property. When he departs, the entries belonging to his name, in the proprietary register, shall be cancelled. If he has a son, the son may also exercise the same art and reside as a metic in the city for twenty years, but no longer; beginning from the age of fifteen. Any metic who may render special service to the city, may have his term prolonged, the magistrates and the citizens consenting.<sup>h</sup>

Plato now passes to the criminal code of his community: the determination of offences, penalties, and penal judicature. Serious and capital offences will be judged by the thirty-seven Nomophylakes, in conjunction with a Board of Select Dikasts, composed of the best among the magistrates of the preceding year.<sup>i</sup> They will hear first the pleading of the accuser, next that of the accused: they will then proceed, in the order of seniority, to put questions to both these persons, sifting the matter of charge. Plato requires them to be active in this examination, and to get at

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 849-850. These regulations are given both briefly and obscurely.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. viii. p. 850.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 855-856. This judicial Board is mentioned also in xi. pp. 926 D, 928 B, 938 B, under the

title of τὸ τῶν ἐκκρίτων δικ τὸ τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν δικαστήριον. It forms the parallel to the Areiopagus at Athens. See K. F. Hermann, De Vestigiis Institutum Atticorum apud Platonem De Legg. pp. 45-46, &c.

the facts by mental effort of their own. They will take notes of the examination, then seal up the tablet, and deposit it upon the altar of Hestia. On the morrow they will reassemble and repeat their examination, hearing witnesses and calling for information respecting the affair. On the third day, again the like: after which they will deliver their verdict on the altar of Hestia. Upon this altar two urns will be placed, for condemnation and acquittal: each Dikast will deposit his pebble in one or other of these, openly before the accuser and accused, and before the assembled citizens.<sup>k</sup>

Conformably to the general sentiment announced still more distinctly in the Republic, Plato speaks here also of penal legislation as if it were hardly required. He regards it as almost an insult to assume that any of his citizens can grow up capable of committing grave crimes, when they have been subjected to such a training, discipline, and government as he institutes. Still human nature is perverse: we must provide for the occurrence of some exceptional criminals among our citizens, even after all our precautionary supervision: besides, over and above the citizens, we have metics and slaves to watch over.<sup>l</sup>

The first and gravest of all crimes is Sacrilege: pillage or destruction of places or objects consecrated to the Gods. Next comes high treason: either betrayal of the city to foreign enemies, or overthrow of the established laws and government. Persons charged with these crimes shall be tried before the Select Dikasts, or High Court above constituted. If found guilty, they shall be punished either capitally or by such other sentence as the court may award. But no sentence either of complete disfranchisement or of perpetual banishment can be passed against any citizen, because every one of the 5040 lots of land must always remain occupied.<sup>m</sup> Nor can any citizen be fined to any greater extent

Sacrilege,  
the gravest  
of all crimes.  
High Treason.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 855-856. Compare the procedure before the Areiopagus at Athens, as described by Schömann, Antiq. Juris Publici Græcor. Part v. s. 63, p. 292. It does not appear that the Areiopagites at Athens were in the practice of exercising any such ἀνέκρισις of the parties

before them, as Plato enjoins upon his ἐκλεκτοὶ δικάσται: though it was competent to the Dikasts at Athens to put questions if they chose. Meier und Schömann, Der Attisch. Prozess, p. 718.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 853 C-D-E.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 855 C.

Compare the penalties inflicted by

than what he possesses over and above his lot of land. He may be imprisoned, or flogged, or exposed in the pillory, or put to do penance in some sacred precinct. But his punishment shall noway extend to his children, unless persons of the same family shall be condemned to death for three successive generations. Should this occur, the family shall be held as tainted. Their lot of land shall be considered vacant, and assigned to some deserving young man of another citizen family.<sup>n</sup>

*Theft.*—Plato next adverts to theft, and prescribes that the punishment for a convicted thief shall be one and the same in all cases—to compensate the party robbed to the extent of double the value of the property, or to be imprisoned until he does so.<sup>o</sup> But upon a question being raised, how far one and the same *pœna dupli*, neither more nor less, can be properly applied to all cases of theft, we are carried (according to the usual unsystematic manner of the Platonic dialogue) into a general discussion on the principles of penal legislation. We are reminded that the Platonic lawgiver looks beyond the narrow and defective objects to which all other lawgivers have hitherto unwisely confined themselves.<sup>p</sup> He is under no pressing necessity to legislate at once: he can afford time for preliminary discussion and exposition: he desires to instruct his citizens respecting right and wrong, as well as to constrain their acts by penalty.<sup>q</sup> As he is better qualified than the poets to enlighten them about the just and honourable, so the principles which he lays down ought to have

Plato with those which were inflicted in Attic procedure. Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Prozess*, pp. 739-740 seq. There is considerable difference between the two, arising to a great degree out of Plato's peculiar institution about the unalterable number of lots of land (5040) and of citizen families—as well as out of his fixation of maximum and minimum of property. Flogging or beating is prescribed by Plato, but had no place at Athens:

was a frequent punishment at Athens: Plato's substitute for it seems to be the pillory—*τινας ἀμρόφους ἔδρας*. Fine was frequent at Athens as a punishment: Plato is obliged to employ it sparingly.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 856 D.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 857 A, xii. p. 941. The Solonian Law at Athens provided, that if a man was sued for theft under the *ἰδία δική κλοπῆς*, he should be condemned to the *pœna dupli* and to a certain *προστίμημα* besides (Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. 733-736). But it seems that the thief might be indicted by a *γραφῆ*, and then the punishment might be heavier. See Aulus Gellius, xi. 18, and chapt. xi. of my 'History of Greece,' p. 189.

Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 857 C. τὰ περὶ τῶν γέγονεν ὀρθῶς διαπεποιημένα, &c. Plato, *Legg.* ix. pp. 857 E, 858 A.

more weight than the verses of Homer or Tyrtæus.<sup>r</sup> In regard to Justice and Injustice generally, there are points on which Plato differs from the public, and also points on which the public are at variance with themselves. For example, every one is unanimous in affirming that whatever is just is also beautiful or honourable. But if this be true, then not only what is justly done, but also what is justly suffered, is beautiful or honourable. Now the penalty of death, inflicted on the sacrilegious person, is justly inflicted. It must therefore be beautiful or honourable: yet everyone agrees in declaring it to be shocking and infamous. Here there is an inconsistency or contradiction in the opinions of the public themselves.<sup>s</sup>

But Plato differs from the public on another point also. He affirms all wicked or unjust men to be unwillingly wicked or unjust: he affirms that no man does injustice willingly.<sup>t</sup> How is he to carry out this maxim in his laws? He cannot make any distinction (as all existing cities make it) in the penalties prescribed for voluntary injustice, and for involuntary injustice; for he does not recognise the former as real.<sup>u</sup> He must explain upon what foundation his dissent from the public rests. He discriminates between *Damnum* and *Injuria*—between Damage or Hurt, and Injustice. When damage is done, it is sometimes done voluntarily—sometimes, and quite as often, involuntarily. The public call this latter by the name of involuntary injustice; but in Plato's view it is no injustice at all. Injustice is essentially distinct from damage: it depends on the temper, purpose, or disposition of the agent, not on the result as affecting the patient. A man may be unjust when he is conferring benefit upon another, as well as when he is doing hurt to another. Whether the result be beneficial or hurtful, the

All unjust men are unjust involuntarily—No such thing as voluntary injustice. Injustice depends upon the temper of the agent —Distinction between damage and injury.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 858-859.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 859-860.

The same argument is employed by Sokrates in the Gorgias, p. 476 E.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 860 D-E.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 861 A. ἃ δὴ κατὰ πάσας τὰς πόλεις ὑπὸ νομοθετῶν

εἶδη τῶν ἀδικημάτων ὄντα, τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια, τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια, ταύτη καὶ νομοθετεῖται.

The eighth chapter, fifth Book, of Aristotle's *Nikomachean Ethics*, discusses this question more instructively than Plato.

action will be right or wrong, and the agent just or unjust, according to the condition of his own mind in doing it.\*

The real distinction therefore (according to Plato) is not

Damage may be voluntary or involuntary—Injustice is shown often by conferring corrupt profit upon another—Purpose of punishment, to heal the distemper of the criminal.

between voluntary and involuntary injustice, but between voluntary and involuntary damage. Voluntary damage is injustice, but it is not voluntary injustice. The unjust agent, so far forth as unjust, acts involuntarily: he is under the perverting influence of mental distemper. He must be compelled to make good the damage which he has done, or to offer such requital as may satisfy the feelings of the

person damaged: and he must besides be subjected to such treatment as will heal the distemper of his mind, so that he will not be disposed to do farther voluntary damage in future. And he ought to be subjected to this treatment equally, whether his mental distemper (injustice) has shown itself in doing wilful damage to another, or in conferring corrupt profit on another—in taking away another man's property, or in giving away his own property wrongfully.<sup>1</sup> The healing treatment may be different in different cases: discourses addressed, or works imposed—pleasures or pains, honour or disgrace, fine or otherwise. But in all cases the purpose is one and the same—to heal the distemper of his mind, and to make him hate injustice. If he be found incurable, he must be put to death. It is a gain for himself to die, and a still greater gain for society that he should die, since his execution will serve as a warning to others.<sup>2</sup>

Of misguided or erroneous proceeding there are in the

Three distinct causes of misguided proceedings.  
1. Painful stimulus.  
2. Pleasurable stimulus.  
3. Ignorance.

human mind three producing causes, acting separately or conjointly:—1. The painful stimulus—Anger, Envy, Hatred, or Fear. 2. The seductive stimulus of Pleasure or Desire. 3. Ignorance. Ignorance is twofold:—1. Ignorance pure and simple. 2. Ignorance combined with the false persuasion of knowledge. This last again is exhibited under two distin-

Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 861-862.

Plato, Legg. ix. p. 862 A-B.

εἰ τίς

δίκαιον ἀπλῶς

τις ἢ  
τοῦτό ἐστι τῷ  
δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλέπτιον, πρό-  
ἀδικίαν καὶ  
Plato, Legg. ix. p. 862 C-E.

guishable cases:—1. When combined with power; and in this case it produces grave and enormous crimes. 2. When found in weak persons, children or old men, in which case it produces nothing worse than slight and venial offences, giving little trouble to the lawgiver.<sup>a</sup>

Now the unjust man (Plato tells us) is he in whose mind either one or other of the two first causes are paramount, and not controuled by Reason: either Hatred, Anger, Fear—or else Appetite and the Desire of Pleasure. What he does under either of these two stimuli is unjust, whether he damages any one else or not. But if neither of these two stimuli be prevalent in his mind—if, on the contrary, both of them are subordinated to the opinion which he entertains about what is good and right—then everything which he does is just, even though he falls into error. If in this state of mind he hurts any one else, it will be simply *hurt*, not injustice. Those persons are incorrect who speak of it as injustice, but as involuntary injustice. The proceedings of such a man may be misguided or erroneous, but they will never be unjust.<sup>b</sup>

The unjust man is under the influence either of the first or second of these causes, without controul of Reason. If he acts under controul of Reason, though the Reason be bad, he is not unjust.

All these three causes may realise themselves in act under three varieties of circumstances:—1. By open and violent deeds. 2. By secret, deceitful, premeditated contrivance. 3. By a combination of both the two. Our laws must make provision for all the three.<sup>c</sup>

Such is the theory here advanced by Plato to reconcile his views and recommendations in the *Leges* with a doctrine which he had propounded and insisted upon elsewhere:—That no man commits injustice voluntarily—That all injustice is involuntary, arising from ignorance—That every one would be just, if he only knew wherein justice consists—That knowledge, when it exists

Reasoning of Plato to save his doctrine —That no man commits injustice voluntarily.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 863.

Τρίτον μὴν ἄγνοϊαν λέγων ἂν τις τῶν ἀδικούντων ἴτιαν οὐκ ἔσται.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 864 A. τοῦ ἀρίστου δοῦσαν, ὅπῃ περ ἂν τοῦτο ἡγήσωνται πόλις τινες, εἰν αὐτῇ κρατούσα ἐν ἡμῖν.

ἢ πάντα ἄνδρα, καὶ

πάντα εἶναι τὸ ταύτην τῆς

ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἅπαντα

Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 864 C.

in the mind, will exercise controul and preponderance over the passions and appetites.<sup>d</sup>

The distinction whereby Plato here proposes to save all inconsistency, is a distinction between misconduct or misguided actions (*ἀμαρτήματα*, or *ἀμαρτανόμενα*), and unjust actions (*ἀδίκηματα*). The last of these categories is comprised by him in the first, as one species or variety thereof. That is, all *ἀδίκηματα* are *ἀμαρτήματα*: but all *ἀμαρτήματα* are not *ἀδίκηματα*. He reckons three distinct causes of *ἀμαρτήματα*: two belonging to the emotional department of mind; one to the intellectual. Those *ἀμαρτήματα* which arise from either of the two first causes are also *ἀδίκηματα*: those which arise from the third are not *ἀδίκηματα*.

This is the distinction which Plato here draws, with a view to save consistency in his own doctrine—at least as far as I can understand it, for the reasoning is not clear. It proceeds upon a restricted definition, peculiar to himself, of the word *injustice*—a restriction, however, which coincides in part with that which he gives of Justice in the Republic,<sup>e</sup> where he treats Justice as consisting in the controul exercised over Passion and Appetite (the emotional department) by Reason (the intellectual): each of the three departments of the soul or each of the three separate souls, keeping in its own place, and discharging its own appropriate functions. Every act which a man does under the influence of persuasion or opinion of the best, is held by Plato to be *just*—whatever his persuasion may be—whether it be true or false.<sup>f</sup> If he be sincerely persuaded that he is acting for the best, he cannot commit injustice.

Injustice being thus restricted to mean the separate and unregulated action of emotional impulse—and such unregulated action being, as a general fact, a cause of misery to the agent—Plato's view is, that no man is voluntarily unjust: for no man wishes to be miserable. Every man wishes to be happy: therefore

Peculiar definition of Injustice. A man may do great voluntary hurt to others, and yet not be unjust, provided he does

<sup>d</sup> Compare Legg. v. p. 731 C; Timæus, p. 86 D; Republic, ix. p. 589 C; Protagoras, pp. 345 D-352 D.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Republ. iv. pp. 443-444.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 863 C, 864 A.

every man wishes to be just : because some controul of impulse by reason is absolutely essential to happiness. When once such controul is established, a man becomes just : he no longer commits injustice. But he may still commit misconduct, and very gross misconduct : moreover, this misconduct will be, or may be, voluntary. For though the rational soul be now preponderant and controuling over the emotional (which controul constitutes *justice*), yet the rational soul itself may be imperfectly informed (ignorance simple); or may not only be ignorant, but preoccupied besides with false persuasions and prejudices. Under such circumstances the just man may commit misconduct, and do serious hurt to others. What he does may be done voluntarily, in full coincidence with his own will : for the will postulates only the controul of reason over emotion, and here that condition is fulfilled, the fault lying with the controuling reason itself.

it under the  
influence of  
not of Appe-  
tite.

Plato's reasoning here (obscure and difficult to follow) is intended to show that there can be no voluntary *injustice*, but that there is much both of voluntary *misconduct*, and voluntary *mischief*. His purpose as lawgiver is to prevent or remedy not only (what he calls) *injustice*, but also misconduct and mischief. As a remedy for mischief done, he prescribes that the agent thereof shall make full compensation to the sufferer. As an antidote to injustice, he applies his educational discipline as well as his penal and remuneratory treatment, to the emotions, with a view to subdue some and develope others.<sup>g</sup> As a corrective to misconduct in all its branches, he assumes to himself as lawgiver a spiritual power, applied to the improvement of the rational or intellectual man : prescribing what doctrines and beliefs shall be accredited in his city, tolerating no others, and forbidding all contradiction, or dissentient individuality of judgment.<sup>h</sup> He thus ensures that every man's individual reason shall be in harmony with the infallible reason.

Plato's purpose in the Laws is to prevent or remedy not only injustice but misconduct.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 862 C-D.

<sup>h</sup> K. F. Hermann, in his valuable Dissertation, *De Vestigiis Institutum Veterum, imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis Leges indagandis*, Marburg, 1836, p. 54, says : — "Platonis manum

novatricem in iis tantum agnosco, quæ de exilii tempore pro diversis criminum fontibus diverso argutatur : qui quum omnino omnium, nisi fallor, primus in hoc ipso Legum Opere veterem usuque receptam criminum divisionem in

The peculiar sense in which Plato uses the words justice and injustice is perplexing throughout this discussion. The words, as he uses them, coincide only in part with the ordinary meaning. They comprehend more in one direction, and less in another.

Plato now proceeds to promulgate laws in respect to homicide, wounds, beating, &c.

Homicide, however involuntary and unintentional, taints the person by whose hands it is committed. He must undergo purification, partly by such expiatory ceremonies as the Exêgêtæ may appoint, partly by a temporary exile from the places habitually frequented by the person slain: who even after death (according to the doctrine of an ancient fable, which Plato here ratifies<sup>1</sup>), if he saw the homicidal agent among his prior haunts, while the occurrence was yet recent, would be himself disturbed, and would communicate tormenting disturbance to the agent. This latter accordingly is commanded to leave the territory for a year, and to refrain from visiting any of the sacred precincts until he has been purified. If he obeys, the relatives of the person slain shall forgive him; and he shall, after his year's exile, return to his ordinary abode and citizenship. But if he evades obedience, these relatives shall indict him for the act, and he shall incur double penalties. Should the nearest relative, under these circumstances, neglect to indict, he may himself be indicted by any one who chooses, and shall be condemned to an exile of five years.<sup>k</sup>

voluntaria et invita reprehenderit, eaque secundum tres animi partes trifariam distribuerit, ita hic quoque medium inter imprudentiam et dolum malum iracundiam inseruit, quâ quis motus cædem vel extemplo committeret vel etiam posterius animum suum sanguine expleret."

I do not conceive Plato's reasoning exactly in the same way as Hermann. Plato denies only the reality of *ἐκούσια* ατα: he considers all *ἀδικήματα* as essentially *ἀκούσια*. But he does not deny *ἐκούσια ἀμαρτήματα* (which is the large genus comprehending *ἀδικήματα* as one species): he recognises both *ἀμαρτήματα ἐκούσια* and *ἀκούσια*. And he considers the arising from *θυμὸς* to be

midway between the two. But he also recognises *ἀμαρτήματα* as springing from the three different sources in the human mind. The two positions are not incompatible; though the whole discussion is obscured by the perplexing distinction between *ἀμαρτήματα* and *ἀδικήματα*.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 805 A-D-866 B.

Compare Antiphon. Accus. Cæd. p. 116, and Lobeck, Aglaophamus, p. 301. The old law of Drako is given in substance in Demosthen. adv. Leptin. p. 505. *Ἀπενιαυτισμὸς*, compulsory year of exile. K. F. Hermann, Griechische Privat Alterthümer, s. 61, not. 23.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 866.

Plato provides distinct modes of proceeding for this same act of involuntary homicide, under varieties of persons and circumstances—citizens, metics, strangers, slaves, &c. He especially lays it down that physicians, if a patient dies under their hands, they being unwilling—shall be held innocent, and shall not need purification.<sup>1</sup>

After involuntary homicide, Plato passes to the case of homicide committed under violent passion or provocation; which he ranks as intermediate between the involuntary and the voluntary—approaching the one or the other, according to circumstances: "according as it is done instantaneously, or with more or less of interval and premeditation. If the act be committed instantaneously, the homicide shall undergo two years' exile: if after time for deliberation, the time of exile must be extended to three years." But if the slain person before his death shall have expressed forgiveness, the case shall be dealt with as one of involuntary homicide.<sup>2</sup> Special enactments are made for the case of a slave killed by a citizen, a citizen killed by a slave, a son killed by his father, a wife by her husband, &c., under the influence of passion or strong provocation. Homicide in self-defence against a previous aggressor is allowed universally.<sup>3</sup>

Thirdly, Plato passes to the case of homicide voluntary, the extreme of injustice, committed under the influence of pleasure, appetite, envy, jealousy, ambition, fear of divulcation of dangerous secrets, &c.—homicide premeditated and unjust. Among all these causes, the chief and most frequent is love of wealth; which gets possession of most men, in consequence of the untrue and preposterous admiration of wealth imbibed in their youth from the current talk and literature. The next in frequency is the competition of ambitious men for power or rank.<sup>4</sup> Whoever has committed homicide upon a fellow-citizen, under these circumstances, shall be interdicted from all the temples and other public

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 865 B.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 867 A. θυμῷ  
καὶ ὅσοι προσηλακισθέντες λόγοις ἢ καὶ  
ἔργοις μεταξύ πού τοῦ τε ἔκου-  
σίου

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 867 D.

<sup>4</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 869 D.

<sup>5</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 868-869 C.

<sup>6</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 870.

places, and shall be indicted by the nearest relatives of the deceased. If found guilty, he shall be put to death: if he leave the country to evade trial, he must be banished in perpetuity. The nearest relative is bound to indict, otherwise he draws down upon himself the taint, and may himself be indicted. Certain sacrifices and religious ceremonies will be required, in such cases, to accompany the legal procedure. These, together with the names of the Gods proper to invoke, will be prescribed by the Nomophylakes, in conjunction with the prophets and the Exêgêtæ, or religious interpreters.<sup>r</sup> The Dikasts before whom such trials will take place are the Nomophylakes, together with some select persons from the magistrates of the past year: the same as in the case of sacrilege and treason.<sup>s</sup> The like procedure and penalty will be employed against any one who has contrived the death of another, not with his own hands, but by suborning some third person: except that this contriver may be buried within the limits of the territory, while the man whose hands are stained with blood cannot be buried therein.<sup>t</sup>

For the cases of homicide between kinsmen or relatives, Homicide between kinsmen. Plato provides a form of procedure still more solemn, and a still graver measure of punishment. He also declares suicide to leave a taint upon the country, which requires to be purified as the Exêgêtæ may prescribe: unless the act has been committed under extreme pain or extreme disgrace. The person who has killed himself must be buried apart without honour, not in the regular family-burying places.<sup>u</sup> The most cruel mode of death is directed to be inflicted upon a slave who has voluntarily slain, or procured to be slain, a freeman. If a slave be put to death without any fault of his own, but only from apprehension of secrets which he may divulge, the person who kills him shall be subjected to the same trial and sentence as if he had killed a citizen.<sup>x</sup> If any animal, or even any lifeless object, has caused the death of a man, the surviving relatives must prosecute, and the animal or the object must be taken away from the country.<sup>y</sup>

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 871.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 871 D.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 872 A.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 873.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 872 D.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 873 E. He makes exception of the cases in which death of a man is caused by thunder

*Justifiable Homicide.*—Some special cases are named in which he who voluntarily kills another, is nevertheless perfectly untainted. A housebreaker caught in act may thus be rightfully slain : so also a clothes-stealer, a ravisher, a person who attacks the life of any man's father, mother, or children.<sup>z</sup>

*Wounds.*—Next to homicide, Plato deals with wounds inflicted : introducing his enactments by a preface on the general necessity of obedience to law.<sup>a</sup> Whosoever, having intended to kill another (except in the special cases wherein homicide is justifiable), inflicts a wound which proves not mortal, is as criminal as if he had killed him. Nevertheless he is not required to suffer so severe a punishment, inasmuch as an auspicious Dæmon and Fortune have interposed to ward off the worst results of his criminal purpose. He must make full compensation to the sufferer, and then be exiled in perpetuity.<sup>b</sup> The Dikastery will decide how much compensation he shall furnish. In general, Plato trusts much to the discretion of the Dikastery, under the great diversity of the cases of wounds inflicted. He would not have allowed so much discretion to the numerous and turbulent Dikasteries of Athens : but he regards his select Dikastery as perfectly trustworthy.<sup>c</sup> Peculiar provision is made for cases in which the person inflicting the wound is kinsman or relative of the sufferer—also for homicide under the same circumstances. Plato also directs how to supply the vacancy which perpetual banishment will occasion in the occupation of one among the 5040 citizen-lots.<sup>d</sup> If one man wounds another in a fit of passion, he must pay simple, double, or triple compensation, according as the Dikasts may award : he must farther do all the military duty which would have been incumbent on the wounded man, should the latter be disabled.<sup>e</sup> But if the person inflicting the wound be a slave and the wounded man a freeman, the slave shall be handed over to the wounded freeman to deal with as he pleases. If the master of the

or some such other missile from the Gods—πλὴν ὅσα κεραυνὸς ἢ τι παρὰ

<sup>z</sup> ὁ τοιοῦτον βέλος ἰδόν.

Plato, Legg. ix. p. 874 C.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 875.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 877 A.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 876 A.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 877.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 878 C.

slave will not give him up, he must himself make compensation for the wound, unless he can prove before the Dikastery that the case is one of collusion between the wounded freeman and the slave; in which case the wounded freeman will become liable to the charge of unlawfully suborning away the slave from his master.<sup>f</sup>

*Beating.*—The laws of Plato on the subject of beating are more peculiar. They are mainly founded in reverence for age. One who strikes a person twenty years older than himself, is severely punished: but if he strikes a person of the same age with himself, that person must defend himself as he can with his own hands—no punishment being provided.<sup>g</sup> For him who strikes his father or mother, the heaviest penalty, excommunication and perpetual banishment, is provided.<sup>h</sup> If a slave strike a freeman, he shall be punished with as many blows as the person stricken directs, nevertheless in such manner as not to diminish his value to his master.<sup>i</sup>

Throughout all this Treatise De Legibus, in regard both to civil and criminal enactments, Plato has borrowed largely from Attic laws and procedure. But in regard to homicide and wounds, he has borrowed more largely than in any other department. Both the general character, and the particular details, of his provisions respecting homicide, are in close harmony with ancient Athenian sentiment, and with the embodiments of that sentiment by the lawgivers Drako and Solon. At Athens, though the judicial procedure generally, as well as the political constitution, underwent great modification between the time of Solon and that of Demosthenes, yet the procedure in the case of homicide remained without any material change. It was of a sanctified character, depending mainly upon ancient religious tradition. The person charged with homicide was not tried before the general body of Dikasts, drawn by lot, but before special ancient tribunals and in certain consecrated places, according to the circum-

Plato has  
borrowed  
much from

icide  
ns, as  
to procedure.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 879 A.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 879-880.

The person who struck first blow was guilty of *aikia*, Demosth. and

Euergetes and Mnesibul. pp. 1141-1151.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 881.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, Legg. p. 882 A.

stances under which the act of homicide was charged. The principal object contemplated, was to protect the city and its public buildings against the injurious consequences arising from the presence of a tainted man—and to mollify the posthumous wrath of the person slain. This view of the Attic procedure <sup>k</sup> against homicide is copied by the Platonic. Plato keeps prominently in view the religious bearing and consequences of such an act; he touches comparatively little upon its consequences in causing distress and diminishing the security of life. He copies the Attic law both in the justifications which he admits for homicide, and in the sentence of banishment which he passes against both animals and inanimate objects to whom any man owes his death. He goes beyond the Attic law in the solemnity and emphasis of his details about homicide among members of the same family and relatives: as well as in the severe punishment which he imposes upon the surviving relatives of the person slain, if they should neglect their obligation of indicting.<sup>1</sup> Throughout all this chapter, Plato not only follows the Attic law, but overpasses it, in dealing with homicide as a portion of the *Jus Sacrum* rather than of the *Jus Civile*.

In respect to the offence of beating, he does not follow the Attic law, when he permits it between citizens of the same age, and throws the beaten person upon his powers of self-defence. This is Spartan, not Athenian. It is also Spartan when he makes the criminality, in giving blows, to turn upon the want of reverence for age: upon the circumstance, that the person beaten is twenty years older than the beater.<sup>m</sup>

<sup>k</sup> The oration of Demosthenes against Aristokrates treats copiously of this subject, pp. 627-646. *εἰργεῖν τῆς τοῦ παθόντος πατρίδος, δίκαιον εἶναι—δσων τῷ παθόντι ζῶντι μετῆν, τούτων εἰργεῖ τὸν δεδρακότα, πρῶτον μὲν* : (632-633).

The first of Matthiæ's Dissertations, De Judiciis Atheniensium (Miscellanea Philologica, vol. i. pp. 145-176), collects the information on these matters: and K. F. Hermann (De Vestigiis Institutum Veterum, præsertim Atticorum, per Platonis De Legibus Libros indagandis, Marburg, 1836) gives a detailed comparison of Plato's directions with what we know about

the Attic Law: "Ipsas homicidiorum religiones (Plato) ex antiquissimo jure patrio in suum ita transtulit, ut nihil opportunius ad illustranda illius vestigia inveniri posse videatur" (p. 49): "quæ omnia Solonis Draconisve legibus ferè ad verbum eadem inveniuntur" (p. 50). The same about *τραύματα ἐκ προνοίας*, pp. 58-59.

<sup>1</sup> K. F. Hermann, De Vestigiis, ut suprâ, p. 54. Compare Demosthenes adv. Theokrin. p. 1331.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. ix. p. 879 C. He admits the same provision as to blows between *ἡλικες* into his Republic (v. p. 464 E).

Compare, about Sparta, Xenophon,

From these various crimes—sacrilege or plunder of holy places, theft, homicide, wounding, beating—Plato passes in the tenth book to insult or outrage (*ὑβρις*). These outrages (he considers) are essentially the acts of wild young men. Outrage may be offered towards five different subjects. 1. Public temples. 2. Private chapels and sepulchres. 3. Parents. 4. The magistrates, in their dignity or their possessions. 5. Private citizens, in respect of their civic rights and dignity.<sup>a</sup> The tenth book is devoted entirely to the two first-mentioned heads, or to impiety and its alleged sources: the others come elsewhere, not in any definite order.<sup>o</sup>

Plato declares that all impiety, either in word or deed, springs from one of three heretical doctrines. 1. The heretic does not believe in the Gods at all. 2. He believes the Gods to exist, but believes also that they do not interest themselves about human affairs; or at least that they interfere only to a small extent. 3. He believes that they exist, and that they direct everything: but that it is perfectly practicable to appease their displeasure, and to conciliate their favour, by means of prayer and sacrifice.<sup>p</sup>

If a person displays impiety, either by word or deed, in either of these three ways, he shall be denounced to the archons by any citizen who becomes acquainted with the fact. The archons, on pain of taking the impiety on themselves, shall assemble the dikastery, and put the person accused on trial. If found guilty, he shall be put in chains and confined in one or other of the public prisons. These public prisons are three in number: one in the market-place, for ordinary offenders: a second, called the House of Correction (*σωφρονιστήριον*), attached to the building in which the Supreme Board of Magistrates hold their nocturnal sittings: a third, known by some designation of solemn

Rep. Laced. iv. 5; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 27; Pausanias, iii. 14; Dionys. Halikarnass. Arch. Rom. xx. 2. *Δακε-δαιμόνιοι ὅτι τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἐπέτρε-πον τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτι*

Plato, Legg. x. pp. 884-885.  
Treatment of parents comes xi. pp. 930-931.  
<sup>p</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 885.

penalty, in the centre of the territory, but in some savage and desolate spot.<sup>a</sup>

Suppose the heretic, under either one of the three heads, to be found guilty of heresy pure and simple—but that his conduct has been just, temperate, unexceptionable, and his social dispositions steadily manifested, esteeming the society of just men, and shunning that of the unjust.<sup>r</sup> There is still danger that by open speech or scoffing he should shake the orthodox belief of others: he must therefore be chained in the House of Correction for a term not less than five years. During this term, no citizen whatever shall be admitted to see him, except the members of the Nocturnal Council of Magistrates. These men will constantly commune with him, administering exhortations for the safety of his soul and for his improvement. If at the expiration of the five years, he appears to be cured of his heresy and restored to a proper state of mind, he shall be set at liberty, and allowed to live with other proper-minded persons. But if no such cure be operated, and if he shall be found guilty a second time of the same offence, he shall suffer the penalty of death.<sup>s</sup>

Heretic, whose conduct has been virtuous and faultless, to be imprisoned for five years, perhaps more.

Again—the heretic may be found guilty, not of heresy pure and simple in one of its three varieties, but of heresy manifesting itself in bad conduct and with aggravating circumstances. He may conceal his real opinion, and acquire the reputation of the best dispositions, employing that reputation to overreach others, and combining dissolute purposes with superior acuteness and intelligence: he may practise stratagems to succeed as a despot, a public orator, a general, or a sophist: he may take up, and will more frequently take up, the profession of a prophet or religious

Heretic with bad conduct —p ment to be inflicted.

Plato, Legg. x. p. 908.

ὅν ὑπαρχέτω πᾶσι.

δ' ὄντων ἐν τῇ πόλει τριῶν, &c.

Imprisonment included chains round the prisoner's legs. Sokrates was put in chains during his thirty days' confinement, arising from the voyage of the Theoric ship to Delos (Plat. Phædon, p. 60 B).

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Legg. p. 908 B-E. §

ἀν, μὴ νομίζουσι θεοὺς εἶναι.

τές τε γίνονται τοὺς κακοὺς, καὶ τῷ

τὴν ἀδικίαν οὐτε τὰς

τοιαύτας πράξεις προσίενται πράττειν, τοὺς τε μὴ δικαίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων φεύγουσι, καὶ τοὺς δικαίους στέργουσι, &c.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 909 A. ἐν τοῦ-

αὐτοῖς ἄλλος ξυγγιγνέσθω, πλὴν οἱ τοῦ νυκτερινοῦ ξυλλόγου κοινωνοῦντες, ἐπὶ

ritualist or sorcerer, professing to invoke the dead or to command the aid of the Gods by prayer and sacrifice. He may thus try to bring ruin upon citizens, families, and cities.<sup>t</sup> A heretic of this description (says Plato) deserves death not once or twice only, but several times over, if it were possible.<sup>u</sup> If found guilty, he must be kept in chains for life in the central penal prison—not allowed to see any freeman—not visited by any one, except the slave who brings to him his daily rations. When he dies, his body must be cast out of the territory without burial: and any freeman who may assist in burying it, shall himself incur the penalty of impiety. From the day that the heretic is imprisoned, he shall be considered as civilly dead; his children being placed under wardship as orphans.<sup>x</sup>

As a still further assurance for reaching and punishing these dangerous heretics, Plato enacts—No one shall erect any temple or altar, no one shall establish any separate worship or sacrifice, in his own private precincts. No one shall propitiate the Gods by secret prayer and sacrifice of his own. When a man thinks fit to offer prayer and sacrifice, he must do it at the public temples, through and along with recognized priests and priestesses. If a man keep in his house any sacred object to which he offers sacrifice, the archons shall require him to bring it into the public temples, and shall punish him until he does so. But if he be found guilty of sacrificing either at home or in the public temples, after the commission of any act which the Dikastery may consider grave impiety—he shall be condemned to death.<sup>y</sup>

In justifying this stringent enactment, Plato not only proclaims that the proper establishment of temples and worship can only be dictated by a man of the highest intelligence, but he also complains of the violent and irregular working of the religious feeling in the minds of individuals. Many men (he says) when sick, or in danger and troubles of what kind soever,

No private worship or religious rites allowed. Every citizen must worship at the public temples.

Uncertain and mischievous action of the religious sentiment upon individuals, if not controuled by public authority.

Plato, Legg. x. pp. 908-909.

Plato, Legg. x. p. 908 E. *ἄν*

*θάρσιν ἀνδραγόν, &c.*

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 909 C.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Legg. x. pp. 909-910.

or when alarmed by dreams or by spectres seen in their waking hours, or when calling to mind and recounting similar narratives respecting the past, or when again experiencing unexpected good fortune—many men under such circumstances, and all women, are accustomed to give a religious colour to the situation, and to seek relief by vows, sacrifices, and altars to the Gods. Hence the private houses and villages become full of such foundations and proceedings.<sup>z</sup> Such religious sentiments and fears, springing up spontaneously in the minds of individuals, are considered by Plato to require strict repression. He will allow no religious worship or manifestation, except that which is public and officially authorised.

Such is the Act of Uniformity promulgated by Plato for his new community of the Magnêtes, and such the terrible sanctions by which it is enforced. The law-giver is the supreme and exclusive authority, spiritual as well as temporal, on matters religious as well as on matters secular. No dissenters from the orthodoxy prescribed by him are admitted. Those who believe more than he does, and those who believe less, however blameless their conduct, are condemned alike to pass through a long solitary imprisonment to execution. Not only the speculations of enquiring individual reason, but also the spontaneous inspirations of religious disquietude or terror, are suppressed and punished.<sup>a</sup>

Intolerant spirit of Plato's legislation respecting uniformity of belief.

We seem to be under a legislation imbued with the persecuting spirit and self-satisfied infallibility of mediæval Catho-

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 909 E-910 A. ἔθος τε γυναῖξί διαφερόντως πάσαις καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσι πάντῃ καὶ κινδυνὶ καὶ ἀποροῦσιν, ὅπῃ τις ἂν ἀπορῇ, ἰρουν τε τὸ παρὸν αἰεὶ, καὶ θυσίας εἰ  
, &c.

If, however, we turn back to v. p. 738 C, we shall see that Plato ratifies these καθιερώσεις, when they have once got footing, and rejects only the new ones. The rites, worship, and sacrifices, in his city, are assumed to have been determined by local or oracular inspiration (v. p. 738 B): the orthodox creed is set out by himself.

<sup>a</sup> Plato himself is here the Νόμος Πόλεως, which the Delphian oracle, in its responses, sanctioned as the proper

rule for individual citizens, Xenophon, Memor. iv. 3, 16. Compare iv. 6, 2, and i. 3, 1; Lysias, Or. xxx. 21-26. θύειν τὰ πάτρια—θύειν τὰ ἐκ τῶν κύρβων, is εὐσεβεία.

See K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, sect. 10: Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp. 201-204.

Cicero also enacts, in his Treatise De Legibus (ii. 8-10):—"Separatim nemo habessit Deos: neve novos, sed ne advenas, nisi publicè adscitos, privatim colunto." Compare Livy, xxxix. 16, about the Roman prohibitions of *sacra externa*. But Cicero does not propose to inflict such severe penalties as Plato.

licism and the Inquisition. The dissenter is a criminal, and among the worst of criminals, even if he do nothing more than proclaim his opinions.<sup>b</sup> How striking is the contradiction be-

<sup>b</sup> Milton, in his *Areopagitica*, or *Argument for Unlicensed Printing* (vol. i. p. 149, Birch's edition of Milton's *Prose Works*), has some strenuous protestations against the rigour of the Platonic censorship in this tenth Book. In the year 1480 Hermolaus Barbarus wrote to George Merula as follows:—"Plato, in *Institutione De Legibus*, inter prima commemorat, in omni republicâ præscribi curarive oportere, ne cui liceat, quæ composuerit, aut privatim ostendere, aut in usum publicum edere, antequam ea constituti super id iudices viderint, nec damnarint. Utinam hodieque haberetur hæc lex: neque enim tam multi scriberent, neque tam pauci bonas litteras discerent. Nam et copîa malorum librorum offundimur et omissis eminentissimis auctoribus, plebeios et minutulos consecramur. Et, quod calamitosissimum est, periti juxta imperitque de studiis impunè ac promiscuè judicant" (*Politiani Opera*, 1533, p. 441).

I transcribe the above passage from an interesting article upon Book-Censors, in Beckmann's *History of Inventions* (vol. iii. p. 93 seq.), where numerous examples are cited of the prohibition, combustion, or licensing of books by authority, from the burning of the work of Protagoras by decree of the Athenian assembly, down to modern times; illustrating the tendency of different sects and creeds, in proportion as they acquired power, to silence all open contradiction. The Christian Arnobius, at a time when his creed was under disfavour by the Emperors, protests against this practice; in a liberal and comprehensive phrase which would have much offended Plato (at the time when he wrote the *Leges*) and Hermolaus:—"Alios audio mussitare indignanter et dicere—oportere statui per Senatum, abolerentur ut hæc scripta, quibus Christiana religio comprobetur et vetustatis opprimatur auctoritas. Nam intercipere scripta, et publicatam velle submergere lectionem, non est Deos defendere, sed veritatis testimonium timere" (*Arnob. adv. Gentes*, iii. p. 104-iv. p. 152).

<sup>c</sup> We are told by Eusebius" (*Beckmann*, p. 96) "that Diocletian caused

the sacred Scriptures to be burnt. After the spreading of the Christian religion, the clergy exercised against books that were either unfavourable or disagreeable to them, the same severity which they had censured in the heathens as foolish and prejudicial to their own cause. Thus were the writings of Arius condemned to the flames at the Council of Nice; and Constantine threatened with the punishment of death those who should conceal them. The clergy assembled at the Council of Ephesus requested the Emperor Theodosius II. to cause the works of Nestorius to be burnt; and this desire was complied with. The writings of Eutyches shared the like fate at the Council of Chalcedon: and it would not be difficult to collect examples of the same kind from each of the following centuries."

Dr. Vaughan observes, in criticising the virtuous character and sincere persecuting spirit of Sir Thomas More:—"If there be any opinion which it would be just to punish as a crime, it is the opinion which makes it a virtue not to tolerate opinion." (*Revolutions in English History*, vol. ii. p. 178.)

I find the following striking anecdote in the transactions of the Académie Royale de Belgique, 1862; *Bulletins, Communications, &c.*, pp. 150-157; *Vie et Travaux de Nicholas Cleynaerts* par M. Thonissen. Cleynaerts (or Clenardus) was a learned Belgian (born 1495, died 1543), professor both at Louvain and at Salamanca, and author of *Grammaticæ Institutiones*, both of the Greek and the Hebrew languages. He acquired, under prodigious difficulties and disadvantages, a knowledge of the Arabic language; and he employed great efforts to organise a course of regular instruction in that language at Louvain, with a view to the formation of missionaries who would combat the doctrines of Islam.

At Grenada, in Spain (1538), "Clenardus ne réussit pas mieux à arracher aux bûchers de l'inquisition les manuscrits et les livres" (*Moorish and Arabic books which had been seized after the conquest of Grenada by the Spaniards*)

tween this spirit and that in which Plato depicts the Sokrates of the Phædon, the Apology, and the Gorgias! How fully does Sokrates in the Phædon<sup>c</sup> recognise and respect the individual reason of his two friends, though dissenting from his own! How emphatically does he proclaim, in the Apology and Gorgias, not merely his own individual dissent from his fellow-citizens, but also his resolution to avow and maintain it against one and all, until he should hear such reasons as convinced him that it was untrue! How earnestly does he declare (in the Apology) that he has received from the Delphian God a mission to cross-examine the people of Athens, and that he will obey the God in preference to them :<sup>d</sup> thus claiming to himself that special religious privilege which his accuser Milétus imputes to him as a crime, and which Plato, in his Magnétic colony, also treats as a crime, interdicting it under the severest penalties! During the interval of forty-five years (probably) between the trial of Sokrates and the composition of the Leges, Plato had passed from sympathy with the free-spoken dissenter to an opposite feeling—hatred of all dissent, and an unsparing employment of penalties for upholding orthodoxy. I have already remarked on the Republic, and I here remark it again—if Milétus lived long enough to read the Leges, he would have found his own accusation of Sokrates

“ qu'elle avait entassés dans sa succursale de Grenade. Ce fut en vain que Cleynaerts, faisant valoir le but éminemment chrétien qu'il voulait atteindre, prodigua les démarches et les prières, pour se faire remettre ces papiers plus nécessaires à lui qu'à Vulcain. L'ineffable inquisition refusa de lâcher sa proie. Un savant théologien, Jean Martin Silicæus, précepteur de Philippe II., fit cependant entendre à notre compatriote, que ses vœux pourraient être exaucés, s'il consentait à fonder son école, non à Louvain, mais à Grenade, où une multitude de néophytes faisaient semblant de professer le Christianisme, tout en conservant les préceptes de Mahomet au fond du cœur. Mais le linguiste Belge lui fit cette réponse, doublement remarquable à cause du pays et de l'époque où elle fut émise. 'C'est en Brabant, et nullement en Espagne, que je poserai les fondemens

de mon œuvre. Je cherche des *compagnons d'armes pour lutter là où la lutte peut être loyale et franche*. Les habitans du royaume de Grenade n'oseraient pas me répondre; puisque la terreur de l'inquisition les force à se dire chrétiens. Le combat est impossible, là où personne n'ose assumer le rôle de l'ennemi'—” Galen calls for a strict censorship, even over medical books—ad Julianum—Vol. xviii. p. 247 K.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Apolog. p. 29; Gorgias, p. 472 A-B. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι τε καὶ σοὶ εἰς ὧν οὐ;

Compare also p. 482 B of the same dialogue, where Sokrates declares his anxiety to maintain consistency with himself, and his indifference to other authority.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Apol. S. p. 29 D. πείσομαι δὲ μάλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, pp. 30 A, 31 D, 33 C.

amply warranted by the enactments and doctrines of the most distinguished Sokratic companion.\*

It is true that the orthodoxy which Plato promulgates and forbids to be impugned, in the Magnêtic community, is an orthodoxy of his own, different from that which was recognised at Athens: but this only makes the case more remarkable, and shows the deep root of intolerance in the human bosom—esteemed as it frequently is, by a sincere man, among the foremost of his own virtues. Plato marks out three varieties of heresy, punishable by long imprisonment, and subsequent death in case of obstinate persistance. Now under one or other of the three varieties, a large majority of actual Greeks would have been included. The first variety—those who did not believe the Gods to exist—was doubtless confined to a small minority of reflecting men; though this minority (according to Plato<sup>f</sup>),

\* The indictment of Melêtus against Sokrates ran thus:—'Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς, οὐ νομίζων, ἑτέρα δὲ καὶνὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρει· ὁ δὲ θάνατος (Diogen. Laert. ii. 40; Xenoph. Memor. i. 1). The charge as to introduction of καὶνὰ δαιμόνια was certainly well founded against Sokrates (compare Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 C). Whoever was guilty of promulgating καὶνὰ δαιμόνια, in the Platonic city De Legibus, would have perished miserably long before he reached the age of 70; which Sokrates attained at Athens.

Compare my 'History of Greece,' ch. xxviii.

I have in one passage greatly understated the amount of severity which Plato employs against heretics. I there affirm that he banishes them: whereas the truth is, that he imprisons them, and ultimately, unless they recant, puts them to death.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 886 E. πᾶμπόληαι. Pp. 888 E, 891 B.

Fabricius tells us that Plato himself has been considered and designated as an atheist, by various critics:—"Alii Platonem atheis, alii Spinossæ præcursoribus adnumerant. Utriusque criminis reum eum facit Nic. Henr. Gundling. At alii benè defenderunt philosophum ab eo crimine." (Bibliothec. Græc. tom. iii. pp. 69-75, Harles.)

This illustrates the loose manner in which the epithet *ἄθεος* has been applied in philosophical and theological controversies: a practice forcibly exposed in the following acute note of Wytttenbach.

Wytttenbach, Præf. ad Plutarch, De Superstit. vol. vi. P. 2, p. 995. "Nam quæ est superstitio? quæ *ἄθεότης*? quæ harum species? qui gradus? His demum explicitis et inter se comparatis intelligi poterit, quæ *ἄθεότης* species cui superstitionis speciei, qui gradus hujus cui gradui illius, anteferri aut postponi debeat. Ac primum in ipsis illis de quibus agitur rebus definiendis magna est difficultas. Quamquam *atheum* quidem definire non difficile videtur: quippe quo ipso nomine significetur is qui *nullum deum esse putat*. Atqui hæc etiam definitio non intelligitur, nisi antea declaretur quid sit id quod *Dei* vocabulo significemus—omnino, quæ sit definitio *Dei*. Jam nemo ignorat quantopere in notione ac definitione Dei dissentiant non modo universi populi, sed et singuli homines: nec solum vulgus, sed et sapientes: ita quidem, ut quo plures partes sint, ex quibus hæc notio constituitur, eo minus en eâ consentiant. Sed fac esse, qui eam paucissimis complectatur proprietatibus, ut dicat, *Deum esse mentem æternam, omnium rerum creatricem et gubernatricem*. Erunt qui eum parum

not contemptible even in number, was distinguished in respect to intellectual accomplishments. The second variety—that of those who believed the Gods to exist, but believed them to produce some results only, not all—was more numerous. And the third variety—that of those who believed them to be capable of being appeased or won over by prayer and sacrifice—was the most numerous of all. Plato himself informs us<sup>g</sup> that this last doctrine was proclaimed by the most eminent poets, rhetors, prophets, and priests, as well as by thousands and tens of thousands besides. That prayer and sacrifice were means of appeasing the displeasure or unfavourable dispositions of the Gods—was the general belief of the Grecian world, from the Homeric times downwards. The oracles or individual prophets were constantly entreated to inform petitioners, what was the nature or amount of expiatory ceremony which would prove sufficient for any specific case; but that there was *some* sort of expiatory ceremony which would avail, was questioned by few sincere believers.<sup>h</sup> All these would have been ranked as heretics by Plato. If the Magnêtic community had become a reality, the solitary cells of the Platonic Inquisition might have been found to include Anaxagoras, and most of the Ionic philosophers, under the first head of heresy; Aristotle and Epikurus under the second; Herodotus and Nikias under the third. Indeed most of the 5040 Magnêtic colonists must have adjusted anew their canon of orthodoxy in order to satisfy the exigence of the Platonic Censors.

To these severe laws and penalties against heretics, Plato

—erunt qui eum nimium—dixisse volent: neutri se atheos volent, utrique et hunc et se atheos dicent. . . Ita se res habet. Quotidiè jactatur tralatitium illud, *verus Deus*: quo suam quisque de Deo notionem significat, sæpe illam ineptam et summi numinis majestate indignam. Et bene nobiscum ageretur, si non nisi ab indocto vulgo jactaretur. Nunc philosophi, certe qui se philosophos haberi volunt, Disputant *de vero Deo*, nec ab ejus definitione proficiscuntur, quasi vero hæc nemini ignota sit. . . . Pervulgata illa *veri Dei* appellatio nobis venit a consuetudine Ecclesiæ, cujus diversæ quondam sectæ notionem Dei diverso modo informant, ejus ignoracionem

et ἀθεότητα non modo profanis, sed invicem aliæ aliis sectis exprobrare solebant. Hæc de notione *atheî*: quæ profecto, nisi constitutâ notione Dei, constitui ipsa nequit.”

Plato, Legg. x. p. 885 D. *νῦν μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ἀκούοντες τε καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα τῶν λεγομένων ἀρίστων εἶναι ποιητῶν τε καὶ ῥη μυρϊκῆς μυρίων, &c.*

<sup>h</sup> See the sections 23 and 24 of the Lehrbuch of K. F. Hermann, Über die Gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer der Griechen; Herodot. vi. 91; Thucyd. i. 134.—Respecting Plato's aversion for Anaxagoras—and the physical philosophers—see Legg. x. 888 E, xii. 967 A., with Stallbaum's notes.

prefixes a Proëm or Prologue of considerable length, commenting upon and refuting their doctrines. In the earlier part of this dialogue he had taken credit to himself for having been the first to introduce his legal mandates by a prefatory harangue, intended to persuade and conciliate the persons upon whom the mandate was imposed, and to procure cheerful obedience.<sup>1</sup> For such a purpose the Proëm in the tenth Book would be badly calculated. But Plato here introduces it with a different view:<sup>k</sup> partly to demonstrate a kosmical and theological theory, partly to excite alarm and repugnance in the heretics whom he marks out and condemns. How many among them might be convinced by Plato's reasonings, I do not know; but the large majority of them could not fail to be offended and exasperated by the tone of his Proëm or prefatory discourse. Confessing his inability to maintain completely the calmness and dignity of philosophical discussion, he addresses them partly with passionate asperity, partly with the arrogant condescension of a schoolmaster lecturing indocile pupils. He describes them now as hateful and unprincipled men—now as presumptuous youths daring to form opinions before they are competent, and labouring under a distemper of reason;<sup>1</sup> and this too, although he intimates that the first-named variety of heresy was adopted by most of the physical philosophers: and the third variety by many of the best poets, rhetors, prophets, and priests.<sup>m</sup> Such unusual vehemence is justified by Plato on the ground of a virtuous indignation against the impugnors of orthodox belief. We learn from the Platonic and Xenophontic Apologies, that Melêtus and Anytus, when they accused Sokrates of impiety before the Dikastery, indulged in the same invective, announced the same justification, and felt the same confidence that they were righteous champions of the national faith against an impious and guilty assailant.

Among the three varieties of heresy, Plato considers the

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 722-723.  
 γὰρ εὐμενῶς καὶ διὰ τὴν

891 B, 900 B, 907 A-B. καὶ μὴν  
 εἰρηναῖα γέ πως σφοδρότερον (οἱ  
 λόγοι) διὰ φιλονεικίαν τῶν κακῶν ἀνθρώ-  
 πων ἐν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα

Plato, Legg. x. p. 887 A.

Plato, Legg. x. pp. 887 B-E, 888 B,

τὴν ὥς εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν γέγονε.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. x. pp. 891 D, 885 D.

third to be the worst. He accounts it a greater crime to believe in indulgent and persuadeable Gods, than not to believe in any Gods at all.<sup>a</sup> Respecting the entire unbelievers, he acknowledges that a certain proportion are so from intellectual, not from moral, default: and that there are, among them, persons of blameless life and disposition.<sup>o</sup> It must be remembered that the foremost of these unbelievers, and the most obnoxious to Plato, were the physical astronomers: those who did not agree with him in recognising the Sun, Moon, and Stars as animated and divine Beings—those who studied their movements as if they were mechanical agents. Plato gives a brief summary of various cosmogonic doctrines professed by these heretics, who did not recognise (he says) either God, or reason, or art, in the cosmogonic process; but ascribed to nature, chance, and necessity, the genesis of celestial and terrestrial substances, which were afterwards modified by human art and reason. Among these matters regulated by human art and reason, were included (these men said) the beliefs of each society respecting the Gods and religion, respecting political and social arrangements, respecting the just and the beautiful: though there were (they admitted) certain things beautiful by nature, yet not those which the lawgiver declared to be such. Lastly, these persons affirmed (Plato tells us) that the course of life naturally right was, for each man to seize all the wealth, and all the power over others, which his strength enabled him to secure, without any regard to the requirements of the law. And by such teaching they corrupted the minds of youth.<sup>p</sup>

The third variety of heresy is declared to be the worst—the belief in Gods persuadeable by prayer and sacrifice.

Who these teachers were, whom Plato groups together as if they taught the same doctrine, we do not know. Having no memorials from themselves, we cannot fully trust the description of their teaching given by an opponent: especially when we reflect, that it coincides substantially with the accusation which Melétus and Anytus urged against Sokrates before the Athenian Dikastery: viz.: that he was irreligious, and that he corrupted youth by teaching them to despise both the laws and their

Heretics censured by Plato—Socrates

the Athenian Dikasts.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. x. pp. 907 A, 906 B.      <sup>o</sup> Plato, Legg. x. pp. 886 A, 908 B.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Legg. x. pp. 889-890.

senior relatives—of which corruption Kritias and Alkibiades were cited as examples. Such allegations, when advanced against Sokrates, are noted both by Plato and Xenophon as the stock-topics, always ready at hand for those who wished to depreciate philosophers.<sup>9</sup>

In so far as these heretics affirmed that right as opposed to wrong, just as opposed to unjust, true belief as opposed to false respecting the Gods, were determined by the lawgiver and not by any other authority—Plato has little pretence for blaming them: because he himself claims such authority explicitly in his Magnêtic community, and punishes severely not merely those who disobey his laws in act, but those who contradict his dogmas in speech or argument. Before he proclaims his intended punishments in a penal law, he addresses the heretics in a proëm or prefatory discourse intended to persuade or win them over: a discourse which was the more indispensable, since their doctrines (he tells us) were disseminated everywhere.<sup>7</sup> If he seriously intended to persuade real dissentients, his attempt is certainly a failure: for the premisses on which he reasons are such as would not have been granted by them—nor indeed by many who agreed in the conclusion which he was himself trying to prove.

The theory here given by Plato, represents the state of his own convictions at the time when the *Leges* were composed. It is a theory of kosmology of universal genesis; different in many respects from what he propounds in the *Timæus*, since it comprises no mention of the extra-kosmical Demiurgus—nor of the eternal Ideas—nor of the primordial chaotic movements called Necessity—while it contains (what we do not find in the *Timæus*) the allegation of a twofold or multiple soul pervading the universe—the good soul (one or more), being coexistent and coeternal with others (one or more) that are bad.<sup>8</sup>

The fundamental principle which he lays down (in this

<sup>9</sup> Plato, *Apolog.* Sokr. p. 23. τὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρό-

ῆς καὶ

λόγον κρείσσω ποιεῖν. Xenoph.

*Memor.* i. 2, 31. See generally the first two chapters of the *Memorabilia*, where Xenophon intimates that So-

krates was accused of training youth to a life of lawless and unprincipled ambition and selfishness, and especially of having trained Kritias and Alkibiades.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 890 D, 891 A.

<sup>8</sup> Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 896 E.

tenth Book De Legibus) is—That soul or mind is older, prior, and more powerful, than body. Soul is the principle of self-movement, activity, spontaneous change. Body cannot originate any movement or change by itself. It is simply passive, receiving movement from soul, and transmitting movement onward. The movement or change which we witness in the universe could never have begun at first, except through the originating spontaneity of soul. None of the four elements—earth, water, air, or fire—is endowed with any self-moving power.<sup>†</sup> As soul is older and more powerful than body, so the attributes of soul are older and more powerful than those of body: that is, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, love, hatred, volition, deliberation, reason, reflection, judgment true or false—are older and more powerful than heat, cold, heaviness, lightness, hardness, softness, whiteness, sweetness, &c.<sup>‡</sup> The attributes and changes of body are all secondary effects, brought about, determined, modified, or suspended, by the prior and primitive attributes and changes of soul. In all things that are moved there dwells a determining soul: which is thus the cause of all effects however contrary—good and bad, just and unjust, honourable and base. But it is one variety of soul which works to good, another variety which works to evil.<sup>§</sup> The

Soul—older, more powerful in the universe than Body. Different souls are at work in the universe—the good soul, and the bad soul.

<sup>†</sup> Plato, Legg. x. pp. 894 D, 895 B.

<sup>‡</sup> Plato, Legg. x. pp. 896 A, 897 A. The κινήσεις of soul are πρωτουργοί—those of body are δευτερουργοί.

<sup>§</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 896 E. καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν τοῖς

As an illustration or comment on this portion of Plato De Legibus, Lord Monboddo's *Antient Metaphysics* are instructive. See vol. i. pp. 2-7-9-25. He adopts the distinction between Mind and Body made both in the tenth Book De Legg., and in the Epinomis. He considers that Body and Mind are mixed together in each part of nature; and in the material world never separated: that motion is perpetual; and "Where there is motion there must be something that moves. What is moved I call Body: what moves I call Mind.

"Under Mind, in this definition, I include:—1. The rational and intellectual. 2. The animal life. 3. That

principle in the vegetable, by which it is nourished, grows, and produces its like, and which therefore is called commonly the *vegetable life*. 4. That motive principle, which I understand to be in all bodies, even such as are inanimate. This is the distinction between Body and Mind made by Plato in his tenth Book of Laws."

"The Greek word ψυχή denotes the three first kinds I have mentioned, which are not expressed by any one word that I know in English; for the word Mind, that I have used to express them, denotes in common use only the *rational mind*, or *soul*, as it is called. The fourth kind I have mentioned, viz., the *motive principle in all bodies*, is not commonly in Greek called ψυχή. But Aristotle, in a passage which I shall afterwards quote, says that it is ὁσπερ ψυχή.

(P. 9). "As to the *principle of motion* or *moving principle*, which Aristotle supposes to be in all bodies,

good variety of soul works under the guidance of *Noûs* or Reason—the bad variety works irrationally.<sup>7</sup> Now which of the two (asks Plato) directs the movements of the celestial sphere, the Sun, Moon, and Stars? Certainly, the good soul, and not the bad. This is proved by the nature and character of their movements: which movements are rotatory in a circle, and exactly uniform and equable. Now among all the ten different sorts of motion or change, rotatory motion in a circle is the one which is most akin or congenial to Reason.<sup>8</sup> The motion of Reason, and the motion of the stars, is alike rotatory, and the same, and unchangeable—in the same place, round the same centre, and returning into itself. The bad soul, acting without reason, produces only irregular movements, intermittent, and accompanied by constant change of place.<sup>9</sup> Though it is the good variety of soul which produces the celestial rotation, yet there are many distinct and separate souls, all of this same variety, which concur to the production of the result. The Sun, the Moon, and each of the Stars, has a distinct soul inherent in itself or peculiar to its own body.<sup>10</sup> Each of these souls, invested in the celestial substance and in each of the visible celestial bodies, is a God: and thus all things are full of Gods.<sup>11</sup>

In this argument—which Plato tells us that no man will be insane enough to dispute,<sup>12</sup> and which he proclaims to be a triumphant refutation of the unbelievers—we find, instead of the extra-kosmical Demiurgus and the pre-kosmical Chaos or Necessity (the doctrine of the

it is what he calls *Nature*. He makes *Nature* also to be the principle of *rest* in bodies; by which I suppose he means, that those bodies which he calls *heavy*, that is, which move towards the centre of the earth, would *rest* if they were there.”

(P. 25.) “From the account here given of motion, it is evident that by it the whole business of nature, above, below, and round about us, is carried on. . . To those who hold that Mind is the first of things, and principal in the Universe, it will not appear surprising that I have made *moving* or *producing motion* an essential attribute of *Mind*.”

In the same Treatise—which exhibits very careful study both of Plato and of Aristotle—Lord Monboddo analyses the ten varieties of motion here re-

cognised by Plato, and shows that it is confused and unsatisfactory. Ancient Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 23-230-252.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 897 B.

<sup>8</sup> Plato, Legg. x. pp. 897 E-898 A. ἢ προσέοικε κινήσει νοῦς, τῶν δέκα ἐκείνων κινήσεων τὴν εἰκόνα λάβωμεν—τούτοις δὲ τοῖς κινήσεισιν τὴν ἐν ἐνὶ

γέ τι μέσον κινεῖσθαι, τῶν ἐντόνων οὐσῶν τι κύκλων, εἶναι τε αὐτὴν τῇ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δυνατόν οἰκείον τε καὶ ὁμοίαν.

<sup>9</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 898 B-C.

<sup>10</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 898 D.

<sup>11</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 899 B.

ἵνα δὲ οἱ πάντες ἀπολογησιν ταῦτα, ὅστις ὁμολογεῖ πάντα;

<sup>12</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 899 B.

Plato's argument is unsatisfactory and inconsistent.

Platonic Timæus<sup>e</sup>), two opposing primordial forces both intra-kosmical: the good soul and the bad soul, there being a multiplicity of each. Though Plato here proclaims his conclusion with an unqualified confidence which contrasts greatly with the modest reserve often expressed in his Timæus—yet the conclusion is rather disproved than proved by his own premisses. It cannot be true that all things are full of Gods, since there are two varieties of soul existing and acting, the bad as well as the good: and Plato calls the celestial bodies Gods, as endowed with and moved by good and rational souls. Aristotle in his theory draws a marked distinction between the regularity and perfection of the celestial region, and the irregularity and imperfection of the terrestrial and sublunary: Plato's premisses as here laid out would have called upon him to do the same, and to designate the Kosmos as the theatre of counteracting agencies, partly divine, partly not divine. So he terms it indeed in the Timæus.<sup>f</sup>

There is another feature, common both to the Timæus and the Leges, which deserves attention as illustrating Plato's point of view. It is the reverential senti-  
Reverence of  
Plato for  
uniform cir-  
cular rota-  
tion.  
 ment with which he regards uniform rotatory movement in the same place. This he pronounces to be the perfect, regular, movement appertaining and congenial to Reason and the good variety of soul. Because the celestial bodies move thus and only thus, he declares them to be Gods. It is this circular rotation which continues with perfect and unchangeable regularity in the celestial sphere of

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Timæus, pp. 48 A, 69 A-B.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Timæus, p. 48 A.

The remarks of Zeller, in the second edition of his work, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* (vol. ii. p. 634 seq.), upon this portion of the *Treatise De Legibus*, are very acute and instructive. He exposes the fallacy of the attempt made by various critics to explain away the Manichæan doctrine declared in this treatise, and to reconcile the *Leges* with the *Timæus*. The subject is handled in a manner superior to the *Platonische Studien* of the same author (wherein the *Leges* are pronounced to be spurious, while in the *History of Philosophy* Zeller

retracts this opinion), though in that work also there is much instruction.—Stallbaum's copious notes on these passages (pp. 188-189-195-207-213 of his edition of *Leges*) while admitting the discrepancy between *Leges* and *Timæus*, furnish what he thinks a satisfactory explanation. One portion of his explanation is, that Plato here accommodates himself "*ad captum vulgarem—ad captum civium communem accommodatè et populari ratione explicari.*" I dissent from this as a matter of fact. I think that the heretics of the second and third class coincide rather with the "*captus vulgaris.*" So Plato himself intimates.

the Kosmos, and also, though imperfect and perturbed, in the spherical cranium of man.<sup>g</sup> Aristotle in his theory maintains unabated the reverence for this mode of motion, as the perfection of reason and regularity. The feeling here noted exercised a powerful and long-continued influence over the course of astronomical speculations.

Having demonstrated to his own full satisfaction, from the regularity of the celestial rotations, that the heavenly bodies are wise and good Gods, and that all things are full of Gods—Plato applies this conclusion to refute the second class of heretics—those who did not believe that the Gods directed all human affairs, the small things as well as the great;<sup>h</sup> that is, the lot of each individual person as well as that of the species or of its component aggregates. He himself affirms that they direct all things. It is inconsistent with their attributes of perfect intelligence, power, and goodness, (he maintains) that they should leave anything, either small or great, without regulation. All good human administrators, generals, physicians, pilots, &c., regulate all things, small and great, in their respective provinces: the Gods cannot be inferior to them, and must be held to do the same. They regulate everything with a view to the happiness of the whole, in which each man has his share and interest; and each man has his special controuling Deity watching over his minutest proceedings, whether the individual sees it or not.<sup>i</sup> Soul, both in its good variety and its bad variety, is essentially in change from one state to another, and passes from time to time out of one body into another. In the perpetual conflict between the good and the bad variety of soul, according as each man's soul inclines to the better or to the worse, the Gods or Fate exalt it to a higher region or degrade it to a lower. By this means the Gods do the best they can to ensure triumph to virtue, and defeat to vice, in the entire Kosmos. This reference to the

<sup>g</sup> Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 44 B, 47 C.

<sup>h</sup> The language of Plato sometimes implies, that the opponents whom he is controverting disbelieve altogether the intervention of the Gods in human affairs, pp. 899 E, 900 A, 885 B. But

the main stress of his argument is directed against those who, admitting the intervention of the Gods in great things, deny it in small, pp. 900 D, 901 A-B-C-D, 902 A-B.

<sup>i</sup> Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 902-903 B-C.

entire Kosmos is overlooked by the heretics who deny the all-pervading management of the Gods.<sup>k</sup>

Plato gives here an outburst of religious eloquence which might prove impressive when addressed to fellow-believers—but which, if employed for the avowed purpose of convincing dissentients, would fail of its purpose, as involving assumptions to which they would not subscribe. As to the actual realities of human life, past as well as present, Plato himself always gives a very melancholy picture of them. “The heaven is full of good things, and also full of things opposite to good: but mostly of things not good.”<sup>l</sup> Moreover, when we turn back to the Republic, we find Plato therein expressly blaming a doctrine very similar to what he declares true here in the Leges—as a dangerous heresy, although extensively believed, from the time of Homer downward. “Since God is good” (Plato had there affirmed<sup>m</sup>) “he cannot be the cause of all things, as most men pronounce him to be. He is the cause of a few things, but of most things he is not the cause: for the good things in our lot are much fewer than the evil. We must ascribe all the good things to him, but for the evil things we must seek some other cause, and not God.” The confessed imperfection of the actual result<sup>n</sup> was one of the main circumstances urged by those heretics, who denied that all-pervading administration of the Gods which Plato in the Leges affirms.<sup>o</sup> If he undertook to convince them at all, he would have done well

<sup>k</sup> This argument is set forth from p. 903 B to 905 B. It is obscure and difficult to follow.

<sup>l</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 906 A. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συγκεχωρήκαμεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὲν τὸν οὐρανὸν πολλῶν μεστὸν εἶναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, τῶν

ἢ τοιαύτη καὶ φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς δεομένη. Ast in his note affirms that after μὴ is understood ἀγαθῶν. Stallbaum thinks, though with some hesitation, that ἐναντίων is understood after μὴ. I agree with Ast.

Compare iii. pp. 676-677, where Plato states that in the earlier history of the human race, a countless number of different societies (μύρια ἐπὶ μυρία) have all successively grown up and

successively perished, with extinction of all their comforts and civilization.

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Republic, ii. p. 379 C. Οὐδ' ἆρα ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἴτιος, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν· ἀλλ' ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τὰγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν· καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἕλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἅλλα ἅττα ζητεῖν δεῖ τὰ αἷτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. See a striking passage in Arnobius, adv. Gentes, ii. 40.

Plato, Legg. x. p. 903 B. Πείθω—δὲν ἐν καὶ εἰς τὸ πᾶν

<sup>o</sup> Lucretius, v. 197:—

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam  
Naturam rerum, tantâ stat prædita culpâ.

to state and answer more fully their arguments, and to clear up the apparent inconsistencies in his own creed.

A similar criticism may be made still more forcibly, upon the demonstration whereby he professes to refute the third and most culpable class of heretics—  
Argument of Plato to refute the third class of heretics. “Those who believe that the Gods exercise an universal agency, but that they can be persuaded by prayer and conciliated by sacrifice.” Here he was treading on dangerous ground: for he was himself a heretic, by his own confession, if compared with Grecian belief generally. Not merely the ordinary public, but the most esteemed and religious persons among the public<sup>p</sup>—poets, rhetors, prophets, and priests—believed the doctrine which he here so vehemently condemns. Moreover it was the received doctrine of the city<sup>q</sup>—that is, it was assumed as the basis of the official and authorised religious manifestations: and the law of the city was recognised by the Delphian oracle<sup>r</sup> as the proper standard of reference for individual enquirers who came there to ask for information on matters of doubtful religious propriety. In the received Grecian conception of religious worship, prayer and sacrifice were correlative and inseparable: sacrifice was the gift of man to the Gods, accompanying the prayer for gifts from the Gods to man, and accounted necessary to render the prayer efficacious.<sup>s</sup> The priest was the professional person competent and necessary to give advice as to the details: but as a general principle, it was considered disrespectful to ask favours from the Gods without tendering to them some present, suitable to the means of the petitioner.

Plato himself states this view explicitly in his *Politikus*.<sup>t</sup>

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 885 D; *Republic*, ii. pp. 364-365-366.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 366 A. αἱ τελεταὶ αὐτὰ μέγα δύνανται, καὶ οἱ λύσιοι θεοὶ, ὡς μέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἱ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν μνηύουσι.

<sup>r</sup> Xenophon. *Memor.* i. 3, 1, iv. 3, 16; Cicero, *Legg.* ii. 16.

<sup>s</sup> See Nägelsbach, *Nach-Homerische Theologie*, Part 5, 1, p. 194 seq., where this doctrine is set forth and largely illustrated.

In approaching a king, a satrap, or

any other person of exalted position above the level of ordinary men, it was the custom to come with a present. Thucyd. ii. 97; Xenoph. *Anab.* vii. 3, 26; Xenoph. *Hellen.* iii. 1, 10-12.

The great person, to whom the presents were made, usually requited them magnificently.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, *Politikus*, p. 290 D.

καὶ τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος, ὡς τὸ φησι, παρὰ μὲν ἡμῶν δι' θυσίων ἐπιστήμόν ἐστι κατὰ νοῦν νοῖς δωρεῖσθαι, παρὰ δ' εὐχαῖς κτήσιν ἀγαθῶν αἱ Compare Euthyphron, p. 14.

Moreover, when a man desired information from the Gods on any contemplated project or on any grave matter of doubt, he sought it by means of sacrifice.<sup>u</sup> Such sacrifice was a debt to the God : and if it remained unpaid, his displeasure was incurred.<sup>x</sup> The motive for sacrificing to the Gods was thus, not simply to ensure the granting of prayers, but to pay a debt : and thus either to prevent or to appease the wrath of the Gods. The religious practice of Greece rested upon the received belief that the Gods were not merely pleased with presents, but exacted them as a mark of respect, and were angry if they were not offered : yet that being angry, their wrath might be appeased by acceptable presents and supplications.<sup>y</sup> To learn what proceedings of this kind *were* suitable, a man went to consult the oracle, the priests, or the Exêgêtæ : in cases wherein he believed that he had incurred the displeasure of the Gods by any wrong or omission.<sup>z</sup>

General belief in Greece about the efficacy of prayer and sacrifice to the Gods.

Now it is against this latter sentiment—that which recognised the Gods as placable or forgiving<sup>a</sup>—that Plato declares war as the worst of all heresies. He admits indeed, implicitly, that the Gods are influenced by prayer and sacrifice ; since he directs both the one and the other to be constantly offered up, by the citizens of his Magnêtic city, in this very Treatise. He even implies that the Gods are too facile and compliant : for in his second Alkibiadês, Sokrates is made to remark that it was dangerous for an ignorant man to pray for specific advantages, because he might very probably bring ruin upon himself by having his prayers granted—

Incongruities of Plato's own doctrine.

“Evertêre domos totas, optantibus ipsis,  
Di faciles.”

Farthermore Plato does not scruple to notice<sup>b</sup> it as a real proceeding of the Gods, that they executed the prayer or

<sup>u</sup> Xenophon, Anab. vii. 6, 44 ; Euripid. Ion, 234.

<sup>x</sup> Plato, Republic, i. p. 331 B. Compare also Phædon, p. 118, the last words spoken by Sokrates before his decease — ὁφείλομεν Ἀσκληπιῶ ἁλεκτρίονα· ἀλλ' ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ

<sup>y</sup> See Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp. 211-213.

<sup>z</sup> See, as one example among a thou-

sand, the proceeding of the Spartan government, Thuc. i. 134, also ii. 48-54.

<sup>a</sup> The common sentiment is expressed in a verse of Euripides—Τίνα δεῖ μακάρων ἐκθυσάμενους Εὐρεῖν μόχθων ἀνάπαυλαν—(Fragm. Ino 155) ; compare Eurip. Hippol. 1323.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 931 B, iii. p. 687 D. ἀραῖος γὰρ γονεὺς τοῖς ἐκγόνοις ὧς οὐδεὶς ἕτερος ἑλλοίς, δίκαιότατα.

curse of Theseus, by bringing a cruel death upon the blameless youth Hippolytus; which Theseus himself is the first to deplore when he becomes acquainted with the true facts. That the Gods should inflict punishment on a person who did not deserve it, Plato accounts not unworthy of their dignity: but that they should remit punishment in any case where he conceives it to have been deserved, he repudiates with indignation. Though accessible and easily influenced by prayer and sacrifice from other persons, they are deaf and inexorable to those who have incurred their displeasure by wrong-doing.<sup>c</sup> The prayer so offered is called by Plato a treacherous cajolery, the sacrifice a guilty bribe, to purchase their indulgence.<sup>d</sup> Since, in human affairs, no good magistrate, general, physician, pilot, &c., will allow himself to be persuaded by prayers or presents to betray his trust: much less can we suppose (he argues) the Gods to be capable of such betrayal.<sup>e</sup>

The general doctrine, upon which Plato here lays so much stress, and the dissent from which he pronounces to be a capital offence—that the Gods, though persuadable by every one else, were thoroughly unfor- giving, deaf to any prayer or sacrifice from one who had done wrong—is a doctrine from which Sokrates<sup>f</sup> himself dissented; and to which few of Plato's contemporaries, perhaps hardly even himself, consistently adhered. The argument upon which Plato rests for convincing all these numerous dissentients, is derived from his conception of the character and functions of the Gods. But this, though satisfactory to himself, would not have been granted by his opponents. The Gods were conceived by Herodotus as jealous, meddlesome, intolerant of human happiness beyond a narrow limit, and keeping all human calculations in a state of uncertainty:<sup>g</sup> in this latter attribute Sokrates also agreed. He affirmed that the Gods kept all the important results essentially unpredictable by human study, reserving them for special revelations

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 716-717.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. x. p. 906 B. *θα- πελας λόγων.*

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. x. pp. 906-907.

<sup>f</sup> Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 3, 14. *Σὺ μὲν, ὦ παῖ, ἐν σωφρονίᾳ, τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς παραιτήσῃ συγγνώμῃς σοι*

*ἴσεαι*

*οὔτοι νομίσαντες, ἀχάριστον εἶναι, οὐκ ἐθέλωσιν εἰδ ποιεῖν.*

At the same time, Sokrates maintains that the Gods accepted sacrifices from good men with greater favour than sacrifices from bad men. Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 3.

<sup>g</sup> Herodotus, i. 32, iii. 40.

by way of prophecy to those whom they preferred. These were privileged and exclusive communications to favoured individuals, among whom Sokrates was one:<sup>h</sup> and Plato, though not made a recipient of the same favour as Sokrates, declares his own full belief in the reality of such special revelations from the Gods, to particular persons and at particular places.<sup>i</sup> Aristotle, on the other hand, pronounces action and construction, especially action in details, to be petty and unworthy of the Gods; whom he regards as employed in perpetual contemplation and theorizing, as the only occupation worthy to characterise their blessed immortality.<sup>k</sup> Epikurus and his numerous followers, though not agreeing with Aristotle in regarding the Gods as occupied in intellectual contemplation, agreed with him fully in considering the existence of the Gods as too dignified and enviable to be disturbed by the vexation of meddling with human affairs, or to take on the anxieties of regard for one man, displeasure towards another.

The orthodox religious belief, which Plato imposes upon his 5040 Magnétic citizens under the severest penalties, would thus be found inconsistent with the general belief, not merely of ordinary Greeks, but also of the various lettered and philosophical individuals who thought for themselves. Most of these latter would have passed, under one of the three heads of Platonic heresy, into the Platonic prison for five years, and from thence either to recantation or death. The arguments which Plato considered so irresistible, that none but silly youth could be deaf to them—did not appear conclusive to Aristotle and other intel-

Great opposition which Plato's doctrine would have encountered in Greece.

<sup>h</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 8-9. τοὺς γὰρ θεοὺς, οἷς ἂν ᾤσιν ἰλέω, σημαίνειν: also 3, 4, iv. 3, 12; Cyropæd. i. 6, 5-23-46. θεοὶ αἰεὶ ὄντες πάντα ἴπασιν—καὶ συμβουλευομένων ἀνθρώπων οἷς ἂν ὁ ᾤσι, προσημαίνουσιν ἃ τε χρὴ εἶναι καὶ ἃ οὐ χρὴ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ πᾶσιν λουσι συμβουλεύειν, οὐδὲν οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς ἔστιν, ὧν ἂν

Solon. Frag. v. 52, ed. Gaisf. :—

δ'

μενον.

See the curious narrative in Hero-

dotus ix. 94 seq. about the prophetic gifts bestowed on Euenius. The same narrative attests the full belief prevalent respecting both the displeasure of the Gods and their placability on the proper expiation being made. It conflicts signally in every respect with the canon of orthodoxy set up by Plato.

Plato, Legg. v. pp. 738 C, 747 vii. p. 811 D; Republic, vi. pp. 496 C, 499 C.

<sup>k</sup> Aristotle, Ethic. Nikom. x. 8, p. 1178, b. 21. ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ

ligent contemporaries. Plato makes up his own mind, what proceedings he thinks worthy and unworthy of the Gods, and then proclaims with confidence as a matter of indisputable fact, that they act conformably. But neither Herodotus, nor Aristotle, would have granted his premisses: they conceived the attributes and character of the Gods differently from him, and differently from each other. And if we turn to the *Kratylus* of Plato, we find Sokrates there declaring, that men knew nothing about the Gods: that speculations about the Gods were in reality speculations about the opinions of men respecting the Gods.<sup>1</sup>

Such opinions were local, traditional, and dissentient, among

Local infallibility was claimed as a rule in each community, though rarely enforced with severity: Plato both claims it more emphatically, and enforces it more rigorously.

the numerous distinct cities and tribes which divided the inhabited earth between them in Plato's time.<sup>m</sup>

Each of these claimed a local infallibility, principally as to religious rites and customs, indirectly also as to dogmas and creed: and Plato's Magnêtic community, if it had come into existence, would have added one to the number of distinct varieties. To this general sentiment, deeply rooted in the emo-

tions and unused to the scrutiny of reason, the philosophers were always more or less odious, as dissenters, enquirers, and critics, each on his own ground.<sup>n</sup> At Athens the sentiment manifested itself occasionally in severe decrees and judicial sentences against obnoxious freethinkers, especially in the case of Sokrates. If the Athenians had carried out consistently and systematically the principle involved in their sentence against Sokrates, philosophy must have been banished from Athens.<sup>o</sup> The school of Plato could never have been maintained. But the principle of intolerance was usually left dormant at Athens: philosophical debate continued active

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Kratylus*, pp. 400-401. *Περὶ τῶν οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὔτε περὶ αὐτῶν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἅττα ποτὲ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς καλοῦσι — σκοπῶμεν ὥσπερ τοῖς θεοῖς ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν*

*οἱοί τε ἂν εἶναι σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ ποτε ἐτίθεντο αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα· τοῦτο γὰρ*  
Compare also *Kratyl.* p.

425 B.

, *Politikus*, p. 262 E.

*ἀπείροις οὖσι καὶ ἀμίκτοις καὶ ἀσυμφώνοις παρ' ἡλλήλα.* Herodot. iii. 39.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, *Euthyphron*, p. 3.

<sup>o</sup> See the *Apologies* both of Plato and Xenophon. In one of the rhetorical discourses cited by Aristotle, on the subject of the trial of Sokrates (seemingly that by the rhetor Theodektês), the point is put thus:—*ἂν λετε δὲ κρίνειν, οὐ περὶ Σωκράτους, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ* . . . (Aristot. *Rhetor.* ii. 1399, a. 8, b. 10).

and unshackled, so that the school of Plato subsisted in the city without interruption for nearly forty years until his death. We might have expected that the philosophers, to whose security toleration of free dissent and debate was essential, would have upheld it as a general principle against the public. But here we find the most eminent among them, at the close of a long life, not only disallowing all liberty of philosophising to others, and assuming to himself the exclusive right of dictating the belief, as well as the conduct, of his imaginary citizens—but also enforcing this exclusive principle with an amount of systematic rigour, which I do not believe to have been equalled in any actual Grecian city. This is a memorable fact in the history of Grecian philosophy. The Stoic Kleanthes, in the century after Plato's death, declared that the Samian astronomer Aristarchus ought to be indicted for impiety, because he had publicly advocated the doctrine of the Earth's rotation round the Sun. Kleanthes and Plato thus stand out as known examples, among Grecian philosophers before the Christian era, of that intolerance which would apply legal penalties against individual dissenters and competitors.<sup>p</sup>

The eleventh Book of the Treatise *De Legibus*, and the larger portion of the twelfth, are devoted to a string of civil and political regulations for the Magnétic community. Each regulation is ushered in with an expository prologue, often with severe reproof towards persons committing the various forbidden acts. There is little of systematic order in the enumeration of subjects. In general, we may remark that neither here nor elsewhere in the Treatise is there any proof, that Plato—though doubtless he had visited Italy, Sicily, and Egypt, perhaps other countries—had taken much pains to acquaint himself with the practice of human life, or that he had studied and compared the working of different institutions in different communities. His experience seems all derived

Farther civil and political regulations for the Magnétic community. No evidence that Plato had studied the working of different institutions in practice.

<sup>p</sup> The Platonist and astronomer Derkyllides afterwards (about 100-120 A.D.) declares those who affirm the doctrine, that the earth moves and that the stars are stationary, to be accursed and impious—*τοὺς δὲ τὰ*

*σάντας, τὰ δὲ ἀκίνητα φύσι*  
*παρὰ τὰς τῆς μαγνητικῆς*

Theon Smyrnæus, *De Astronomiâ*, ch. 41, p. 328, fol. 26, ed Martin.

from Athenian law and practice: the criticisms and modifications which he applies to it flow from his own sentiment and theory: from his religious or ethical likings or dislikings. He sets up a type of character which he desires to enforce among his citizens, and which he guards against adulteration by very stringent interference. The displeasure of the Gods is constantly appealed to, as a justification for the penalties which he proposed: sometimes even the current mythes are invoked as authority, though in other places Plato so greatly disparages them.<sup>a</sup>

Various modes of acquiring property are first forbidden as illegitimate. The maxim<sup>r</sup>—"That which you have not put down, do not take up"—is rigorously enforced: any man who finds a buried treasure is prohibited from touching it, though he find it by accident and though the person who buried it be unknown. If a man violates this law, every one, freeman or slave, is invited and commanded to inform against him. Should he be found guilty, a special message must be sent to the Delphian oracle, to ask what is to be done both with the treasure and with the offender. So again, an article of property left on the highway is declared to be under protection of the Goddess or Dæmon of the Highway: whoever finds and takes it, if he be a slave, shall be severely flogged by any freeman above thirty years of age who meets him: if he be a freeman, he shall be disgraced and shall pay, besides, ten times its value to the person who left it.<sup>b</sup> These are average specimens of Plato's point of view and manner of handling offences respecting property.

The general constitution of Plato's community restricts within comparatively narrow limits the occasions of proprietary dispute. His 5040 lots of land are all

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 913 D.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, ib. "Α μή κατέθου, μή ἀνελή. This does not include, however, what has been deposited by a man's father or grandfather.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 914. Seemingly, if any man found a treasure buried in the ground, or a purse lying on the road without an owner, he was not considered by most persons dis-

honest if he appropriated it; to do so was looked upon as an admissible piece of good luck. See Theophrastus, περὶ Μεμψιμοιρίας. From Plato's language we gather that the finder sometimes went to consult the prophets what he should do, p. 913 B —μήτε τοῖς λεγομένοις μάντεσιν ἀνακοινώσαιμι: his phrase is not very respectful towards the prophets.

marked out, unchangeable, and indivisible, each possessed by one citizen. No man is allowed to acquire for disputes about ownership. or possess moveable property to a greater value than four times the lot of land: every article of property possessed by every man is registered by the magistrates. Disputes as to ownership, if they arise, are settled by reference to this register.<sup>t</sup> If the disputed article be not registered, the possessor is bound to produce the seller or donor from whom he received it. All purchases and sales are required to take place in the public market before the Agoranomi: and all for ready money, or by immediate interchange and delivery. If a man chooses to deliver his property, without receiving the consideration, or in any private place, he does so at his own risk: he has no legal claim against the receiver.<sup>u</sup> So likewise respecting the Eranoi or Associations for mutual Succour and Benefit. Plato gives no legal remedy to a contributor or complainant respecting any matter arising out of these associations. He requires that every man shall contribute at his own risk: and trust for requital to the honesty or equity of his fellow-contributors.<sup>x</sup>

A remark must here be made upon Plato's refusal to allow any legal redress in such matters as sale on credit, or payments for the purpose of mutual succour and relief. Such refusal appears to contradict his general manner of proceeding: for his usual practice is, to estimate offences not according to the mischief which they inflict, but according to the degree of wickedness or impiety which he supposes them to imply in the doer. Now the contributor to an association for mutual succour, who, after paying his contributions for the aid of his associates, finds that they refuse to contribute to his aid when the hour of his necessity arrives—suffers not only heavy calamity but grievous disappointment: which implies very bad dispositions on the part of those who, not being themselves distressed, nevertheless refuse. Of such dispositions Plato takes no notice in the present case. He does not expatiate (as he does in many other

Plato's principles of legislation, not consistent—comparison of them with the Attic law about Eranoi.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 914 D.

<sup>u</sup> The same by Plato, was also (Theophrast. ap. Stobæum Serm. xlv.

21, p. 204). Aristotle alludes to some Grecian cities in which it was the established law. K. F. Hermann, *Privat-Alterthümer der Griechen*, s. 71, n. 10. <sup>x</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 915 D-E.

cases far more trifling and disputable) upon the displeasure of the Gods when they see a man who has been benefited in distress by his neighbours' contributions, refusing all requital at the time of that neighbours' need. Plato indeed treats it as a private affair between friends. You do a service to your friend, and you must take your chance whether he will do you a service in return: you must not ask for legal redress, if he refuses: what you have contributed was a present voluntarily given, not a loan lent to be repaid. This is an intelligible point of view, but it excludes those ethical and sentimental considerations which Plato usually delights in enforcing.<sup>7</sup> His ethics here show themselves by leading him to turn aside from that which takes the form of a pecuniary contract. It was in this form that the Eranoi or Mutual Assurance Associations were regarded by Attic judicature: that is, they seem to have been considered as a sort of imperfect obligation, which the Dikastery would enforce against any citizen whose circumstances were tolerably prosperous, but not against one in bad circumstances. Such Eranic actions before the Attic Dikastery were among those that enjoyed the privilege of speedy adjudication (*ἐμμηνοὶ δίκαι*).<sup>2</sup>

As to property in slaves, Plato allows any owner to lay hold of a fugitive slave belonging either to himself or to any friend. If a third party reclaims the slave as being not rightfully in servitude, he must provide three competent sureties, and the slave will then be set free until legal trial can be had. Moreover, Plato enacts, respecting one who has been a slave, but has been manumitted,

Regulations  
about slaves,  
and about  
freedmen.

<sup>7</sup> In Xenophon's ideal legislation, or rather education of the Persian youth, in the *Cyropædia*, he introduces legal trial and punishment for ingratitude generally (*Cyropæd.* i. 2, 7. The Attic judicature took cognizance of neglect or bad conduct towards parents, which Xenophon ranks as a sort of ingratitude—but not of ingratitude towards any one else (*Xenoph. Memor.* ii. 2, 13). There is an interesting discussion in Seneca (*De Beneficiis*, iii. 6-18) about the propriety of treating ingratitude as a legal offence.

Respecting the *ἐρανικὰ δίκαι* at Athens, see *Heraldisus Animadversiones* in *Salmasium*, vi. 1, p. 407 seq.;

Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Prozess*, p. 540 seq.; K. F. Hermann, *Staats Alterth.* s. 146, not. 9.

The word *ἐρανος* meant very different things—a pic-nic banquet, a club for festive meetings kept up by subscription with a common purse, a contribution made to relieve a friend in distress, carrying obligation on the receiver to requite it if the donor fell into equal distress. This last sense is the prevalent one in the Attic orators, and is brought out well in the passage of Theophrastus—*Περὶ Μεμψιμοιρίας*. Probably the Attic *ἐρανικὰ δίκαι* took cognizance of complaints arising out of  
" in all its senses.

that such freedman (*ἀπελεύθερος*), if he omits to pay “proper attention” to his manumitter, may be laid hold of by the latter, and re-enslaved. Proper attention consists in : 1. Going three times per month to the house of his former master, to tender service in all lawful ways. 2. Not contracting marriage without consulting his former master. 3. Not acquiring so much wealth as to become richer than his former master : if he should do so, the latter may appropriate all that is above the limit. The freedman, when liberated, does not become a citizen, but is only a non-citizen or metic. He is therefore subject to the same necessity as all other metics—of departing from the territory after a residence of twenty years,<sup>a</sup> and of never acquiring more wealth than is possessed by the second class of citizens enrolled in the Schedule.

The duties imposed by Plato on the freedman towards his former master—involving a formal recognition at least of the prior dependence, and some positive duties besides—are deserving of remark, as we know so little of the condition or treatment of this class of persons in antiquity.

Regulations are made to provide for the case where a slave, sold by his master, is found to be distempered or mad, or to have committed a murder. If the sale has been made to a physician or a gymnast, Plato holds that these persons ought to judge for themselves about the bodily condition of the slave bought : he therefore grants them no redress. But if the buyer be a non-professional man, he may within one month restore the distempered slave (or within one year, if the distemper be the *Morbus Sacer*), and may cause a jury of physicians to examine the case. Should they decide the distemper of the slave to be undoubted, the seller must take him back : repaying the full price if he be a private man—double the price if he be a professional man, who ought to have known, and perhaps did know, the real condition of the slave sold.<sup>b</sup>

Provisions in case a slave is sold, having a distemper upon him.

In regard to Retail Selling, and to frauds committed either in sale or in barter, Plato provides or enjoins strict regulations. The profession of the retailer, and the function of money as auxiliary to it, he pronounces

Retailers. Strict regulations about them. No citizen can be a retailer.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 915 A-B.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 916 B-C.

to be useful and almost indispensable to society, for the purpose of rendering different articles of value commensurable with each other, and of ensuring a distribution suitable to the requirements of individuals. This could not be done without retailers, merchants, hired agents, &c.<sup>c</sup> But though retailing is thus useful, if properly conducted, it slides easily and almost naturally into cheating, lying, extortion, &c., from the love of money inherent in most men. Such abuses must be restrained: at any rate they must not be allowed to corrupt the best part of the community. Accordingly, none of the 5040 citizens will be allowed either to practise retailing or to exercise any hired function, except under his own senior relatives, and of a dignified character. The discrimination of what is dignified and not dignified must be made according to the liking or antipathy of a court of honour, composed of such citizens as have obtained prizes for virtue.<sup>d</sup> None must be permitted to sell by retail except metics or non-citizens: and these must be kept under strict watch by the Nomophylakes, who after enquiring into the details of each article, will fix its price at such sum as will afford to the dealer a moderate profit.<sup>e</sup>

If there be any fraud committed by the seller (which is nearly akin to retailing<sup>f</sup>), Plato prescribes severe penalty. The seller must never name two prices for his article during the same day. He must declare his price: and if no one will give it, he must withdraw the article for the day.<sup>g</sup> He is not allowed to praise his own articles, or to take any oath respecting them. If he shall take any oath, any citizen above thirty years of age shall be held bound to thrash him, and may do so with impunity: such citizen, if he neglect to thrash the swearer, will himself be amenable to censure for betraying the laws. If the seller

Frauds committed by sellers—severe punishments on them.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 918 B. The like view of retail trade is given in the Republic, ii. p. 371. It indicates just and penetrating social observation, taken in reference to Plato's age.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 918-919. τὸ δ' ἐλευθερικὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον ἀκριβῶς μὲν οὐ ῥᾶδιον νομοθετεῖν, κρινέσθω γε μὴν ὑπὸ τῶν τὰ ἀριστεία εἰληφότεων τῶ ἐκείνων μίσει καὶ ἀσπασμῶ.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 920 B-C.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 920 D. τῆς

κιβδηλείας πέρι, ἐγγενοῦς τοῦτ' (καπηλεία) πράγματος, &c.

Plato is more rigorous on these matters than the Attic law. See K. F. Hermann, Griech. Privat-Alterthümer, s. 62.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 917 B-C. I do not quite see how this is to be reconciled with Plato's direction that the prices of articles sold shall be fixed by the magistrates; but both of the two are here found.

shall sell a spurious or fraudulent article, the magistrates must be informed of it by any one cognizant. The informer, if a slave or a metic, shall be rewarded by having the article made over to him. If he be a citizen, he will receive the article, but is bound to consecrate it to the Gods who preside over the market: if being cognizant he omits to inform, he shall be proclaimed a wicked man, for defrauding the Gods of that to which they are entitled. The magistrates, on receiving information, will not only deprive the seller of the spurious article, but will cause him to be flogged by the herald in the market-place—one stripe for every drachma contained in the price demanded. The herald will publicly proclaim the reason why the flogging is given. Besides this, the magistrates will collect and write up in the market-place both regulations of detail for the sellers, and information to put buyers on their guard.<sup>h</sup>

Compare this enactment in Plato with the manner in which the Attic law would have dealt with the like offence. The defrauded buyer would have brought his action before the Dikastery against the fraudulent seller, who, if found guilty, would have been condemned in damages to make good the wrong: perhaps fined besides. The penalties inflicted by the usual course of law at Athens were fine, disfranchisement, civil disability of one kind or other, banishment, confiscation of property: occasionally imprisonment—sometimes, though rarely, death by the cup of hemlock in prison.<sup>i</sup> Except in very rare cases, an accused person might retire into banishment if he chose, and might thus escape any penalty worse than banishment and confiscation of property. But corporal punishment was never inflicted by the law at Athens. The people, especially the poorer citizens, were very sensitive on this point,<sup>k</sup> regarding it as one great line of distinction between the freeman and the slave. At Sparta, on the contrary, corporal chastisement was largely employed as a penalty: moreover the use of the fist in private contentions, by the younger citizens, was encouraged rather than forbidden.<sup>l</sup>

Comparison  
with the  
lighter  
punishment  
inflicted by  
Attic law.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 917 B-D.

<sup>i</sup> See Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Prozess*, B. iv. chap. 13, 740.

<sup>l</sup> Xenophon, *Hellen.* iii. 3, 11; *De Republ. Laced.* ii. 8, iv. 6, ix. 5; Aristophanes *Aves*, 1013.

2, 58.

Plato follows the analogy of Sparta in preference to that of Athens. Here, as elsewhere, he employs corporal punishment abundantly as a penalty. Here, as elsewhere, he not only prescribes that it shall be inflicted by a public agent under the supervision of magistrates, but also directs it to be administered, against certain offenders, by private unofficial citizens. I believe that this feature of his system would have been more repugnant than any other, to the feelings of all classes of Athenian citizens—to all the different types of character represented by Periklês, Nikias, Kleon, Isokrates, Demosthenes, and Sokrates. Abstinence from manual violence was characteristic of Athenian manners. Whatever licence might be allowed to the tongue, it was at least a substitute for the aggressive employment of the arm and hand. Athens exhibited marked respect for the sanctity of the person against blows—much equality of dealing between man and man—much tolerance, public as well as private, of individual diversity in taste and character—much keenness of intellectual and oral competition, liable to degenerate into unfair stratagem in political, forensic, professional, and commercial life, as well as in rhetorical, dialectical, and philosophical exercises. All these elements, not excepting even the first, were distasteful to Plato. But those who copy the disparaging judgment which he pronounces against Athenian manners, ought in fairness to take account of the point of view from which that judgment is delivered. To a philosopher whose ideal is depicted in the two treatises *De Republicâ* and *De Legibus*, Athenian society would appear repulsive enough. We learn from these two treatises what it was that a great speculative politician of the day desired to establish as a substitute.

Plato next goes on to make regulations about orphans and guardians, and in general for cases arising out of the death of a citizen. The first question presenting itself naturally is, How far is the citizen to be allowed to direct by testament the disposition of his family and property? What restriction is to be placed upon his power of making a valid will? Many persons (Plato says) affirmed that it was unjust to impose any restriction: that the dying man had a right to make such dispositions as he chose,

Regulations  
about Or-  
phans and  
Guardians:  
also about  
Testament-  
ary Powers.

for his property and family after his death. Against this view Plato enters his decided protest. Each man—and still more each man's property—belongs not to himself, but to his family and to the city: besides which, an old man's judgment is constantly liable to be perverted by decline of faculties, disease, or the cajoleries of those around him.<sup>m</sup> Accordingly Plato grants only a limited liberty of testation. Here, as elsewhere, he adopts the main provisions of the Attic law, with such modifications as were required by the fundamental principles of his Magnêtic city: especially by the fixed total of 5040 lots or *fundi*, each untransferable and indivisible. The lot, together with the plant or stock for cultivating it,<sup>n</sup> must descend entire to one son: but the father, if he has more than one son, may determine by will to which of them it shall descend. If there be any one among the sons whom another citizen (being childless) is disposed to adopt, such adoption can only take place with the father's consent. But if the father gives his consent, he cannot bequeath his own lot to the son so adopted, because two lots cannot be united in the same possessor. Whatever property the father possesses over and above his lot and its appurtenances, he may distribute by will among his other sons, in any proportion he pleases. If he dies, leaving no sons, but only daughters, he may select which of them he pleases; and may appoint by will some suitable husband, of a citizen family, to marry her and inherit his lot. If a citizen (being childless) has adopted a son out of any other family, he must bequeath to that son the whole of his property, except one-tenth part of what he possesses over and above his lot and its appurtenances: this tenth he may bequeath to any one whom he chooses.<sup>o</sup>

If the father dies intestate, leaving only daughters, the nearest relative who has no lot of his own shall marry one of the daughters, and succeed to the lot. The nearest is the

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 923 B.

It is to be observed that Plato does not make any allusion to these misguiding influences operating upon an aged man, when he talks about the curse of a father against his son being constantly executed by the Gods: xi. p. 931 B.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 923 D.

τοῦ πατρῶου κλήρου καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν κλῆρον κατασκευῆς πάσης.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 923-924. The language of Plato seems to imply that this childless citizen would not be likely to make any will, but that having adopted a son, the son so adopted would hardly be satisfied unless he inherited the whole.

brother of the deceased; next, the brother of the deceased's wife (paternal and maternal uncles of the maiden); next, their sons; next, the paternal and maternal uncle of the deceased father, and their sons. If all these relatives be wanting, the magistrates will provide a suitable husband, in order that the lot of land may not remain unoccupied.<sup>p</sup> If a citizen die both intestate and childless, two of his nearest unmarried relatives, male and female, shall intermarry and succeed to his property: reckoning in the order of kinship above mentioned.<sup>q</sup> In thus imposing marriage as a legal obligation upon persons in a certain degree of kinship, Plato is aware that there will be individual cases of great hardship and of repugnance almost insurmountable. He treats this as unavoidable: providing however that there shall be a select judicial Board of Appeal, before which persons who feel aggrieved by the law may bring their complaints, and submit their grounds for dispensation.<sup>r</sup>

These provisions deserve notice as showing how largely Plato coincides with the prevalent Attic sentiment respecting family and relationship. He does not award the slightest preference to primogeniture, among brothers: he grants to agnates a preference over cognates: he regards it as a public misfortune that any house shall be left empty, so as to cause interruption of the sacred rites of the family: lastly, he ensures that the family, in default of lineal male heirs, shall be continued by intermarriage with the nearest relatives—and he especially approves the marriage of an heiress with her paternal or maternal uncle. On these points Plato is in full harmony with his countrymen, though he dissents widely from modern sentiment.

Respecting tutelage of orphans, he makes careful provision against abuse, as the Attic law also did: he tries also to meet the cases of family discord, where father and

Plato's general coincidence with Attic law and its sentiment.

Tutelage of Orphans—Disagree—

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 924-925.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 925 C-D. These provisions appear to me not very clear.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 926 B-D. He directs also (p. 925 A) that the Dikasts shall determine the fit season when these young persons become marriageable by examining their naked

bodies: that is, the males quite naked, the females half naked. A direction seemingly copied from Athenian practice, and illustrating curiously the language of Philokleon in Aristophanes, Vesp. 598. See K. F. Hermann, Vestig. Juris Domestici ap. Platonem cum Græciæ Institutis Comparata, p. 27.

son are in bitter wrath against each other. A father may formally renounce his son, but not without previously obtaining the concurrence of a *conseil de famille*: if the father has become imbecile with age, and wastes his substance, the son may institute a suit as for lunacy, but not without the permission of the Nomophylakes.<sup>a</sup> Respecting disagreement between married couples, ten of the Nomophylakes, together with ten women chosen as supervisors of marriages, are constituted a Board of reference,<sup>b</sup> to obtain a reconciliation, if it be possible: but if this be impossible, then to divorce the couple, and unite each with some more suitable partner. The lawgiver must keep in view, as far as he can, to obtain from each married couple a sufficiency of children—that is, one male and one female child from each, whereby the total of 5040 lots may be kept up.<sup>c</sup> If a husband loses his wife before he has these two children, the law requires him to marry another wife: but if he becomes a widower, having already the sufficiency of children, he is advised not to marry a second wife (who will become stepmother), though not prohibited from doing so, if he chooses. So also, if a woman becomes a widow, not having the sufficient number of children, she must be compelled to marry again: if she already has the sufficient number, she is directed to remain in the house, and to bring them up. In case she is still young, and her health requires a husband, her relatives will apply to the Female Supervisors of Marriage, and will make such arrangements as may seem advisable.<sup>d</sup>

Against neglect of aged parents by their children, Plato both denounces the most stringent legal penalties, and delivers the most emphatic reproofs: commending with full faith the ancient traditional narratives, that the curse of an offended parent against his sons was always executed by the Gods, as in the cases of Œdipus, Theseus, Amyntor, &c.<sup>e</sup> In the event of lunacy, he directs that the lunatic shall be kept in private custody by his relatives, who will be fined if they neglect the duty.<sup>f</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 928-929.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 929-930.

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 930 C. π  
καθότως ἀκοιθῆς ἕδδον καὶ θ

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 930 C.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 931-932.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 934 D.

*Hurt or damage*, not deadly, done by one man to another.—Plato enumerates two different modes of inflicting damage:—1. By drugs (applied externally or internally), magic, or sorcery. 2. By theft or force.<sup>a</sup>

As to the first mode, if the drug be administered by a physician, he must be put to death: if by one not a physician, the Dikasts will determine the nature of his punishment. And in the case of magical arts, or incantations, if the person who resorts to them be a prophet or an inspector of prodigies, he must be put to death: another person doing the same will be punished at the discretion of the Dikasts. Here we see that the prophet is ranked as a professional person (the like appears in Homer) along with the physician,<sup>b</sup>—who must know what he is about, while another person perhaps may not know. But Plato's own opinion respecting magical incantations is delivered with singular reserve. He will neither avouch them nor reject them. He intimates that a man can hardly find out what is true on the subject; and even if he could, it would be harder still to convince others. Most men are in serious alarm when they see waxen statuettes hung at their doors or at their family tombs; and it is useless to attempt to tranquillise them by reminding them that they have no certain evidence on the subject.<sup>c</sup> Here we see how Plato discourages the received legends and the current faith, when he believes them to be hurtful—as contrasted with his vehemence in upholding them when he thinks them useful: as in the case of the paternal curse, and the judgments of the Gods. The question of their truth is made to depend on their usefulness.<sup>d</sup> The Gods are made to

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 932 E-933 E. Both these come under the general head ὅσα τις ἄλλος ἕλλον πημαίνει.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 933 D. ὡς πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα φαρμάττειν οὐκ εἰδὸτα τί δρᾷ, τὰ τ

μαγγα-

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 933 A.

που κήρινα μμήματα πεπλασμένα. Compare Theokritus, Idyll. ii. 28-59.

See the remarkable narrative of the death of Germanicus in Syria, supposed to have been brought about by the magical artifices wrought under the auspices of Piso (Tacitus, Ann. ii. 69).

<sup>d</sup> Cicero, Legg. i. 7. "Utiles autem esse has opiniones, quis neget, cum intelligat, quam multa firmentur jurejurando," &c.

Homer, Odys. xvii. 383:—  
τῶνδ' οἱ δημιοεργοί  
μάντιν, ἦ

καὶ θέσπιν δοιδόν, &c.

act exactly as he thinks they ought to act. They are not merely invoked, but positively counted on, as executioners of Plato's ethical sentences.

Respecting the second mode of damage—by theft or violence—Plato's law forms a striking contrast to that which has been just set forth. The person who inflicts damage must repay it, or make full compensation for it, to the sufferer: small, if the damage be small—great, if it be great. Besides this, the guilty person must undergo some farther punishment with a view to correction or reformation. This will be smaller, if he be young and seduced by the persuasion of others; but it must be graver, if he be self-impelled by his own desires, fears, wrath, jealousy, &c. Understand, however (adds Plato), that such ulterior punishment is not imposed on account of the past misdeed—for the past cannot be recalled or undone—but on account of the future: to ensure that he shall afterwards hate wrong-doing, and that those who see him punished shall hate it also. The Dikasts must follow out in detail the general principle here laid down.<sup>e</sup>

Punishment is inflicted with a view to future prevention or amendment.

This passage proclaims distinctly an important principle in regard to the infliction of legal penalties: which principle, if kept in mind, might have led Plato to alter or omit a large portion of the *Leges*.

Respecting *words of abuse, or revilement*, or insulting derision.—These are altogether forbidden. If used in any temple, market, or public and frequented place, the magistrate presiding must punish the offender forthwith, as he thinks fit: if elsewhere, any citizen by-stander, being older than the offender, is authorized and required to thrash him.<sup>f</sup> No writer of comedy is allowed to ridicule or libel any citizen.

Penalty for abusive words—for libellous comedy. Mendicity forbidden.

Mendicity is strictly prohibited. Every mendicant must be sent away at once, in order that the territory may be rid of such a creature. Every man, who has passed an honest life,

<sup>e</sup> Plato, *Legg.* xi. pp. 933-934. Compare Plato, *Protagor.* p. 324 B.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 935 C-D. The Attic law expressly forbade the utterance of abusive words against any individual in an office or public place

upon any pretence (*Lysias*, Or. ix. *Pro Milite*, s. 6-9). Demosthenes (contra Konon. p. 1263) speaks of or *λοιδορία* as in itself trifling, but as forbidden by the law, lest it should lead to violence and blows.

will be sure to have made friends who will protect him against the extremity of want.<sup>s</sup>

The rules provided by Plato about witnesses in judicial trials and indictments for perjury, are pretty much the same as those prevalent at Athens: with some peculiarities. Thus he permits a free woman to bear witness, and to address the court in support of a party interested, provided she be above forty years of age. Moreover, she may institute a suit, if she have no husband: but not if she be married.<sup>h</sup> A slave or a child may bear witness at a trial for murder; provided security be given that they will remain in the city to await an indictment for perjury, if presented against them.

Censure of forensic eloquence, and the teachers of it. Penalties against contentious litigation.

Among Plato's prohibitions, we are not surprised to find one directed emphatically against forensic eloquence, and against those who professed to teach it. Every thing beneficial to man (says he) has its accompanying poison and corruption. Justice is a noble thing, the great civilising agent in human affairs: to aid any one in obtaining justice, is of course a noble thing also. But these benefits are grossly abused by men, who pretend to possess an art, whereby every one may be sure of judicial victory, either as principal or as auxiliary, whether his cause be just or unjust:—and who offer to teach this art to all who pay a stipulated price. Whether this be (as they pretend) a real art, or a mere inartificial knack—it would be a disgrace to our city, and must be severely punished. Whoever gives show of trying to pervert the force of justice in the minds of the Dikasts, or indulges in unseasonable and frequent litigation, or even lends his aid to other litigants—may be indicted by any citizen as guilty of abuse of justice, either as principal or auxiliary. He shall be tried before the Court of Select

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 936 C.  
 ἡ χάρα τοῦ τοιοῦτου ζῶον καθαρά  
 γίγνηται τὸ παράπαν.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 937 A-B.

It appears that women were not admitted as witnesses before the Athenian Dikasteries. Meier und Schömann, Attisch. Prozess, pp. 667-668. The testimony of slaves was received after they had been tortured; which

was considered as a guarantee for truth, required in regard to them, but not required in regard to a freeman. The torture is not mentioned in this Platonic treatise. Plato treats a male as *young* up to the age of thirty (compare Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 35), a female as *young* up to the age of forty (pp. 932 B-C, 961 B).

Judges: who, if they find him guilty, will decide whether he has committed the offence from love of money, or from love of contention and ambitious objects. If from love of contention, he shall be interdicted, for such time as the Court may determine, from instituting any suit at law on his own account as well as from aiding in any suite instituted by others.<sup>1</sup> If from love of money, the citizen found guilty shall be capitally punished, the non-citizen shall be banished in perpetuity. Moreover the citizen convicted of committing this offence even from love of contention, if it be a second conviction for the offence, shall be put to death also.<sup>k</sup>

The vague and undefined character of this offence, for which Plato denounces capital punishment, shows how much his penal laws are discharges of ethical antipathy and hostility against types of character conceived by himself—rather than measures intended for application, in which he had weighed beforehand the practical difficulties of singling out and striking the right individual. On this matter the Athenian public had the same ethical antipathy as himself; and Melétus took full advantage of it, when he brought his accusation against Sokrates. We know both from the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, and from the Nubes of Aristophanes—that Sokrates was rendered odious to the Athenian people and Dikasts, partly as heterodox and irreligious, but partly also as one who taught the art of using speech so as to make the worse appear the better reason. Both Aristophanes and Melétus would have sympathised warmly with the Platonic law. If there had been any Solonian law to the same effect, which Melétus could have quoted in his accusatory speech, his case against Sokrates would have been materially strengthened. Especially, he would have had the express sanction of law for his proposition of death as the penalty: a proposition to which the Athenian Dikasts would

Many of Plato's laws are discharges of ethical antipathy. The antipathy of Melétus against Sokrates was of the same character.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. p. 938 B.

ξυνδικῆσαι. I cannot understand why Stallbaum, in his very useful notes on the Leges, observes upon this passage: de caussidicis ac-

ciendum, qui caussam aliquam pro aliis in foro agendam ac defendendam suscipiunt." This is the explanation belonging to *ξυνδικῆσαι*: *λαχεῖν δίκην* is the well known phrase for a plaintiff or a prosecutor as principal.

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 937 E, 938 C.

not have consented, had they not been affronted and driven to it by the singular demeanour of Sokrates himself when before them. It would be irrelevant here to say that Sokrates was not guilty of what was imputed to him: that he never came before the Dikastery until the time of his trial—and that he did not teach “the art of words.” If he did not teach it, he was at least believed to teach it, not merely by Aristophanes and by the Athenian Dikasts, but also by intelligent men like Kritias and Charikles,<sup>1</sup> who knew him perfectly well: while the example of Antiphon shows that a man might be most acute and efficacious as a forensic adviser, without coming in person before the Dikastery.<sup>m</sup> What the defence really makes us feel is, the indefinite nature of the charge: which is neither proveable nor disproveable, and which is characterised, both by Xenophon and in the Platonic Apology, as one of the standing calumnies against all philosophising men.<sup>n</sup> Here, in the Platonic Leges, this same unproveable offence is adopted and made capital: the Select Platonic Dikasts being directed to ascertain, not only whether a man has really committed it, but whether he has been impelled to commit it by love of money, or by love of victory and personal consequence.

The twelfth and last Book of the Treatise De Legibus deals with various cases of obligation, not towards individuals, but towards the public or the city. Abuse of trust in the character of a public envoy is declared punishable. This offence (familiar to us at Athens through the two harangues of Demosthenes and Æschines) is invested by Plato with a religious colouring, as desecrating the missions and commands of Hermês and Zeus.<sup>o</sup> Wrongful appropriation of the public money by a

Penalty for abuse of public trust—wrongful appropriation of public money—evulsion of military service.

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon, Mem. i. 2, 31 seq.

<sup>m</sup> Thucyd. viii. 68.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 23.

Such was the colloquial power of Sokrates, in the portrait drawn by Xenophon (Mem. i. 2, 14), “that he handled all who conversed with him just as he pleased—τοῖς δὲ διαλεγόμενοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν λόγοις ὅπως βούλοιοτο. Kritias and Alkibiades (Xenophon tells us) sought his society for the purpose of strengthening their own oratorical powers as

political men, and of becoming κρείττονες τῶν συγγιγνομένων (i. 2, 16). Looked at from the point of view of opponents, this would be described as the proceeding of one who himself both could pervert, and did pervert, justice—and who taught others to pervert it also. This was the picture of Sokrates which the accusers presented to the Athenian Dikastery; as we may see by the language of Sokrates himself at the beginning of the Platonic Apology.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 941 A.

citizen is also made capital. The penalty is to be inflicted equally whether the sum appropriated be large or small: in either case the guilt is equal, and the evidence of wicked disposition the same, for one who has gone through the public education and training.<sup>p</sup> This is quite different from Plato's principle of dealing with theft or wrongful abstraction of property from private persons: in which case the sentence of Plato was, that the amount of damage done, small or great, should be made good by the offender, and that a certain ulterior penalty should be inflicted sufficient to deter him as well as others from a repetition.

Provision is farther made for punishing any omission of military service either by males or females, or any discreditable abandonment of arms.<sup>q</sup> The orders of the military commander must be implicitly and exactly obeyed. The actions of all must be orderly, uniform, and simultaneous. Nothing can be more mischievous than that each should act for himself, separately and apart from others. This is confessedly true as to war: but it is no less essential as to the proceedings in peace.<sup>r</sup> Suppression of individuality, and conversion of life into a perpetual, all-pervading, drill and discipline—is a favourite aspiration always present to Plato.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 941: compare xi. p. 934 A.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 944. It is curious to compare this passage of Plato with the two orations of Lysias κατὰ Θεομνήστου A and B (Oratt. x. xi.) Plato enjoins upon all accusers the greatest caution and precision in the terms used to indicate what they intended to charge upon the accused. To call a man *ρίψασπις* is a more aggravated offensive designation than to call him *ἀποβολεὺς ὅπλων*, which latter term is more general, and may possibly be applied to those who have lost their arms under the pressure of irresistible necessity, without any disgrace. On the other hand, we read in Lysias, that the offence which was punishable under the Attic law was *ὅπλων ἀποβολή*, and that to assert falsely respecting any citizen, *τὰ ὅπλα* was an *ἀπόρρητον* or forbidden phrase, which exposed the speaker to a fine of 500 drachmæ (sect. 1-12). But to assert respecting any man that he was *ρίψασπις* was not

expressly *ἀπόρρητον*, (compare Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii. ss. 87-89), and the speaker might argue (successfully or not) that he had said nothing *ἀπόρρητον*, and was not guilty of legal *κακηγορία*.—There is another phrase in this section of Plato to which I would call attention. He enumerates the excusable cases of losing arms as follows—*ὅποσοι κατὰ κρημνῶν ριφέντες ἀπώλεσαν ὅπλα ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν* (p. 944 A). Now the cases of soldiers being thrown down cliffs are, I believe, unknown until the Phokian prisoners were so dealt with in the Sacred War, as sacrilegious offenders against Apollo and the Delphian temple. Hence we may probably infer that this was composed after the Sacred War began, B.C.

See Diodorus and my 'Hist. of Greece,' chap. 87, p. 350 seq.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 942 C-945

τε τὴν ψυχὴν ἐθεσι μήτε γιγνώσκειν ἐπίστασθαι τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καὶ ἅμα καὶ κοινὸν τὸν βίον  
δ, τι

A Board of Elders is constituted by Plato, as auditors of the proceedings of all Magistrates after their term of office.<sup>a</sup> The mode of choosing these Elders, as well as their duties, liabilities, privileges, and honours, both during life and after death, are prescribed with the utmost solemnity.

Plato forbids the parties in any judicial suit from swearing: they will present their case to the court, but not upon oath. No judicial oath is allowed to be taken by any one who has a pecuniary interest in the matter on hand. The Dikasts—the judges in all public competitions—the Electors before they elect to a public trust—are all to be sworn: but neither the parties to any cause, nor (seemingly) the witnesses. If oaths were taken on both sides, one or other of the parties must be perjured: and Plato considers it dreadful, that they should go on living with each other afterwards in the same city. In afore-time Rhadamanthus (he tells us) used to settle all disputes simply, by administering an oath to the parties: for in his time no one would take a false oath: men were then not only pious, but even sons or descendants of the Gods. But now (in the Platonic days) impiety has gained ground, and men's oaths are no longer to be trusted, where anything is to be gained by perjury.<sup>t</sup>

Strict regulations are provided, as to exit from the Platonic city, and ingress into it. Plato fears contamination to his citizens from converse with the outer world. He would introduce the peremptory Spartan Xenelasy, if he were not afraid of the obloquy attending it. He strictly defines the conditions on which the foreigner will be allowed to come in, or the citizen to go out. No citizen is allowed to go out before he is forty years of age.<sup>u</sup> Envoys must be sent on public missions; and sacred legations (theôries) must be despatched to the four great Hellenic festivals—Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian. But private citizens are not permitted to visit even these great festivals at their own pleasure. The envoys sent must be chosen and trustworthy men: moreover, on returning, they

Oaths. Di-

ing: they will present their case to the court, but not upon oath. No judicial oath is allowed to be taken by any one who has a pecuniary interest in the matter on hand. The Dikasts—the judges in all public competitions—the Electors before they elect to a public trust—are all to be sworn: but neither the parties to any cause, nor (seemingly) the witnesses. If oaths were taken on both sides, one or other of the parties must be perjured: and Plato considers it dreadful, that they should go on living with each other afterwards in the same city. In afore-time Rhadamanthus (he tells us) used to settle all disputes simply, by administering an oath to the parties: for in his time no one would take a false oath: men were then not only pious, but even sons or descendants of the Gods. But now (in the Platonic days) impiety has gained ground, and men's oaths are no longer to be trusted, where anything is to be gained by perjury.<sup>t</sup>

Regulations about admission of strangers, and foreign travel of citizens.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 946-948.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 948-949.

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 950.

will assure their youthful fellow-citizens, that the home institutions are better than anything that can be seen abroad.\*

Special travellers, between the ages of fifty and sixty, will also be permitted to go abroad, and will bring back reports to the Magistrates of what they have observed. Strangers are admitted into the city or its neighbourhood, under strict supervision; partly as observers, partly as traders, for the limited amount of traffic which the lawgiver tolerates.<sup>y</sup> Thus scanty is the worship which Plato will allow his Magnêtes to pay to Zeus Xenius.<sup>z</sup> He seems however to take credit for it as liberal dealing.

Plato proceeds with various enactments respecting suretyship—time of prescription for ownership—keeping men away by force either from giving testimony in court or from contending at the public matches—receiving of stolen goods—private war or alliance on the part of any individual citizen, without the consent of the city—receipt of bribes by functionaries—return and registration of each citizen's property—dedications and offerings to the Gods.<sup>a</sup> No systematic order or classification can be traced in the successive subjects.

In respect to judiciary matters, he repeats (what had before been directed) his constitution of three stages of tribunals. First, Arbitrators, chosen by both parties in the dispute. From their decision, either party may appeal to the Tribe-Dikasteries, composed of all the citizens of the Tribe or Dême: or at least, composed of a jury taken from these. After this, there is a final appeal to the Select Dikastery, chosen among all the Magistrates for the time being.<sup>b</sup> Plato leaves to his successors

Suretyship—  
Length of  
prescription  
for owner-  
ship, &c.

Judicial  
trial—three  
stages. 1. Ar-  
bitrators.  
2. Tribe-  
Dikasteries.  
3. Select Di-  
kastery.

\* Plato, Legg. xii. p. 951.

<sup>y</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 952-953.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 953 E. Τοῦτοις τοῖς νόμοις ὑποδέχεσθαι τε πάντας ξένους τε καὶ ξένας καὶ τοὺς Δία,

τὰς

, καθάπερ ποιοῦσι νῦν θρέμ-

Νείλου, μηδὲ κηρύγμασιν ἀγρίοις.

Stallbaum says in his note:—"μὴ βρώμασι καὶ θύμασι—peregrinos non expellentes cœnis et sacrificiis, h. e. eorum usu iis interdicentes." This surely is

not the right explanation. Plato means to say that the Egyptian habits as to eating and sacrifice were intolerably repulsive to a foreigner. We may see this from κηρύγμασι which follows. The peculiarities of Egypt, which Herodotus merely remarks upon with astonishment, may well have given offence to the fastidious and dictatorial spirit of Plato.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 954-956.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 956.

the regulations of details, respecting the mode of impannelling and the procedure of these Juries.

Lastly come the regulations respecting funerals—the cost, ceremonies, religious proceedings, mode of showing sorrow and reverence, &c.<sup>c</sup> These are given in considerable detail, and with much solemnity of religious exhortation.

We have now reached the close. The city has received its full political and civil outfit: as much legal regulation as it is competent for the lawgiver to provide at the beginning. One guarantee alone is wanting. Some security must be provided for the continuance and durability of the enactments.<sup>d</sup> We must have a special conservative organ, watching over and keeping up the scheme of the original lawgiver. For this function, Plato constitutes a Board, which, from its rule of always beginning its sittings before daybreak, he calls the Nocturnal council. It will comprise ten of the oldest Nomophylakes: all those who have obtained prizes for good conduct or orderly discipline: all those who have been authorised to go abroad, and have been approved on their return. Each of these members will introduce into the Synod one young man of thirty years of age, chosen by himself, but approved by the others.<sup>e</sup> The members will thus be partly old, partly young.

This Nocturnal council is intended as the conservative organ of the Platonic city. It is, in the city, what the soul and head are in an animal. The soul includes Reason: the head includes the two most perfect senses—Sight and Hearing. The fusion, in one, of Reason with these two senses ensures the preservation of the animal.<sup>f</sup> In the Nocturnal council, the old members represent Reason, the young members represent the two superior senses, serving as instruments and means of communication between Reason and the outer world. The Nocturnal council, embracing the agency of both, maintains thereby the life and continuity of the city.<sup>g</sup>

<sup>c</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 957-958.

<sup>d</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 960 C-D.  
Compare Plato, Republ. vi. p. 497 D.  
ἑταίροι δέ τισι τι αἰεὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῇ  
λόγον ἔχον τῆς πολιτείας τὸν αὐτὸν

ὄνπερ καὶ σὺ ὁ νομοθέτης ἔχων τοὺς  
νόμους ἐτίθης.

<sup>e</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 961 A-B.

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 961 D.

<sup>g</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 964 D-965 A.

It is the special duty of this council, to serve as a perpetual embodiment of the original lawgiver, and to comprehend as well as to realise the main purpose for which the city was put together. The councillors must keep constantly in view this grand political end, as the pilot keeps in view safe termination of the voyage—as the military commander keeps in view victory, and the physician, recovery of health. Should the physician or the pilot either not know his end, or not know the conditions under which it may be attained—his labour will be in vain. So, if there does not exist in the city an authority understanding the great political end and the means (either by laws or human agents) of accomplishing it, the city will be a failure. Hence the indispensable necessity of the Nocturnal council, with members properly taught and organised.<sup>h</sup>

The great political end must be one, and not many. All the arrows aimed by the central Conservative organ must be aimed at one and the same point.<sup>1</sup> This is the chief excellence of a well-constituted conservative authority. Existing cities err all of them in one of two ways. Either they aim at one single End, but that End bad or wrong: or they aim at a variety of Ends without giving exclusive attention to any one. Survey existing cities: you will find that in one, the great purpose, and the main feature of what passes for justice, is, that some party or faction shall obtain or keep political power, whether its members be better or worse than their fellow-citizens: in a second city, it is wealth—in a third, freedom of individuals—in a fourth, freedom combined with power over foreigners. Some cities, again, considering themselves wiser than the rest, strive for all these objects at once or for a variety of others, without exclusive attention to any one.<sup>k</sup> Amidst such divergence and error in regard to the main end, we cannot wonder that all cities fail in attaining it.

This Council  
must keep

view the one  
great end of  
the city—  
Mistakes  
made by ex-  
isting cities  
about the  
right end.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 962 A-B.  
—είναι τι τὸ γίνωσκον ἐν αὐτῷ (the  
city) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ὃ λέγομεν, τὸν  
ὅς τις ποτε ὁ πολιτικὸς ὢν ἡμῖν  
ἔπειτα ὄντινα τρόπον δεῖ μετα-  
ῖν τούτου καὶ τίς αὐτῷ καλῶς ἢ  
συμβουλεύει τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν πρῶτον,

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 962 C. δεῖ δὴ  
τοῦτον (the nocturnal synod) πᾶσαν

τοῦτο εἰ τὰ πάντα οἶον

<sup>k</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 962 D-E. Com-  
pare Aristot. Eth. Nikom. x. 1180, a. 20.

The One End proposed by *our* city is, the virtue of its citizens. But virtue is fourfold, or includes four varieties—Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice. Our End is and must be One. The medical Reason has its One End, Good Health:<sup>1</sup> the strategic Reason has its One End—Victory: What is that One End (analogous to these) which the political Reason aims at? It must be that in which the four cardinal virtues—Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice—are One, or coincide: that common property, possessed by all and by each, which makes them to be virtue, and constitutes the essential meaning of the name, Virtue. We must know the four as four, that is, the points of difference between them: but it is yet more important to know them as One—to discern the point of essential coincidence and union between them.<sup>m</sup>

To understand thoroughly this unity of virtue, so as to act upon it themselves, to explain it to others and to embody it in all their orders—is the grand requisite for the supreme Guardians of our city—the Nocturnal council. We cannot trust such a function in the hands of poets, or of visiting discourses who announce themselves as competent to instruct youth. It cannot be confided to any less authority than the chosen men—the head and senses—of our city, properly and specially trained to exercise it.<sup>n</sup> Upon this depends the entire success or failure of our results. Our guardians must be taught to see that One Idea which pervades the Multiple and the Diverse:<sup>o</sup> to keep it steadily before their own eyes, and to explain and illustrate it in discourse to others. They must contemplate the point of coincidence and unity between Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice: as well as between the many different things called Beautiful, and the many different things called Good.<sup>p</sup> They must declare whether the name Virtue, common to all the four, means something One—

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 963 B. *νοῦν γὰρ δὴ κυβερνητικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν καὶ στρατηγικὸν εἰπομεν εἰς τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ οἱ δεῖ βλέπειν, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἐλέγ-  
ἐνταῦθ' ἐσμέν νῦν—? ὦ θαυμάσιε,  
οὐ δὲ δὴ ποῖ σκοπεῖς; τί ποτ'  
ἐστι τὸ ἐν, ὃ δὴ σαφῶς ὁ μὲν ἰατρικὸς  
νοῦς;*

*ὡς φαίης ἂν, πάντων τῶν ἐμφορῶν, οὐχ  
ἕξεις εἰπεῖν;*

<sup>m</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 963 E-964 A.

<sup>n</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 964 D.

<sup>o</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 965 C. *τὸ  
ῥὸς μίαν ἰδέαν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ  
νομῶν δυνατόν εἶναι βλέπειν.*

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 965 D, 966 A-B.

or a Whole or Aggregate—or both together.<sup>a</sup> If they cannot explain to us whether Virtue is Manifold or Fourfold, or in what manner it is One—they are unfit for their task, and our city will prove a failure. To know the truth about these important matters—to be competent to explain and defend it to others—to follow it out in practice, and to apply it in discriminating what is well done and what is ill done—these are the imperative and indispensable duties of our Guardians.<sup>r</sup>

Farthermore it is also essential that they should adopt an orthodox religious creed, and should be competent to explain and defend it. The citizens generally must believe without scrutiny such dogmas as the lawgiver enjoins; but the Guardians must master the proofs of them.<sup>s</sup> The proofs upon which, in Plato's view, all true piety rests, are two<sup>t</sup> (he here repeats them):—1. Mind or Soul is older than Body—anterior to Body as a moving power—and invested with power to impel, direct, and controul Body. 2. When we contemplate the celestial rotation, we perceive such extreme exactness and regularity in the movement of the stars (each one of the vast multitude maintaining its relative position in the midst of prodigious velocity of movement) that we cannot explain it except by supposing a Reason or Intelligence pervading and guiding them all. Many astronomers have ascribed this regular movement to an inherent Necessity, and have hereby drawn upon science reproaches from poets and others, as if it were irreligious. But these astronomers (Plato affirms) were quite mistaken in excluding Mind and Reason from the celestial bodies, and in pronouncing the stars to be bodies without mind, like earth or stones. Necessity cannot account for their exact and regular movements: no other supposition is admissible except the constant volition of mind in-dwelling in each, impelling and guiding them to-

They must also adopt, explain, and enforce upon the citizens, an orthodox religious creed. Fundamental dogmas of such creed.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 965 E. πρὶν ἰκανῶς εἰπωμεν τί ποτ' ἔστιν, εἰς

τὴν πόλιν, περὶ ἧς οὐτε εἰ πολλὰ ἔστ', οὐτ' εἰ τέτταρα, οὐθ' ὥς ἐν, δυνατοί

εἴτε ὅπως ποτε ἡ τούτου διαφυγόντος ποτε

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 966 B.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 966 D.

<sup>t</sup> Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967 E.

wards exact goodness of result. Astronomy well understood is, in Plato's view, the foundation of true piety. It is only the erroneous astronomical doctrines which are open to the current imputations of irreligion.<sup>u</sup>

These are the capital religious or kosmical dogmas which the members of the Nocturnal Council must embrace and expound to others, together with the mathematical and musical teaching suitable to illustrate them. Application must be made of these dogmas to improve the laws and customs of the city, and the dispositions of the citizens.<sup>x</sup>

When this Nocturnal Council, with its members properly trained and qualified, shall be established in the akropolis—symbolising the conjunction of Reason with the head or with the two knowledge-giving senses—the Magnêtic City may securely be entrusted to it, with certainty of an admirable result.<sup>y</sup>

## EPINOMIS.

Here closes the dialogue called *Leges*: somewhat prematurely, since the peculiar training indispensable for these Nocturnal Counsellors has not yet been declared. The short dialogue called *Epinomis* supplies this defect. It purports to be a second day's conversation between the same trio.

s' defect.

The Athenian declares

Astronomy.

The Athenian—adverting to the circumstances of human life generally, as full of toil and suffering, with few and transient moments of happiness—remarks that none except the wise have any chance of happiness; and that few can understand what real wisdom is, though every one presumes that there must be something of the kind discoverable.<sup>z</sup> He first enumerates what *it is not*. It is not any of the useful arts—husbandry, house-building, metallurgy, weaving, pottery, hunting, &c.:

Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 967 A-D. | *εἰρημένον ἐν τοῖς ἑστροῖς νοῦν τῶν*  
*διανοήσις βουλήσεως ἀγαθῶν περὶ τελευτῆς ὕτων.*

λογισμοῖς

Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 967 E.

Plat. *Legg.* xii. p. 969 B.

Plat. *Epinom.* pp. 973-974.

nor is it prophecy, or the understanding of omens: nor any of the elegant arts—music, poetry, painting: nor the art of war, or navigation, or medicine, or forensic eloquence: nor does it consist in the natural endowments of quick wit and good memory.<sup>a</sup> True wisdom is something different from all these. It consists in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, leading to a full comprehension of the regular movements of the Kosmos—combined with a correct religious creed as to the divine attributes of the Kosmos and its planetary bodies, which are all pervaded and kept in harmonious rotation by divine, in-dwelling, soul or mind.<sup>b</sup> It is the God Uranus (or Olympus, or Kosmos), with the visible Gods included therein, who furnishes to us not only the gifts of the seasons and the growth of food, but also varied intelligence, especially the knowledge of number, without which no other knowledge would be attainable.<sup>c</sup> Number and proportion are essential conditions of every variety of art. The regular succession of night and day, and the regularly changing phases of the moon—the comparison of months with the year—first taught us to count, and to observe the proportions of numbers to each other.<sup>d</sup>

The Athenian now enters upon the directly theological point of view, and re-asserts the three articles of orthodoxy which he had laid down in the tenth book of *Leges*: together with the other point of faith also—That Soul or Mind is older than body: soul is active and ruling—body, passive and subject. An animal is a compound of both. There are five elementary bodies—fire, air, æther, water, earth<sup>e</sup>—which the kosmical soul moulded, in varying proportions, so as to form different animals and plants. Man, animals, and plants, were

Theological  
view of  
Astronomy—  
Divine Kos-  
mos—Soul  
more ancient  
and more  
sovereign  
than Body.

<sup>a</sup> Plat. *Epinom.* pp. 975-976.

<sup>b</sup> Plat. *Epinom.* pp. 976-977.

<sup>c</sup> Plat. *Epinom.* pp. 977-978.

<sup>d</sup> Plat. *Epinom.* pp. 978-979.

Plat. *Epinom.* pp. 980-981. We know, from a curious statement of Xenokrates (see *Fragm.* of his work *Περὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος βίου*, cited by Simplicius, ad. *Aristot. Physic.* p. 427, a. 17, *Schol. Brandis*), that this quintuple elementary scale was a doctrine of Plato. But it is not the doctrine of

the *Timæus*. The assertion of Xenokrates (good evidence) warrants us in believing that Plato altered his views after the composition of *Timæus*, and that his latest opinions are represented in the *Epinomis*. Zeller indeed thinks that the dodekahedron in the *Timæus* might be construed as a fifth element, but this is scarcely tenable. Zeller, *Philos. der Griechen*, vol. ii. p. 513, ed. 2nd.

moulded chiefly of earth, yet with some intermixture of the other elements: the stars were moulded chiefly from fire, having the most beautiful bodies, endowed with divine and happy souls, and immortal, or very long-lived.<sup>f</sup> Next to the stars were moulded the Dæmons, out of æther, and inhabitants of that element: after them, the animals inhabiting air, and Nymphs inhabiting water. These three occupy intermediate place between the stars above and man below.<sup>g</sup> They serve as media of communication between man and the Gods: and also for the diffusion of thought and intelligence among all parts of the Kosmos.<sup>h</sup> The Gods of the ordinary faith—Zeus, Hêrê, and others—must be left to each person's disposition, if he be inclined to worship them: but the great visible Kosmos, and the sidereal Gods, must be solemnly exalted and sanctified, with prayer and the holiest rites.<sup>i</sup> Those astronomers who ignore this divine nature, and profess to explain their movements by physical or mechanical forces, are guilty of grave impiety. The regularity of their movements is a proof of their divine nature, not a proof of the contrary, as some misguided persons affirm.<sup>k</sup>

effects of the  
study of As-  
tronomy in  
this spirit.

Next, the Athenian intimates that the Greeks have obtained their astronomical knowledge, in the first instance, from Egypt and Assyria, but have much improved upon what they learnt (p. 987): that the Greeks at first were acquainted only with the three the outer or sidereal sphere (*Ἀπλανής*), the Sun, and the Moon—but unacquainted with the other five or planetary *φωραὶ*, which they first learned from these foreigners, though not the names of the planets (p. 986): that all these eight were alike divine, fraternal agents, partakers in the same rational nature, and making up altogether the divine *Κόσμος*: that those who did not recognise all the eight as divine, consummately rational, and revolving with perfectly uniform movement, were guilty of impiety (p. 985 E): that these kosmical, divine, rational agents taught to mankind arithmetic and the art of numeration (p. 988 B): that soul, or

<sup>f</sup> Plat. Epinom. pp. 981-982.

<sup>g</sup> Plat. Epinom. pp. 983-984.

<sup>h</sup> Plat. Epinom. p. 984.

<sup>i</sup> Plat. Epinom. pp. 984 D-985 D.

<sup>k</sup> Plat. Epinom. pp. 982 D, 983 C.

plastic, demiurgic, cognitive force (p. 981 C), was an older and more powerful agent in the universe than body—but that there were two varieties of soul, a good and bad, of which the good variety was the stronger: the good variety of soul produced all the good movements, the bad variety produced all the bad movements (p. 988 D, E): that in studying astronomy, a man submitted himself to the teaching of this good soul and these divine agents, from whom alone he could learn true wisdom and piety (pp. 989 B-990 A): that this study, however, must be conducted not with a view to know the times of rising and setting of different stars (like Hesiod) but to be able to understand and follow the eight *περιφοράς* (p. 990 B).

To understand these—especially the five planetary and difficult *περιφοράς*—arithmetic must also be taught, not in the concrete, but in the abstract (p. 990 C, D), to understand how much the real nature of things is determined by the generative powers and combination of Odd and Even Number. Next, geometry also must be studied, so as to compare numbers with plane and solid figures, and thus to determine proportions between two numbers which are not directly commensurable. The varieties of proportion, which are marvellously combined, must be understood—first arithmetical and geometrical proportions, the arithmetical proportion increasing by equal addition ( $1 + 1 = 2$ ), or the point into a line—then the geometrical proportion by way of multiplication ( $2 \times 2 = 4$ ;  $4 \times 2 = 8$ ), or the line raised into a surface, and the surface raised into a cube. Moreover there are two other varieties of proportion (*τὸ ἡμιόλιον* or sesquialterum, and *τὸ ἐπίτριτον* or sesquitertium), both of which occur in the numbers between the ratio of 6 to 12 (*i. e.* 9 is *τὸ ἡμιόλιον* of 6, or  $9 = 6 + \frac{3}{2}$ ; again, 8 is *τὸ ἐπίτριτον* of 6, or  $8 = 6 + \frac{2}{3}$ ). This last is *harmonic proportion*, when there are three terms, of which the third is as much greater than the middle, as the middle is greater than the first ( $3 : 4 : 6$ )—six is greater than four by one-third of six, while four is greater than three by one-third of three (p. 991 A).

Lastly, having thus come to comprehend the general forms

of things, we must bring under them properly the visible individuals in nature; and in this process interrogation and cross-examination must be applied (p. 991 C). We must learn to note the accurate regularity with which time brings all things to maturity, and we shall find reason to believe that all things are full of Gods (p. 991 D). We shall come to perceive that there is one law of proportion pervading every geometrical figure, every numerical series, every harmonic combination, and all the celestial rotations: one and the same bond of union among all (p. 991 E). These sciences, whether difficult or easy, must be learnt: for without them no happy nature will be ever planted in our cities (p. 992 A). The man who learns all this will be the truly wise and happy man, both in this life and after it; only a few men can possibly arrive at such happiness (p. 992 C). But it is these chosen few, who, when they become Elders, will compose our Nocturnal Council, and maintain unimpaired the perpetual purity of the Platonic City.

Such then is the answer given by the *Epinomis*, to the question left unanswered in the *Leges*. However unsatisfactory it may appear, to those who look for nothing but what is admirable in Plato—I believe it to represent the latest views of his old age, when dialectic had given place in his mind to the joint ascendancy of theological sentiment and Pythagorean arithmetic.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In connection with the treatise called *Epinomis*, the question arises, What were the modifications which Plato's astronomical doctrines underwent during the latter years of his life? In what respect did they come to differ from what we read in the *Platonic Timæus*, where a geocentric system is proclaimed: whether we suppose (as Boeckh and others do) that the Earth is represented as stationary at the centre—or (as I suppose) that the Earth is represented as fastened to the centre of the kosmical axis, and revolving with it. The *Epinomis* delivers a geocentric system also.

Now it is upon this very point that Plato's opinions are said to have changed towards the close of his life. He came to repent that he had assigned

to the Earth the central place in the system; and to conceive that place as belonging properly to something else, some other better (or more powerful) body. This is a curious statement, made in two separate passages by Plutarch, and in one of the two passages with reference to Theophrastus as his witness (Plutarch, *Vit. Numæ*, c. 11; *Platonic. Quæst.* 8, p. 1006 C).

Boeckh (*Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon*, pp. 144-149) and Martin (*Études sur le Timée*, ii. 91) discredit the statement ascribed by Plutarch to Theophrastus. But I see no sufficient ground for such discredit. Sir George Lewis remarks very truly (*Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients*, p. 143):—"The testimony of Theophrastus, the

When the general forms of things have thus been learnt, particular individuals in nature must be brought under them.

Question as to education of the Nocturnal Council is answered in the *Epinomis*.

Assuming that the magistrates of the Nocturnal Council have gone through the course of education prescribed in the *Epinomis*, and have proved themselves unimpeachable on the score of orthodoxy—will they be able to solve the main problem

Problem  
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disciple of Aristotle and nearly his contemporary, has great weight upon this point. The ground of the opinion alludes to the Pythagorean doctrine mentioned by Aristotle, that the centre is the most dignified place, and that the earth is not the first in dignity among the heavenly bodies. It has no reference to observed phenomena, and is not founded on inductive scientific arguments. The doctrine as to the superior dignity of the central place, and of the impropriety of assigning this most dignified station to the earth—was of Pythagorean origin, and was probably combined with the Philolaic cosmology."

This remark of Sir George Lewis deserves attention, not merely from the proper value which he assigns to the testimony of Theophrastus, but because he confines himself to the exact matter which Theophrastus affirmed; viz. that Plato in his old age came to repent of his own kosmical views on one particular point and on one special ground. Theophrastus does not tell us what it was that Plato supposed to be in the centre, after he had become convinced that it was too dignified a place for the earth. Plato *may* have come to adopt the positive opinion of Philolaus (that of a central fire) as well as the negative opinion (that the earth was not the central body). But we cannot affirm that he *did* adopt either this positive opinion or any other positive opinion upon that point. I take Theophrastus to have affirmed exactly what Plutarch makes him affirm, and no more: that Plato came to repent of having assigned to the earth the central place which did not befit it, and to account the centre the fit place "for some other body better than the Earth," yet without defining what that other body was. If Theophrastus had named what the other body was, surely Plutarch would never have suppressed the specific designation to make room for the vague *ἐτέρω τι κρείττονι*.

There is thus, in my ground for believing that Plato in his

old age (after the publication of the *Treatise De Legibus*) came to distrust the geocentric dogma which he had previously supported; but we do not know whether he adopted any other dogma in place of it. The geocentric doctrine passed to the *Epinomis* as a continuation of the *Treatise De Legibus*. The phrase which Plutarch cites from Theophrastus deserves notice—

λεῖν, ὥς

γῆ τὴν μέσην χώραν τοῦ παντός. Plato *repented*. Whoever reads the *Treatise De Legibus* (especially Books vii. and x.) will see that Plato at that period of his life considered astronomical errors as not merely errors, but heresies offensive to the Gods; and that he denounced those who supported such errors as impious. If Plato came afterwards to alter his astronomical views, he would *repent* of his own previous views as of a heresy. He came to believe that he had rated the dignity of the Earth too high; and we can see how this change of view may have been occasioned. Earth was looked upon by him, as well as by many others, in two distinct points of view. 1. As a kosmical body, divine, and including τοὺς χθονίους θεούς. 2. As one of the four elements, along with water, air, and fire; in which sense it was strung together with λίθοι, and had degrading ideas associated with it (Plat. *Apol. Sokr.* p. 26 D). These two meanings, not merely distinct but even opposed to each other, occur in the very same sentence of *De Legibus*, x. p. 836 D. The elemental sense of Earth was brought prominently forward by those reasoners whom Plato refutes in Book x.: and the effect of such reasonings upon him was, that though he still regarded Earth as a Deity, he no longer continued to regard Earth as worthy of the kosmical post of honour. At that age, however, he might well consider himself excused from broaching any new positive theory.

He has imposed upon them at the close of the Leges? There, as elsewhere, he proclaims a problem as indispensable to be solved, but does not himself furnish any solution. What is the common property, or point of similarity, between Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice—by reason of which each is termed Virtue? What are the characteristic points of difference, by reason of which Virtue sometimes receives one of these names, sometimes another?

The proper way of answering this question has been much debated, from Plato's day down to the present. It is one of the fundamental problems of Ethical Philo-

all of them  
are essential

The subjective matter of fact, implied by every one who designates an act or a person as virtuous, is an approving or admiring sentiment which each man knows in his own bosom. But Plato assumes that there is, besides this, an objective connotation: a common object or property to which such sentiment refers. What is that common object? I see no other except that which is indicated by the principle of Utility: I mean that principle which points out Happiness and Unhappiness, not merely of the agent himself, but also of others affected or liable to be affected by his behaviour, as the standard to which these denominations refer. Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, all tend to prevention and mitigation of unhappiness, and to increase of happiness, as well for the agent himself as for the society surrounding him. The opposite qualities—Timidity, Imprudence, Intemperance, Injustice—tend with equal certainty either to increase positively the unhappiness of the agent and of society, or to remove the means for warding it off or abating it. Indeed there is a certain minimum of all the four—Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice—without which or below which neither society could hold together, nor the life of the individual agent himself could be continued.

Here then is one answer at least to the question of Plato. Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice—all of them mental attributes of rational voluntary agents—

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have also the common property of being, in a certain minimum degree, absolutely essential to the life of the agent and the maintenance of society—and of being, above that degree, tutelary against the suffering, and beneficial to the happiness, of both. This tutelary or beneficent tendency is the common objective property signified by the general term *Virtue*; and is implicated with the subjective property before mentioned—the sentiment of approbation. The four opposite qualities are designated by the general term *Vice* or *Defect*, connoting both maleficent tendency and the sentiment of disapprobation.

This proposition will be farther confirmed, if we look at all the four qualities—*Courage*, *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Justice*—in another point of view. Taking them in their reference to *Virtue*, each of them belongs to *Virtue* as a part to the whole,<sup>m</sup> not as one species contradistinguished from and excluding other species. The same person may have, and ought to have, a certain measure of all: he will not be called virtuous unless he has a measure of all. Excellence in any one will not compensate for the entire absence of the others.

A certain measure of all the four virtues is required. In judging of particular acts instigated by each, there

to the hurt or benefit in the special case.

A just and temperate man will not be accounted virtuous, if (to use an Aristotelian simile) he be so extravagantly timid as to fear every insect that flits by, or the noise of a mouse.<sup>n</sup> All probability of beneficial results from his agency is effaced by this capital defect: and it is the probability of such results which constitutes his title to be called virtuous.

When we speak of the four as qualities or attributes of men (as Plato does in this treatise, while considering the proper type of character which the lawgiver should aim at forming) we speak of them in the abstract—that is, making abstraction of particular circumstances, and regarding only what is common to most men in most situations. But in the realities

<sup>m</sup> Compare Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 629 B, where he describes *τὴν ξύμπασαν* —δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σις εἰς ταῦτόν ἐλθοῦσα μετ' ἀνδρείας: also pp. 630 C-E, 631 A, where he considers all these as *μῦρια ἀρετῆς*, but *φρόνησις* as the first of the four

and *ἀνδρεία* as the last.

See also iii. pp. 688 B, 696 C-D, iv. p. 705 D.

<sup>n</sup> *Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach.* vii. 6, p. 1148, a. 8; *Politic.* vii. 1, p. 1323, a. 29.

of life these particulars are always present: there is a series of individual agents and patients, acts and sufferings, each surrounded by its own distinct circumstances and situation. Now in each of these situations an agent is held responsible for the consequences of his acts, when they are such as he knows and foresees, or might by reasonable care know and foresee. An officer who (like Charles XII. at Bender) marches up without necessity at the head of a corporal's guard to attack a powerful hostile army of good soldiers, exhibits the maximum of courage: but his act, far from being commended as virtue, must be blamed as rashness, or pitied as folly. If a friend has deposited in my care a sword or other deadly weapon (to repeat the very case put by Sokrates<sup>o</sup>), justice requires me to give it back to him when he asks for it. Yet if, at the time when he asks, he be insane, and exhibits plain indications of being about to employ it for murderous purposes, my just restoration of it will not be commended as an act of virtue. When we look at these four qualities—Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice—not in the abstract, but in reference to particular acts, agents, and situations—we find that before a just or courageous act can be considered to deserve the name of Virtue, there is always a tacit supposition, that no considerable hurt to innocent persons is likely or predictable from it in the particular case. The sentiment of approbation, implied in the name Virtue, will not go along with the act, if in the particular case it produce a certain amount of predictable mischief. This is another property common to all the four attributes of mind—Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice:—and forming one of the conditions under which they become entitled to the denomination of Virtue.

In the first books of the *Leges*, Plato<sup>p</sup> puts forward  
 Plato places these four virtues in the highest scale of *Expetenda* or *Bona*, on the ground that all the other *Bona*  
 Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, as the parts or sorts of Virtue: telling us that the natural rectitude of laws consists in promoting, not any one of the four separately, but all the four together in their due subordination. He classifies good things

\* Plato, *Republic*, i. p. 331 C; Xenoph. *Memor.* iv. 2, 17; Cicero, *De Officiis*, iii. 25.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, *Legg.* i. pp. 627 D, 631 A-C.

(Bona or Expetenda) in a triple scale of value.<sup>1</sup> are sure to flow from them.  
 First, and best of all, come the mental attributes—which he calls divine—Prudence or Intelligence, Temperance, Justice, and Courage: Second, or second best, come the attributes of body—health, strength, beauty, activity, manual dexterity: Third, or last, come the extraneous advantages, Wealth, Power, Family-Position, &c. It is the duty of the lawgiver to employ his utmost care to ensure to his citizens the first description of Bona (the mental attributes)—upon which (Plato says) the second and third description depend, so that if the first are ensured, the second and third will be certain to follow: while if the lawgiver, neglecting the first, aims at the second and third exclusively or principally, he will miss all three.<sup>2</sup> Here we see, that while Plato assigns the highest scale of value to the mental attributes, he justifies such preference by assuring us that they are the essential producing causes of the other sorts of Bona. His assurance is even given in terms more unqualified than the realities of life will bear out.

When Plato therefore proclaims it as the great desideratum for his Supreme Council, that they shall understand the common relation of the four great mental attributes (Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice) to each other as well as to the comprehensive whole, Virtue—he fastens their attention on the only common property which the four can be found to possess: *i.e.* that they are mental attributes required in every one for the security and comfort of himself and of society. To ward off or mitigate the

In thus directing the attention of the Council to the common property of the four virtues, Plato enforces upon them the necessity of looking to the security and happiness of their community as the paramount end

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Legg. i. p. 631 B-D, iii. p. 607 B. This tripartite classification of Bona differs altogether from the tripartite classification of Bona given at the commencement of the second book of the Republic. But it agrees with that, the "*tria genera Bonorum*," distinguished by Aristotle in the first book of the *Nikomachean Ethics* (p. 1098, b. 12), among which *τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν* were *κυριώτατα καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ*. This recognition of "*tria genera Bonorum*" is sometimes quoted as an opinion characteristic of the

Peripatetics; but Aristotle himself declares it to be ancient and acknowledged, and we certainly have it here in Plato.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Legg. i. p. 631 C. *ἡρτηται δ' ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα, καὶ ἂν μὲν δέχεται τὰ μείζονα πόλις, κτᾶται καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσονα· εἰ δὲ μὴ, στέρεται*

The same doctrine is declared by Sokrates in the *Platonic Apology*, pp. 29-30. *λέγων, ὅτι ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ*

suffering, and to improve the comfort of society, is thus inculcated as the main and constant End for them to keep in view. It is their prescribed task, to preserve and carry forward that which he as lawgiver had announced as his purpose in the beginning of the *Leges*.

In thus taking leave of Plato, at the close of his longest, latest, and most affirmative composition, it is satisfactory to be able to express unqualified sympathy with this main purpose which, as departing lawgiver, he directs his successors to promote. But to these salutary directions, unfortunately, he has attached others noway connected with them except by common feelings of reverence in his own mind—and far less deserving of sympathy. He requires that his own religious belief shall be erected into a peremptory orthodoxy, and that heretics shall be put down by the severest penalties. Now a citizen might be perfectly just, temperate, brave, and prudent—and yet dissent altogether from the Platonic creed. For such a citizen—the counterpart of Sokrates at Athens—no existence would be possible in the Platonic community.

We must farther remark that, even when Plato's ends are unexceptionable, the amount of interference which he employs to accomplish them is often extravagant. As a Constructor, he carries the sentiment of his own infallibility—which in a certain measure every lawgiver must assume—to an extreme worthy only of the kings of the Saturnian age:<sup>\*</sup> manifesting the very minimum of tolerance for that enquiring individual reason, of which his own negative dialogues remain as immortal masterpieces. We trace this intolerance through all the dialogue *Leges*. Even when he condescends to advise and persuade, he speaks rather in the tone of an encyclical censor, than of one who has before him a reasonable opponent to be convinced. The separate laws proposed by Plato are interesting to read, as illustrating antiquity: but most of them are founded on existing Athenian law. Where they depart from it, they depart as often for the worse as for the better—so far as I can pretend to judge. And in spite of all the indisputable defects,

<sup>\*</sup> Plato, *Politikus*, pp. 271 E, 275 A-C.

political and judicial of that glorious city, where Plato was born and passed most of his days—it was, in my judgment, preferable to his Magnêtic city, as to all the great objects of security, comfort, recreation, and enjoyment. Athens was preferable, even for the ordinary citizen: but for the men of free, inquisitive, self-thinking, minds—the dissentient minority, who lived upon that open speech of which Athenian orators and poets boasted—it was a condition of existence: since the Platonic censorship would have tolerated neither their doctrines nor their persons.

## APPENDIX.

SINCE the commencement of the present century, with its increased critical study of Plato, different and opposite opinions have been maintained by various authors respecting the genuineness or spuriousness of the *Treatise De Legibus*. Schleiermacher (*Platons Werke*, I. i. p. 51) admitted it as a genuine work of Plato, but ranked it among the *Nebenwerke*, or outlying dialogues: i.e. as a work that did not form an item or stepping-stone in the main Platonic philosophical series (which Schleiermacher attempts to lay out according to a system of internal sequence and gradual development), but was composed separately, in general analogy with the later or more constructive portion of that series. On the other hand, Ast (*Platons Leben und Schriften*, pp. 376-392) distinctly maintains that the *Treatise De Legibus* is not the composition of Plato, but of one of his scholars and contemporaries, perhaps Xenokrates or the Opuntian Philippus. Ast supports this opinion by many internal grounds, derived from a comparison of the treatise with other Platonic dialogues.

Zeller (in his *Platonische Studien*, Tübingen, 1839, pp. 1-144) discussed the same question in a more copious and elaborate manner, and declared himself decidedly in favour of Ast's opinion—that the *Treatise De Legibus* was not the work of Plato, but of one among his immediate scholars. But in his *History of Grecian Philosophy* (vol. ii. pp. 348-615-641, second edition), Zeller departs from this judgment, and pronounces the *Treatise* to be a genuine work of Plato—the last form of his philosophy, modified in various ways.

Again, Suckow (in his work, *Die Wissenschaftliche und Künstlerische Form der Platonischen Schriften*, Berlin, 1855, I. pp. 111-118 seq.) advocates Zeller's first opinion—that the *Treatise De Legibus* is not the work of Plato.

Lastly, Stallbaum, in the *Prolegomena* prefixed to his edition of the *Treatise*, strenuously vindicates its Platonic authorship. This is also the opinion of Boeckh and K. F. Hermann; and was, moreover, the opinion of all critics (I believe) anterior to Ast.

To me, I confess, it appears that the *Treatise De Legibus* is among the best authenticated works of the Platonic collection. I do not know what better positive proof can be tendered than the affirmation of Aristotle in his *Politics*

—distinct and unqualified, mentioning both the name of the author and the title of the work, noting also the relation in which it stood to the Republic, both as a later composition of the same author, and as discrepant on some points of doctrine, analogous on others. This in itself is the strongest *prima facie* evidence, not to be rebutted, except by some counter-testimony, or by some internal mark of chronological impossibility: moreover, it coincides with the consentient belief of all the known ancient authors later than Aristotle—such as Zeno the Stoic, who composed a treatise in seven books—*Πρὸς τοὺς Πλάτωνος Νόμους* (Diog. La. vii. 36.) Persæus, the Alexandrine critics, Cicero, Plutarch, &c. (Stallbaum, Prolegg. p. xlv.) Aristophanes Grammaticus classified both Leges and Epinomis as Plato's works. The arguments produced in Zeller's *Platonische Studien*, to show that Aristotle may have been mistaken in his assertion, are of little or no force. Nor will it be material to the present question, even if we concede to Zeller and Suckow another point which they contend for—that the remarks of Aristotle upon Plato's opinions are often inaccurate at least, if not unfair. For here Aristotle is produced in court only as a witness to authenticity.

Among the points raised by Suckow, there is indeed one, which if it were made out, would greatly invalidate, if not counterbalance, the testimony of Aristotle. Suckow construes the passage in the Oration of Isokrates ad Philippum (p. 84, § 16)—*δμοίως οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἄκυροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις*—as if it alluded to the Platonic Republic, and to the Treatise *De Legibus*; but as if it implied, at the same time, that the two treatises were not composed by the same author, but by different authors, indicated by the plural *σοφιστῶν*. If this were the true meaning of Isokrates, we should then have Aristotle distinctly contradicted by another respectable contemporary witness, which would of course much impair the value of his testimony.

But Stallbaum (p. lii.) disputes altogether the meaning ascribed by Suckow to the words of Isokrates, and contends that the plural *σοφιστῶν* noway justifies the hypothesis of a double authorship. So far, I think, he is decidedly right: and this clears away the only one item of counter-testimony which has yet been alleged against Aristotle as a witness. Stallbaum, indeed, goes a step farther. He contends that the passage above cited from Isokrates is an evidence on his side, and against Suckow: that Isokrates alludes to Plato as author of both Republic and Leges, and thus becomes available as a second contemporary witness, confirming the testimony of Aristotle. This is less certain; yet perhaps supposable. We may imagine that Isokrates, when he composed the passage, had in his mind Plato pre-eminently—then recently dead at a great age, and the most illustrious of all the Sophists who had written upon political theory. The vague and undefined language in which Isokrates speaks, however, sets forth, by contrast, the great evidentiary value of Aristotle's affirmation, which is distinct and specific in the highest degree, declaring Plato to be the author of Leges.

To contradict this affirmation—an external guarantee of unusual force—Zeller produces a case of internal incredibility. The Legg. cannot be the work of Plato (he argues) because of the numerous disparities and marked inferiority of style, handling, and doctrine, which are very frequently un-Platonic, and not seldom anti-Platonic. Whoever will read the *Platonische Studien*, will see that Zeller has made out a strong case of this sort, set forth with remarkable ability and ingenuity. Indeed, the strength of the case, as to internal discrepancy, is fully admitted by his opponent Stallbaum, who

says in general terms—"Argumentatio quidem et disserendi ratio, quæ in Legibus regnat, ubi considerata fuerit paullo accuratius, dubitare sanè nemo poterit, quin multa propria ac peculiaria habere judicanda sit, quæ ab aliorum librorum Platoniorum usu et consuetudine longissimè recedant." He then proceeds to enumerate in detail many serious points of discrepancy. See the second part (ch. xv.) of his *Prolegomena*, prefixed to Book v. Legg., and in *Prolegg.* to his edition of 1859, pp. lv.-lix. But in spite of such undeniable force of internal improbability, Stallbaum still maintains that the *Treatise* is really the work of Plato. Of course, he does not admit that the whole of the internal evidence is nothing but discrepancy. He points out also much that is homogeneous and Platonic.

I agree with his conclusion (which is also the subsequent conclusion of Zeller) respecting the authorship of Legg. To me the testimony of Aristotle appears conclusive. But when I perceive how strong are the grounds for doubt, so long as we discuss the question on grounds of internal evidence simply (that is, by comparison with other Platonic dialogues)—while yet such doubts are over-ruled, by our fortunately possessing incontestable authenticating evidence *ab extra*—an inference suggests itself to me, of which Platonic critics seem for the most part unconscious. I mean the great fallibility of reasonings founded simply on internal evidence, for the purpose of disproving authenticity, where we have no external evidence, contemporary or nearly contemporary, to controul them. In this condition are the large majority of the dialogues. I do not affirm that such reasonings are *never* to be trusted; but I consider them eminently fallible. To compare together the various dialogues, indeed, and to number as well as to weigh the various instances of analogy and discrepancy between them, is a process always instructive. It is among the direct tasks and obligations of the critic. But when, after detecting discrepancies, more or less grave and numerous, he proceeds to conclude, that the dialogue in which they occur cannot have been composed by Plato, he steps upon ground full of hypothesis and uncertainty. Who is to fix the limit of admissible divergence between the various compositions of a man like Plato? Who can determine what changes may have taken place in Plato's opinions, or point of view, or intellectual powers—during a long literary life of more than fifty years, which we know only in mere outline? Considering that Plato systematically lays aside his own personal identity, and speaks only under the assumed names of different expositors, opponents, and respondents—which of us can claim to possess a full and exhaustive catalogue of all the diverse phases of Platonism, so as to make sure that some unexpected variety has no legitimate title to be ranked among them?

For my part, I confess that these questions appear to me full of doubt and difficulty. I am often surprised at the confidence with which critics, upon the faith of internal evidence purely and simply, pronounce various dialogues of the Platonic collection to be spurious. A lesson of diffidence may be learnt from the *Leges*: which, if internal evidence alone were accessible, would stand among the questionable items of the Platonic catalogue—while it now takes rank among the most unquestionable, from the complete external certificate which has been fortunately preserved to us.

Stallbaum, who maintains the authenticity of the Platonic *Leges*, disallows altogether that of the *Epinomis*. In his long and learned *Prolegg.* (vol. iii. p. 441-470), he has gone over the whole case, and stated at length his reasons for this opinion. I confess that his reasons do not satisfy me. If, on the faith of those reasons, I rejected the *Epinomis*, I should also on the grounds stated by

Ast and Zeller reject the *Leges*. The reasons against the *Leges* are of the same character and tenor as those against the *Epinomis*, and scarce at all less weighty. Respecting both of them, it may be shown that they are greatly inferior in excellence to the *Republic* and the other masterpieces of the Platonic genius, and that they contain points of doctrine and reasoning different from what we read in other Platonic works. But when, from these premisses, I am called upon to admit that they are not the works of Plato, I cannot assent either about the one or the other. I have already observed that I expect to find among his genuine compositions, some inferior in merit, others dissentient in doctrine—especially in compositions admitted to belong to his oldest age. All critics from Aristophanes down to Tennemann, have admitted the *Epinomis* as genuine: and when Stallbaum contends that Diogenes mentions doubts on the point entertained even in antiquity—I think he is not warranted by the words of that author, iii. 37: *ἐνιοὶ δὲ φασιν, ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ Ὀπούντιος τοὺς Νόμους αὐτοῦ (Πλάτωνος) μετέγραψεν ὕπτας ἐν κηρῷ· τούτου δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐπινομίδα φασιν εἶναι*. I do not think we can infer from these words anything more than this—that “Philippus transcribed the *Epinomis* also out of the waxen tablet as he had transcribed the *Leges*.” The persons (whosoever they were—*ἐνιοὶ*) to whom Diogenes refers, considered Philippus as in part the author of the *Νόμοι*; because he had first transcribed them in a legible form from the rough original, and might possibly have introduced changes of his own in the transcription. If they had meant to distinguish what he did in respect to the *Leges*, from what he did in respect to the *Epinomis*: if they had meant to assert that he transcribed the *Leges*, but that he composed the *Epinomis* as an original addition of his own; I think they would have employed, not the conjunction *καὶ*, but some word indicating contrast and antithesis.

But even if we concede that the persons here alluded to by Diogenes did really believe, that the *Epinomis* was the original composition of Philippus and not of Plato—we must remember that all the critics of antiquity known to us believed the contrary—that it was the genuine work of Plato. In particular, Aristophanes Grammaticus acknowledges it as such; enrolling it in one trilogy with the *Minos* and the *Leges*. The testimony of Aristophanes, and the records of the Alexandrine Library in his time, greatly outweigh the suspicions of the unknown critics alluded to by Diogenes; even if we admit that those critics did really conceive the *Epinomis* as an actual composition of Philippus.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

## OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.

HAVING dwelt at some length on the life and compositions of Plato, I now proceed to place in comparison with him some other members of the Sokratic philosophical family: less eminent, indeed, than the illustrious author of the Republic, yet still men of marked character, ability, and influence.\* Respecting one of the brethren, Xenophon, who stands next to Plato in celebrity, I shall say a few words separately in my next and concluding chapter.

The ascendancy of Sokrates over his contemporaries was powerfully exercised in more than one way. He brought into vogue new subjects both of indefinite amplitude, and familiar as well as interesting to every one. On these subjects, moreover, he introduced, or at least popularised, a new method of communication, whereby the relation of teacher and learner, implying a direct transfer of ready-made knowledge from the one to the other, was put aside. He substituted an interrogatory process, at once destructive and suggestive, in which the teacher began by unteaching and the learner by unlearning what was supposed to be already known, for the purpose of provoking in the learner's mind a self-operative energy of thought, and an internal generation of new notions. Lastly, Sokrates worked forcibly upon the minds of several friends, who were in the habit of attending him when he talked in the market-place or the palæstra. Some tried to copy his wonderful knack of colloquial cross-examination: how far they did so with success or reputation we do not know: but Xenophon says that several of them would only discourse with those who paid them a fee, and that they thus sold for considerable sums what were only

Influence  
exercised by  
Sokrates over  
his com-

\* Dionysius of Halikarnassus contrasts Plato with τὸ Σοκράτους διδασκαλεῖον πᾶν (De Adm. Vi Dic. Demosthen. p. 956). Compare also Epistol.

ad Cn. Pomp. p. 762, where he contrasts the style and phraseology of Plato with that of the generally.

small fragments obtained gratuitously from the rich table of their master.<sup>b</sup> There were moreover several who copied the general style of his colloquies by composing written dialogues. And thus it happened that the great master,—he who passed his life in the oral application of his Elenchus, without writing anything,—though he left no worthy representative in his own special career, became the father of numerous written dialogues and of a rich philosophical literature.<sup>c</sup>

Besides Plato and Xenophon, whose works are known to us, we hear of Alexamenus, Antisthenes, Æschines, Aristippus, Bryson, Eukleides, Phædon, Kriton, Simmias, Kebês, &c., as having composed dialogues of this sort. All of them were companions of Sokrates; several among them either set down what they could partially recollect of his conversations, or employed his name as a dramatic speaker of their own thoughts. Seven of these dialogues were ascribed to Æschines, twenty-five to Aristippus, seventeen to Kriton, twenty-three to Simmias, three to Kebês, six to Eukleides, four to Phædon. The compositions of Antisthenes were far more numerous: ten volumes of them, under a variety of distinct titles (some of them probably not in the form of dialogues) being recorded by Diogenes.<sup>d</sup> Aristippus was the

Names of  
those com-  
panions.

<sup>b</sup> Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 60. *Ὡς τινὲς μικρὰ μέρη παρ' ἐκείνου προῦκα λαβόντες πολλοὺ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπώλουν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν ὥσπερ ἐκείνος δημοτικοί· τοῖς γὰρ μὴ ἔχουσι χρήματα δίδοναι οὐκ*

patiated on the demerits of many philosophers, their servility, profligate ambition, rapacity, want of patriotism, &c., from which Athenæus makes several extracts. *Τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀπὸ*

<sup>c</sup> We find a remarkable proof how long the name and conception of Sokrates lasted in the memory of the Athenian public, as having been the great progenitor of the philosophy and philosophers of the fourth century B.C. in Athens. It was about 300 B.C., almost a century after the death of Sokrates, that Demochares (the nephew of the orator Demosthenes) delivered an oration before the Athenian judiciary for the purpose of upholding the law proposed by Sophokles, forbidding philosophers or Sophists to lecture without a license obtained from the government; which law, passed a year before, had determined the secession of all the philosophers from Athens until the law was repealed. In this oration Demochares ex-

—Ὡσπερ ἐκ κατασκευάσαι τοὺς στρατιώτην

Demetrius Phalereus also, in or near that same time, composed a *Σωκράτους ἀπολογία* (Diog. La. ix. 37-57). This shows how long the interest in the personal fate and character of Sokrates endured at Athens.

<sup>d</sup> Diogenes Laert. i. 47-61-83, vi. 15; Athenæ. xi. p. 505 C.

Bryson is mentioned by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 508 D. Theopompus, the contemporary of Aristotle and pupil of Isokrates, had composed an express treatise or discourse against Plato's dialogues, in which discourse he affirmed that most of them were not Plato's own, but borrowed in large proportion from the dialogues of

first of the line of philosophers called Kyrenaic or Hedonic, afterwards (with various modifications) Epikurean: Antisthenes, of the Cynics and Stoics: Eukleides, of the Megaric school. It seems that Aristippus, Antisthenes, Eukleides, and Bryson, all enjoyed considerable reputation, as contemporaries and rival authors of Plato: Æschines, Antisthenes (who was very poor), and Aristippus, are said to have received money for their lectures; Aristippus being named as the first who thus departed from the Sokratic canon.\*

Æschines the companion of Sokrates did not become (like Eukleides, Antisthenes, Aristippus) the founder of a succession or sect of philosophers. The few fragments remaining of his dialogues do not enable us to appreciate their merit. He seems to have employed the name of Aspasia largely as a conversing personage, and to have esteemed her highly. He also spoke with great admiration of Themistokles. But in regard to present or recent characters, he stands charged with much bitterness and ill-nature: especially we learn that he denounced the Sophists Prodikus and Anaxagoras, the first on the ground of having taught Theramenes, the second as the teacher of two worthless persons—Ariphrades and Arignôtus. This accusation deserves greater

Æschines—  
Oration of  
Lysias  
against him.

Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Bryson. Ehippus also, the comic writer (of the 4th century B.C., contemporary with Theopompus, perhaps even earlier) spoke of Bryson as contemporary with Plato (Athenæ. xi. 509 C). This is good proof to authenticate Bryson as a composer of "Sokratic dialogues" belonging to the Platonic age, along with Antisthenes and Aristippus: whether Theopompus is correct when he asserts that Plato borrowed much from the three, is very doubtful.

Many dialogues were published by various writers, and ascribed falsely to one or other of the *virī Sokratici*: Diogenes (ii. 64) reports the judgment delivered by Panætius, which among them were genuine and which not so; Panætius considered that the dialogues ascribed to Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Æschines, were genuine; that those assigned to Phædon and Eukleides were doubtful; and that the rest were all spurious. He thus regarded as spurious those of Alexa-

menus, Kriton, Simmias, Kebês, Simon, Bryson, &c., or he did not know them all. It is possible that Panætius may not have known the dialogues of Bryson; if he did know them, and believed them to be spurious, I should not accept his assertion, because I think that it is outweighed by the contrary testimony of Theopompus. Moreover, though Panætius was a very able man, our confidence in his critical estimate is much shaken when we learn that he declared the Platonic Phædon to be spurious.

\* Diogen. Laert. i. 62-65; Athenæus, xi. p. 507 C.

Dion Chrysostom (Orat. iv. De Homero et Socrate, p. 289, Reiske) must have had in his view some of these other Sokratic dialogues, not those composed by Plato or Xenophon, when he alludes to conversations of Sokrates with Lysikles, Glykon, and Anytus; what he says about Anytus can hardly refer to the Platonic Menon.

notice, because it illustrates the odium raised by Melétus against Sokrates as having instructed Kritias and Alkibiades.<sup>†</sup> Moreover, we have Æschines presented to us in another character, very unexpected in a *vir Socraticus*. An action for recovery of money alleged to be owing, was brought in the Athenian Dikastery against Æschines, by a plaintiff, who set forth his case in a speech composed by the rhetor Lysias. In this speech it is alleged, that Æschines, having engaged in trade as a preparer and seller of unguents, borrowed a sum of money at interest from the plaintiff; who affirms that he counted with assurance upon honest dealing from a disciple of Sokrates, continually engaged in talking about justice and virtue.<sup>‡</sup> But so far was this expectation from being realised, that Æschines had behaved most dishonestly. He repaid neither principal nor interest; though a judgment of the Dikastery had been obtained against him, and a branded slave belonging to him had been seized under it. Moreover, Æschines had been guilty of dishonesty equally scandalous in his dealings with many other creditors also. Farthermore, he had made love to a rich woman seventy years old, and had got possession of her property; cheating and impoverishing her family. His character as a profligate and cheat was well known and could be proved by many witnesses. Such are the allegations against Æschines, contained in the fragment of a lost speech of Lysias, and made in open court by a real plaintiff. How much of them could be fairly proved, we cannot say: but it seems plain at least that Æschines must have been

<sup>†</sup> Plutarch, Perikles, c. 24-32; Cicero, De Invent. i. 31; Athenæus, v. 220. Some other citations will be found in Fischer's collection of the few fragments of Æschines Socraticus (Leipsic, 1788, p. 68 seq.), though some of the allusions which he produces seem rather to belong to the orator Æschines. The statements of Athenæus, from the dialogue of Æschines called Telaugés, are the most curious. The dialogue contained, among other things, τὴν Προδίκου καὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν διαμάχην, where we see Anaxagoras denominated a *Sophist* (see also Diodor. xii. 39) as well as Prodikos.

Fischer considers the three Pseudo-

Platonic dialogues—Περὶ Ἀρετῆς, Περὶ Πλούτου, Περὶ Θανάτου—as the works of Æschines. But this is noway established.

Athenæus, xiii. pp. 611-612. Πεισθεὶς δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα λέγοντος, τοῦτον κράτους γεγενέσθαι μαθητὴν, καὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀρετῆς πολλοὺς καὶ λέγοντα λόγους, οὐκ

We read also about another oration of Lysias against Æschines—περὶ συκοφαντίας (Diogen. Laert. ii. 63), unless indeed it be the same oration differently described.

a trader as well as a philosopher. All these writers on philosophy must have had their root and dealings in real life, of which we know scarce anything.

The dialogues known by the title of Sokratic dialogues,<sup>h</sup> were composed by all the principal companions of Sokrates, and by many who were not companions. Yet though thus composed by many different authors, they formed a recognised class of literature, noticed by the rhetorical critics as distinguished for plain, colloquial, unstudied, dramatic execution, suiting the parts to the various speakers: from which general character Plato alone departed—and he too not in all of his dialogues. By the Sokratic authors generally Sokrates appears to have been presented under the same main features: his proclaimed confession of ignorance was seldom wanting: and the humiliation which his cross-questioning inflicted even upon insolent men like Alkibiades, was as keenly set forth by Æschines as by Plato:

Written  
Sokratic Dia-  
logues—their  
general cha-  
racter.

<sup>h</sup> Aristot. ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 505 C; Rhetoric, iii. 16.

Dionys. Halikarnass. ad Cn. Pomp. de Platone, p. 762, Reisk. Τραφεῖς (Plato) ἐν τοῖς Σωκρατικοῖς διαλόγοις ἰσχυροτάτοις οὐσι καὶ ἀκριβεστάτοις, οὐ μέντας δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τῆς Γοργίου

also, De Admir. Vi Dicend. in Demosthene, p. 968. Again in the same treatise De Adm. V. D. Demosth. p.

καὶ δοκοῦσα κατασκευὴν τε καὶ πρὸς ἰδιώτην ἔχειν

θοὺς ἄνδρας προστάτας—καὶ οἱ τὸ Πλάτωνος, &c.

Dionysius calls this style ὁ Σωκρατικός χαρακτήρ, p. 1025. I presume it is the same to which the satirist Timon applies the words:—

Ἀσθενική δὲ λόγων δυὰς ἡ τριάς, ἡ ἔτι πόρσω,  
Οἷος Ξεινοφών, Ἰς τ

Diogen. La. ii. 55.

Lucian, Hermogenes, Phrynichus, Longinus, and some later rhetorical critics of Greece judged more favourably than Timon about the style of Æschines as well as of Xenophon. See Zeller, Gesch. der Phil. ii. p. 171, sec.

ed. And Demetrius Phalereus (or the author of the treatise which bears his name), as well as the rhetor Aristides, considered Æschines and Plato as the best representatives of the Σωκρατικός χαρακτήρ, Demetr. Phaler. De Interpretat. 310; Aristides, Orat. Platon. i. p. 35; Photius, Cods. 61 and 158; Longinus, ap. Walz. ix. p. 559, c. 2. Lucian says (De Parasito, 33) that Æschines passed some time with the elder Dionysius at Syracuse, to whom he read aloud his dialogue, entitled Miltiades, with great success.

An inedited discourse of Michael Psellus, printed by Mr. Cox in his very careful and valuable catalogue of the MSS. in the Bodleian Library, recites the same high estimate as having been formed of Æschines by the chief ancient rhetorical critics: they reckoned him among and alongside of the foremost Hellenic classical writers, as having his own peculiar merits of style—παρὰ μὲν Πλάτωνι, τὴν δια-  
παρὰ δὲ τοῦ

κοῦ Αἰσχίνου, τὴν ἐμμελεῆ συνθήκην τῶν λέξεων, παρὰ δὲ Θουκυδίδου, &c. See Mr. Cox's Catalogue, pp. 743-745. Cicero speaks of the Sokratic philosophers generally, as writing with an elegant playfulness of style (De Officiis, i. 29, 104); which is in harmony with Lucian's phrase—Αἰσχίνης δὲ τοὺς γοὺς μακροὺς καὶ ἀστείους γράψας, &c.

moreover the Sokratic disciples generally were fond of extolling the Dæmon or divining prophecy of their master.<sup>i</sup> Some dialogues circulating under the name of some one among the companions of Sokrates, were spurious, and the authorship was a point not easy to determine. Simon, a currier at Athens, in whose shop Sokrates often conversed, is said to have kept memoranda of the conversations which he heard, and to have afterwards published them: Æschines also, and some other of the Sokratic companions, were suspected of having preserved or procured reports of the conversations of the master himself, and of having made much money after his death by delivering them before select audiences.<sup>k</sup> Aristotle speaks of the followers of Antisthenes as unschooled, vulgar men: but Cicero appears to have read with satisfaction the dialogues of Antisthenes, whom he designates as acute though not well-instructed.<sup>l</sup> Other accounts describe his dialogues as composed in a rhetorical style, which is ascribed to the fact of his having received lessons from Gorgias:<sup>m</sup> and Theopompus must have held in considerable estimation the dialogues of that same author, as well as those of Aristippus and Bryson, when he accused Plato of having borrowed from them largely.<sup>n</sup>

Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, were all companions

<sup>i</sup> Cicero, Brutus, 85, s. 292; De Divinatione, i. 54-122; Aristides, Orat. xlv. *περί Πηγοικῆς*, vol. ii. pp. 24-25; Orat. xlv. *Ἐνερ τῶν Τετραδῶν*, vol. ii. pp. 295-369, ed. Dindorf. It appears by this that some of the dialogues composed by Æschines were mistaken by various persons for actual conversations held by Sokrates. It was argued, that because Æschines was inferior to Plato in ability, he was more likely to have repeated accurately what he had heard Sokrates say.

<sup>k</sup> Diog. L. ii. 122. He mentions a collection of thirty-three dialogues in one volume, purporting to be reports of real colloquies of Sokrates, published by Simon. But they can hardly be regarded as genuine.

The charge here mentioned is advanced by Xenophon (see a preceding note, Memorab. i. 2, 60) against some persons (*τινες*), but without specifying names. About Æschines, see Athenæus, xiii. p. 611 C; Diogen. Laert. ii. 62.

<sup>l</sup> Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, xii. 38:

—“*virī acuti magis quam eruditi*,” is the judgment of Cicero upon Antisthenes. I presume that these words indicate the same defect as that which is intended by Aristotle when he says —*οἱ Ἀντισθένηοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοί*, Metaphysic. H. 3, p. 1043, b. 24. It is plain too that Lucian considered the compositions of Antisthenes as not unworthy companions to those of Plato (Lucian, adv. Indoctum, c. 27).

<sup>m</sup> Diogen. Laert. vi. 1. If it be true that Antisthenes received lessons from Gorgias, this proves that Gorgias must sometimes have given lessons *gratis*; for the poverty of Antisthenes is well known. See the Symposium of Xenophon.

<sup>n</sup> Theopomp. ap. Athenæ. xi. p. 508. See K. F. Hermann, Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller. Motive, p. 300.

An extract of some length, of a dialogue composed by Æschines between Sokrates and Alkibiades is given by Aristides, Or. xlv. *Ἐνερ τῶν Τετραδῶν*, vol. ii. pp. 292-294, ed. Dindorf.

and admirers of Sokrates, as was Plato. But none of them were his disciples, in the strict sense of the word : none of them continued or enforced his doctrines, though each used his name as a spokesman. During his lifetime the common attachment to his person formed a bond of union which ceased at his death.

Relations between the companions

Sokrates.

There is indeed some ground for believing that Plato then put himself forward in the character of leader, with a view to keep the body united.<sup>o</sup> We must recollect that Plato, though then no more than twenty-eight years of age, was the only one among them who combined the advantages of a noble Athenian descent, opulent circumstances, an excellent education, and great native genius. Eukleides and Aristippus were neither of them Athenians : Antisthenes was very poor : Xenophon was absent on service in the Cyreian army. Plato's proposition however found no favour with the others, and was even indignantly repudiated by Apollodorus : a man ardently attached to Sokrates, but violent and overboiling in all his feelings.<sup>p</sup> The companions of Sokrates, finding themselves unfavourably looked upon at Athens after his death, left the city for a season and followed Eukleides to Megara. How long they stayed there we do not know. Plato is said, though I think on no sufficient authority, to have remained absent from Athens for several years continuously. It seems certain (from an anecdote recounted by Aristotle)<sup>q</sup> that he talked with something like arrogance among the companions of Sokrates : and that Aristippus gently rebuked him by reminding him how very different had been the language of Sokrates himself. Complaints too were made by contempo-

<sup>o</sup> Athenæus, xi. p. 507 B. from the *ὑπομνήματα* of the Delphian Hegesander. Who Hegesander was, I do not know : but there is nothing improbable in the anecdote which he recounts.

<sup>p</sup> Plato, Phædon, pp. 59 A, 117 D. Eukleides, however, though his school was probably at Megara, seems to have possessed property in Attica : for there existed, among the orations of Isæus, a pleading composed by that rhetor for some client—*Πρὸς Εὐκλείδην τὸν Σω-ἀμφισβήτησις ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ χωρίου λύσεως*. Dionys. Hal. Isæus, c. 14. Harpokration—*Ὅτι τὰ*

*ρυττάμενα* : also under some other words by Harpokration and by Pollux, viii. 48.

<sup>q</sup> Aristot. Rhetoric, ii. 24, p. 1398, b. 30.

*Ἀριστίππος, πρὸς Πλε-  
ρικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα, ὡς  
—ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γ' ἐταῖρος  
οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον—λέγων τὸν :*

This anecdote, mentioned by Aristotle, who had good means of knowing, appears quite worthy of belief.

The jealousy and love of supremacy inherent in Plato's temper (*τὸ φιλότιμον*), were noticed by Dionysius Hal. (Epist. ad Cn. Pompeium, p. 756).

ries about Plato's jealous, censorious, spiteful temper. The critical and disparaging tone of his dialogues, notwithstanding the admiration which they inspire, accounts for the existence of these complaints: and anecdotes are recounted, though not verified by any sufficient evidence, of ill-natured dealing on his part towards other philosophers who were poorer than himself.\* Dissension or controversy on philosophical topics is rarely carried on without some invidious or hostile feeling. Athens, and the *virī Sokratici*, Plato included, form no exception to this ordinary madady of human nature.

It is common for historians of philosophy to speak of a Sokratic school: but this phrase, if admissible at all, is only admissible in the largest and vaguest sense. The effect produced by Sokrates upon his companions was, not to teach doctrine, but to stimulate self-working enquiry, upon ethical and social subjects. Eukleides, Antisthenes, Aristippus, each took a line of his own, not less decidedly than Plato. But unfortunately we have no compositions remaining from either of the three. We possess only brief reports respecting some leading points of their doctrine, emanating altogether from those who disagreed with it: we have besides aphorisms, dicta, repartees, bons-mots, &c., which they are said to have uttered. Of these many are evident inventions; some proceeding from opponents and probably coloured or exaggerated, others hardly authenticated at all. But if they were ever so well authenticated, they would form very insufficient evidence on which to judge a philosopher—much less to condemn him with asperity.\*

\* Athenæus, xi. pp. 505-508. Diog. Laert. ii. 60-65, iii. 36.

The statement made by Plato in the *Phædon*—That Aristippus and Kleombrotus were not present at the death of Sokrates, but were said to be in Ægina—is cited as an example of Plato's ill-will and censorious temper (Demetr. Phaler. s. 306). But this is unfair. The statement ought not to be so considered, if it were true: and if not true, it deserves a more severe epithet. We read in Athenæus various other criticisms, citing or alluding to passages of Plato, which are alleged to indicate ill-nature; but many of the passages cited do not deserve the remark.

\* Respecting these ancient philosophers, whose works are lost, I transcribe a striking passage from Descartes, who complains, in his own case, of the injustice of being judged from the statements of others, and not from his own writings:—

“Quod adeo in hac materiâ verum est, ut quamvis sæpe aliquas ex meis opinionibus explicaverim viris acutissimis, et qui me loquente videbantur eas valde distincte intelligere: attamen cum eas retulerunt, observavi ipsos fere semper illas ita mutavisse, ut pro meis agnoscere amplius non possem. Quâ occasione posteros hic oratos volo, ut nunquam credant, quidquam à me esse

Philosophy (as I have already observed) aspires to deliver not merely truth, but reasoned truth. We ought to know, not only what doctrines a philosopher maintained, but how he maintained them:—what objections others made against him, and how he replied:—what objections he made against dissentient doctrines, and what replies were made to him. Respecting Plato and Aristotle, we possess such information to a considerable extent: respecting Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, we are without it. All their compositions (very numerous, in the case of Antisthenes) have perished.

### EUKLEIDES.

Eukleides was a Parmenidean, who blended the ethical point of view of Sokrates with the ontology of Parmenides, and followed out that negative Dialectic which was common to Sokrates with Zeno.

Eukleides of  
Megara—he  
blended Parmenides with

Parmenides (I have already said)<sup>1</sup> and Zeno after him, recognised no absolute reality except Ens Unum, continuous, indivisible: they denied all real plurality: they said that the plural was Non-Ens or Nothing, *i.e.* nothing real or absolute, but only apparent, perpetually transient and changing, relative, different as appreciated by one man and by another. Now Sokrates laid it down that wisdom or knowledge of Good, was the sum total of ethical perfection, including within it all the different virtues: he spoke also about the divine wisdom inherent in, or pervading the entire Kosmos or universe.<sup>2</sup> Eukleides blended together the Ens of Parmenides with the Good of Sokrates, saying that the two names designated one and the same thing: sometimes called Good, Wisdom, Intelligence, God, &c., and by other names also, but always one and the same object named and meant. He farther maintained that the opposite of Ens, and the opposite of Bonum

profectum, quod ipse in lucem non edidero. *Et nullo modo miror absurda illa dogmata, quæ veteribus illis philosophis tribuuntur, quorum scripta non habemus: nec propterea judicio ipsorum cogitationes valde à ratione fuisse alienas, cum habuerint præstantissima suorum sæculorum ingenia; sed tan-*

tum nobis perperam esse relatas." (Descartes, Diss. De Methodo, p. 43).

<sup>1</sup> See vol. i. ch. i. pp. 20-23.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon. Memor. i. 4, 17. τὴν ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησιν. Compare Plato, Philébus, pp. 29-30; Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 6, 6, iii. 11.

(Non-Ens, Non-Bonum, or Malum) were things non-existent, unmeaning names, Nothing,<sup>x</sup> &c.: i.e. that they were nothing really, absolutely, permanently, but ever varying and dependant upon our ever varying conceptions. The One—the All—the Good—was absolute, immoveable, invariable, indivisible. But the opposite thereof was a non-entity or nothing: there was no one constant meaning corresponding to Non-Ens—but a variable meaning, different with every man who used it.

It was in this manner that Eukleides solved the problem which Sokrates had brought into vogue—What is the Bonum—or (as afterwards phrased) the Summum Bonum? Eukleides pronounced the Bonum to be coincident with the Ens Unum of Parmenides. The Parmenidean thesis, originally belonging to Transcendental Physics or Ontology, became thus implicated with Transcendental Ethics.<sup>y</sup>

Plato departs from Sokrates on the same point. He agrees with Eukleides in recognising a Transcendental Bonum. But it appears that his doctrines on this head underwent some change. He held for some time what is called the doctrine of Ideas: transcendental Forms, Entia, Essences: he considered the Transcendental to be essentially multiple, or to be an aggregate—whereas Eukleides had regarded it as essentially One. This is the doctrine which we find in some of the Platonic dialogues. In the Republic, the Idea of Good appears as one of these, though it is declared to be the foremost in rank and the most ascendant in efficacy.<sup>z</sup> But in the later part of his life, and in his lectures (as we learn from Aristotle), Plato came to adopt a different view. He resolved the Ideas into numbers. He regarded them as made up by the combination of two distinct factors:—1. The One—the Essentially One. 2. The Essentially Plural: the Indeterminate Dyad: the Great and

<sup>x</sup> Diog. L. ii. 106. Οὗτος ἐν ἀπεφθίγατο πολλοῖς

θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀνέρει, ἱγαι φάσκων. Compare also vii. 2, 162, where the Megarici are represented as recognising only μίαν ἀρετὴν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην. Cicero, Academ. ii. 42.

<sup>y</sup> However in the verse of Xenophanes, the predecessor of Parmenides—Οὐλος ὄρα, οὐλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὐλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει—the Universe is described as a thinking, seeing, hearing, God—Ἐν καὶ Πάν. Sextus, Emp. adv. Mathemat. ix. 144; Xenophon, Fragm. p. 36, ed. Karsten.

<sup>z</sup> Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 E, vii. p. 517 A.

Little.—Of these two elements he considered the Ideas to be compounded. And he identified the Idea of Good with the essentially One— $\tau\delta\ \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$  with  $\tau\delta\ \epsilon\nu$ : the principle of Good with the principle of Unity: also the principle of Evil with the Indeterminate. But though Unity and Good were thus identical, he considered Unity as logically antecedent, or the subject—Good as logically consequent, or the predicate.\*

This last doctrine of Plato in his later years (which does not appear in the dialogues, but seems, as far as we can make out, to have been delivered substantially in his oral lectures, and is ascribed to him by Aristotle) was nearly coincident with that of Eukleides. Both of them held the identity of  $\tau\delta\ \epsilon\nu$  with  $\tau\delta\ \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$ . This one doctrine is all that we know about Eukleides: what consequences he derived from it, or whether any, we do not know. But Plato combined, with this transcendental Unum = Bonum, a transcendental indeterminate plurality: from which combination he considered his Ideas or Ideal Numbers to be derivatives.

Last doctrine of Plato nearly the same as that of Eukleides.

\* The account given by Aristotle of Plato's doctrine of Ideas, as held by Plato in his later years, appears in various passages of the *Metaphysica*, and in the curious account repeated by Aristoxenus (who had often heard it from Aristotle—*Ἀριστοτέλης δεικνύει* of the *ἀκρόασις* or lecture delivered by Plato, *De Bono*. See Aristoxen. *Harmon.* ii. p. 30, Meibom. Compare the sixth chapter in this work, *Platonic Dialogues*, Generally, p. 217. *Metaphys.* N. 1091, b. 13. *τῶν δὲ τὰς ἀκινήτους οὐσίας εἶναι λεγόντων* (sc. *Platonici*) *οἱ μὲν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὐσίαν, τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ φόντο εἶναι μάλιστα*, which words are very clearly explained by Bonitz in the note to his Commentary, p. 586: also *Metaphys.* 987, b. 20, and *Schol.* p. 551, b. 20, p. 567, b. 34, where the work of Aristotle, *Περὶ Τάγαθου*, is referred to: probably the memoranda taken down by Aristotle from Plato's lecture on that subject, accompanied by notes of his own.

In *Schol.* p. 573, a. 18, it is stated that the astronomer Eudoxus was a hearer both of Plato and of Eukleides.

The account given by Zeller (*Gesch. der Philos.* ii. p. 453, 2nd ed.) of this

latter phase of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, applies exactly to that which we hear about the main doctrine of Eukleides. Zeller describes the Platonic doctrine as being "Eine Vermischung des ethischen Begriffes vom höchsten Gut, mit dem Metaphysischen des Absoluten: Der Begriff des Guten ist zunächst aus dem menschlichen Leben abstrahirt; er bezeichnet das, was dem Menschen zuträglich ist. So noch bei Sokrates. Plato verallgemeinert ihn nun zum Begriff des Absoluten; dabei spielt aber seine ursprüngliche Bedeutung noch fortwährend herein, und so entsteht die Unklarheit, dass weder der ethische noch der metaphysische Begriff des Guten rein gefasst wird."

This remark is not less applicable to Eukleides than to Plato, both of them agreeing in the doctrine here criticised. Zeller says truly, that the attempt to identify Unum and Bonum produces perpetual confusion. The two notions are thoroughly distinct and independent. It ought not to be called (as he phrases it) "a generalization of Bonum." There is no common property on which to found a generalization. It is a forced conjunction between two disparates.

Eukleides is said to have composed six dialogues, the titles of which alone remain. The scanty information which we possess respecting him relates altogether to his negative logical procedure. Whether he deduced any consequences from his positive doctrine of the Transcendental Ens, Unum, Bonum, we do not know : but he, as Zeno had been before him,<sup>b</sup> was acute in exposing contradictions and difficulties in the positive doctrines of opponents. He was a citizen of Megara, where he is said to have harboured Plato and the other companions of Sokrates, when they retired for a time from Athens after the death of Sokrates. Living there as a teacher or debater on philosophy, he founded a school or succession of philosophers who were denominated *Megarici*. The title is as old as Aristotle, who both names them and criticises their doctrines.<sup>c</sup> None of their compositions are preserved. The earliest who becomes known to us is Eubulides, the contemporary and opponent of Aristotle ; next Ichthyas, Apollonius, Diodôrus Kronus, Stilpon, Alexinus, between 340-260 B.C.

With the Megaric philosophers there soon become confounded another succession, called Eleian or Eretrian, who trace their origin to another Sokratic man—Phædon. The chief Eretrians made known to us are Pleistanus, Menedêmus, Asklepiades. The second of the three acquired some reputation.

The Megarics and Eretrians, as far as we know them, turned their speculative activity altogether in the logical or intellectual direction, paying little attention to the ethical and emotional field. Both Antisthenes and Aristippus, on the contrary, pursued the ethical path. To the Sokratic question, What is the Bonum ? Eukleides had answered by a transcendental definition : Antisthenes and Aristippus each gave to it an ethical answer, having reference to human wants and emotions, and

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Parmenides*, p. 128 C, where Zeno represents himself as taking for his premisses the conclusions of opponents, to show that they led to absurd consequences. This seems what is meant, when Diogenes says about Eukleides—*ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ἐλίστατο οὐ κατὰ λήμματα, ἀλλὰ κατ' (ii. 107) ;* Deycke, *De Megaricorum*

*Doctrinâ*, p. 34.

<sup>c</sup> Aristot. *Metaph.* iv. p. 1046, b 29.

The sarcasm ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic implies that Eukleides was really known as the founder of a school *τὴν μὲν Εὐκλείδου σχολήν* (Diog. L. vi. 24)—the earliest mention (I apprehend) of the word in that sense.

to the different views which they respectively took thereof. Antisthenes declared it to consist in virtue, by which he meant an independent and self-sufficing character, confining all wants within the narrowest limits: Aristippus placed it in the moderate and easy pleasures, in avoiding ambitious struggles, and in making the best of every different situation, yet always under the guidance of a wise calculation and self-command. Both of them kept clear of the transcendental: they neither accepted it as *Unum et Omne* (the view of Eukleides), nor as *Plura* (the Eternal Ideas or Forms, the Platonic view). Their speculations had reference altogether to human life and feelings, though the one took a measure of this wide subject very different from the other: and in thus confining the range of their speculations, they followed Sokrates more closely than either Eukleides or Plato followed him. They not only abstained from transcendental speculation, but put themselves in declared opposition to it. And since the intellectual or logical philosophy, as treated by Plato, became intimately blended with transcendental hypothesis—Antisthenes and Aristippus are both found on the negative side against its pretensions. Aristippus declared the mathematical sciences to be useless, as conducing in no way to happiness, and taking no account of what was better or what was worse.<sup>d</sup> He declared that we could know nothing except in so far as we were affected by it, and as it was or might be in correlation with ourselves: that as to causes not relative to ourselves, or to our own capacities and affections, we could know nothing about them.<sup>e</sup>

Such were the leading writers and talkers contemporary with Plato, in the dialectical age immediately following on the death of Sokrates. The negative vein greatly preponderates in them, as it does on the

ance of the  
negative  
vein in the  
Platonic age.

<sup>d</sup> Aristotel. *Metaph. B.* 996, a 32. *ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα τῶν σοφιστῶν τινες Ἀριστιππος προεπηλάκιζον αὐτὰς (τὰς μαθηματικὰς τέχνας).—ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις—καὶ ταῖς βαναύοις ἐν τεκτονικῇ καὶ πᾶσι, τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς οὐθέν τι ποιεῖσθαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.*

Aristotle here ranks Aristippus

among the σοφισταί.

Aristippus, in discountenancing φιλοσοφίαν, cited the favourite saying of Sokrates that the proper study of mankind was ὅτι τοι ἐν κακῶν τ' ἀγαθῶν τε τέτυκται.

Plutarch, ap. Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* i. 8.

<sup>e</sup> Sext. *Emp. adv. Math.* vii. 191; *Diog. L.* ii. 92.

whole even in Plato—and as it was pretty sure to do, so long as the form of dialogue was employed. Affirmative exposition and proof is indeed found in some of the later Platonic works, carried on by colloquy between two speakers. But the colloquial form manifests itself evidently as unsuitable for the purpose: and we must remember that Plato was a lecturer as well as a writer, so that his doctrines made their way, at least in part, through continuous exposition. But it is Aristotle with whom the form of affirmative continuous exposition first becomes predominant, in matters of philosophy. Though he composed dialogues (which are now lost), and though he appreciates dialectic as a valuable exercise, yet he considers it only as a discursive preparation; antecedent, though essential, to the more close and concentrated demonstrations of philosophy.

Most historians deal hardly with this negative vein. They depreciate the Sophists, the Megarics and Eretrians, the Academics and Sceptics of the subsequent ages—under the title of Eristics, or lovers of contention for itself—as captious and perverse enemies of truth.

Harsh manner in which historians of philosophy censure the negative vein.

I have already said that my view of the importance and value of the negative vein of philosophy is altogether different. It appears to me quite as essential as the affirmative. It is required as an antecedent, a test, and a corrective. Aristotle deserves all honour for his attempts to construct and defend various affirmative theories: but the value of these theories depends upon their being defensible against all objectors. Affirmative philosophy, as a body not only of truth but of reasoned truth, holds the champion's belt, subject to the challenge not only of competing affirmants, but of all deniers and doubters. And this is the more indispensable, because of the vast problems which these affirmative philosophers undertake to solve: problems especially vast during the age of Plato and Aristotle. The question has to be determined, not only which of two proposed solutions is the best, but whether either of them is tenable, and even whether any solution at all is attainable by the human faculties: whether there exist positive evidence

Negative method in philosophy essential to the controul of the

adequate to sustain any conclusion, accompanied with adequate replies to the objections against it. The burthen of proof lies upon the affirmant: and the proof produced must be open to the scrutiny of every dissentient.

Among these dissentients or negative dialecticians, Sokrates himself, during his life, stood prominent. In his footsteps followed Eukleides and the Megarics: who, though they acquired the unenviable surname of Eristics or Controversialists, cannot possibly have surpassed Sokrates, and probably did not equal him, in the refutative Elenchus. Of no one among the Megarics, probably, did critics ever affirm, what the admiring Xenophon says about Sokrates—"that he dealt with every one in colloquial debate just as he chose,"—*i.e.* that he baffled and puzzled his opponents whenever he chose. No one of these Megarics probably ever enunciated so sweeping a negative programme, or declared so emphatically his own inability to communicate positive instruction, as Sokrates in the Platonic Apology. A person more thoroughly Eristic than Sokrates never lived. And we see perfectly, from the Memorabilia of Xenophon (who nevertheless strives to bring out the opposite side of his character), that he was so esteemed among his contemporaries. Plato, as well as Eukleides, took up this vein in the Sokratic character, and worked it with unrivalled power in many of his dialogues. The Platonic Sokrates is compared, and compares himself, to Antæus, who compelled every new-comer, willing or unwilling, to wrestle with him.<sup>f</sup>

<sup>f</sup> Plato, Theætét. p. 169 A.

Theodorus. Οὐ βᾶδιον, ὦ

λόγον,  
σε

ἀποδύεσθαι,

καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ

μοι δοκεῖς τρὶς

μὲν γὰρ

ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσιν, σὺ δὲ κατ'

ἑὸν τί μοι

τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης  
της ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις

Sokrates. Ἀριστα,

νόσον μου

τερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων· μύριοι γὰρ  
ἤδη μοι Ἡρακλεῖς τε καὶ

πρὸς

τι

οὕτω τις ἐρῶς ἵ

περὶ ταῦτα

οὐκ μὴδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς προσ-  
νος σαυτὸν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐμὲ

How could the eristic appetite be manifested in stronger language either by Eukleides, or Eubulides, or Diodorus Kronus, or any of those Sophists upon whom the Platonic commentators heap so many harsh epithets?

Among the compositions ascribed to Protagoras by Diogenes Laertius (ix. 55), one is entitled Τέχνη Ἐριστικῶν. But if we look at the last chapter of

Of the six dialogues composed by Eukleides, we cannot speak positively, because they are not preserved. But they cannot have been more refutative, and less affirmative, than most of the Platonic dialogues; and we can hardly be wrong in asserting that they were very inferior both in energy and attraction. The *Theætétus* and the *Parmenidès*, two of the most negative among the Platonic dialogues, seem to connect themselves, by the *personnel* of the drama, with the Megaric philosophers: the former dialogue is ushered in by Eukleides, and is, as it were, dedicated to him: the latter dialogue exhibits, as its *protagonistes*, the veteran Parmenides himself, who forms the one factor of the Megaric philosophy, while Sokrates forms the other. Parmenides (in the Platonic dialogue so called) is made to enforce the negative method in general terms, as a philosophical duty co-ordinate with the affirmative; and to illustrate it by a most elaborate argumentation, directed partly against the Platonic Ideas (here advocated by the youthful Sokrates), partly against his own (the Parmenidean) dogma of *Ens Unum*. Parmenides adduces unanswerable objections against the dogma of Transcendental Forms or Ideas; yet says at the same time that there can be no philosophy unless you admit it. He reproves the youthful Sokrates for precipitancy in affirming the dogma, and contends that you are not justified in affirming any dogma until you have gone through a bilateral scrutiny of it—that is, first assuming the doctrine to be true, next assuming it to be false, and following out the deductions arising from the one assumption as well as from the other.<sup>5</sup> Parmenides then gives a string of (to remind the reader of what has been already set forth in my twenty-fourth chapter) successive deductions (at great length, occupying the last half of the dialogue)—four pairs of counter-demonstrations or Antinomies—in which contradictory conclusions appear each to be alike proved. He enunciates the final result as follows:—“Whether *Unum* exists, or does not exist, *Unum* itself and *Cætera*, both exist and do not exist, both

the *Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis*, we shall find Aristotle asserting explicitly that there existed no *Τέχνη*

| *Ἐπιστικῶν* anterior to his own work the *Topica*.

| <sup>5</sup> Plato, *Parmen.* p. 136.

appear and do not appear, all things and in all ways—both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other.”<sup>h</sup>

If this memorable dialogue, with its concluding string of elaborate antinomies, had come down to us under the name of Eukleides, historians would probably have denounced it as a perverse exhibition of ingenuity, worthy of “that litigious person, who first infused into the Megarians the fury of disputation.”<sup>i</sup> But since it is of Platonic origin, we must recognise Plato not only as having divided with the Megaric philosophers the impulse of negative speculation which they had inherited from Sokrates, but as having carried that impulse to an extreme point of invention, combination, and dramatic handling, much beyond their powers. Undoubtedly, if we pass from the *Parmenidês* to other dialogues, we find Plato very different. He has various other intellectual impulses, an abundant flow of ideality and of constructive fancy, in many distinct channels. But negative philosophy is at least one of the indisputable and prominent items of the Platonic aggregate.

While then we admit that the Megaric succession of philosophers exhibited negative subtlety and vehement love of contentious debate, we must recollect that these qualities were inherited from Sokrates and shared with Plato. The philosophy of Sokrates, who taught nothing and cross-examined every one, was essentially more negative and controversial, both in him and his successors, than any which had preceded it. In an age when dialectic colloquy was considered as appropriate for philosophical subjects, and when long continuous exposition was left to the rhetor—Eukleides established a succession or school<sup>k</sup> which was more distinguished for impugning dogmas

The Megarics  
sha  
neg

Plato.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Parmen.* p. 106. ἐν εἴτ' | 'Ἄλλ' οὐ μοι τούτων φλεδόνων μέλει, ἔστιν, εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἔστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.—'Ἀληθέστατα.

, ὅτις γε

Μεγαρεῦσιν ὡς ἐμβαλε

See above, vol. ii. ch. xxv. pp. 288-318.

<sup>i</sup> This is the phrase of the satirical sillographer Timon, who spoke with scorn of all the philosophers except Pyrrhon:—

<sup>k</sup> If we may trust a sarcastic bon-mot ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic, the contemporary of the *viri Sokratici* and the follower of Antisthenes, the term σχολή was applied to the visitors

of others than for defending dogmas of its own. Schleiermacher and others suppose that Plato in his dialogue *Euthydêmus* intends to expose the sophistical fallacies of the Megaric school:<sup>1</sup> and that in the dialogue *Sophistês*, he refutes the same philosophers (under the vague designation of "the friends of Forms") in their speculations about Ens and Non-Ens. The first of these two opinions is probably true to some extent, though we cannot tell how far: the second of the two is supported by some able critics—yet it appears to me untenable.<sup>m</sup>

Of Eukleides himself, though he is characterised as strongly controversial, no distinct points of controversy have been preserved: but his successor Eubulides is celebrated for various sophisms. He was the contemporary and rival of Aristotle: who, without however expressly naming him, probably intends to speak of him when alluding to the Megaric philosophers generally.<sup>n</sup> Another of the same school, Alexinus (rather later than Eubulides), is also said to have written against Aristotle.

Six sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides. 1. Ὁ ψευδόμενος—

Mentiens. 2. Ὁ διαλανθάνων, or

the person hidden under a veil.

<sup>puzzles—difficulty of</sup>

4. Σωρείτης—Sorites. 5. Κερατίνης—Cornutus.

of Eukleides rather than to those of Plato—καὶ τὴν μὲν Εὐκλείδου σχολὴν ἔλεγε, χολήν, τὴν δὲ Πλάτωνος διατριβήν, κατατριβήν. Diog. L. vi. 42.

<sup>1</sup> Schleierm. Einleitung to Plat. Euthyd. p. 403 seq.

<sup>m</sup> Schleierm. Introduction to the *Sophistês*, pp. 134-135.

See Deycks, *Megaricorum Doctrina*, p. 41 seq. Zeller, *Gesch. der Griech. Phil.* vol. ii. p. 180 seq., with his instructive note. Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, vol. i. p. 37, and others cited by Zeller.—Ritter dissents from this view, and I concur in his dissent. To affirm that Eukleides admitted a plurality of Ideas or Forms, is to contradict the only one deposition, certain and unequivocal, which we have about his philosophy. His doctrine is that of the Transcendental Unum, Ens, Bonum; while the doctrine of the Transcendental Plura (Ideas or Forms) belongs to Plato and others. Both Deycks and Zeller (p. 185) recognise

this as a difficulty. But to me it seems fatal to their hypothesis; which, after all, is only an hypothesis—first originated by Schleiermacher. If it be true that the Megarici are intended by Plato under the appellation οἱ τῶν εἰδῶν, we must suppose that the school had been completely transformed before the time of Stilpon, who is presented as the great opponent of τὰ εἶδη.

<sup>n</sup> Aristokles, ap. Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* xv. 2. Eubulides is said not merely to have controverted the philosophical theories of Aristotle, but also to have attacked his personal character with bitterness and slander: a practice not less common in ancient controversy than in modern. About Alexinus, Diog. L. ii. 109.

Among those who took lessons in rhetoric and pronunciation from Eubulides, we read the name of the orator Demosthenes, who is said to have improved his pronunciation thereby. Diog. Laert. ii. p. 108. Plutarch, x. *Orat.* 21, p. 845 C.

6. Φάλακρος—Calvus. Of these the second is substantially the same with the third; and the fourth the same with the sixth, only inverted.<sup>o</sup>

solving them  
...many so-  
lutions at-  
tempted.

These sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides, and belonged probably to the Megaric school both before and after him. But it is plain both from the Euthydêmus of Plato, and from the Topica of Aristoteles, that there were many others of similar character; frequently employed in the abundant dialectic colloquies which prevailed at Athens during the fourth and third centuries B.C. Plato and Aristotle handle such questions and their authors contemptuously, under the name of Eristic: but it was more easy to put a bad name upon them, as well us upon the Eleate Zeno, than to elucidate the logical difficulties which they brought to view. Neither Aristotle nor Plato provided a sufficient answer to them: as is proved by the fact, that several subsequent philosophers wrote treatises expressly in reference to them—even philosophers of reputation, like Theophrastus and Chrysippus.<sup>p</sup> How these two latter philosophers performed their task, we cannot say. But the fact, that they attempted the task, exhibits a commendable anxiety to make their logical theory complete, and to fortify it against objections.

It is in this point of view—in reference to logical theory—that the Megaric philosophers have not been fairly appreciated. They, or persons reasoning in their manner, formed one essential encouragement and

Real character  
of the

<sup>o</sup> Diog. L. ii. pp. 108-109; vii. 82. Lucian Vit. Auct. 22.

1. Cicero, Academ. ii. pp. 30-36. "Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris. Dicis autem te mentiri, verumque dicis: mentiris igitur."

2, 3. Ὁ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος. You know your father: you are placed before a person covered and concealed by a thick veil: you do not know him. But this person is your father. Therefore you both know your father, and do not know him. 5. Κερατίνης. That which you have not lost, you have: but you have not lost horns; therefore you have horns. 4, 6. Σωπελτής—Φάλακρος. What number of grains make a heap—or are many? What number are few? Are three grains

few, and four many?—or, where will you draw the line between Few and Many? The like question about the hairs on a man's head—How many must he lose before he can be said to have only a few, or to be bald?

<sup>p</sup> Diog. L. v. p. 49; vii. pp. 192-198. Seneca, Epistol. p. 45. Plutarch (De Stoicor. Repugnantia, p. 1037) has some curious extracts and remarks from Chrysippus; who (he says) spoke in the harshest terms against the Μεγαρικά ἐρωτήματα, as having puzzled and unsettled men's convictions without ground—while he (Chrysippus) had himself proposed puzzles and difficulties still more formidable, in his treatise κατὰ Συνθήκας.

ceive, but to  
guard against  
deception.

condition to the formation of any tolerable logical theory. They administered, to minds capable and constructive, that painful sense of contradiction, and shock of perplexity, which Sokrates relied upon as the stimulus to mental parturition—and which Plato extols as a lever for raising the student to general conceptions.<sup>1</sup> Their sophisms were not intended to impose upon any one, but on the contrary, to guard against imposition.<sup>2</sup> Whoever states a fallacy clearly and nakedly, applying it to a particular case in which it conduces to a conclusion known upon other evidence not to be true—contributes to divest it of its misleading effect. The persons most liable to be deceived by the fallacy are those who are not forewarned;—in cases where the premisses are stated not nakedly, but in an artful form of words—and where the conclusion, though false, is not known beforehand to be false by the hearer. To use Mr. John Stuart Mill's phrase,<sup>3</sup> the fallacy is a case of apparent evidence mistaken for real evidence: you expose it to be evidence only apparent and not real, by giving a type of the fallacy, in which the conclusion obtained is obviously false: and the more obviously false it is, the better suited for its tutelary purpose. Aristotle recognises, as indispensable in philosophical enquiry, the preliminary wrestling into which he conducts his reader, by

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 523 A, 524. τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκειψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως

ὕγιες ποιούσης—Τὰ μὲν οὐ παρα-  
ῖσα μὴ ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν  
ἕμα· τὰ δ' ἐκβαίνοντα, ὡς πα-  
α τίθημι, ἐπειδὴν ἡ αἰσθησις  
λον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ.

Compare p. 524 E: the whole passage very interesting.

<sup>2</sup> The remarks of Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. ii. p. 139, 2nd ed.) upon these Megaric philosophers are more just and discerning than those made by most of the historians of philosophy—"Doch darf man wohl annehmen, dass sie solche Trugschlüsse nicht zur Täuschung, sondern zur Belehrung für unvorsichtige, oder zur Warnung vor der Seichtigkeit gewöhnlicher Vorstellungsweisen, gebrauchen wollten. So

viel ist gewiss, dass die Megariker sich viel mit den Formen des Denkens beschäftigten, vielleicht mehr zur Aufsuchung einzelner Regeln, als zur Begründung eines wissenschaftlichen Zusammenhangs unter ihnen; obwohl auch besondere Theile der Logik unter ihren Schriften erwähnt werden."

This is much more reasonable than the language of Prantl, who denounces "the shamelessness of doctrinarism" (die Unverschämtheit des Doctrinarismus) belonging to these Megarici—"the petulance and vanity which prompted them to seek celebrity by intentional offences against sound common sense," &c. (Gesch. der Logik, pp. 39-49.—Sir Wm. Hamilton has some good remarks on these sophisms, in his Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxiii. p. 452 seq.

<sup>3</sup> See the first chapter of his book v. on Fallacies, System of Logic, vol. ii.

means of a long string of unsolved difficulties or puzzles—(ἀπόρριαι). He declares distinctly and forcibly, that whoever attempts to lay out a positive theory, without having before his mind a full list of the difficulties with which he is to grapple, is like one who searches without knowing what he is looking for; without being competent to decide whether what he hits upon as a solution be really a solution or not.<sup>t</sup> Now that enumeration of puzzles which Aristotle here postulates (and in part undertakes, in reference to *Philosophia Prima*) is exactly what the Megarics, and various other dialecticians (called by Plato and Aristotle Sophists) contributed to furnish for the use of those who theorised on Logic.

You may dislike philosophy: you may undervalue, or altogether proscribe, the process of theorising. This is the standing-point usual with the bulk of mankind, ancient as well as modern: who generally dislike all accurate reasoning, or analysis and discrimination of familiar abstract words, as mean and tiresome hair-splitting.<sup>u</sup> But if you admit the business of theorising to be legitimate, useful, and even honourable, you must reckon on free working of independent, individual, minds as the operative force—and on the necessity of dissentient, conflicting manifestations of this common force, as essential conditions to any successful result. Upon no other conditions can you obtain any tolerable body of reasoned truth—or even reasoned *quasi-truth*.

Now the historians of philosophy seldom take this view of philosophy as a whole—as a field to which the free antithesis of affirmative and negative is indispensable. They consider true philosophy as represented by Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, one or other of

If the process of theorising be admissible, it must include negative as well as affirmative.

Logical position of the Megaric philosophers erroneously described by historians of

Aristotel. Metaphys. B. i, p. 994, a. 33.

τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἀνευ τοῦ δια-  
 ἡσθαι πρῶτον ὁμολοῦν εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ  
 , καὶ πρὸς τούτοις

εἴ ποτε

τέλος τούτῳ

οὐ

Aristotle devotes the whole of this Book to an enumeration

<sup>u</sup> See my account of the Platonic dialogue *Hippias Major*, vol. i. ch. xi. pp. 382-385. Aristot. Metaphys. A minor, p. 995, a. 9. τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς, ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ

τι τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καθάπερ  
 ἴων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λό-  
 γων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λό-

ἵνα τισι δοκεῖ. Cicero (*Paradoxa*, c. 2) talks of the "*minutæ interrogatiunculæ*" of the Stoics as tedious and tiresome.

philosophy.  
Necessity of  
a complete  
collection of  
difficulties.

them: while the contemporaries of these eminent men are discredited under the name of Sophists, Eristics, or sham-philosophers, sowing tares among the legitimate crop of wheat—or as devils whom the miraculous virtue of Sokrates and Plato is employed in expelling from the Athenian mind. Even the companions of Sokrates, and the Megarics among them, whom we know only upon the imperfect testimony of opponents, have fallen under this unmerited sentence: \* as if they were destructive agents breaking down an edifice of well-constituted philosophy—no such edifice in fact having ever existed in Greece, though there were several dissenting lecture rooms and conflicting veins of speculation promoted by eminent individuals.

Whoever undertakes, *bonâ fide*, to frame a complete and defensible logical theory, will desire to have before him a copious collection of such difficulties, and will consider those who propound them as useful auxiliaries.† If he finds no one

\* The same charge is put by Cicero into the mouth of Lucullus against the Academics:—"Similiter vos (Academici) quum perturbare, ut illi" (the Gracchi and others) "republicam, sic vos philosophiam, benè jam constitutam velitis. Tum exortus est, ut in optimâ republicâ Tiberius Gracchus, sic Arcesilas, qui constitutam philosophiam everteret."

Even in the liberal and comprehensive history of the Greek philosophy by Zeller (vol. ii. p. 187, ed. 2nd), respecting Eukleides and the Megarians:—"Dagegen bot der *Streit gegen die geltenden Meinungen* dem Scharfsinn, der Rechthaberei, und dem wissenschaftlichen Ehrgeiz, ein unerschöpfliches Feld dar, welches denn auch die Megarischen Philosophen rüstig ausbeuteten."

If by "*die geltenden Meinungen*" Zeller means the *common sense* of the day—that is, the opinions and beliefs current among the *ἰδῶται*, the working, enjoying, non-theorising public—it is very true that the Megaric philosophers contended against them: but Sokrates and Plato contended against them quite as much; we see this in the Platonic Apology, Gorgias, Republic, Timæus, Parmenidès, &c.

If, on the other hand, by "*die geltenden Meinungen*" Zeller means any philosophical or logical theories

generally or universally admitted by thinking men as valid, the answer is that there were none such in the fourth and third centuries B.C. Various eminent speculative individuals were labouring to construct such theories, each in his own way, and each with a certain congregation of partisans; but established theory there was none. Nor can any theory (whether accepted or not) be firm or trustworthy, unless it be exposed to the continued thrusts of the negative weapon, searching out its vulnerable points. We know of the Megarics only what they furnished towards that negative testing; without which, however,—as we may learn from Plato and Aristotle themselves,—the true value of the affirmative defences can never be measured.

† Marbach (Gesch. der Philos. s. 91), though he treats the Megarics as jesters (which I do not think they were), yet adds very justly: "Nevertheless these puzzles (propounded by the Megarics) have their serious and scientific side. We are forced to inquire, how it happens that the contradictions shown up in them are not merely possible but even necessary."

Both Tiedemann and Winckelmann also remark that the debaters called Eristics contributed greatly to the formation of the theory and precepts of Logic, afterwards laid out by Aristotle.

to propound them, he will have to imagine them for himself. "The philosophy of reasoning" (observes Mr. John Stuart Mill) "must comprise the philosophy of bad as well as of good reasoning."<sup>2</sup> The one cannot be complete without the other. To enumerate the different varieties of apparent evidence which is not real evidence (called Fallacies), and of apparent contradictions which are not real contradictions—referred as far as may be to classes, each illustrated by a suitable type—is among the duties of a logician. He will find this duty much facilitated, if there happen to exist around him an active habit of dialectic debate: ingenious men who really study the modes of puzzling and confuting a well-armed adversary, as well as of defending themselves against the like. Such a habit did exist at Athens: and unless it had existed the Aristotelian theories on logic would probably never have been framed. Contemporary and antecedent dialecticians, the Megarici among them, supplied the stock of particular examples enumerated and criticised by Aristotle in the *Topica*:<sup>a</sup> which treatise (especially the last book, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*) is intended both to explain the theory, and to give suggestions on the practice, of logical controversy. A man who takes lessons in fencing must learn not only how to thrust and parry, but also how to impose on his opponent by feints, and to meet the feints employed against himself: a general who learns the art of war must know how to take advantage of the enemy by effective cheating and treachery (to use the language of Xenophon), and how to avoid being cheated himself. The Aristotelian *Topica*, in like manner, teach the arts both of dialectic attack and of dialectic defence.<sup>b</sup>

Winckelmann, *Prolegg. ad Platon. Euthydem.* pp. xxiv.-xxxi. Even Stallbaum, though full of harshness towards those Sophists whom he describes as belonging to the school of Protagoras, treats the Megaric philosophers with much greater respect. *Prolegom. ad Platon. Euthydem.* p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> *System of Logic*, Book v. i. 1.

<sup>a</sup> Prantl (*Gesch. der Logik*. vol. i. pp. 43-50), ascribes to the Megarics all or nearly all the sophisms which Aristotle notices in the *Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis*. This is more than can be proved, and more than I think probable. Several of them are

taken from the Platonic *Euthydémus*.

<sup>b</sup> See the remarkable passages in the discourses of Sokrates (*Memorab.* iii. 1, 6; iv. 2, 15), and in that of Kambyases to Cyrus, which repeats the same opinion—*Cyropæd.* i. 6, 27—respecting the amount of deceit, treachery, the thievish and rapacious qualities required for conducting war against an enemy—(τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς νόμιμα, i. 6, 34).

Aristotle treats of Dialectic, as he does of Rhetoric, as an art having its theory and precepts founded upon that theory. I have already observed, in a former chapter (vol. i. c. xix.

The Sophisms ascribed to Eubulides, looked at from the point of view of logical theory, deserve that attention which they seem to have received. The logician lays down as a rule that no affirmative proposition can be at the same time true and false. Now the first  
 4. Cornutus. sophism (called *Mentiens*) exhibits the case of a proposition which is, or appears to be, at the same time true and false.<sup>c</sup> It is for the logician to explain how this proposition

pp. 543-550), that logical Fallacies are not generated or invented by persons called Sophists, but are inherent liabilities to error in the human intellect; and that the habit of debate affords the only means of bringing them into clear daylight, and guarding against being deceived by them. Aristotle gives precepts both how to thrust, and how to parry with the best effect: if he had taught only how to parry, he would have left out one-half of the art.

One of the most learned and candid of the Aristotelian commentators—M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire—observes as follows (*Logique d'Aristote*, p. 435, Paris, 1835) respecting *De Sophist. Elenchis*:—

"Aristote va donc s'occuper de la marche qu'il faut donner aux discussions sophistiques; et ici il serait difficile quelquefois de décider, à la manière dont les choses sont présentées par lui, si ce sont des conseils qu'il donne aux Sophistes, ou à ceux qui veulent éviter leurs ruses. Tout ce qui précède, prouve, au reste, que c'est en ce dernier sens qu'il faut entendre la pensée du philosophe. Ceci est d'ailleurs la seconde portion du traité."

It appears to me that Aristotle intended to teach or to suggest both the two things which are here placed in Antithesis—though I do not agree with M. St. Hilaire's way of putting the alternative—as if there were one class of persons, professional Sophists, who fenced with poisoned weapons, while every one except them refrained from such weapons. Aristotle intends to teach the art of Dialectic as a whole; he neither intends nor wishes that any learners shall make a bad use of his teaching; but if they do use it badly, the fault does not lie with him. See the observations in the beginning of the *Rhetorica*, i. p. 1355, a. 26, and the observations put by Plato into the mouth of Gorgias (*Gorg.* p. 456 E).

Even in the *Analytica Priora* (ii. 19, a. 34) (independent of the *Topica*) Aristotle says:—*χρὴ δὲ περὶ φυλάτ- παραγγέλλομεν ἀποκρινόμενους, αὐτοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας περιᾶσθαι λανθάνειν*. Investigations of the double or triple senses of words (he says) are useful—*καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παραλογισθῆναι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ παραλογισθῆναι*, *Topica*, i. 18, p. 108, a. 20. See also other passages of the *Topica* where artifices are indicated for the purpose of concealing your own plan of proceeding and inducing your opponent to make answer in the sense which you wish, *Topica*, i. 2, p. 101, a. 25, vi. 10, p. 148, a. 37, viii. 1, p. 151, b. 23, viii. 1, p. 153, a. 6, viii. 2, p. 154, a. 5, viii. 11, p. 161, a. 24 seq. You must be provided with the means of meeting every sort and variety of objection—*πρὸς γὰρ τὸν*

*ἐὼν ἔστιν*. *Topic.* v. 4. p. 134, a. 4.

I have already touched on the *Topica*, in this point of view, as founded upon and illustrating the Megaric logical puzzles (vol. i. ch. vi. pp. 241-243-259).

<sup>c</sup> Theophrastus wrote a treatise in three books on the solution of the puzzle called *Ὁ ψευδόμενος* (see the list of his lost works in Diogenes L. v. 49). We find also other treatises entitled *Μεγαρικὸς δ* (which Diogenes cites, vi. 22),—*Ἀγωνιστικὸν τῆς περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικoὺς λόγους θεωρίας*—*Σοφισμάτων δ*, β—besides several more titles relating to dialectics, and bearing upon the solution of syllogistic problems. Chrysippus also, in the ensuing century, wrote a treatise in three books, *Περὶ τῆς τοῦ ψευδομένου λύσεως* (*Diog.* vii. 197). Such facts show the importance of these problems in their bearing upon logical theory, as conceived by the ancient world. Epikurus also wrote against the *Μεγαρικοί* (*Diog.* x. 27).

The discussion of sophisms, or logical difficulties (*λύσεις ἀποριῶν*), was a

can be brought under his rule—or else to admit it as an exception. Again, the second and third sophisms in the list (the Veiled or Hidden Man) are so contrived as to involve the respondent in a contradiction: he is made to say both that he knows his father, and that he does not know his father. Both the one answer and the other follow naturally from the questions and circumstances supposed. The contradiction points to the loose and equivocal way in which the word *to know* is used in common speech. Such equivocal meaning of words is not only one of the frequent sources of error and fallacy in reasoning, but also one of the least heeded by persons untrained in dialectics; who are apt to presume that the same word bears always the same meaning. To guard against this cause of error, and to determine (or impel others to determine) the accurate meaning or various distinct meanings of each word, is among the duties of the logician: and I will add that the verb *to know* stands high in the list of words requiring such determination—as the Platonic Theætétus<sup>a</sup> alone would be sufficient to teach us. Farthermore, when we examine what is called the Soritês of Eubulides, we perceive that it brings to view an inherent indeterminateness of various terms; indeterminateness which cannot be avoided, but which must be pointed out in order that it may not mislead. You cannot say how many grains are *much*—or how many grains make *a heap*. When this want of precision, pervading many words in the language, was first brought to notice in a suitable special case, it would naturally appear a striking novelty. Lastly, the sophism called *Κερατίνης* or Cornutus, is one of great plausibility, which would probably impose upon most persons, if the question were asked for the first time without any forewarning. It serves to administer a lesson, nowise

favourite occupation at the banquets of philosophers at Athens, on or about 100 B C. Ἀντίπατρος δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος, συμπόσιόν ποτε συνάγων, συνέταξε τοῖς ἐρχομένοις ὡς περὶ σοφισμάτων ἐροῦσιν (Athenæus, v. 186 C; Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, p. 1096 C). De Sanitate Præcepta, c. 20, p. 133 B.

<sup>a</sup> Various portions of the Theætétus illustrate this Megaric sophism (pp. 165-188). The situation assumed in

the question of Eubulides—having before your eyes a person veiled—might form a suitable addition to the various contingencies specified in Theætét. pp. 192-193.

The manner in which the Platonic Sokrates proves (Theæt. 105) that you at the same time see, and do not see, an object before you, is quite as sophistical as the way in which Eubulides proves that you both know, and do not know, your father.

unprofitable or superfluous, that before you answer a question, you should fully weigh its import and its collateral bearings.

The causes of error and fallacy are inherent in the complication of nature, the imperfection of language, the small range of facts which we know, the indefinite varieties of comparison possible among those facts, and the diverse or opposite predispositions, intellectual as well as emotional, of individual minds. They are not fabricated by those who first draw attention to them.\* The Megarics, far from being themselves deceivers, served as sentinels against deceit. They planted conspicuous beacons upon some of the sunken rocks whereon unwary reasoners were likely to be wrecked. When the general type of a fallacy is illustrated by a particular case in which the conclusion is manifestly untrue, the like fallacy is rendered less operative for the future.

Of the positive doctrines of the Megarics we know little: but there is one upon which Aristotle enters into controversy with them, and upon which (as far as can be made out) I think they were in the right. In the question about Power, they held that the power to do a thing did not exist, except when the thing was actually done: that an architect, for example, had no power to build a house, except when he actually did build one. Aristotle controverts this opinion at some length: contending

\* Cicero, in his *Academ. Prior. ii.* pp. 28-30, has very just remarks on the obscurities and difficulties in the reasoning process, which the Megarics and others brought to view—and were blamed for so doing, as unfair and captious reasoners—as if they had themselves created the difficulties—“*(Dialectica) primo progressu festivé tradit elementa loquendi et ambiguum intelligentiam concludendique rationem; tum paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sané et periculosum locum, quod tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut nullâ in re statuere possimus quatenus. Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nullâ omnino in re*

*minutatim interroganti—dives, pauper—clarus, obscurus, sit—multa, pauca, magna, parva, longa, brevia, lata, angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto certum respondeamus, non habemus. At vitiosi sunt soritæ. Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. . . . Sic me (inquit) sustineo, neque diutius captiosè interroganti respondes. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbis: si non habes, ne tu quidem percipis.*”

The principle of the Sorites (*ἡ σωπιτική ἀπορία*—Sextus adv. Gramm. s. 68) though differently applied, is involved in the argument of Zeno the Eleate, addressed to Protagoras—see Simplicius ad Aristot. Physic. 250, p. 423, b. 42, Sch. Brand.; compare chap. ii. of this work, vol. i. p. 98-104.

that there exists a sort of power or cause which is in itself irregular and indeterminate, sometimes turning to the affirmative, sometimes to the negative, to do or not to do;<sup>f</sup> that the architect *has the power to build* constantly, though he exerts it only on occasions: and that many absurdities would follow if we did not admit, That a given power or energy—and the exercise of that power—are things distinct and separable.<sup>g</sup>

Now these arguments of Aristotle are by no means valid against the Megarics, whose doctrine, though apparently paradoxical, will appear when explained to be no paradox at all, but perfectly true. When we say that the architect has power to build, we do not mean that he has power to do so under all supposable circumstances, but only under certain conditions: we wish to distinguish him from non-professional men, who under those same conditions have no power to build. The architect must be awake and sober: he must have the will or disposition to build:<sup>h</sup> he must be provided with tools and materials, and be secure against destroying enemies. These and other conditions being generally understood, it is unnecessary to enunciate them in common speech. But when we engage in dialectic analysis, the accurate discussion (*ἀκριβολογία*) indispensable to philosophy requires us to bring under distinct notice, that which the elliptical character of common speech implies without enunciating. Unless these favourable conditions be supposed, the architect is no more able to build than an ordinary non-professional man. Now the Megarics did not deny the distinctive character of the architect, as compared with the non-architect: but they defined more accurately in what it consisted, by restoring the omitted conditions. They went a step farther: they pointed out that whenever the architect

These argu-

<sup>f</sup> Aristot. De Interpret. p. 19, a. 6-20. ὅπως ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ αἰεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ὁμοίως ἐν οἷς ἅμωφ ἐνδέχεται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι.

<sup>g</sup> Aristot. Metaph. Θ. 3, p. 1046, b. 29. Εἰσι δὲ τινες, οἱ φασιν, ὅσον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ, μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ, μὴ δύνασθαι—ὅσον αὐτὸ δύνασθαι οἰκοδο-

μεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Deycks (De Megaricorum Doctrinā, pp. 70-71) considers this opinion of the Megarics to be derived from their general Eleatic theory of the Ens Unum et Immutum. But I see no logical connection between the two.

<sup>h</sup> About this condition, implied in the predicate *δυνατός*, see Plato, *Hippias Minor*, p. 366 D.

finds himself in concert with these accompanying conditions (his own volition being one of the conditions) he goes to work—and the building is produced. As the house is not built, unless he wills to build, and has tools and materials, &c.—so conversely, whenever he has the will to build and has tools and materials, &c., the house is actually built. The effect is not produced, except when the full assemblage of antecedent conditions come together: but as soon as they do come together, the effect is assuredly produced. The accomplishments of the architect, though an essential item, are yet only one item among several, of the conditions necessary to building the house. He has no power to build, except when those other conditions are assumed along with him: in other words, he has no such power except when he actually does build.

Aristotle urges against the Megarics, various arguments, as follows:—1. Their doctrine implies that the architect is not an architect, and does not possess his professional skill,<sup>i</sup> except at the moment when he is actually building.—But the Megarics would have denied that their doctrine did imply this. The architect possesses his art at all times: but his art does not constitute a power of building except under certain accompanying conditions.

2. The Megaric doctrine is the same as that of Protagoras, implying that there exists no perceivable Object, and no Subject capable of perceiving, except at the moment when perception actually takes place.<sup>k</sup>—On this we may observe, that the Megarics coincide with Protagoras thus far, that they bring into open daylight the relative and conditional, which the received phraseology tends to hide. But neither they nor he affirm what is here put upon them. When we speak of a perceivable Object, we mean that which may and will be perceived, *if* there be a proper Subject to perceive it: when we affirm a Subject capable of perception, we mean, one which will perceive, under those circumstances which we call the presence of an Object suitably placed. The Subject and Object are correlates: but it is convenient to have a language

<sup>i</sup> Aristot. *Metaph.* θ. 3, 1047, a. 2. *ὅταν παύσῃται (οἰκοδομῶν) οὐχ ἔξει τῇ*

<sup>k</sup> Aristot. *Metaph.* θ. 3, 1047, a. 8-13.

in which one of them alone is introduced unconditionally, while the conditional sign is applied to the correlate: though the matter affirmed involves a condition common to both.

3. According to the Megaric doctrine (Aristotle argues) every man when not actually seeing, is blind; every man when not actually speaking, is dumb.—Here the Megarics would have said that this is a misinterpretation of the terms dumb and blind; which denote a person who cannot speak or see, even though he wishes it. One who is now silent, though not dumb, may speak if he wills it: but his own volition is an essential condition.<sup>1</sup>

4. According to the Megaric doctrine (says Aristotle) when you are now lying down, you have no power to rise: when you are standing up, you have no power to lie down: so that the present condition of affairs must continue for ever unchanged:—nothing can come into existence which is not now in being.—Here again, the Megarics would have denied his inference. The man who is now standing up, has power to lie down, *if he wills* to do so—or he may be thrown down by a superior force: that is, he will lie down, *if* some new fact of a certain character shall supervene. The Megarics do not deny that he has power, *if*—so and so: they deny that he has power, without the *if*—that is, without the farther accompaniments essential to energy.

On the whole, it seems to me that Aristotle's refutation of the Megarics is unsuccessful. A given assemblage of condi-

<sup>1</sup> The question between Aristotle and the Megarics has not passed out of debate with modern philosophers.

Dr. Thomas Brown observes, in his inquiry into Cause and Effect—"From the mere silence of any one, we cannot infer that he is dumb in consequence of organic imperfection. He may be silent only because he has no desire of speaking, not because speech would not have followed his desire: and it is not with the mere *existence* of any one, but *with his desire of speaking*, that we suppose utterance to be connected. A man who has *no desire of speaking*, has in truth, and in strictness of language, *no power of speaking*, when in that state of mind: since he has not a circumstance which, as immediately

prior, is essential to speech. But since he has that power, as soon as the new circumstance of desire arises—and as the presence or absence of the desire cannot be perceived but in its effects—*there is no inconvenience in the common language*, which ascribes the power, *as if it were possessed at all times, and in all circumstances of mind*, though unquestionably, nothing more is meant than that the desire existing will be followed by utterance." (Brown, Essay on the Relation of Cause and Effect, p. 200.)

This is the real sense of what Aristotle calls τὸ δὲ (λέγεται) δυνατόν, ὁλον δυνατόν εἶναι βαλῖ(ειν ὅτι) βαλῖσειεν ἂν, i.e. he will walk *if* he desires to do so (De Interpret. p. 23, a. 9-15).

tions is requisite for the production of any act: while there are other circumstances, which, if present at the same time, would defeat its production. We often find it convenient to describe a state of things in which some of the antecedent conditions are present without the rest: in which therefore the act is not produced, yet would be produced, if the remaining circumstances were present, and if the opposing circumstances were absent.<sup>m</sup> The state of things thus described is the *potential* as distinguished from the *actual*: power, distinguished from act or energy: it represents an incomplete assemblage of the antecedent positive conditions—or perhaps a complete assemblage, but counteracted by some opposing circumstances. As soon as the assemblage becomes complete, and the opposing circumstances removed, the potential passes into the actual. The architect, when he is not building, possesses, not indeed the full or plenary power to build, but an important fraction of that power, which will become plenary when the other fractions supervene, but will then at the same time become operative, so as to produce the actual building.<sup>n</sup>

<sup>m</sup> Hobbes, in his *Computation or Logic* (chaps. ix. and x. Of Cause and Effect. Of Power and Act) expounds this subject with his usual perspicuity.

"A Cause simply, or an Entire Cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents, both of the agents, how many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; which, when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same instant: and if any one of them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the effect is not produced" (ix. 3).

"Correspondent to Cause and Effect are Power and Act; nay, those and these are the same things, though for divers considerations they have divers names. For whensoever any agent has all those accidents which are necessarily requisite for the production of some effect in the patient, then we say that agent has power to produce that effect if it be applied to a patient. In like manner, whensoever any patient has all those accidents which it is requisite it should have for the production of some effect in it, we say it is in

the power of that patient to produce that effect if it be applied to a fitting agent. Power, active and passive, are parts only of plenary and entire power: nor, except they be joined, can any effect proceed from them. And therefore these powers are but conditional: namely, the agent has power if it be applied to a patient, and the patient has power if it be applied to an agent. *Otherwise neither of them have power, nor can the accidents which are in them severally be properly called powers*; nor any action be said to be possible for the power of the agent alone or the patient alone."

<sup>n</sup> Aristotle does in fact grant all that is here said, in the same book and in the page next subsequent to that which contains his arguments against the Megaric doctrine, *Metaphys.* Θ. 5, 1048, a. 1-24.

In this chapter Aristotle distinguishes powers belonging to things from powers belonging to persons—powers irrational from powers rational—powers in which the agent acts without any will or choice, from those in which the will or choice of the agent

The doctrine which I have just been canvassing is expressly cited by Aristotle as a Megaric doctrine, and was therefore probably held by his contemporary Eubulides. From the pains which Aristotle takes (in the treatise 'De Interpretatione' and elsewhere) to explain and vindicate his own doctrine about the Potential and the Actual, we may see that it was a theme much debated among the dialecticians of the day. And we read of another Megaric, Diodorus<sup>o</sup> Kronus, perhaps contemporary (yet probably a little later than Aristotle), as advancing a position substantially the same as that of Eubulides. That alone is possible (Diodorus affirmed) which either is happening now, or will happen at some future time. As in speaking about facts of an unrecorded past, we know well that a given fact either occurred or did not occur, yet without knowing which of the two is true—and therefore we affirm only that the fact *may* have occurred: so also about the future, either the assertion that a given fact will at some time occur, is positively true, or

is one item of the aggregate of conditions. He here expressly recognises that the power of the agent, separately considered, is only *conditional*; that is conditional on the presence and suitable state of the patient, as well as upon the absence of counteracting circumstances. But he contends that such absence of counteracting circumstances is plainly implied, and need not be expressly mentioned in the definition.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν τι δυνατόν, καὶ ποτέ, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ—

τὸ δυνατόν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέγηται, οὗ τ' ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἔχει δὲ παρὸντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὧδι ἔχοντος εἰ δὲ μή, ποιεῖν οὐ σέεται.

προσδιορίζεσθαι, οὐθὲν ἔτι

ἔν, ἔστι δ' οὐ πᾶσι  
πῶς, ἢς ἀφορισθήσεται καὶ  
τὰ ἔξω κωλύοντα ἀφαίρεται γὰρ ταῦτα

The commentary of Alexander Aphr. upon this chapter is well worth consulting (pp. 546-548 of the edition of his commentary by Bonitz, 1847). Moreover Aristotle affirms in this chapter, that when τὸ ποιητικὸν and τὸ παθητικὸν come together under

suitable circumstances, the power will certainly pass into act.

Here then, it seems to me, Aristotle concedes the doctrine which the Megarics affirmed; or, if there be any difference between them, it is rather verbal than real. In fact, Aristotle's reasoning in the third chapter (wherein he impugns the doctrine of the Megarics), and the definition of *δυνατόν* which he gives in that chapter (1047, a. 25), are hardly to be reconciled with his reasoning in the fifth chapter. Bonitz (Notes on the Metaphys. pp. 393-395) complains of the *mira levitas* of Aristotle in his reasoning against the Megarics, and of his omitting to distinguish between *Vermögen* and *Möglichkeit*. I will not use so uncourteous a phrase; but I think his refutation of the Megarics is both unsatisfactory and contradicted by himself. I agree with the following remark of Bonitz:—"Nec mirum, quod Megarici, aliis illi quidem in rebus arguti, in hac autem satis acuti, existentiam τῷ δυνάμει ὄντι tribuere recusarint," &c.

<sup>o</sup> The dialectic ingenuity of Diodorus is powerfully attested by the verse of Ariston, applied to describe Arkesilaus. (Sext. Emp. Pyrr. Hyp. i. p. 234.)

the assertion that it will never occur, is positively true: the assertion that it may or may not occur some time or other, represents only our ignorance, which of the two is true. That which will never at any time occur, is impossible.

The argument here recited must have been older than Diodorus, since Aristotle states and controverts it: *Sophism of Diodorus—* but it seems to have been handled by him in a peculiar dialectic arrangement which obtained the title of *‘Ο Κυριεύων*.<sup>p</sup> The Stoics (especially Chrysippus) in times somewhat later, impugned the opinion of Diodorus, though seemingly upon grounds not quite the same as Aristotle. This problem was one upon which speculative minds occupied themselves for several centuries. Aristotle and Chrysippus maintained that affirmations respecting the past were *necessary* (one necessarily true and the other necessarily false)—affirmations respecting the future, *contingent* (one must be true and the other false, but either might be true). Diodorus held that both varieties of affirmations were equally necessary—Kleanthes the Stoic thought that both were equally contingent.<sup>q</sup>

It was thus that the Megaric dialecticians, with that fertility of mind which belonged to the Platonic and Aristotelian century, stirred up many real problems and difficulties connected with logical evidence, and supplied matters for discussion which not only occupied the speculative minds of the next four or five centuries, but have continued in debate down to the present day.

The question about the Possible and Impossible, raised between Aristotle and Diodorus, depends upon the larger question, Whether there are universal laws of Nature or not? whether the sequences are, universally and throughout, composed of assemblages of conditions regularly antecedent, and assemblages of events regularly consequent; though from the

Question between Aristotle and Diodorus, depends upon whether universal regularity of  
 —————be  
 —————or  
 denied.

<sup>p</sup> Aristot. De Interpret. p. 18, a. pp. 27-38. Alexander ad Aristot. Analyt. Prior. 34, p. 163, b. 34, Schol. Brandis. See also Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxiii. p. 464.

<sup>q</sup> Arrian ad Epiktet. ii. p. 19. Upton, in his notes on this passage of Arrian (p. 151) has embodied a very valuable

and elaborate commentary by Mr. Jas. Harris (the great English Aristotelian scholar of the 18th century), explaining the nature of this controversy, and the argument called *δ Κυριεύων*.

Compare Cicero, De Fato, c. 7-9. Epistol. Fam. ix. 4.

number and complication of causes, partly co-operating and partly conflicting with each other, we with our limited intelligence are often unable to predict the course of events in each particular situation. Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, all maintained that regular sequence of antecedent and consequent was not universal, but partial only: <sup>r</sup> that there were some agencies essentially regular, in which observation of the past afforded ground for predicting the future—other agencies (or the same agencies on different occasions) essentially irregular, in which the observation of the past afforded no such ground. Aristotle admitted a graduation of causes from perfect regularity to perfect irregularity:—1. The Celestial Spheres, with their included bodies or divine persons, which revolved and exercised a great and preponderant influence throughout the Kosmos, with perfect uniformity; having no power of contraries, *i.e.* having no power of doing anything else but what they actually did (having ἐνεργεία without δύναμις). 2. The four Elements, in which the natural agencies were to a great degree necessary and uniform, but also in a certain degree otherwise—either always or for the most part uniform (τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ)—tending by inherent appetency towards uniformity, but not always attaining it. 3. Besides these there were two other varieties of Causes accidental, or perfectly irregular—Chance and Spontaneity: powers of contraries, or with equal chance of contrary manifestations—essentially capricious, undeterminable, unpredictable.<sup>s</sup> This *Chance* of Aristotle—with one of two contraries sure to turn up, though you could never tell beforehand which of the two—was a conception analogous to what logicians sometimes call an Indefinite Proposition, or to what some grammarians have reckoned as a special variety of genders called the *doubtful gender*. There were thus positive causes of regularity, and

<sup>r</sup> Xenophon, Memor. i. 1; Plato, Timæus, p. 48 A. ἡ πλανωμένη αἰτία, &c.

<sup>s</sup> Ἡ τύχη—τὸ  
are in the conception of Aristotle independent Ἀρχαί, attached to and blending with ἀνάγκη and τὸ πολὺ. See Physic. ii. 196, b. 11; Metaphys. v. 1026-1027.

Sometimes τὸ ὅπότερ' ἐτυχεῖ is spoken

of as an Ἀρχή, but not as an αἰτίον, or belonging to ὅλη as the Ἀρχή. 1027, b. 11. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι μέχρι τίνος βαδίζει οὐκετ' εἰς ἄλλο· ἔσται καὶ αἰτίον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ οὐδέν.

See, respecting the different notions of Cause held by ancient philosophers, my remarks on the Platonic Phædon *suprà*, vol. ii. ch. xxiii. pp. 182-186.

positive causes of irregularity, the co-operation or conflict of which gave the total manifestations of the actual universe. The principle of irregularity, or the Indeterminate, is sometimes described under the name of Matter,<sup>1</sup> as distinguishable from, yet co-operating with, the three determinate Causes—Formal, Efficient, Final. The Potential—the Indeterminate—the *May or May not be*—is characterised by Aristotle as one of the inherent principles operative in the Kosmos.

In what manner Diodorus stated and defended his opinion upon this point we have no information. We know only that he placed affirmations respecting the future on the same footing as affirmations respecting the past: maintaining that our potential affirmation—*May or May not be*—respecting some future event, meant no more than it means respecting some past event, viz.: no inherent indeterminateness in the future sequence, but our

Conclusion  
of Diodorus

by Hobbes—  
Explanation  
given by  
Hobbes.

<sup>1</sup> Aristot. Metaph. E. 1027, a. 12, A. 1071, a. 10.

ἔστε ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία, ἡ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως, τοῦ συμβεβηκότος.

Matter is represented as the principle of irregularity, of τὸ ὁπότ' ἐτυχε—as the δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων.

In the explanation given by Alexander of Aphrodisias of the Peripatetic doctrine respecting chance—free-will, the principle of irregularity—τύχη is no longer assigned to the material cause, but is treated as an αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκός, distinguished from αἰτία προηγούμενα or καθ' αὐτά. The exposition given of the doctrine by Alexander is valuable and interesting. See his treatise *De Fato*, addressed to the Emperor Severus, in the edition of Orelli, Zurich, 1824 (a very useful volume, containing treatises of Ammonius, Plotinus, Bardesanes, &c., on the same subject); also several sections of his *Quæstiones Naturales et Morales*, ed. Spengel, Munich, 1842, pp. 22-61-65-123, &c. He gives, however, a different explanation of τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ ἀδύνατον in pp. 62-63, which would not be at variance with the doctrine of Diodorus. We may remark that Alexander puts the antithesis of the two doctrines differently from Aristotle,—in this way. 1. Either all events happen καθ' εἰμαρμένην. 2. Or all events do not happen καθ' εἰμαρμένην, but

some events are ἐφ' ἡμῖν. See *De Fato*, p. 14 seq. This way of putting the question is directed more against the Stoics, who were the great advocates of εἰμαρμένη, than against the Megaric Diodorus. The treatises of Chrysippus and the other Stoics alter both the wording and the putting of the thesis. We know that Chrysippus impugned the doctrine of Diodorus, but I do not see how.

The Stoic antithesis of τὰ καθ' εἰμαρμένην—τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν is different from the antithesis conceived by Aristotle, and does not touch the question about the universality of regular sequence. Τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν describes those sequences in which human volition forms one among the appreciable conditions determining or modifying the result; τὰ καθ' εἰμαρμένην includes all the other sequences wherein human volition has no appreciable influence. But the sequence τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν is just as regular as the sequence τῶν καθ' εἰμαρμένην: both the one and the other are often imperfectly predictable, because our knowledge of facts and power of comparison is so imperfect.

Theophrastus discussed τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην, and explained it to mean the same as τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. φανερώτατα δὲ Θεόφραστος δεικνύει ταῦτον ἐν τῷ καθ' εἰμαρμένην τῷ κατὰ φύσιν (Alexander Aphrodisias ad Aristot. *De Animâ*, ii.).

ignorance of the determining conditions, and our inability to calculate their combined working.<sup>u</sup> In regard to scientific method generally, this problem is of the highest importance: for it is only so far as uniformity of sequence prevails, that facts become fit matter for scientific study.<sup>v</sup> Consistently with the doctrine of all-pervading uniformity of sequence, the definition of Hobbes gives the only complete account of the Impossible and Possible: *i. e.* an account such as would appear to an omniscient calculator, where *May or May not* merge in *Will or Will not*. According as each person falls

<sup>u</sup> The same doctrine as that of the Megaric Diodorus is declared by Hobbes in clear and explicit language (First Grounds of Philosophy, ii. 10, 4-5):—

“That is an impossible act, for the production of which there is no power plenary. For seeing plenary power is that in which all things concur which are requisite for the production of an act, if the power shall never be plenary, there will always be wanting some of those things, without which the act cannot be produced. Wherefore that act shall never be produced: that is, that act is *impossible*. And every act, which is not impossible, is *possible*. Every act therefore which is possible, shall at some time or other be produced. For if it shall never be produced, then those things shall never concur which are requisite for the production of it: wherefore the act is *impossible*, by the definition; which is contrary to what was supposed.

“A *necessary act* is that, the production of which it is impossible to hinder: and therefore every act that shall be produced, shall necessarily be produced; for that it shall not be produced is impossible, because, as has already been demonstrated, every possible act shall at some time be produced. Nay, this proposition—*What shall be shall be*—is as necessary a proposition as this—*A man is a man*.

“But here, perhaps, some man will ask whether those future things which are commonly called *contingents*, are necessary. I say, then, that generally all contingents have their necessary causes, but are called *contingents*, in respect of other events on which they do not depend—as the rain which shall be to-morrow shall be necessary, that is,

from necessary causes: but we think and say, it happens by chance, because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof, though they exist now. For men commonly call that *casual* or *contingent*, whereof they do not perceive the necessary cause: and in the same manner they use to speak of things past, when not knowing whether a thing be done or not, they say, *It is possible it never was done*.

“Wherefore all propositions concerning future things, contingent or not contingent, as this—It will rain to-morrow, or to-morrow the sun will rise—are either necessarily true or necessarily false: but we call them contingent, because we do not yet know whether they be true or false; whereas their verity depends not upon our knowledge, but upon the foregoing of their causes. But there are some who, though they will confess this whole proposition—*To-morrow it will either rain or not rain*—to be true, yet they will not acknowledge the parts of it, as, *To-morrow it will rain*, or *To-morrow it will not rain*, to be either of them true by itself; because (they say) neither this nor that is true *determinately*. But what is this *true determinately*, but true upon our knowledge, or *evidently true*? And therefore they say no more but that it is not yet known whether it be true or not: but they say it more obscurely, and darken the evidence of the truth with the same words by which they endeavour to hide their own ignorance.”

<sup>v</sup> The reader will find this problem admirably handled in Mr. John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic*, Book iii. ch. 21, and Book vi. chs. 2 and 3; also in the volume of Mr. Alexander Bain on the *Emotions and the Will*, ch. xi. s. 4, p. 546, seq.

short of or approaches this ideal standard—according to his knowledge and mental resource, inductive and deductive—will be his appreciation of what may be or may not be—as of what may have been or may not have been during the past. But such appreciation, being relative to each individual mind, is liable to vary indefinitely, and does not admit of being embodied in one general definition.

Besides the above doctrine respecting Possible and Impossible, there is also ascribed to Diodorus a doctrine respecting Hypothetical Propositions, which, as far as I comprehend it, appears to have been a correct one.<sup>1</sup> He is also said to have reasoned against the reality of motion, renewing the arguments of Zeno the Eleate.

But if he reproduced the arguments of Zeno, he also employed another, peculiar to himself. He admitted the reality of *past* motion: but he denied the reality of *present* motion. You may affirm truly (he said) that a thing *has been moved*: but you cannot truly affirm that any thing *is being moved*. Since it was *here* before, and is *there* now, you may be sure that it has been moved: but actual present motion you cannot perceive or prove. Affirmation in the perfect tense may be true, when affirmation in the present tense neither is nor ever was true: thus it is true to say—Helen *had* three husbands (Menelaus, Paris, Deiphobus): but it was never true to say—Helen *has* three husbands, since they became her husbands in succession.<sup>2</sup> Diodorus supported this paradox by some ingenious arguments, and the opinion which he denied seems to have presented itself to him as involving the position of indivisible minima—atoms of body, points of space, instants of time. He admitted such minima of atoms, but not of space or time: and without such admission he could not make intelligible to himself the fact of present or actual motion. He

difficulties  
about the  
Now of time.

<sup>1</sup> Sextus Emp. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. ii. pp. 110-115. ἀληθὲς συνημμένον. adv. Mathemat. viii. 112. Philo maintained that an hypothetical proposition was true, if both the antecedent and consequent were true—"If it be day, I am conversing." Diodorus denied that this proposition, as an Hypothe-

tical proposition, was true: since the consequent might be false, though the antecedent were true. An Hypothetical proposition was true only, when, assuming the antecedent to be true, the consequent must be true also.

<sup>2</sup> Sextus Emp. adv. Mathemat. x. pp. 85-101.

could find no present *Now* or Minimum of Time; without which neither could any present motion be found. Plato in the *Parmenidès* <sup>a</sup> professes to have found this inexplicable moment of transition, but he describes it in terms not likely to satisfy a dialectical mind: and Aristotle, denying that the *Now* is any portion or constituent part of time, considers it only as a boundary of the past and future.<sup>b</sup>

This opinion of Aristotle is in the main consonant with that of Diodorus; who, when he denied the reality of present motion, meant probably only to deny the reality of *present motion apart from past and future motion*. Herein also we find him agreeing with Hobbes, who denies the same in clearer language.<sup>c</sup> Sextus Empiricus declares

Motion is always present, past, and future.

<sup>a</sup> Plato, *Parmenidès*, p. 156 D-E. Πότε οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὶς ἂν οὔτε κινούμενον μετάβαλλοι, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν. (Here Plato adverts to the difficulties attending the supposition of actual μεταβολή, as Diodorus to those of actual κίνησις. Next we have Plato's hypothesis for getting over the difficulties.) Ἄρ' οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἀποκον τοῦτο, τότ' ἂν εἴη ὅτε μεταβάλλει; Τὸ βῆ; Τὸ ἐξαίφνης; ἡ ἐξαίφνης φύσις ἀποκός τις τῆς κινήσεως τε καὶ οὐδενὶ οὐσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον ἐπὶ τὸ ἐστάναι καὶ τὸ ἐστὶς τὸ κινεῖσθαι. Diodorus could not make out this φύσις ἀποκος which Plato calls τὸ.

<sup>b</sup> To illustrate this apparent paradox of Diodorus, affirming past motion, but denying present motion, we may compare what is said by Aristotle about the *Now* or Point of Present Time—that it is not a part, but a boundary between Past and Future.

Aristot. *Physic.* iv. p. 218, a. 4-10. τοῦ δὲ χρόνου τὰ μὲν γέγονε, τὰ δὲ μέλλει, ἐστὶ δ' οὐδέν, ὅντος μεριστοῦ—τὸ δὲ νῦν οὐ μέρος—τὸ δὲ νῦν πέρας ἐστὶ (a. 24)—p. 222, a. 10-20-223, a. 20. ὁ δὲ χρόνος καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἅμα κατὰ τε δύναμιν καὶ κατ' ἐνεργεῖαν.

Which doctrine is thus rendered by Harris in his *Hermes*, ch. vii. pp. 101-103-105:—

“Both Points and Nows being taken as Bounds, and not as Parts, it will follow that in the same manner as the same point may be the end of one line and the beginning of another—so the

same *Now* may be the End of one time, and the beginning of another. . . I say of these two times, that with respect to the *Now*, or Instant which they include, the first of them is necessarily Past time, as being previous to it; the other is necessarily Future, as being subsequent. . . From the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place, there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such thing as Time Present. For if all Time be transient, as well as continuous, it cannot like a line be present altogether, but part will necessarily be gone and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, and be Time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can Time possibly be present, to which such continuity is essential?”—Compare Sir William Hamilton's *Discussions on Philosophy*, p. 581.

<sup>c</sup> Hobbes, *First Grounds of Philosophy*, ii. 8, 11.

“That is said to be at rest which, during any time, is in one place; and that to be moved, or to have been moved, which whether it be now at rest or moved, was formerly in another place from that which it is now in. From which definition it may be inferred, first, that whatsoever is moved *has been* moved: for if it still be in the same place in which it was formerly, it is at rest: but if it be in another place, it *has been* moved, by the definition of

Diodorus to have been inconsistent in admitting past motion while he denied present motion.<sup>d</sup> But this seems not more inconsistent than the doctrine of Aristotle respecting the *Now* of time. I know, when I compare a child or a young tree with what they respectively were a year ago, that they have grown: but whether they actually are growing, at every moment of the intervening time, is not ascertainable by sense, and is a matter of probable inference only.<sup>e</sup> Diodorus could not understand present motion, except in conjunction with past and future motion, as being the common limit of the two: but he could understand past motion, without reference to present or future. He could not state to himself a satisfactory theory respecting the beginning of motion: as we may see by his reasonings distinguishing the motion of a body all at once in its integrity, from the motion of a body considered as proceeding from the separate motion of its constituent atoms—the moving atoms preponderating over the atoms at rest, and determining them to motion,<sup>f</sup> until gradually the whole body came to move. The same argument re-appears in another example, when he argues—The wall does not fall while its component stones hold together, for then it is still standing: nor yet when they have come apart, for then it *has* fallen.<sup>g</sup>

That Diodorus was a person seriously anxious to solve logical difficulties, as well as to propose them, would be incontestably proved if we could believe the story recounted of him—that he hanged himself because he could not solve a problem proposed by Stilpon in the presence of Ptolemy Soter.<sup>h</sup> But this story probably grew out of the fact, that Stilpon succeeded Diodorus at Megara, and eclipsed him in reputation. The celebrity of Stilpon, both at

moved. Secondly, that what *is* moved, *will yet be* moved: for that which is moved, leaveth the place where it is, and consequently will be moved still. Thirdly, that whatsoever is moved, is not in one place during any time, how little soever that may be: for by the definition of rest, that which is in one place during any time, is at rest. . . . From what is above demonstrated—namely, that whatsoever *is* moved, *has also been* moved, and *will be* moved: this also may be collected. That there can be no conception of

motion without conceiving past and future time."

<sup>d</sup> Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 91-97-112-116.

See this point touched by Plato in Philébus, p. 43 B.

<sup>f</sup> Sext. Emp. adv. Math. x. 113. κίνησις κατ' εἰδικρίνειαν . . . κίνησις κατ' ἐπικράτειαν. Compare Zeller, Geschichte der Griech. Philos. ii. p. 191, ed. 2nd.

Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 346-348.

<sup>h</sup> Diog. L. ii. 112.

Megara and at Athens (between 320-300 B.C., but his exact date can hardly be settled), was equal, if not superior, to that of any contemporary philosopher. He was visited by listeners from all parts of Greece, and he drew away pupils from the most renowned teachers of the day; from Theophrastus as well as the others.<sup>i</sup> He was no less remarkable for fertility of invention than for neatness of expression. Two persons, who came for the purpose of refuting him, are said to have remained with him as admirers and scholars. All Greece seemed as it were looking towards him, and inclining towards the Megaric doctrines.<sup>k</sup> He was much esteemed both by Ptolemy Soter and by Demetrius Poliorkêtes, though he refused the presents and invitations of both: and there is reason to believe that his reputation in his own day must have equalled that of either Plato or Aristotle in theirs. He was formidable in disputation; but the nine dialogues which he composed and published are characterised by Diogenes as cold.<sup>l</sup>

Contemporary with Stilpon (or perhaps somewhat later) was Menedêmus of Eretria, whose philosophic parentage is traced to Phædon. The name of Phædon has been immortalised, not by his own works, but by the splendid dialogue of which Plato has made him the reciter. He is said (though I doubt the fact) to have been a native of Elis. He was of good parentage, a youthful companion of Sokrates in the last years of his life.<sup>m</sup> After the death of

<sup>i</sup> This is asserted by Diogenes upon the authority of Φίλιππος ὁ Μεγαρικός, whom he cites κατὰ λέξιν. We do not know anything about Philippus.

Menedêmus, who spoke with contempt of the other philosophers, even of Plato and Xenokrates, admired Stilpon (Diog. L. ii. p. 134).

<sup>k</sup> The phrase of Diogenes is here singular, and must probably have been borrowed from a partisan—ὥστε μ

ἰπᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀφορῶσαν εἰς μεγαρίσαι. Stilpon, εὐρεσιλογία

ἰα προῆγε τοὺς ἄλλους— (Diog. L. ii. 113-116).

<sup>l</sup> Diog. L. ii. pp. 119-120. ψυχροί.

<sup>m</sup> The story given by Diogenes (L. ii. pp. 31-105; compare Aulus Gellius, xi. p. 18), about Phædon's adventures, antecedent to his friendship with Sokrates, is unintelligible to me.

"Phædon was made captive along with his country (Elis), sold at Athens, and employed in a degrading capacity; until Sokrates induced Alkibiades or Kriton to pay his ransom." Now, no such event as the capture of Elis, and the sale of its Eupatrids as slaves, happened at that time: the war between Sparta and Elis (described by Xenophon, Hellen. iii. p. 3) led to no such result, and was finished, moreover, after the death of Sokrates. Alkibiades had been long in exile. If, in the text of Diogenes, where we now read Φαίδων, Ἡλείος, τῶν εὐπατριδῶν—we were allowed to substitute Φαίδων Μήλιος, τῶν εὐπατριδῶν—the narrative would be rendered consistent with known historical facts. The Athenians captured the island of Melos in 415 B.C., put to death the Melians of

Sokrates, Phædon went to Elis, composed some dialogues, and established a succession or sect of philosophers—Pleistanus, Anchipylus, Moschus. Of this sect Menedêmus,<sup>a</sup> contemporary and hearer of Stilpon, became the most eminent representative, and from him it was denominated Eretriac instead of Eleian. The Eretriacs, as well as the Megarics, took up the negative arm of philosophy, and were eminent as puzzlers and controversialists.

But though this was the common character of the two, in a logical point of view, yet in Stilpon, as well as Menedêmus, other elements became blended with the logical. These persons combined, in part at least, the free censorial speech of Antisthenes with the subtlety of Eukleides. What we hear of Menedêmus is chiefly his bitter, stinging sarcasms, and clever repartees. He did not, like the Cynic Diogenes, live in contented poverty, but occupied a prominent place (seemingly under the patronage of Antigonus and Demetrius) in the government of his native city Eretria. Nevertheless he is hardly less celebrated than Diogenes for open speaking of his mind, and carelessness of giving offence to others.<sup>o</sup>

Open speech  
and licence  
of censure  
assumed by  
Menedêmus.

## ANTISTHENES.

Antisthenes, the originator of the Cynic succession of philosophers, was one of those who took up principally the ethical element of the Sokratic discoursing, which the Megarics left out or passed lightly over. He did not indeed altogether leave out the logical element: all his doctrines respecting it, as far as we hear of them, appear to have been on the negative side. But re-

Antisthenes  
took up  
Ethics principally,  
but with negative  
Logic intermingled.

military age, and sold into slavery the younger males as well as the females (Thucyd. v. 116). If Phædon had been a Melian youth of good family, he would have been sold at Athens, and might have undergone the adventures narrated by Diogenes. We know that Alkibiades purchased a female

Melian as slave (Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad.).

<sup>a</sup> Diog. L. ii. 105-126. There was a statue of Menedêmus in the ancient stadium of Eretria: Diogenes speaks as if it existed in his time, and as if he himself had seen it (ii. 133).

<sup>o</sup> Diog. L. ii. 129-142.

specting ethics, he laid down affirmative propositions,<sup>p</sup> and delivered peremptory precepts. His aversion to pleasure, by which he chiefly meant sexual pleasure, was declared in the most emphatic language. He had therefore, in the negative logic, a point of community with Eukleides and the Megarics: so that the coalescence of the two successions, in Stilpon and Menedêmus, is a fact not difficult to explain.

The life of Sokrates being passed in conversing with a great variety of persons and characters, his discourses were of course multifarious, and his ethical influence operated in different ways. His mode of life, too, exercised a certain influence of its own.

Antisthenes, and his disciple Diogenes, were in many respects closer approximations to Sokrates than either Plato or any other of the Sokratic companions. The extraordinary colloquial and cross-examining force was indeed a peculiar gift, which Sokrates be-  
He copied the manner of life of Sokrates, in plainness and rigour.  
 queathed to none of them: but Antisthenes took up the Sokratic purpose of inculcating practical ethics not merely by word of mouth, but also by manner of life. He was not inferior to his master in contentment under poverty, in strength of will and endurance,<sup>q</sup> in acquired insensibility both to pain and pleasure, in disregard of opinion around him, and in fearless exercise of a self-imposed censorial mission. He learnt from Sokrates indifference to conventional restraints and social superiority, together with the duty of reducing wants to a minimum, and stifling all such as were above the lowest term of necessity. To this last point, Sokrates gave a religious colour, proclaiming that the Gods had no wants, and that those who had least came nearest to the Gods.<sup>r</sup> By Antisthenes, these qualities were exhibited in eminent mea-

<sup>p</sup> Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. 20, p. 485, Potter. ἐγὼ δ' ἀποδέχομαι τὸν λέγοντα κἄν κατατορεύσαιμι, &c.

<sup>ν</sup>, Diog. L.

vi. 3. Cicero, de Orator. iii. 17, 62; Diog. L. vi. 2. παρ' οὗ (Sokrates) καὶ κατῆρξε πρῶτος τοῦ;

also vi. 15. The appellation of Cynics is said to have arisen from the practice

of Antisthenes to frequent the gymnasium called *Κυνόσαργες* (D. L. vi. 13), though other causes are also assigned for the denomination (Winckelmann, Antisth. Frag. pp. 8-10).

<sup>r</sup> Sokrates had said, τὸ σθαί, θεῶν εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θεῶν (Xenoph., Memor. i. 6, 10. Compare Apuleius, Apol. p. 25). Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 E. The same dictum is ascribed to Diogenes (Diog. L. vi. 105).

sure; and by his disciple Diogenes they were still farther exaggerated. Epiktetus, a warm admirer of both, considers them as following up the mission from Zeus which Sokrates (in the Platonic Apology) sets forth as his authority, to make men independent of the evils of life by purifying and disciplining the appreciation of good and evil in the mind of each individual.<sup>8</sup>

Antisthenes declared virtue to be the End for men to aim at—and to be sufficient *per se* for conferring happiness; but he also declared that virtue must be manifested in acts and character, not by words. Neither much discourse nor much learning was required for virtue: nothing else need be postulated except bodily strength like that of Sokrates.<sup>9</sup> He undervalued theory even in regard to ethics: much more in regard to Nature (Physics) and to Logic: he also despised literary, geometrical, musical teaching, as distracting men's attention from the regulation of their own appreciative sentiment, and the adaptation of their conduct to it. He maintained strenuously (what several Platonic dialogues call in question) that virtue both could be taught and must be taught: when once learnt, it was permanent, and could not be eradicated. He prescribed the simplest mode of life, the reduction of wants to a minimum, with perfect indifference to enjoyment, wealth, or power. The reward was, exemption from fear, anxiety, disappointments, and wants: together with the pride of approximation to the Gods.<sup>10</sup> Though Antisthenes thus despised both literature and theory, yet he had obtained a rhetorical education, and had even heard the rhetor Gorgias. He composed a large number of dialogues and other treatises, of which only the titles (very multifarious) are preserved to us.<sup>11</sup> One dialogue, entitled Sathon, was a coarse attack on Plato: several treated of Homer and of other poets, whose verses he seems to have allegorised. Some of his dialogues are also

<sup>8</sup> Epiktetus, Dissert. iii. 1, 19-22, iii. 21-19, iii. 24-40-60-69. The whole of the twenty-second Dissertation, *Περὶ Κυνισμοῦ*, is remarkable. He couples Sokrates with Diogenes more closely than with any one else.

<sup>9</sup> Diog. L. vi. 11.

<sup>10</sup> Diog. L. vi. 102-104.

<sup>11</sup> Diog. L. vi. 1, 15-18. The two remaining fragments—*Alas*, *Ὁδυσσεὺς* (Winckelmann, Antisth. Fragm. pp. 38-42)—cannot well be genuine, though Winckelmann seems to think them so.

declared by Athenæus to contain slanderous abuse of Alkibiades and other leading Athenians. On the other hand, the dialogues are much commended by competent judges; and Theopompus even affirmed that much in the Platonic dialogues had been borrowed from those of Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Bryson.\*

Antisthenes was amongst the most constant friends and followers of Sokrates, both in his serious and in his playful colloquies.<sup>v</sup> The Symposium of Xenophon describes both of them, in their hours of joviality. The picture, drawn by an author, himself a friend and companion, exhibits Antisthenes (so far as we can interpret caricature and jocular inversion) as poor, self-denying, austere, repulsive, and disputatious—yet bold and free-spoken, careless of giving offence, and forcible in colloquial repartee.<sup>z</sup>

In all these qualities, however, Antisthenes was surpassed by his pupil and successor Diogenes of Sinôpê; whose ostentatious austerity of life, eccentric and fearless character, indifference to what was considered as decency, great acuteness and still greater

Constant  
friendship of  
Antisthenes  
with Sokrates  
—Xenophonic  
Symposi-  
on.

Di  
su  
Antis-  
—His

\* Athenæus, v. 220, xi. 508; Diog. L. iii. 24-35; Phrynichus ap. Photium, cod. 158; Epiktétus, ii. 16-35. Antisthenes is placed in the same line with Kritias and Xenophon, as a Sokratic writer, by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, De Thucyd. Jud. p. 941. That there was standing reciprocal hostility between Antisthenes and Plato we can easily believe. Plato never names Antisthenes: and if the latter attacked Plato, it was under the name of Sathon. How far Plato in his dialogues intends to attack Antisthenes without naming him—is difficult to determine. Probably he does intend to designate Antisthenes as γέρον ὀψιμαθής, in Sophist. 251. Schleiermacher and other commentators think that he intends to attack Antisthenes in Philebus, Theætétus, Euthydémus, &c. But this seems to me not certain. In Philebus, p. 44, he can hardly include Antisthenes among the μάλα δεινοὶ περὶ φύσιν. Antisthenes neglected the study of φύσις.

Xenophon, Memor. iii. 11, 17.

\* Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 11, 17; Symposium, ii. 10, iv. 2-3-44. Plutarch

(Quæst. Symp. ii. 1, 6, p. 632) and Diogenes (Laertius, vi. 1, 15) appear to understand the description of Xenophon as ascribing to Antisthenes a winning and conciliatory manner. To me it conveys the opposite impression. We must recollect that the pleasantry of the Xenophonic Symposium (not very successful as pleasantry) is founded on the assumption, by each person, of qualities and pretensions the direct reverse of that which he has in reality—and on his professing to be proud of that which is a notorious disadvantage. Thus Sokrates pretends to possess great personal beauty, and even puts himself in competition with the handsome youth Kritobulus; he also prides himself on the accomplishments of a good μαστροπός. Antisthenes, quite indigent, boasts of his wealth; the neglected Hermogenes boasts of being powerfully friended. The passage, iv. 57-61, which talks of the winning manners of Antisthenes, and his power of imparting popular accomplishments, is to be understood in this ironical and inverted sense.

power of expression, freedom of speech towards all and against all—constituted him the perfect type of the Cynical sect. Being the son of a money agent at Sinôpê, he was banished with his father for fraudulently counterfeiting the coin of the city. On coming to Athens as an exile, he was captivated with the character of Antisthenes, who was at first unwilling to admit him, and was only induced to do so by his invincible importunity. Diogenes welcomed his banishment, with all its poverty and destitution, as having been the means of bringing him to Antisthenes,<sup>a</sup> and to a life of philosophy. It was Antisthenes (he said) who emancipated him from slavery, and made him a freeman. He was clothed in one coarse garment with double fold: he adopted the wallet (afterwards the symbol of cynicism) for his provisions, and is said to have been without any roof or lodging—dwelling sometimes in a tub near the Metroon, sometimes in one of the public porticoes or temples: he is also said to have satisfied all his wants in the open day. He here indulged unreservedly in that unbounded freedom of speech, which he looked upon as the greatest blessing of life. No man ever turned that blessing to greater account: the string of repartees, sarcasms, and stinging reproofs, which are attributed to him by Diogenes Laertius, is very long, but forms only a small proportion of those which that author had found recounted.<sup>b</sup> Plato de-

<sup>a</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 21-49; Plutarch, *Quest. Sympos.* ii. 1, 7; Epiktétus, iii. 22, 67, iv. 1, 114; Dion Chrysostom. *Orat.* viii. ix.-x.

Plutarch quotes two lines from Diogenes respecting Antisthenes:—  
 'Ὅς με βάρη τ' ἠμπισχε καὶ ξυνάγκασε  
 Πτωχὸν γενέσθαι καὶ δόμων ἀνάστατον—  
 οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὁμοίως πιθανὸς ἦν λέγων—  
 "Ὅς με σοφὸν καὶ αὐτάρκη καὶ μακάριον  
 ἐποίησε. The interpretation given of the passage by Plutarch is curious, but quite in the probable meaning of the author. However it is not easy to reconcile with the fact of this extreme poverty another fact mentioned about Diogenes, that he asked fees from listeners, in one case as much as a mina (Diog. L. vi. 2, 67).

<sup>b</sup> Diog. L. v. 18, vi. 2, 69.

τί κάλλιστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἶ  
 σία. Among the numerous lost works of Theophrastus (enumerated by

Diogen. Laert. v. 43) one is τῶν Διογένους Συναγωγῇ, &c, a remarkable evidence of the impression made by the sayings and proceedings of Diogenes upon his contemporaries. Compare Dion Chrysostom, *Or.* ix. (vol. i. 288 seq. Reisk) for the description of the conduct of Diogenes at the Isthmian festival, and the effect produced by it on spectators.

These smart sayings, of which so many are ascribed to Diogenes, and which he is said to have practised beforehand, and to have made occasions for—δτι χρεῖαν εἶη μεμελετηκώς (Diog. L. v. 18, vi. 91, vii. 26)—were called by the later rhetors Χρεῖαι. See Hermogenes and Theon, apud Walz, *Rhetor. Græc.* i. pp. 19-201; Quintilian, i. 9, 4.

Such collections of *Ana* were ascribed to all the philosophers in greater or less number. Photius, in giving the

scribed Diogenes as Sokrates running mad :<sup>c</sup> and when Diogenes, meeting some Sicilian guests at his house and treading upon his best carpet, exclaimed—"I am treading on Plato's empty vanity and conceit," Plato rejoined—"Yes, with a different vanity of your own." The impression produced by Diogenes in conversation with others, was very powerfully felt both by young and old. Phokion, as well as Stilpon, were among his hearers.<sup>d</sup> In crossing the sea to Ægina, Diogenes was captured by pirates, taken to Krete, and there put up to auction as a slave : the herald asked him what sort of work he was fit for : whereupon Diogenes replied—To command men. At his own instance, a rich Corinthian named Xeniares bought him and transported him to Corinth. Diogenes is said to have assumed towards Xeniares the air of a master : Xeniares placed him at the head of his household, and made him preceptor of his sons. In both capacities Diogenes discharged his duty well.<sup>e</sup> As a slave well treated by his master, and allowed to enjoy great freedom of speech, he lived in greater comfort than he had ever enjoyed as a freeman : and we are not surprised that he declined the offers of friends to purchase his liberation. He died at Corinth in very old age : it is said, at ninety years old, and on the very same day on which Alexander the Great died at Babylon (B.C. 323). He was buried at the gate of Corinth leading to the Isthmus : a monument being erected to his honour, with a column of Parian marble crowned by the statue of a dog.<sup>f</sup>

list of books from which the Sophist Sopater collected extracts, indicates one as *Τὰ Διογένους τοῦ Κυνικοῦ Ἀποφύματα* (Codex 161).

Diog. L. 2, 53. *Σωκράτης μαινό-*

*Οἱ δὲ φασὶ τὸν Διογένην*

*Πατῶ τὸν Πλάτωνος*

The term *τῦφος* ("vanity, self-conceit, assumption of knowing better than others, being puffed up by the praise of vulgar minds") seems to have been much interchanged among the ancient philosophers, each of them charging it upon his opponents ; while the opponents of philosophy generally imputed it to all philosophers alike. Pyrrho the Sceptic took credit for being the only *ἄτυφος* : and he is complimented as such by his panegyrist

Timon in the Silli. Aristokles affirmed that Pyrrho had just as much as the rest. Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* xiv. 18.

<sup>d</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 75-76.

<sup>e</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 74.

Xeniares was mentioned by Demokritus : he is said to have been a sceptic (*Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.* vii. 48-53), at least he did not recognise any *κριτήριον*.

<sup>f</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 77-78.

Diogenes seems to have been known by his contemporaries under the title of *ὁ Κύνων*. Aristotle cites from him a witty comparison under that designation, *Rhetoric*, iii. 10, 1410, a. 24.

*Κύνων (ἐκάλει) τὰ καπηλεία τὰ*

In politics, ethics, and rules for human conduct, Diogenes adopted views of his own, and spoke them out freely. He was a freethinker (like Antisthenes) as to the popular religion: and he disapproved of marriage laws, considering that the intercourse of the sexes ought to be left to individual taste and preference.<sup>g</sup> Though he respected the city and conformed to its laws, yet he had no reverence for existing superstitions, or for the received usages as to person, sex, or family. He declared himself to be a citizen of the Kosmos, and of Nature.<sup>h</sup> His sole exigency was, independence of life, and freedom of speech: having these, he was satisfied, fully sufficient to himself for happiness, and proud of his own superiority to human weakness. The main benefit which he derived from philosophy (he said) was, that he was prepared for any fortune that might befall him. To be ready to accept death easily, was the sure guarantee of a free and independent life.<sup>i</sup> He insisted emphatically upon the necessity of exercise or training (ἀσκησις) both as to the body and as to the mind. Without this, nothing could be done: by means of it everything might be achieved. But he required that the labours imposed should be directed to the acquisition of habits really useful; instead of being wasted, as they commonly were, upon objects frivolous and showy. The truly wise man ought to set before him as a model the laborious life of Hēraklēs: and he would find, after proper practice and training, that the contempt of pleasures would afford him more enjoyment than the pleasures themselves.<sup>k</sup>

Diogenes declared that education was sobriety to the young, consolation to the old, wealth to the poor; ornament to

<sup>g</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 72. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 13.

<sup>h</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 63-71. The like declaration is ascribed to Sokrates. Epiktētus, i. 9, 1.

<sup>i</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 63, 72. μηδὲν ἐλευθερίας προκρίνων. Epiktētus, iv. 1, 30. Οὕτω καὶ Διογένης λέγει, μίαν εἶναι μηχανὴν πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν—τὸ εὖ.

Compare iv. 7-28, i. 24, 6.

<sup>k</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 70-71. καὶ γὰρ καταφρόνησις ἡδυάτη προμελετηθεῖσα, καὶ ὥστερ οἱ συνεθισ-

θέντες ἡδέως ζῆν, ἀηδῶς ἐπὶ τούναντιον μετασιν, οὕτως οἱ τούναντιον ἀσκηθέντες ἡδίων αὐτῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν καταφρονοῦσι. See Lucian, Vitar. Auct. c. 9, about the hard life and the happiness of Diogenes. Compare s. 26 about the τύφος of Diogenes treading down the different τύφος of Plato, and Epiktētus iii. 22, 57. Antisthenes, in his dialogue or discourse called Ἡρακλῆς, appears to have enforced the like appeal to that hero as an example to others. See Winckelmann, Fragm. Antisthen. pp. 15-18.

the rich. But he despised much of what was commonly imparted as education—music, geometry, astronomy, &c.: and he treated with equal scorn Plato and Eukleides.<sup>1</sup> He is said however to have conducted the education of the sons of his master Xeniades<sup>m</sup> without material departure from the received usage. He caused them to undergo moderate exercise (not with a view to athletic success) in the palæstra, and afterwards to practise riding, shooting with the bow, hurling the javelin, slinging and hunting: he cultivated their memories assiduously, by recitations from poets and prose authors, and even from his own compositions: he kept them on bread and water, without tunic or shoes, with clothing only such as was strictly necessary, with hair closely cut, habitually silent, and fixing their eyes on the ground when they walked abroad. These latter features approximate to the training at Sparta (as described by Xenophon) which Diogenes declared to contrast with Athens as the apartments of the men with those of the women. Diogenes is said to have composed several dialogues and even some tragedies.<sup>n</sup> But his most impressive display (like that of Sokrates) was by way of colloquy—prompt and incisive interchange of remarks. He was one of the few philosophers who copied Sokrates in living constantly before the public—in talking with every one indiscriminately and fearlessly, in putting home questions like a physician to his patient.<sup>o</sup> Epiktêtus,—speaking of Diogenes as equal, if not superior, to Sokrates—draws a distinction pertinent and accurate. “To Sokrates” (says he) “Zeus assigned the elenctic or cross-examining function: to Diogenes, the magisterial and chastising function: to Zeno (the Stoic) the didactic and dogmatical.” While thus describing Diogenes justly enough, Epiktêtus nevertheless insists upon his agreeable person and his extreme gentleness and good-nature:<sup>p</sup> qualities for which

<sup>1</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 68-73-24-27.

<sup>m</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 30-31.

<sup>n</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 80. Diogenes Laertius himself cites a fact from one of the dialogues—Pordalus (vi. 2, 20): and Epiktêtus alludes to the treatise on Ethics by Diogenes—*ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ*—ii. 20, 14. It appears however that the works ascribed to Diogenes were

not admitted by all authors as genuine (Diog. L. c.).

<sup>o</sup> Dion Chrysost. Or. x.; De Servis, p. 295 R. Or. ix.; Isthmicus, p. 289 R. *ὥσπερ ἰατροὶ ἀνακρίνουσι τοὺς ἀσθεντας, οὕτως Διογένης ἀνέκρινε τὸν ῥωπον, &c.*

<sup>p</sup> Epiktêtus, iii. 21, 19. *ὥς*

probably Diogenes neither took credit himself, nor received credit from his contemporaries. Diogenes seems to have really possessed—that which his teacher Antisthenes postulated as indispensable—the Sokratic physical strength and vigour. His ethical creed, obtained from Antisthenes, was adopted by many successors, and (in the main) by Zeno and the Stoics in the ensuing century. But the remarkable feature in Diogenes which attracts to him the admiration of Epiktétus, is—that he set the example of acting out his creed consistently and resolutely, in his manner of life: <sup>a</sup> an example followed by some of his immediate successors, but not by the Stoics, who confined themselves to writing and preaching. Contemporary both with Plato and Aristotle, Diogenes stands to both of them in much the same relation as Phokion to Demosthenes

Admiration of Epiktétus for Diogenes, especially for his consistency in acting out his own ethical

ὡς Διογένης τὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ  
εἰσικὴν, ὡς Ζήνωνι τὴν διδασ-  
καλὴν δογματικὴν.

About τὸ ἡμερον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον of Diogenes, see Epiktétus, iii. 24, 64; who also tells us (iv. 11-19), professing to follow the statements of contemporaries, that the bodies both of Sokrates and Diogenes were by nature so sweet and agreeable (ἐπίχαρι καὶ ἡδύ) as to dispense with the necessity of washing.

“Ego certé” (says Seneca, Epist. 108, about the lectures of the eloquent Stoic Attalus) “cum Attalum audirem, in vitia, in errores, in mala vitæ perorantem, sæpè misertus sum generis humani, et illum sublimem altioremq; humano fastigio credidi. Ipse regem se esse dicebat: sed plusquam regnare mihi videbatur, cui liceret censuram agere regnantium.” See also his treatises De Beneficiis, v. 4-6, and De Tranquillitate Animi (c. 8), where, after lofty encomium on Diogenes, he exclaims—“Si quis de felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest idem dubitare et de Deorum immortalium statu, an parum beatè degant,” &c.

<sup>a</sup> Cicero, in his Oration in defence of Murena (30-61-62) compliments Cato (the accuser) as one of the few persons who adopted the Stoic tenets with a view of acting them out, and who did really act them out—“Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. Cato, autoribus eruditissimis inductus, arripuit: neque

disputandi causâ, ut magna pars, sed ita vivendi.” Tacitus (Histor. iv. 5) pays the like compliment to Helvidius Priscus.

M. Gaston Boissier (Étude sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de Varron, pp. 113-114, Paris, 1801) expresses an amount of surprise which I should not have expected, on the fact that persons adopted a philosophical creed for the purpose only of debating it and defending it, and not of acting it out. But he recognises the fact, in regard to Varro and his contemporaries, in terms not less applicable to the Athenian world: amidst such general practice, Antisthenes, Diogenes, Krates, &c., stood out as memorable exceptions. “Il ne faut pas non plus oublier de quelle manière, et dans quel esprit, les Romains lettrés étudiaient la philosophie Grecque. Ils venaient écouter les plus habiles maîtres, connaître les sectes les plus célèbres: mais ils les étudiaient plutôt en curieux, qu’ils ne s’y attachaient en adeptes. On ne les voit guères approfondir un système et s’y tenir, adopter un ensemble de croyances, et y conformer leur conduite. On étudiait le plus souvent la philosophie pour discuter. C’était seulement une matière à des conversations savantes, un exercice et un aliment pour les esprits curieux. Voilà pourquoi la secte Académique étoit alors mieux accueillie que les autres,” &c.

in politics and oratory: he exhibits strength of will, insensibility to applause as well as to reproach, and self-acting independence—in antithesis to their higher gifts and cultivation of intellect. He was undoubtedly, next to Sokrates, the most original and unparalleled manifestation of Hellenic philosophy.

Respecting Diogenes and the Cynic philosophers generally, we have to regard not merely their doctrines, but <sup>Admiration</sup> the effect produced by their severity of life. In this point Diogenes surpassed his master Antisthenes, <sup>of tl</sup>  
<sup>—A</sup> whose life he criticised as not fully realising the <sup>ex</sup>  
<sup>th</sup> lofty spirit of his doctrine. The spectacle of man not merely abstaining from enjoyment, but enduring with indifference hunger, thirst, heat, cold, poverty, <sup>Diogenes.</sup> privation, bodily torture, death, &c., exercises a powerful influence on the imagination of mankind. It calls forth strong feelings of reverence and admiration in the beholders: while in the sufferer himself, also, self-reverence and self-admiration, the sense of power and exaltation above the measure of humanity is largely developed. The extent to which self-inflicted hardships and pains have prevailed in various regions of the earth, the long-protracted and invincible resolution with which they have been endured, and the veneration which such practices have procured for the ascetics who submitted to them—are among the most remarkable chapters in history.<sup>7</sup> The East, especially India, has always been, and still is, the country in which these voluntary endurances have reached their extreme pitch of severity; even surpassing those of the Christian monks in Egypt and Syria, during the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era.<sup>8</sup> When Alexander the Great first opened India to the observation of Greeks, one of the novelties which most surprised him and his followers was, the sight of the Gymnosophists or naked philosophers. These men were found lying on the ground, either totally uncovered or with nothing but a cloth round the loins; abstaining from all enjoyment, nourishing themselves upon a minimum of coarse vegetables or fruits, careless of the extreme heat of the plain, and the extreme cold of the

<sup>7</sup> Dion Chrysostom, viii. p. 275, Reisk.

<sup>8</sup> See the striking description in Gibbon, *Decl. and Fall*, ch. xxxvii. pp. 253-265.

mountain; and often superadding pain, fatigue, or prolonged and distressing uniformity of posture. They passed their time either in silent meditation or in discourse on religion and philosophy: they were venerated as well as consulted by every one, censuring even the most powerful persons in the land. Their fixed idea was to stand as examples to all, of endurance, insensibility, submission only to the indispensable necessities of nature, and freedom from all other fear or authority. They acted out the doctrine, which Plato so eloquently preaches under the name of Sokrates in the *Phædon*—That the whole life of the philosopher is a preparation for death: that life is worthless, and death an escape from it into a better state.<sup>1</sup> It is an interesting fact to learn that when Onesikritus (one of Alexander's officers, who had known and frequented the society of Diogenes in Greece), being despatched during the Macedonian march through India for the purpose of communicating with these Gymnosophists, saw their manner of life and conversed with them—he immediately compared them with Diogenes, whom he had himself visited—as well as with Sokrates and Pythagoras, whom he knew by reputation. Onesikritus described to the Gymnosophists the manner of life of Diogenes, but Diogenes wore a threadbare mantle, and this appeared to them a mark of infirmity and imperfection. They remarked that Diogenes was right to a considerable extent; but wrong for obeying convention in preference to nature, and for being ashamed of going naked, as they did.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, xv. 713 A (probably from Onesikritus, see Geier, Fragment. Alexandr. Magn. Histor. p. 379). Πλείστους δ' εἶναι αὐτοῖς λόγους περὶ τοῦ θανάτου· νομίζειν γὰρ δὴ, τὸν μὲν ἐνθαδε βίον ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· τὸν δὲ θάνατον γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, τοῖς φιλοσοφῆσαι· διδὲ τῇ ἀσκήσει πλείστη χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἐτοιμοθάνατον ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡ κακὸν μὴδὲν εἶναι τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀνθρώποις, &c.

This is an application of the doctrines laid down by the Platonic Sokrates in the *Phædon*, p. 64 A: Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας, λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτη-

δεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ Compare p. 67 D. Cicero, *Tusc.* D. i. 30. Compare Epiktētus. iv. 1, 30 (cited in a former note) about Diogenes the Cynic. Also Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 27; Valerius Maximus, iii. 3, 6; Diogen. L. *Proem.* s. 6; Pliny, H. N. vii. 2.

Bohlen observes (*Das Alte Indien*, ch. ii. pp. 279-289), "It is a remarkable fact that Indian writings of the highest antiquity depict as already existing the same ascetic exercises as we see existing at present: they were even then known to the ancients, who were especially astonished at such fanaticism."

<sup>2</sup> Strabo gives a condensed summary of this report, made by Onesikritus respecting his conversation with the

These observations of the Indian Gymnosophist are a reproduction and an application in practice<sup>x</sup> of the memorable declaration of principle enunciated by Sokrates—"That the Gods had no wants: and that the man who had fewest wants, approximated most nearly to the Gods." This principle is first introduced into Grecian Ethics by Sokrates: ascribed to him both by Xenophon and Plato, and seemingly approved by both. In his life, too, Sokrates carried the principle into effect, up to a certain point. Both admirers and opponents attest his poverty, hard fare, coarse clothing, endurance of cold and privation: <sup>y</sup> but he was a family man, with a wife and children to maintain, and he partook occasionally of indulgences which made him fall short of his own ascetic principle. Plato and Xenophon—both of them well-born Athenians, in circumstances affluent, or at least easy, the latter being a knight, and even highly skilled in horses and horsemanship—contented themselves with preaching on the text, whenever they had to deal with an opponent more self-indulgent than themselves;

The precepts

execution by the Cynics.

Indian Gymnosophist Mandanis, or Dandamis (Strabo, xv. p. 716 B): —Ταῦτ' εἰπόντα ἐξέρεσθαι (Dandamis asked Onesikritus), εἰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησι λόγοι τοιοῦτοι λέγοντο. Εἰπόν-  
 γόρας  
 ὅτι καὶ Πυθα-

γός (Onesikritus) εἰνασθαι (Dandamis), ὅτι τὰλλα μὲν νομίζει φρονίμως αὐτοῖς δοκεῖν, ἐν δ' ἁμαρτάνειν—νόμον πρὸ τῆς φύσεως τιθεμένους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰνασθαι γυμνοῖς, ὥσπερ αὐτὸν, διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ λιτῶν ζῶντας· καὶ γὰρ ἀρίστην εἶναι, ἥτις ἂν

his conclusion, that the doctrines and practice of Antisthenes were borrowed, not from Sokrates with exaggeration, but from the Parmenidean theory, and the Vedanta theory of the Ens Unum, leading to negation and contempt of the phenomenal world.

<sup>x</sup> Onesikritus observes, respecting the Indian Gymnosophists, that "they were more striking in act than in discourse" (ἐν ἔργοις γὰρ αὐτοῖς κρείττους ἢ λόγοις εἶναι, Strabo, xv. 713 B); and this is true about the Cynic succession of philosophers, in Greece as well as in Rome. Diogenes Laertius (compare his Prooem, s. 19, 20, and vi. 103) ranks the Cynic philosophy as a distinct *αἵρεσις*: but he tells us that other writers (especially Hippobotus) would not reckon it as an *αἵρεσις*, but only as an *ἐνστασις βίου*—practice without theory.

<sup>y</sup> Xenophon, Memor. i. 6, 2-5; Plato, Sympos. 219, 220.

About Onesikritus, Diog. Laert. vi. 75-84; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 65; Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alexandri, p. 331.

The work of August Gladitsch (Einleitung in das Verständniss der Weltgeschichte, Posen, 1841) contains an instructive comparison between the Gymnosophists and the Cynics, as well as between the Pythagoreans and the Chinese philosophers—between the Eleatic sect and the Hindoo philosophers. The points of analogy, both in doctrine and practice, are very numerous and strikingly brought out, pp. 356-377. I cannot, however, agree in

The language of contemporary comic writers, Ameipsias, Eupolis, Aristophanes, &c., about Sokrates—is very much the same as that of Menander a century afterwards about Kratês. Sokrates is depicted as a Cynic in mode of life (Diogen. L. ii. 28; Aristophan. Nubes, 104-362-415).

but made no attempt to carry it into practice.\* Zeno the Stoic laid down broad principles of self-denial and apathy: but in practice he was unable to conquer the sense of shame, as the Cynics did, and still more the Gymnosophists. Antisthenes, on the other hand, took to heart, both in word and act, the principle of Sokrates: yet even he, as we know from the Xenophontic Symposium, was not altogether constant in rigorous austerity. His successors Diogenes and Krates attained the maximum of perfection ever displayed by the Cynics of free Greece. They stood forth as examples of endurance, abnegation—insensibility to shame and fear—free-spoken censure of others. Even they however were not so recognised by the Indian Gymnosophists: who, having reduced their wants, their fears, and their sensibilities, yet lower, had thus come nearer to that which they called the perfection of Nature, and which Sokrates called the close approach to divinity.<sup>a</sup> When Alexander the Great (in the first year of his reign and prior to any of his Asiatic conquests) visited Diogenes at Corinth, found him lying in the sun, and asked if there was anything which he wanted—Diogenes made the memorable reply—"Only that you and your guards should stand out of my sunshine." This reply doubtless manifests the self-satisfied independence of the philosopher. Yet it is far less impressive than the fearless reproof which the Indian Gymnosophists administered to Alexander, when they saw him in the Punjab at the head of his victorious army, after exploits, dangers, and fatigues almost superhuman, as conqueror of Persia and acknowledged son of Zeus.<sup>b</sup>

\* Zeno, though he received instructions from Krates, was ἄλλως μὲν εἰ-

ώς πρὸς τὴν κυνικὴν ἀναισχυρτίαν (Diog. L. vii. 3).

"Disputare cum Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicuro quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere," &c. This is the distinction which Seneca draws between Stoic and Cynic (De Brevitat. Vitæ, 14). His admiration for the "seminudus" Cynic Demetrius, his contemporary and companion, was extreme (Epist. 62, and Epist. 20).

<sup>a</sup> Xenoph. Memor. i. 6, 10 (the pas-

sage is cited in a previous note).

The Emperor Julian (Orat. vi. p. 192 Spanh.) says about the Cynics—  
γὰρ ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος, τοῦτο δὲ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι. Dion Chrysostom (Or. vi. p. 208) says also about Diogenes the Cynic—καί μάλιστα

μείτο τῶν θεῶν τὸν βίον.

<sup>b</sup> Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 32, and the Anabasis of Arrian, vii. 1-2-3, where both the reply of Diogenes and that of the Indian Gymnosophists are reported. Dion Chrysostom (Orat. iv. p. 145 seq. Reisk) gives a prolix dialogue between Alexander and Diogenes. His picture of the effect produced by Diogenes upon the dif-

Another point, in the reply made by the Indian Gymnosophist to Onesikritus deserves notice: I mean the antithesis between law (or convention) and nature (*νόμος—φύσις*)—the supremacy which he asserts for Nature over law—and the way in which he understands Nature and her supposed ordinances. This antithesis was often put forward and argued in the ancient Ethics: and it is commonly said, without any sufficient proof, that the Sophists (speaking of them collectively) recognised only the authority of law—while Sokrates and Plato had the merit of vindicating against them the superior authority of Nature. The Indian Gymnosophist agrees with the Athenian speaker in the Platonic treatise *De Legibus*, and with the Platonic Kallikles in the *Gorgias*, thus far—that he upholds the paramount authority of Nature. But of these three interpreters, each hears and reports the oracles of Nature differently from the other two: and there are many other dissenting interpreters beside.<sup>c</sup> Which of them are we to follow? And if,

Antithesis between Nature—and Law or Convention—insisted on by the Indian Gymnosophists.

ferent spectators at the Isthmian festival, is striking and probable.

Kalanus, one of the Indian Gymnosophists, was persuaded, by the instances of Alexander, to abandon his Indian mode of life and to come away with the Macedonian army, very much to the disgust of his brethren, who scornfully denounced him as infirm and even as the slave of appetite (*ἀκόλαστον*, Strabo, xv. 718). He was treated with the greatest consideration and respect by Alexander and his officers; yet when the army came into Persis, he became sick of body and tired of life. He obtained the reluctant consent of Alexander to allow him to die. A funeral pile was erected, upon which he voluntarily burnt himself in presence of the whole army; who witnessed the scene with every demonstration of military honour. See the remarkable description in Arrian, *Anab.* vii. 3. Cicero calls him “Indus indoctus et barbarus” (*Tusc. Disp.* ii. 21); but the impression which he made on Alexander himself, Onesikritus, Lysimachus, and generally upon all who saw him, was that of respectful admiration (Strabo, xv. 715; Arrian, l. c.). One of these Indian sages, who had come into Syria along with the Indian envoy sent by an Indian king to

the Roman Emperor Augustus, burnt himself publicly at Athens, with an exulting laugh when he leaped upon the funeral pile (Strabo, xv. 720 A)

*τὰ πατρία τῶν Ἰνδῶν*

The like act of self-immolation was performed by the Grecian Cynic Peregrinus Proteus, at the Olympic festival in the reign of Marcus Antoninus, 105 A.D. (See Clinton, *Fas. Rom.*) Lucian, who was present and saw the proceeding, has left an animated description of it, but ridicules it as a piece of silly vanity. Theagenes, the admiring disciple of Peregrinus, and other Cynics, who were present in considerable numbers—and also Lucian himself—compare this act to that of the Indian Gymnosophists—*οὗτος δὲ τίνας αἰτίας*

*πῦρ; νῆ δὲ, ὅπως τὴν καρτερίαν ἐπιδείξεται, καθάπερ οἱ Βραχμῶνες* (Lucian, *De Morte Peregrini*, 25-39, &c.).

<sup>c</sup> Though Seneca (*De Brevitate Vit.* 14) talks of the Stoics as “conquering Nature, and the Cynics as exceeding Nature,” yet the Stoic Epiktētus considers his morality as the only scheme conformable to Nature (*Epiktēt. Diss.* iv. 1, 121-128); while the Epikurean Lucretius claims the same conformity for the precepts of Epikurus.

adopting any one of them, we reject the others upon what grounds are we to justify our preference? When the Gymnosophist points out, that nakedness is the natural condition of man; when he farther infers, that because natural it is therefore right—and that the wearing of clothes, being a departure from nature, is also a departure from right—how are we to prove to him that his interpretation of nature is the wrong one? These questions have received no answer in any of the Platonic dialogues: though we have seen that Plato is very bitter against those who dwell upon the antithesis between Law and Nature, and who undertake to decide between the two.

Reverting to the Cynics, we must declare them to be in one respect the most peculiar outgrowth of Grecian philosophy: because they are not merely a doctrinal sect, with phrases, theories, reasonings, and teachings of their own—but still more prominently a body of practical ascetics, a mendicant order<sup>d</sup> in philosophy, working up the bystanders by exhibiting themselves as models of endurance and apathy. These peculiarities seem to have originated partly with Pythagoras, partly with Sokrates—for there is no known prior example of it in Grecian history, except that of the anomalous priests of Zeus at Dodona, called Selli, who lay on the ground with unwashed feet. The discipline of Lykurgus at Sparta included severe endurance; but then it was intended to form, and actually did form, good soldiers. The Cynics had no view to military action. They exaggerated the peculiarities of Sokrates, and we should call their mode of life the Sokratic life, if we followed the example

<sup>d</sup> Respecting the historical connexion between the Grecian Cynics and the ascetic Christian monks, see Zeller, *Geschichte der Griech. Philos.* ii. p. 241, ed. 2nd.

Homer, *Iliad* xvi. 235:—

Zeû êνα, Δωδωναίε Πελασγικέ, τηλόθι ναίων

Δωδώνης μεδέων δυσχειμέρου, ἀμφὶ δὲ Σέλλοι

Ξοὶ ναλοῦσ' ὑποφῆται ἀνιπτόποδες, χαμαιεῦναι.

There is no analogy in Grecian history to illustrate this very curious passage: the *Excursus* of Heyne fur-

nishes no information (see his edition of the *Iliad*, vol. vii. p. 289) except the general remark:—"Selli—vitam genus et institutum affectabant abhorrens à communi usu, vitæ monachorum mendicantium haud absimile, cum sine vitæ cultu viverent, nec corpus abluerent, et humi cubarent. Ita inter barbaros non modo, sed inter feras gentes ipsas intellectum est, eos qui auctoritatem apud multitudinem consequi vellent, externâ specie, vitæ cultu austiori, abstinentiâ et continentia, oculos hominum in se convertere et mirationem facere debere."

of those who gave names to the Pythagorean or Orphic life, as a set of observances derived from the type of Pythagoras or Orpheus.\*

Though Antisthenes and Diogenes laid chief stress upon ethical topics, yet they also delivered opinions on logic and evidence.<sup>†</sup> Antisthenes especially was engaged in controversy, and seemingly in acrimonious controversy, with Plato: whose opinions he impugned in an express dialogue entitled *Sathon*.<sup>Ideas.</sup> Plato on his side also attacked the opinions of Antisthenes, and spoke contemptuously of his intelligence, yet without formally naming him. At least there are some criticisms in the Platonic dialogues (especially in the *Sophistês*, p. 251) which the commentators pronounce, on strong grounds, to be aimed at Antisthenes: who is also unfavourably criticised by Aristotle. We know but little of the points which Antisthenes took up against Plato—and still less of the reasons which he urged in support of them. Both he and Diogenes, however, are said to have declared express war against the Platonic theory of self-existent Ideas. The functions of general Concepts and general propositions, together with the importance of defining general terms, had been forcibly insisted on in the colloquies of Sokrates; and his disciple Plato built upon this foundation the memorable hypothesis of an aggregate of eternal, substantive realities, called Ideas or Forms, existing separate from the objects of sense, yet affording a certain participation in themselves to those objects: not discernible by sense, but only by the Reason or understanding. These bold creations of the Platonic fancy wererepudiated by Antisthenes and Diogenes: who are both said to have declared—"We see Man, and we see Horse; but Manness and Horseness we do not see." Whereunto Plato replied—"You possess that eye

\* Plato, Republic, x. 600 B; Legib. vi. 782 C; Eurip. Hippol. 955; Fragm. Κρητες.

See also the citations in Athenæus (iv. pp. 161-163) from the writers of the Attic middle comedy, respecting the asceticism of the Pythagoreans, analogous to that of the Cynics.

† Among the titles of the works of Antisthenes, preserved by Diogenes

Laertius (vi. 15), several relate to dialectic or logic. Ἀντισθένης Περὶ τοῦ

περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν, α, β, γ. Περὶ Δια-  
Περὶ Παιδείας ἢ περὶ ὁ

σεως, &c. &c.

Diogenes Laertius refers to of these treatises.

by which Horse is seen: but you have not yet acquired that eye by which Horseness is seen." \*

This debate between Antisthenes and Plato marks an interesting point in the history of philosophy. It is the first protest of Nominalism against the doctrine of an extreme Realism. The Ideas or Forms of Plato (according to many of his phrases, for he is not always consistent with himself) are not only real existences distinct from particulars, but absorb to themselves all the reality of particulars. The real universe in the Platonic theory was composed of Ideas or Forms—such as Manness or Horseness<sup>h</sup> (called by Plato the *Ἀνδρῶν* *Ἀνθρωπος* and *ἵππων* *ἵππος*), of which particular men and horses were only disfigured, transitory, and ever-varying photographs. Antisthenes denied what Plato affirmed, and as Plato affirmed it. Aristotle denied it also; maintaining that genera, species, and attributes, though distinguishable as separate predicates of, or inherencies in, individuals—yet had no existence apart from individuals. Aristotle was no less wanting than Antisthenes, in the intellectual eye required for discerning the Platonic Ideas. Antisthenes is said to have declared these Ideas to be mere thoughts or conceptions (*ψυχὰς ἐννοίας*): i. e. merely subjective or within the mind, without any object corresponding to them. This is one of the various modes of presenting the theory of Ideas, resorted to even in the Platonic Parmenidēs, not by one who opposes that theory, but by one seeking to defend it—viz. by Sokrates, when he is hard pressed by the objections of the

\* Simplicius, ad Aristot. Categ. p. 66, b. 47, 67, b. 18, 68, b. 25, Schol. Brand.; Tzetzes, Chiliad. vii. 606.

τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἀνῆρουν τὰς ποιότητας τελέως, τὸ ποιῶντες εἶναι ὥσπερ

ὁ Πλάτων,

καὶ  
ὁρᾶται

ἦσαν ταύτης τῆς δόξης· οἱ δὲ  
ἀνῆρουν ποιότητας, τινὰς δὲ

occurs p. 68, a. 31.

Compare p. 20, a. 2.

The same conversation is reported as having taken place between Dio-

genes and Plato, except that instead of *ἵπποτης* and *ἀνθρωπότης*, we have *τραπεζότης* and *κυαθότης* (Diog. L. 53).

We have

Galen's argument against the Stoics (vol. xix. p. 481, Kühn).

<sup>h</sup> We know from Plato himself (Theætétus, p. 182 A) that even the word *ποιότης*, if not actually first introduced by himself, was at any rate so recent as to be still repulsive, and to require an Apology. If *ποιότης* was strange, *ἀνθρωπότης* and *ἵπποτης* would be still more strange. Antisthenes probably invented them, to present the doctrine which he impugned in a dress of greater seeming absurdity.

Eleate against the more extreme and literal version of the theory.<sup>1</sup> It is remarkable, that the objections ascribed to Parmenides against that version which exhibits the Ideas as mere Concepts of and in the mind, are decidedly less forcible than those which he urges against the other versions.

There is another singular doctrine, which Aristotle ascribes to Antisthenes, and which Plato notices and confutes; alluding to its author contemptuously, but not mentioning his name. Every name (Antisthenes argued) has its own special reason or meaning (*οικείος*<sup>k</sup> *λόγος*), declaring the essence of the thing named, and differing from every other word: you cannot therefore truly predicate any one word of any other, because the reason or meaning of the two is different: there can be no true propositions except identical propositions, in which the predicate is the same with the subject—"man is man, good is good." "Man is good" was an inadmissible proposition: affirming different things to be the same, or one thing to be many.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly it was impossible for two speakers really to contradict each other. There can be no contradiction between them if both declare the essence of the same thing—nor if neither of them declare the essence of it—nor if one speaker declares the essence of one thing, and another speaker that of another. But one of these three cases must happen: therefore there can be no contradiction.<sup>m</sup>

The works of Antisthenes being lost, we do not know how he himself stated his own doctrine, nor what he said on behalf

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Parmenidēs*, p. 132 B.

See vol. ii. chap. xxv. p. 271 of this work.

<sup>k</sup> Diogen. L. vi. 3. *Πρώτως τε ὁρίσαστο* (Antisthenes) *λόγον, εἰπών, λόγος ἔστιν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἐστὶ δηλών.*

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphy. Δ.* 1024, b. 32, attributes this doctrine to Antisthenes by name; which tends to prove that Plato meant Antisthenes, though not naming him, in *Sophist.* p. 251 B, where he notices the same doctrine. Compare *Philēbus*, p. 14 D.

It is to be observed that a doctrine exactly the same as that which Plato here censures in Antisthenes, will be found maintained by the Platonic Sokrates himself, in Plato, *Hippias*

Major, p. 304 A. See chap. xi. vol. i. p. 378 of the present work.

<sup>m</sup> Aristot. *Topic.* i. p. 104, b. 20. *θέσις δὲ ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινος κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν οἶον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης.*

Plato puts this *θέσις* into the mouth of Dionysodorus, in the *Euthydēmus*—p. 250 B; but he says (or makes Sokrates say) that it was maintained by many persons, and that it had been maintained by Protagoras, and even by others yet more ancient.

Antisthenes had discussed it specially in a treatise of three sections, polemical against Plato—*Σάθων, ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν*, α, β, γ (*Diog. L.* vi. 10).

Doctrine of  
cation—He  
admits no  
other predi-  
cation but  
identical.

of it, declaring contradiction to be impossible. Plato sets aside the doctrine as absurd and silly; Aristotle —since he cites it as a paradox, apt for dialectical debate where the opinion of a philosopher stood opposed to what was generally received—seems to imply that there were plausible arguments to be urged in its favour." And that the doctrine actually continued to be held and advocated, in the generation not only after Antisthenes but after Aristotle—we may see by the case of Stilpon: who maintained (as Antisthenes had done) that none but identical propositions, wherein the predicate was a repetition of the subject, were admissible: from whence it followed (as Aristotle observed) that there could be no propositions either false or contradictory. Plutarch,<sup>o</sup> in reciting this doctrine of Stilpon (which had been vehemently impugned by the Epikurean Kolôtês), declares it to have been intended only in jest. There is no ground for believing that it was so intended: the analogy of Antisthenes goes to prove the contrary.

Stilpon, however, while rejecting (as Antisthenes had done) the universal Ideas<sup>p</sup> or Forms, took a larger ground of objec-

<sup>n</sup> Aristotle (Met. Δ 1024) represents the doctrine of Antisthenes, That contradictory and false propositions are impossible—as a consequence deduced from the position laid down—That no propositions except identical propositions were admissible. If you grant this last proposition, the consequences will be undeniable. Possibly Antisthenes may have reasoned in this way: "There are many contradictory and false propositions now afloat; but this arises from the way in which predication is conducted. So long as the predicate is different from the subject, there is nothing in the form of a proposition to distinguish falsehood from truth (to distinguish *Thexêtus sedet*, from *Thexêtus volat*—to take the instance in the Platonic Sophistês—p. 263). There ought to be no propositions except identical propositions: the form itself will then guarantee you against both falsehood and contradiction: you will be sure always to give τὸν οἰκείον λόγον τοῦ πράγματος." There would be nothing inconsistent in such a precept: but Aristotle might call it silly

(εἰρηδῶς), because, while shutting out falsehood and contradiction, it would also shut out the great body of useful truth, and would divest language of its usefulness as a means of communication.

Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Römisch. Phil. vol. ii. xciii. 1) gives something like this as the probable purpose of Antisthenes: "Nur Eins bezeichne die Wesenheit eines Dinges—die Wesenheit als einfachen Träger des mannichfaltigen der Eigenschaften" (this is rather too Aristotelian)—"zur Abwehr von Streitigkeiten auf dem Gebiete der Erscheinungen." Compare also Ritter, Gesch. Phil. vol. ii. p. 130. We read in the Kratylus, that there were persons who maintained the rectitude of all names: to say that a name was not right, was (in their view) tantamount to saying that it was no name at all, but only an unmeaning sound (Plato, Krat. pp. 429-430).

<sup>o</sup> Plutarch, adv. Kolôtên, p. 1119 C-D.

<sup>p</sup> Hegel (Geschichte der Griech. Philos. i. p. 123) and Marbach (Geschichte der Philos. s. 91) disallow the

tion. He pronounced them to be inadmissible both as subject and as predicate. If you speak of Man in general (he said) what, or whom, do you mean? You do not mean A or B, or C or D, &c.: that is, you do not mean any one of these more than any other. You have no determinate meaning at all: and beyond this indefinite multitude of individuals, there is nothing that the term can mean. Again, as to predicates—when you say, *The man runs* or *The man is good*, what do you mean by the predicate *runs*, or is *good*? You do not mean anything specially belonging to *man*: for you apply the same predicates to many other subjects: you say *runs*, about a horse, a dog, or a cat—you say *good* in reference to food, medicine, and other things besides. Your predicate, therefore, being applied to many and diverse subjects, belongs not to one of them more than to another: in other words, it belongs to neither: the predication is not admissible.<sup>9</sup>

Nominalism  
of Stilpon.  
His reasons  
against acci-  
dental predi-  
cation.

assertion of Diogenes, that Stilpon ἀνέρι τὰ εἶδη. They maintain that Stilpon rejected the particular affirmations, and allowed only general or universal affirmations. This construction appears to me erroneous.

<sup>9</sup> Diog. L. ii. 113; Plutarch, adv. Kolōten, 1119-1120. εἰ περὶ ἵππου τὸ τρέχειν κατηγοροῦμεν, οὐ φησι (Stilpon) ταῦτον εἶναι τῷ περὶ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τὸ κατηγορούμενον—ἐκατέρου γὰρ ἀπαιτούμενοι τὸν λόγον, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδίδομεν ὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν. "Ὅθεν ἀμαρτάνειν τοὺς ἕτερον ἑτέρου κατηγοροῦντας. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ τρέχειν, πῶς καὶ σιτίου καὶ φαρμάκου τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ νῆ Δία πάλιν λέοντος καὶ κυνὸς τὸ τρέχειν κατηγοροῦμεν; εἰ δ' ἕτερον, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν καὶ ἵπ-  
που τρέχειν, ἕτερον.

Sextus Empiricus (adv. Mathem. vii. p. 269-282) gives a different vein of reasoning respecting predication,—yet a view which illustrates this doctrine of Antisthenes. Sextus does not require that all predication shall be restricted to identical predication: but he maintains that you cannot define any general word. To define, he says, is to enunciate the essence of that which is defined. But when you define Man—"a mortal, rational animal, capable of reason and knowledge"—you give only certain attri-

butes of Man, which go along with the essence—you do not give the essence itself. If you enumerate even all the accompaniments (συμβεβηκότα) you will still fail to tell me what the essence of Man is; which is what I desire to know, and what you profess to do by your definition. It is useless to enumerate accompaniments, until you explain to me what the essence is which they accompany.

These are ingenious objections which seem to me quite valid, if you assume the logical subject to be a real, absolute essence, apart from all or any of its predicates. And this is a frequent illusion, favoured even by many logicians. We enunciate the subject first, then the predicate; and because the subject can be conceived after abstraction of this that, or the other, or

predicates—we are apt to imagine that it may be conceived without *all* or *any* of the predicates. But this is an illusion. If you suppress all predicates, the subject or supposed substratum vanishes along with them: just as the Genus vanishes, if you suppress all the different species of it.

"Sais tu au moins ce que c'est que in matière? Par exemple, cette pierre est grise, et d'une telle forme; elle a ses trois dimensions, elle est pesante et divisible. Eh bien (dit le Sirien), cette chose qui te paraît être divisible, pe-

Stilpon (like Antisthenes, as I have remarked above) seems to have had in his mind a type of predication, similar to the type of reasoning which Aristotle laid down in the syllogism: such that the form of the proposition should be itself a guarantee for the truth of what was affirmed. Throughout the ancient philosophy, especially in the more methodised debates between the Academics and Sceptics on one side, and the Stoics on the other—what the one party affirmed and the other party denied, was, the existence of a Criterion of Truth: some distinguishable mark, such as falsehood could not possibly carry. To find this infallible mark in propositions, Stilpon admitted none except identical. While agreeing with Antisthenes, that no predicate could belong to a subject different from itself, he added a new argument, by pointing out that predicates applied to one subject were also applied to many other subjects.

Difficulty of understanding how the same predicate could belong to more than one subject.

sante, et grise, me diras tu bien ce que c'est? Tu vois bien ce que c'est: mais le fond de la chose, le connais tu? Non, dit l'autre. Tu ne sais donc point ce que c'est que la matière." (Voltaire, *Micromégas*, c. 7.)

"Le fond de la chose"—the Ding an sich—is nothing but the name itself, divested of every fraction of meaning: it is *titulus sine re*. But the name being familiar, and having been always used with a meaning, still appears invested with much of the old emotional associations, even though it has been stripped of all its meaning by successive acts of abstraction. If you substract from four, 1 + 1 + 1 + 1, there will remain zero. But by abstracting, from the subject *man*, all its predicates, real and possible, you cannot reduce it to zero. The name *man* always remains, and appears by old association to carry with it some meaning—though the meaning can no longer be defined.

This allusion is well pointed out in a valuable passage of Cabanis (*Du Degré de Certitude de la Médecine*, p. 61):—

"Je pourrois d'ailleurs demander ce qu'on entend par la nature et les causes premières des maladies. Nous connoissons de leur nature, ce que les faits en manifestent. Nous savons, par exemple, que la fièvre produit tels et tels changemens: ou plutôt, c'est par ces changemens qu'elle se montre à nos

yeux: c'est par eux seuls qu'elle existe pour nous. Quand un homme tousse, crache du sang, respire avec peine, ressent une douleur de côté, a le pouls plus vite et plus dur, la peau plus chaude que dans l'état naturel—l'on dit qu'il est attaqué d'une pleurésie. Mais qu'est ce donc qu'une pleurésie? On vous répliquera que c'est une maladie, dans laquelle tous, ou presque tous, ces accidens se trouvent combinés. S'il en manque un ou plusieurs, ce n'est point la pleurésie, du moins la vraie pleurésie essentielle des écoles. C'est donc le concours de ces accidens qui la constitue. Le mot pleurésie ne fait que les retracer d'une manière plus courte. Ce mot n'est pas un être par lui même: il exprime une abstraction de l'esprit, et reveille par un seul trait toutes les images d'un assez grand tableau.

"Ainsi lorsque, non content de connoître une maladie par ce qu'elle offre à nos sens, par ce qui seul la constitue, et sans quoi elle n'existeroit pas, vous demandez encore ce qu'elle est en elle-même, quelle est son essence — c'est comme si vous demandiez quelle est l'essence d'un mot, d'une pure abstraction. Il n'y a donc pas beaucoup de justesse à dire, d'un air de triomphe, que les médecins ignorent même la nature de la fièvre, et que sans cesse ils agissent dans des circonstances, et manient des instrumens, dont l'essence leur est inconnue."

Now if the predicates belonged to one, they could not (in his view) belong to the others: and therefore they did not really belong to any. He considered that predication involved either identity or special and exclusive implication of the predicate with the subject.

Stilpon was not the first who had difficulty in explaining to himself how one and the same predicate could be applied to many different subjects. The difficulty had already been set forth in the Platonic Parmenidès.<sup>r</sup> How can the Form (Man, White, Good, &c.) be present at one and the same time in many distinct individuals? It cannot be present as a whole in each; nor can it be divided, and thus present partly in one, partly in another. How therefore can it be present at all in any of them? In other words, how can the One be Many, and how can the Many be One? Of this difficulty (as of many others) Plato presents no solution, either in the Parmenidès or anywhere else.<sup>s</sup> Aristotle alludes to several contemporaries or predecessors who felt it. Stilpon reproduces it in his own way. It is a very real difficulty, requiring to be dealt with by those who lay down a theory of predication; and calling upon them to explain the functions of general propositions, and the meaning of general terms.

Analogous difficulties in the Platonic Parmenides.

Menedémus the Eretrian, one among the hearers and admirers of Stilpon, combined even more than Stilpon the attributes of the Cynic with those of the Megaric. He was fearless in character, and untroubled in speech, delivering harsh criticisms without regard to offence given: he was also a great master of ingenious dialectic and puzzling controversy.<sup>t</sup> His robust frame, grave

Menedémus

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Parmenidès, p. 131. Compare also Philèbus, p. 15, and Stallbaum's Proleg. to the Parmenidès, pp. 46-47. The long commentary of Proklus (v. 100-110, pp. 670-682 of the edition of Stallbaum) amply attests the *δυσκολίαν* of the problem.

The argument of Parmenidès (in the dialogue called Parmenidès) is applied to the Platonic *εἶδη* and to τὰ μετέχοντα. But the argument is just as much applicable to attributes, genera, species: to all general predicates.

<sup>s</sup> Aristot. Physic. i. 2, 185, b. 26-36.

Lykophron and some others anterior to Aristotle proposed to elude the difficulty, by ceasing to use the substantive verb as copula in predication: instead of saying Σωκράτης ἐστὶ λευκός, they said either Σωκράτης λευκός, simply, or Σωκράτης λελευκώται.

This is a remarkable evidence of the difficulty arising, even in these early days of logic, about the logical function of the copula.

<sup>t</sup> Diog. L. ii. 127-134, ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἐπικόπτης κί

deportment and simplicity of life, inspired great respect; especially as he occupied a conspicuous position, and enjoyed political influence at Eretria. He is said to have thought meanly both of Plato and Xenokrates. We are told that Menedêmus, like Antisthenes and Stilpon, had doctrines of his own on the subject of predication. He disallowed all negative propositions, admitting none but affirmative: moreover even of the affirmative propositions, he disallowed all the hypothetical, approving only the simple and categorical.<sup>u</sup>

It is impossible to pronounce confidently respecting these doctrines, without knowing the reasons upon which they were grounded. Unfortunately these last have not been transmitted to us. But we may be very sure that there *were* reasons, sufficient or insufficient: and the knowledge of those reasons would have enabled us to appreciate more fully the state of the Greek mind, in respect to logical theory, in and before the year 300 B.C.

Another doctrine, respecting knowledge and definition, is ascribed by Aristotle to "the disciples of Antisthenes and other such uninstructed persons:" it is also canvassed by Plato in the *Theætétus*,<sup>\*</sup> without specifying its author, yet probably having Antisthenes in view. As far as we can make out a doctrine which both these authors recite as opponents, briefly and in their own way, it is as follows:—"Objects must be distinguished into 1. Simple or primary; and 2. Compound or secondary combinations of these simple elements. This last class, the compounds, may be explained or defined, because you can enumerate the component elements. By such analysis, and by the definition founded thereupon, you really come to *know* them—describe them—predicate about them. But the first class, the simple or primary objects, can only be perceived by sense and named: they cannot be analysed, defined, or known. You can only predicate about them that they are like such and such other things: e. g. *silver*, you cannot say what it is in itself, but only that it is like tin, or like something else. There may thus be a *ratio* and a defini-

Distinction

between simple and complex objects. Simple objects undefinable.

<sup>u</sup> Diog. L. ii. 134.

<sup>\*</sup> Plato, *Theætét.* pp. 201-202    Aristotel. *Metaph.* H. 1043, b. 22.

tion of any compound object, whether it be an object of perception or of conception: because one of the component elements will serve as Matter or Subject of the proposition, and the other as Form or Predicate. But there can be no definition of any one of the component elements separately taken: because there is neither Matter nor form to become the Subject and Predicate of a defining proposition."

This opinion ascribed to the followers of Antisthenes, is not in harmony with the opinion ascribed by Aristotle to Antisthenes himself (viz., That no propositions, except identical propositions, were admissible): and we are led to suspect that the first opinion must have been understood or qualified by its author in some manner not now determinable. But the second opinion, drawing a marked logical distinction between simple and complex Objects, has some interest from the criticisms of Plato and Aristotle: both of whom select, for the example illustrating the opinion, the syllable—as the compound made up of two or more letters which are its simple constituent elements.

Plato refutes the doctrine,<sup>7</sup> but in a manner not so much to prove its untruth, as to present it for a verbal incongruity. How can you properly say (he argues) that you *know* the compound AB, when you know neither A nor B separately? Now it may be incongruous to restrict in this manner the use of the words *know*—*knowledge*: but the distinction between the two cases is not denied by Plato. Antisthenes said—"I feel a simple sensation (A or B) and can name it, but I do not *know* it: I can affirm nothing about it in itself, or about its real essence: But the compound AB I do know, for I know its essence. I can affirm about it that *it is* compounded of A and B, and this is its essence." Here is a real distinction: and Plato's argument amounts only to affirming that it is an incorrect use of words to call the compound *known*, when the component elements are not known. Unfortunately the refutation of Plato is not connected with any declaration of his own counter-doctrine, for the Theætétus ends in a result purely negative.

Remarks of  
Plato on this  
doctrine.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, Theætét. ut suprà.

Aristotle, in his comment on the opinion of Antisthenes, makes us understand better what it really is:—  
 Remarks of “Respecting simple essences (A or B), I cannot tell what they really are: but I can tell what they are like or unlike, *i. e.* I can compare them with other essences, simple or compound. But respecting the compound AB, I can tell what it really is: its essence is, to be compounded of A and B. And this I call *knowing* or *knowledge*.”<sup>2</sup> The distinction here taken by Antisthenes (or by his followers) is both real and useful: Plato does not contest it: while Aristotle distinctly acknowledges it, only that among the simple items he ranks both Percepta and Concepta.

Monimus a Syracusan, and Krates a Theban, with his wife Hipparchia,<sup>a</sup> were successors of Diogenes in the Cynic vein of philosophy: together with several  
 Krates—others of less note. Both Monimus and Krates are

<sup>2</sup> Aristot. *Metaphys.* H. 1043, b. 24-32, with the Scholia, p. 774, b. Br.

Mr. J. S. Mill observes, *Syst. of Logic*, i. 5, 6, p. 114, ed. 5:—“There is still another exceptional case, in which, though the predicate is the name of a class, yet in predicating it we affirm nothing but resemblance: the class being founded not on resemblance in any given particular, but on general unanalysable resemblance. The classes in question are those into which our simple sensations, or other simple feelings are divided. Sensations of white, for instance, are classed together, not because we can take them to pieces, and say, they are alike in this, not alike in that, but because we feel them to be alike altogether, though in different degrees. When therefore I say—The colour I saw yesterday was a white colour, or, The sensation I feel is one of tightness—in both cases the attribute I affirm of the colour or of the other sensation is mere resemblance: simple likeness to sensations which I have had before, and which have had that name bestowed upon them. The names of feelings, like other concrete general names, are connotative: but they connote a mere resemblance. When predicated of any individual feelings, the information they convey is that of its likeness to the other feelings which we have been accustomed to call by the same name.”

<sup>a</sup> Hipparchia was a native of Maroneia in Thrace; born in a considerable station, and belonging to an opulent family. She came to Athens with her brother Métroklès, and heard both Theophrastus and Kratès. Both she and her brother became impressed with the strongest admiration for Kratès: for his mode of life, as well as for his discourses and doctrine. Rejecting various wealthy suitors, she insisted upon becoming his wife, both against his will and against the will of her parents. Her resolute enthusiasm overcame the reluctance of both. She adopted fully his hard life, poor fare, and threadbare cloak. She passed her days in the same discourses and controversies, indifferent to the taunts which were addressed to her for having relinquished the feminine occupations of spinning and weaving. Diogenes Laërtius found many striking dicta or replies ascribed to her (*ἄλλα μύρια τῆς φιλοσόφου*, vi. 96-98). He gives an allusion made to her by the contemporary comic poet Menander, who (as I before observed) handled the Cynics of his time as Aristophanes, Eupolis, &c., had handled Sokrates—

ὥσπερ Κράτητι  
 Καὶ θυγατέρ’

ἐπὶ περὶ δούς τριδικονθ

(vi. 93.)

said to have been persons of wealthy condition,<sup>b</sup> yet their minds were so powerfully affected by what they saw of Diogenes, that they followed his example, renounced their wealth, and threw themselves upon a life of poverty; with nothing beyond the wallet and the threadbare cloak, but with fearless independence of character, free censure of every one, and indifference to opinion. "I choose as my country" (said Krates) "poverty and low esteem, which fortune cannot assail: I am the fellow-citizen of Diogenes, whom the snares of envy cannot reach."<sup>c</sup> Krates is said to have admonished every one, whether they invited it or not: and to have gone unbidden from house to house for the purpose of exhortation. His persistence in this practice became so obtrusive that he obtained the title of "the Door-Opener."<sup>d</sup> This feature, common to several other Cynics, exhibits an approximation to the missionary character of Sokrates, as described by himself in the Platonic Apology: a feature not found in any of the other eminent heads of philosophy—neither in Plato nor in Aristotle, Zeno, or Epikurus.

Among other hearers of Krates, who carried on, and at the same time modified, the Cynic discipline, we have to mention Zeno, of Kitium in Cyprus, who became celebrated as the founder of the Stoic sect. In him the Cynic, Megaric, and Herakleitean tendencies may be said to have partially converged, though with considerable modifications: the ascetic doctrines (without the ascetic practices or obtrusive forwardness) of the Cynics—and the logical subtleties of the others. He blended them, however, with much of new positive theory, both physical and cosmological. His compositions were voluminous; and those of the Stoic Chrysippus, after him, were still more numerous. The negative and

<sup>b</sup> Diog. L. vi. 82-88.

Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 48-88.

About Krates, Plutarch, De Vit. Aere Alieno, 7, p. 831 F.

<sup>c</sup> Diog. L. vi. 93. *ἔχειν δὲ πατρίδα καὶ πενίαν ἀνάλωτα τῇ*

The parody or verses of Krates, about his city of Pera (the Wallet), vi. 85, are very spirited—  
*οὐκ ἔστι πόλις ἐστὶ μέσση ἐνὶ οἴκῳ*

Krates composed a collection of philosophical Epistles, which Diogenes pronounces to be excellent, and even to resemble greatly the style of Plato (vi. 98).

<sup>d</sup> Diog. L. vi. 86. *ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ θυρεο-  
ν, διὰ τὸ εἰς πᾶσαν ἑνε-  
ρουθετεῖν.* Compare Seneca,

Epist. 29.

Numenius ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv. 5.

opugning function, which in the fourth century B.C. had been directed by the Megarics against Aristotle, was in the third century B.C. transferred to the Platonists, or Academy represented by Arkesilaus: whose formidable dialectic was brought to bear upon the Stoic and Epikurean schools—both of them positive, though greatly opposed to each other.

## ARISTIPPUS.

Along with Antisthenes, among the hearers and companions of Sokrates, stood another Greek of very opposite dispositions, yet equally marked and original—Aristippus of Kyrênê. The stimulus of the Sokratic method, and the novelty of the topics on which it was brought to bear, operated forcibly upon both, prompting each of them to theorise in his own way on the best plan of life.

Aristippus, a Kyrenean of easy circumstances, having heard of the powerful ascendancy exercised by Sokrates <sup>life, character, and doctrine.</sup> over youth, came to Athens for the express purpose of seeing him, and took warm interest in his conversation.<sup>f</sup> He set great value upon mental cultivation and accomplishments; but his habits of life were inactive, easy, and luxurious. Upon this last count, one of the most interesting chapters in the Xenophontic Memorabilia reports an interrogative lecture addressed to him by Sokrates, in the form of dialogue.<sup>g</sup>

Sokrates points out to Aristippus that mankind may be distributed into two classes: 1. Those who have <sup>Discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus.</sup> trained themselves to habits of courage, energy, bodily strength, and command over their desires and appetites, together with practice in the actual work of life:—the seare the men who become qualified to rule, and who do actually rule. 2. The rest of mankind, inferior in these points, who have no choice but to obey, and who do obey.<sup>h</sup>—Men of the first or ruling

<sup>f</sup> Plutarch (De Curiositate, p. 516 A) says that Aristippus informed himself, at the Olympic games, from Ischomachus respecting the influence of Sokrates.

<sup>g</sup> See the first chapter of the Second Book of the Memorabilia.

I give an abstract of the principal points in the dialogue, not a literal translation.

<sup>h</sup> Xen. Mem. ii. 1, pp. 64-67. 1  
ἄνθρωποι ἱκανοὶ εἶναι ἄρχεω, τὸν

class possess all the advantages of life: they perform great exploits, and enjoy a full measure of delight and happiness, so far as human circumstances admit. Men of the second class are no better than slaves, always liable to suffer, and often actually suffering, ill treatment and spoliation of the worst kind. To which of these classes (Sokrates asks Aristippus) do you calculate on belonging—and for which do you seek to qualify yourself?—To neither of them (replies Aristippus). I do not wish to share the lot of the subordinate multitude: but I have no relish for a life of command, with all the fatigues, hardships, perils, &c., which are inseparable from it. I prefer a middle course: I wish neither to rule, nor to be ruled, but to be a freeman: and I consider freedom as the best guarantee for happiness.<sup>i</sup> I desire only to pass through life as easily and pleasantly as possible.<sup>k</sup>—Which of the two do you consider to live most pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled? asks Sokrates.—I do not rank myself with either (says Aristippus): nor do I enter into active duties of citizenship anywhere: I pass from one city to another, but everywhere as a stranger or non-citizen.—Your scheme is impracticable (says Sokrates). You cannot obtain security in the way that you propose. You will find yourself suffering wrong and distress along with the subordinates<sup>l</sup>—and even worse than the subordinates: for a stranger, wherever he goes, is less befriended and more exposed to injury than the native citizens. You will be sold into slavery, though you are fit for no sort of work: and your master will chastise you, until you become fit for work.—But (replies Aristippus) this very art of ruling, which you consider to be happiness,<sup>m</sup> is itself a hard life, a toilsome slavery, not only stripped of

<sup>i</sup> Xen. Mem. ut suprâ. ἀλλ' εἶναι τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδὸς, ἣν

σταναὶ οἱ κρείττονες τοὺς ἥττονας ἢ καὶ ἰδίᾳ κλαίοντας ὡς δούλοις χρῆσθαι.

<sup>k</sup> Xen. Mem. ut s. ἐμαυτὸν τοίνυν τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ὡς βῆστα καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν.

What follows is yet more emphatic, about the unjust oppression of rulers, and the suffering on the part of subjects.

Xen. Mem. l. c. p. 71.

<sup>l</sup> Xen. Mem. l. c. εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀν-

, οἱ εἰς

, μήτε τοὺς ἀρχοντας θεραπεύσεις, οἷμά σε ὀρέῃ, ὥς

εἶναι.  
Compare Memor. ii. 8, 4.

enjoyment, but full of privation and suffering. A man must be a fool to embrace such discomforts of his own accord.—It is that very circumstance (says Sokrates), that he does embrace them of his own accord—which renders them endurable, and associates them with feelings of pride and dignity. They are the price paid beforehand, for a rich reward to come. He who goes through labour and self-denial, for the purpose of gaining good friends or subduing enemies, and for the purpose of acquiring both mental and bodily power, so that he may manage his own concerns well and may benefit both his friends and his country—such a man will be sure to find his course of labour pleasureable. He will pass his life in cheerful<sup>a</sup> satisfaction, not only enjoying his own esteem and admiration, but also extolled and envied by others. On the contrary, whoever passes his earlier years in immediate pleasures and indolent ease, will acquire no lasting benefit either in mind or body. He will have a soft lot at first, but his future will be hard and dreary.<sup>o</sup>

Sokrates enforces his lecture by reciting to Aristippus the memorable lecture or apologue, which the Sophist Prodikus was then delivering in lofty diction to numerous auditors<sup>p</sup>—the fable still known as the Choice of Hêraklês. Virtue and Pleasure (the latter of the two being here identified with Evil or Vice) are introduced as competing for the direction of the youthful Hêraklês. Each sets forth her case, in dramatic antithesis. Pleasure is introduced as representing altogether the gratification of the corporeal appetites and the love of repose: while Virtue replies by saying, that if youth be employed altogether in pursuing such delights, at the time when the appetites are most vigorous—the result will be nothing but fatal disappointment, accompanied with entire loss of the different and superior pleasures available in mature years and in old age. Youth is the season of labour: the physical appetites must be indulged

<sup>a</sup> Xen. Mem. l. c. p. 72. πῶς οὐκ οἴεσθαι χρὴ τούτους καὶ ποιεῖν ἡδέως εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ζῆν εὐφραϊνόμενους, ἀγαμένους μὲν ἑαυτοὺς, ἐπαινούμενους δὲ καὶ ζηλουμένους ὅτι

Epicharmus:—

Xen. Mem. l. c. p. 74. ἐν τῷ συγ-  
τῷ περὶ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὲ

Xen. Mem. l. c. p. 73, cited from ποῖς ῥήμασιν. P. 81.

sparingly, and only at the call of actual want: accomplishments of body and mind must be acquired in that season, which will enable the mature man to perform in after life great and glorious exploits. He will thus realise the highest of all human delights—the love of his friends and the admiration of his countrymen—the sound of his own praises and the reflexion upon his own deserts. At the price of a youth passed in labour and self-denial, he will secure the fullest measure of mature and attainable happiness.

“It is worth your while, Aristippus” (says Sokrates, in concluding this lecture), “to bestow some reflexion on what is to happen in the latter portions of your life.”

This dialogue (one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and probably reported by Xenophon from actual hearing) is valuable in reference not only to Aristippus, but also to Sokrates himself. Many recent historians of philosophy describe Sokrates and Plato as setting up an idea of Virtue or Good Absolute (*i. e.* having no essential reference to the happiness or security of the agent or of any one else) which they enforce—and an idea of Vice or Evil Absolute (*i. e.* having no essential reference to suffering or peril, or disappointment, either of the agent or of any one else) which they denounce and discommend—and as thereby refuting the Sophists, who are said to have enforced Virtue and denounced Vice only relatively—*i. e.* in consequence of the bearing of one and the other upon the security and happiness of the agent or of others. Whether there be any one doctrine or style of preaching which can be fairly ascribed to the Sophists as a class, I will not again discuss here: but I believe that the most eminent among them, Protagoras and Prodikus, held the language here ascribed to them. But it is a mistake to suppose that upon this point Sokrates was their opponent. The Xenophontic Sokrates (a portrait more resembling reality than the Platonic) always holds this same language: the Platonic Sokrates not always, yet often. In the dialogue between Sokrates and Aristippus, as well as in the apologue of Prodikus, we see that the devotion of the season of youth to indulgence and inactive gratification of appetite, is blamed as productive of ruinous

Illustration  
afforded of  
the views of  
Sokrates

Good and  
Evil.

consequences—as entailing loss of future pleasures, together with a state of weakness which leaves no protection against future suffering; while great care is taken to show, that though laborious exercise is demanded during youth, such labour will be fully requited by the increased pleasures and happiness of after life. The pleasure of being praised, and the pleasure of seeing good deeds performed by one's self, are especially insisted on. On this point both Sokrates and Prodikos concur.<sup>a</sup>

If again we compare the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic Sokrates, we shall find that the lecture of the former to Aristippus coincides sufficiently with the theory laid down by the latter in the dialogue Protagoras; to which theory the Sophist Protagoras is represented as yielding a reluctant adhesion. But we shall find also that it differs materially from the doctrine maintained by Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias. Nay, if we follow the argument addressed by the Xenophontic Sokrates to Aristippus, we perceive that it is in substance similar to that which the Platonic dialogue Gorgias puts in the mouth of the rhetor Pôlus and the politician Kalliklês. The Xenophontic Sokrates distributes men into two classes—the rulers and the ruled: the former strong, well-armed, and well-trained, who enjoy life at the expense of the submission and suffering of the latter: the former committing injustice, the latter enduring injustice. He impresses upon Aristippus the misery of being confounded with the suffering many, and exhorts him to qualify himself by a laborious apprenticeship for enrolment among the ruling few. If we read the Platonic Gorgias, we shall see that this is the same strain in which Pôlus and Kalliklês address Sokrates, when they invite him to exchange philosophy for rhetoric, and to qualify himself for active political life. “Unless you acquire these accomplishments, you will be helpless and defenceless against injury and insult from others: while, if you acquire them, you will raise yourself to political influence, and will exercise power

Comparison  
of the Xeno-  
phontic So-  
krates with  
the Platonic  
Sokrates.

<sup>a</sup> Xenoph. Mem. l. c. pp. 80-81. τοῦ πάποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθῆσθαι.  
πάντων μὲν ἡδέα ἐν τῇ νεότητι διαδρα-  
νήκοος εἶ, καὶ τῶν

over others, thus obtaining the fullest measure of enjoyment which life affords: see the splendid position to which the Macedonian usurper Archelaus has recently exalted himself.<sup>r</sup> Philosophy is useful, when studied in youth for a short time as preface to professional and political apprenticeship: but if a man perseveres in it and makes it the occupation of life, he will not only be useless to others, but unable to protect himself; he will be exposed to suffer any injustice which the well-trained and powerful men may put upon him." To these exhortations of Pôlus and Kalliklês Sokrates replies by admitting their case as true matter of fact. "I know that I am exposed to such insults and injuries: but my life is just and innocent. If I suffer, I shall suffer wrong: and those who do the wrong will thereby inflict upon themselves a greater mischief than they inflict upon me. Doing wrong is worse for the agent than suffering wrong."<sup>s</sup>

There is indeed this difference between the Xenophontic Sokrates in his address to Aristippus, and the Platonic Kalliklês in his exhortation to Sokrates: That whereas Kalliklês proclaims and even vindicates it as natural justice and right, that the strong should gratify their desires by oppressing and despoiling the weak—the Xenophontic Sokrates merely asserts such oppression as an actual fact, notorious and undeniable,<sup>t</sup> without either approving or blaming it. Plato, constructing an imaginary conversation with the purpose that Sokrates shall be victorious, contrives intentionally and with dramatic consistency that the argument of Kalliklês shall be advanced in terms so invidious and revolting that no one else would be bold enough to speak it out: "which contrivance was the more necessary, as So-

Sokrates  
talking to

Platonic  
Gorgias.

<sup>r</sup> Plato, Gorgias, pp. 466-470-486.

<sup>s</sup> Plato, Gorgias, pp. 508-509-521-527 C. *καὶ ἕσόν τινα σοῦ καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνόητου, καὶ προσηλακίσαι, καὶ ναι μὰ Δία σὺ γε ταύτην*

*πέσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾖ λος κάγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν.*

<sup>t</sup> If we read the conversation alleged by Thucydides (v. 94-105-112) to have taken place between the Athenian generals and the executive council of Melos, just before the siege of that

island by the Athenians, we shall see that this same language is held by the Athenian. "You, the Melians, being much weaker, must submit to us who are much stronger; this is the universal law and necessity of nature, which we are not the first to introduce, but only follow out, as others have done before us, and will do after us. Submit—or it will be worse for you. No middle course, or neutrality, is open to you."

<sup>u</sup> Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-487-492.

krates is made not only to disparage the poets, rhetors, and most illustrious statesmen of historical Athens, but to sustain a thesis in which he admits himself to stand alone, opposed to aristocrats as well as democrats.<sup>x</sup> Yet though there is this material difference in the manner of handling, the plan of life which the Xenophontic Sokrates urges upon Aristippus, and the grounds upon which he enforces it, are really the same as those which Kalliklès in the Platonic Gorgias urges upon Sokrates. "Labour to qualify yourself for active political power"—is the lesson addressed in the one case to a wealthy man who passed his life in ease and indulgence, in the other case to a poor man who devoted himself to speculative debate on general questions, and to cross-examination of every one who would listen and answer. The man of indulgence, and the man of speculation,<sup>y</sup> were both of them equally destitute of those active energies, which were necessary to confer power over others, or even security against oppression by others.

In the Xenophontic dialogue, Aristippus replies to Sokrates that the apprenticeship enjoined upon him is too laborious, and that the exercise of power, itself laborious, has no charm for him. He desires a middle course, neither to oppress nor to be oppressed: neither to command, nor to be commanded—like Otanes among the seven Persian conspirators.<sup>z</sup> He keeps clear of political obligation, and seeks to follow, as much as he can, his own individual judgment. Though Sokrates, in the

<sup>x</sup> Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 472-521.

<sup>y</sup> If we read the treatise of Plutarch, *Περὶ Στωϊκῶν ἐναντιωμάτων* (c. 2-3, p. 1033 C-D), we shall see that the Stoic writers, Zeno, Kleanthes, Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater, all of them earnestly recommended a life of active citizenship and laborious political duty, as incumbent upon philosophers not less than upon others; and that they treated with contempt a life of literary leisure and speculation. Chrysippus explicitly declared οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον τοῦ ἡδονικοῦ, i. e. that the speculative philosopher who kept aloof from political activity, was in substance a follower of Epikurus. Tacitus holds much the same language (*Hist.* iv. 5) when he says about Helvidius Priscus:—"ingenium il-

lustre altioribus studiis juvenis admodum dedit: non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo constanter adversus fortuita, rempublicam capesseret," &c.

The contradiction which Plutarch notes is, that these very Stoic philosophers (Chrysippus and the others) who affected to despise all modes of life except active civic duty—were themselves all men of literary leisure, spending their lives away from their native cities, in writing and talking philosophy. The same might have been said about Sokrates and Plato (except as to leaving their native cities), both of whom incurred the same reproach for inactivity as Sokrates here addresses to Aristippus.

<sup>z</sup> Herodot. iii. 80-83.

Xenophontic dialogue, is made to declare this middle course impossible, yet it is substantially the same as what the Platonic Sokrates in the *Gorgias* aspires to:—moreover the same as what the real Sokrates at Athens both pursued as far as he could, and declared to be the only course consistent with his security.\* The Platonic Sokrates in the *Gorgias* declares emphatically that no man can hope to take active part in the government of a country, unless he be heartily identified in spirit with the ethical and political system of the country: unless he not merely professes, but actually and sincerely shares, the creed, doctrines, tastes, and modes of appreciation prevalent among the citizens.<sup>b</sup> Whoever is deficient in this indispensable condition, must be content “to mind his own business and to abstain from active meddling with public affairs.” This is the course which the Platonic Sokrates claims both for himself and for the philosopher generally:<sup>c</sup> it is also the course which Aristippus chooses for himself, under the different title of a middle way between the extortion of the ruler and the suffering of the subordinate. And the argument of Sokrates that no middle way is possible—far from refuting Aristippus (as Xenophon says that it did)<sup>d</sup> is founded upon an

\* Plato, *Apol. So.* p. 32 A. ἰδιω-  
τεῦειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 510-513. Τίς  
οὖν ποτ' ἔστι τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς  
τοῦ  
σκέψαι εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἥπερ ἐμοί· ἐμοί  
γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε·

ὑπαρ-  
πόλεως ἐταῖρον εἶναι; (This  
is exactly the language which Sokrates  
holds to Aristippus, Xenoph. *Memor.*  
ii. 1, 12.)

ἂν ὁμοθηῆς ὧν, ταῦτά  
ἄρχεσθαι καὶ  
ῥθὺς ἐκ νέου εἶθι

τηρ (510 D). οὐ γὰρ  
ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς

<sup>c</sup> Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 526 C-D. (Com-  
pare Republic, vi. p. 496 D.)

Καλλικλεις,  
αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγ-  
αντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ—καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀντι-  
αλῶ σε (Sokrates to Kalliklēs)  
τούτων τὸν βίον. Upon these words

Routh remarks: “Respicitur inter hæc  
verba ad Calliclis orationem, quæ rerum

civilium tractatio et  
Socrati persuadentur,”—which is the  
same invitation as the Xenophontic  
Sokrates addresses to Aristippus.  
Again, in *Plat. Rep.* viii. pp. 549 C, 550  
A, we read, that corruption of the vir-  
tuous character begins by invitations  
to the shy youth to depart from the  
quiet plan of life followed by a virtuous  
father (who τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει) and to  
enter on a career of active political  
ambition. The youth is induced, by  
instigation of his mother and relatives  
without, to pass from ἀπραγμοσύνη to  
φιλοπραγμοσύνη, which is described as  
a change for the worse. Even in Xeno-  
phon (*Memor.* iii. 2, 16) Sokrates re-  
cognises and jests upon his own ἀπραγ-  
μοσύνη.

<sup>d</sup> Xen. *Mem.* iii. 8, 1. Diogenes L.  
says (and it is probable enough, from  
radical difference of character) that  
Xenophon was adversely disposed to  
Aristippus. In respect to other per-  
sons also, Xenophon puts invidious  
constructions (for which at any rate no  
ground is shown) upon their purposes  
in questioning Sokrates: thus, in the  
(i. 6) with the Sophist Anti-

incorrect assumption : had it been correct, neither literature nor philosophy could have been developed.

The real Sokrates, since he talked incessantly and with every one, must of course have known how to diversify his conversation and adapt it to each listener. Xenophon not only attests this generally,<sup>a</sup> but has preserved the proofs of it in his *Memorabilia*—real conversations, reported though doubtless dressed up by himself.

Diversified

of the hearer.

The conversations which he has preserved relate chiefly to piety and to the duties and proceedings of active life : and to the necessity of controuling the appetites : these he selected partly because they suited his proclaimed purpose of replying to the topics of indictment, partly because they were in harmony with his own *idéal*. Xenophon was a man of action, resolute in mind and vigorous in body, performing with credit the duties of the general as well as of the soldier. His heroes were men like Cyrus, Agesilaus, Ischomachus—warriors, horsemen, hunters, husbandmen, always engaged in active competition for power, glory, or profit, and never shrinking from danger, fatigue, or privation. For a life of easy and unambitious indulgence, even though accompanied by mental and speculative activity—"homines ignavâ operâ et philosophâ sententiâ"—he had no respect. It was on this side that the character of Aristippus certainly seemed to be, and probably really was, the most defective. Sokrates employed the arguments the most likely to call forth within him habits of action—to render him *πρακτικώτερον*.<sup>f</sup> In talking with the presumptuous youth Glaukon, and with the diffident Charmides,<sup>g</sup> Sokrates used language adapted to correct the respective infirmities of each. In addressing Kritias and Alkibiades, he would consider it necessary not only to inculcate self-denial as to appetite, but to repress an exorbitance of ambition.<sup>h</sup> But in dealing with Aristippus, while insisting upon command of appetite and acquirement of active energy, he at the same time endeavours

phon, he says that Antiphon questioned Sokrates in order to seduce away his companions.

<sup>a</sup> Xen. Mem. iv. 1, 2-3.

<sup>f</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 1. *ὥς δὲ ἐπολεῖ τοὺς συνόντας*

*φῶ, νῦν αὖ τοῦτο*

<sup>g</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iii. capp. 6 and 7.

<sup>h</sup> Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 15-18-24. Respecting the different tone and arguments employed by Sokrates, in his conversations with different persons, see a good passage in the Rhetor Aristides, Orat. xlv. *Ἐπὶ τῶν τετραρῶν*, p. 161, Dindorf.

to kindle ambition, and the love of command : he even goes so far as to deny the possibility of a middle course, and to maintain (what Kritias and Alkibiades<sup>1</sup> would have cordially approved) that there was no alternative open, except between the position of the oppressive governors and that of the suffering subjects. Addressed to Aristippus, these topics were likely to thrust forcibly upon his attention the danger of continued indulgences during the earlier years of life, and the necessity, in view to his own future security, for training in habits of vigour, courage, self-command, endurance.

Xenophon notices briefly two other colloquies between Sokrates and Aristippus. The latter asked Sokrates, "Do you know anything good?" in order (says Xenophon) that if Sokrates answered in the affirmative and gave as examples, health, wealth, strength, courage, bread, &c., he (Aristippus) might show circumstances in which this same particular was evil; and might thus catch Sokrates in a contradiction, as Sokrates had caught him before.<sup>k</sup> But Sokrates (says Xenophon) far from seeking to fence with the question, retorted it in such a way as to baffle the questioner, and at the same time to improve and instruct the by-standers.<sup>l</sup> "Do you ask me if I know anything good for a fever?—No. Or for ophthalmic distemper?—No. Or

Conversation between Sokrates and Aristippus—about the Good and Beautiful.

<sup>1</sup> We see from the first two chapters of the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon (as well as from the subsequent intimation of Æschines, in the oration against Timarchus, p. 173) how much stress was laid by the accusers of Sokrates on the fact that he had educated Kritias and Alkibiades: and how the accusers alleged that his teaching tended to encourage the like exorbitant aspirations in others, dangerous to established authority, traditional, legal, parental, divine. I do not doubt (what Xenophon affirms) that Sokrates, when he conversed with Kritias and Alkibiades, held a very opposite language. But it was otherwise when he talked with men of ease and indulgence without ambition, such as Aristippus. If Melétus and Anytus could have put in evidence the conversation of Sokrates with Aristippus, many points of it would have strengthened their case against Sokrates before the *Dikasts*. We read in Xenophon (*Mem.* i. 2, 58) how the point was made to tell, that

Sokrates often cited and commented on the passage of the *Iliad* (ii. 188) in which the Grecian chiefs, retiring from the agora to their ships, are described as being respectfully addressed by Odysseus—while the common soldiers are scolded and beaten by him, for the very same conduct: the relation which Sokrates here dwells on as subsisting between *οἱ ἀρχικοὶ* and *οἱ ἀρχόμενοι*, would favour the like colouring.

<sup>k</sup> Xenoph. *Memor.* iii. 8, 1. Both Xenophon and some of his commentators censure this as a captious string of questions put by Aristippus—"captiosas Aristippi quæstiunculas." Such a criticism is preposterous, when we recollect that Sokrates was continually examining and questioning others in the same manner. See in particular his cross-examination of Euthydémus, reported by Xenophon, *Memor.* iv. 2: and many others like it, both in Xenophon and in Plato.

<sup>l</sup> Xenoph. *Memor.* iii. 8, 1.  
*ὅς σουδράς*

for hunger?—No. Oh! then, if you mean to ask me, whether I know anything good, which is good for nothing—I reply that I neither know any such thing, nor care to know it.”

Again, on another occasion Aristippus asked him—“Do you know anything beautiful?—Yes: many things.—Are they all like to each other?—No; they are as unlike as possible to each other.—How then (continues Aristippus) can that which is unlike to the beautiful, be itself beautiful?—Easily enough (replies Sokrates); one man is beautiful for running: another man, altogether unlike him, is beautiful for wrestling. A shield, which is beautiful for protecting your body, is altogether unlike to a javelin, which is beautiful for being swiftly and forcibly hurled.—Your answer (rejoined Aristippus) is exactly the same as it was when I asked you whether you knew anything good.—Certainly (replies Sokrates). Do you imagine, that the Good is one thing, and the Beautiful another? Do you not know that all things are good and beautiful in relation to the same purpose? Virtue is not good in relation to one purpose, and beautiful in relation to another. Men are called both good and beautiful in reference to the same ends: the bodies of men, in like manner: and all things which men use, are considered both good and beautiful, in consideration of their serving their ends well.—Then (says Aristippus) a basket for carrying dung is beautiful?—To be sure (replied Sokrates), and a golden shield is ugly; if the former be well made for doing its work, and the latter badly.—Do you then assert (asked Aristippus) that the same things are both beautiful and ugly?—Assuredly (replied Sokrates); and the same things are both good and evil. That which is good for hunger, is often bad for a fever: that which is good for a fever, is often bad for hunger. What is beautiful for running, is often ugly for wrestling—and *vice versâ*. All things are good and beautiful, in relation to the ends which they serve well: all things are evil and ugly, in relation to the ends which they serve badly.”<sup>m</sup>

These last cited colloquies also, between Sokrates and Aristippus, are among the most memorable remains of Grecian philosophy: belonging to one of the years

Remarks on  
the conversation—Theory  
of Good.

<sup>m</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1-9.

preceding 399 B.C., in which last year Sokrates perished. Here (as in the former dialogue) the doctrine is distinctly enunciated by Sokrates—That Good and Evil—Beautiful (or Honourable) and Ugly (or Dishonourable—Base)—have no intelligible meaning except in relation to human happiness and security. Good or Evil Absolute (*i. e.* apart from such relation) is denied to exist. The theory of Absolute Good (a theory traceable to the Parmenidean doctrines, and adopted from them by Eukleides) becomes first known to us as elaborated by Plato. Even in his dialogues it is neither always nor exclusively advocated, but is often modified by, and sometimes even exchanged for, the eudæmonistic or relative theory.

Sokrates declares very explicitly, in his conversation with Aristippus, what *he* means by the Good and the Beautiful: and when therefore in the name of the <sup>tiv</sup><sub>ms</sub> Good and the Beautiful, he protests against an uncontrolled devotion to the pleasures of sense (as in <sup>of Sokrates.</sup> one of the Xenophontic dialogues with Euthydemus<sup>n</sup>), what he means is, that a man by such intemperance ruins his prospects of future happiness, and his best means of being useful both to himself and others. Whether Aristippus first learnt from Sokrates the relative theory of the Good and the Beautiful, or had already embraced it before, we cannot say. Some of his questions, as reported in Xenophon, would lead us to suspect that it took him by surprise: just as we find, in the Protagoras of Plato, that a theory substantially the same, though in dif-

<sup>n</sup> Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5.

Sokrates exhorts those with whom he converses to be sparing in indulgences, and to cultivate self-command and fortitude as well as bodily energy and activity. The reason upon which these exhortations are founded is eudæmonistic: that a person will thereby escape or be able to confront serious dangers—and will obtain for himself ultimately greater pleasures than those which he foregoes (Memor. i. 6, 8, ii. 1, 31-33, iii. 12, 2-5). Τοῦ δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν γαστρὶ μὴδὲ ὕπνῳ καὶ λαγνείᾳ οἷε τι ἄλλο αἰτιώτερον εἶναι, ἢ τέρα ἔχειν

καὶ

See

also Memor. ii. 4, ii. 10, 4, about the importance of acquiring and cultivating friends, because a good friend is the most useful and valuable of all possessions. Sokrates, like Aristippus, adopts the prudential view of life, and not the transcendental; recommending sobriety and virtue on the ground of pleasures secured and pains averted. We find Plutarch, in his very bitter attacks on Epikurus, reasoning on the Hedonistic basis, and professing to prove that Epikurus discarded pleasures more and greater for the sake of obtaining pleasures fewer and less. See Plutarch, *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum*, pp. 1096-1099.

ferent words, is proposed by the Platonic Sokrates to the Sophist Protagoras: who at first repudiates it, but is compelled ultimately to admit it by the elaborate dialectic of Sokrates.<sup>o</sup> If Aristippus did not learn the theory from Sokrates, he was at any rate fortified in it by the authority of Sokrates; to whose doctrine, in this respect, he adhered more closely than Plato.

Aristippus is recognised by Aristotle<sup>p</sup> in two characters: both as a Sophist, and as a companion of Sokrates and Plato. Moreover it is remarkable that the doctrine, in reference to which Aristotle cites him as one among the Sophists, is a doctrine unquestionably Sokratic—contempt of geometrical science as useless, and as having no bearing on the good or evil of life.<sup>q</sup> Herein also Aristippus followed Sokrates, while Plato departed from him.

Life and dicta of Aristippus—His type of cha-  
 In estimating the character of Aristippus, I have brought into particular notice the dialogues reported by Xenophon, because the Xenophontic statements, with those of Aristotle, are the only contemporary evidence (for Plato only names him once to say that he was not present at the death of Sokrates, and was reported to be in Ægina). The other statements respecting Aristippus, preserved by Diogenes and others, not only come from later authorities, but give us hardly any facts; though they ascribe to him a great many sayings and repartees, adapted to a peculiar type of character. That type of character, together with an imperfect notion of his doctrines, is all that we can make out. Though Aristippus did not follow the recommendation of Sokrates, to labour and qualify himself for a ruler, yet both the advice of Sokrates, to reflect and prepare himself for the anxieties and perils of the future—and the spectacle of self-sufficing independence which the character of Sokrates afforded—were probably highly useful to him. Such advice being adverse to the natural tendencies of his mind, impressed upon him forcibly those points of the case which he was most likely to forget: and contributed to form in him that habit of self-command which is a marked feature in his

<sup>o</sup> Plato, *Protagoras*, pp. 351-361.

<sup>p</sup> Aristot. *Rhetoric*. ii. 24; *Metaphysic*. B. 996, a. 32.

<sup>q</sup> Xenophon, *Memor.* iv. 7, 2.

character. He wished (such are the words ascribed to him by Xenophon) to pass through life as easily and agreeably as possible. Ease comes before pleasure: but his plan of life was to obtain as much pleasure as he could, consistent with ease, or without difficulty and danger. He actually realised, as far as our means of knowledge extend, that middle path of life which Sokrates declared to be impracticable.

Much of the advice given by Sokrates, Aristippus appears to have followed, though not from the reasons which Sokrates puts forward for giving it. When Sokrates reminds him that men liable to be tempted and ensnared by the love of good eating, were unfit to command—when he animadverts on the insanity of the passionate lover, who exposed himself to the extremity of danger for the purpose of possessing a married woman, while there were such abundant means of gratifying the sexual appetite without any difficulty or danger whatever—to all this Aristippus assents: and what we read about his life is in perfect conformity therewith. Reason and prudence supply ample motives for following such advice, whether a man be animated with the love of command or not. So again, when Sokrates impresses upon Aristippus that the Good and the Beautiful were the same, being relative only to human wants or satisfaction—and that nothing was either good or beautiful, except in so far as it tended to confer relief, security, or enjoyment—this lesson too Aristippus laid to heart, and applied in a way suitable to his own peculiar dispositions and capacities.

The type of character represented by Aristippus is the man who enjoys what the present affords, so far as can be done without incurring future mischief, or provoking the enmity of others—but who will on no account enslave himself to any enjoyment; who always maintains his own self-mastery and independence—and who has prudence and intelligence enabling him to regulate each separate enjoyment so as not to incur preponderant evil in future.<sup>a</sup> This self-mastery and independence

*Aristippus acted conformably to the advice of Sokrates.*

*Self-mastery and independence—the great aspiration of Aristippus.*

Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 5. καὶ

φέρεσθαι, ἀρ' οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο ἐστίν;

τε καὶ αἰσχροῦν, ὀντων δὲ πολ-  
των

Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ,

<sup>a</sup> Diog. L. ii. 67. οὕτως

καὶ

is in point of fact the capital aspiration of Aristippus, hardly less than of Antisthenes and Diogenes. He is competent to deal suitably with all varieties of persons, places, and situations, and to make the best of each—Οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτος εἰμ' ἐγώ:<sup>1</sup> but he accepts what the situation presents, without yearning or struggling for that which it cannot present.<sup>2</sup> He enjoys the society both of the Syracusan despot Dionysius, and of the Hetæra Lais; but he will not make himself subservient either to one or to the other: he conceives himself able to afford, to both, as much satisfaction as he receives.<sup>3</sup> His enjoyments are not enhanced by the idea that others are excluded from the like enjoyment, and that he is a superior, privileged, man: he has no jealousy or antipathy, no passion for triumphing over rivals, no demand for envy or admiration from spectators. Among the Hetærae in Greece were included all the most engaging and accomplished women—for in Grecian matrimony, it was considered becoming and advantageous that the bride should be young and ignorant, and that as a wife she should neither see nor know anything beyond the administration of her own feminine apartments and household.<sup>4</sup> Aristippus attached himself to those Hetærae who pleased him; declaring that the charm of their society was in no way lessened by the knowledge that others enjoyed it also, and that he could claim no exclusive privilege.<sup>5</sup> His patience and mildness in argument is much

<sup>1</sup> Diog. L. ii. 66. ἦν δὲ ἱκανὸς ἀρμόσασθαι καὶ τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ προ- καὶ πᾶσαν περίστασιν ἀρμοδίως καὶ παρὰ Διονυσίῳ μᾶλλον, ἀεὶ τὸ ἀπέλαυε μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐθέρα δὲ οὐκ ἀπόλαυσιν τῶν οὐ παρόντων.

Horat. Epistol. i. 17-23:—

Omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et

Tentantem majora, ferè præsentibus æquum."

<sup>2</sup> Sophokles, Philoktètes, 1049 (the words of Odysseus).

<sup>3</sup> Diog. L. ii. 75. ἐχρητο καὶ οὐκ ἔβουλον τοὺς

αὐτῶν

κρατεῖν καὶ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι ἡδονῶν, —οὐ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι. ii. 77, Διονυσίου ποτ' ἐρομένου, ἐπὶ τί ἦκοι. ἐπὶ τῷ μεταδᾶσειν ὧν ἔχοι, καὶ

Lucian introduces Ἀρετὴν and Τρυφὴν

as litigating before Δίκη for the possession of Aristippus: the litigation is left undecided (Bis Accusatus, c. 13-23).

<sup>4</sup> Xenophon, Œconomic. iii. 13, vii. 5, Ischomachus says to Sokrates about his wife, Καὶ τί ἂν ἐπισταμένην αὐτὴν παρέλαβον, ἥ ἔτη μὲν οὐπω πεντεκαίδεκα γεγονυῖα ἦλθε πρὸς ἐμὲ, τὸν δ' ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον ἐς ἣν ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας, ὅπως ὡς ἐλαχίστα μὲν

ἐλάχιστα δὲ ἔροιτο;

<sup>5</sup> Dion. L. ii. 74. On this point his opinion coincided with that of Diogenes, and of the Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus (D. L. vii. 131), who maintained, that among the wise wives ought to be in common, and that all marital jealousy ought to be discarded.

δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κοινὰ εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν παρὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς ὅστε τὸν ὄντα τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ φησι Ζήνων ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ

commended. The main lesson which he had learnt from philosophy (he said), was self-appreciation—to behave himself with confidence in every man's society: even if all laws were abrogated, the philosopher would still, without any law, live in the same way as he now did.<sup>a</sup> His confidence remained unshaken, when seized as a captive in Asia by order of the Persian satrap Artaphernes: all that he desired was, to be taken before the satrap himself.<sup>b</sup> Not to renounce pleasure, but to enjoy pleasure moderately and to keep desires under controul,—was in his judgment the true policy of life. But he was not solicitous to grasp enjoyment beyond what was easily attainable, nor to accumulate wealth or power which did not yield positive result.<sup>c</sup> While Sokrates recommended, and Antisthenes practised, the precaution of deadening the sexual appetite by approaching no women except such as were ugly and repulsive,<sup>d</sup>—while Xenophon in the *Cyropædia*,<sup>e</sup> working out the Sokratic idea of the dangerous fascination of beauty, represents Cyrus as refusing to see the captive Pantheia, and depicts the too confident Araspes, (who treats such precaution as exaggerated timidity, and fully trusts his own self-possession) when appointed to the duty of guarding her, as absorbed against his will in a passion which makes him forget all reason and duty—Aristippus has sufficient self-mastery to visit the most seductive Hetærae without being drawn into ruinous extravagance or humiliating subjugation. We may doubt whether he ever felt, even for Lais, a more passionate sentiment than Plato in his Epigram expresses towards the Kolophonian Hetæra Archeanassa.

Aristippus is thus remarkable, like the Cynics Antisthenes and Diogenes, not merely for certain theoretical doctrines, but also for acting out a certain plan of life.<sup>f</sup> We know little or nothing of the real life

Aristippus compared with Antisthenes and

ποσ ἐν τῇ περὶ Πολιτείας, ἀλλ' ἔτι Διογένης ὁ Κυνικὸς καὶ Πλάτων· πάντας δὲ παῖδας ἐπίσης στέρξομεν πατέρων τρόπον, καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ μοιχείᾳ ζηλοτυπία περιαιρεθήσεται. Compare Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. H. iii. 205.

<sup>a</sup> Diog. L. ii. 68. The like reply is ascribed to Aristotle. Diog. L. v. 20; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtut. p. 80 D.

<sup>b</sup> Diog. L. ii. 79.

<sup>c</sup> Diog. L. ii. 72-74.

<sup>d</sup> Xenoph. Memor. i. 3, 11-14; Symposion, iv. 38; Diog. L. vi. 3.

ἡ ἡσθεῖν — καὶ —

<sup>e</sup> Xenoph. Cyropæd. v. 1.

<sup>f</sup> Sextus Empiricus and others describe this by the Greek word ἀγωγή (Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 150). Plato's

of Aristippus, except what appears in Xenophon. The biography of him (as of the Cynic Diogenes) given by Diogenes Laertius, consists of little more than a string of anecdotes, mostly sayings, calculated to illustrate a certain type of character.<sup>g</sup> Some of these are set down by those who approved the type, and who therefore place it in a favourable point of view—others by those who disapprove it and give the opposite colour.

We can understand and compare the different types of character represented by Antisthenes or Diogenes, and by Aristippus: but we have little knowledge of the real facts of their lives. The two types, each manifesting that marked individuality which belongs to the Sokratic band, though in many respects strongly contrasted, have also some points of agreement. Both Aristippus and Diogenes are bent on individual freedom and independence of character: both of them stand upon their own appreciation of life and its phenomena: both of them are impatient of that servitude to the opinions and antipathies of others, which induces a man to struggle for objects, not because they afford him satisfaction, but because others envy him for possessing them—and to keep off evils, not because he himself feels them as such, but because others pity or despise him for being subject to them: both of them are exempt from the competitive and ambitious feelings, from the thirst after privilege and power, from the sense of superiority arising out of monopolised possession and exclusion of others from partnership. Diogenes kept aloof from political life and civil obligations as much as Aristippus; and would have pronounced (as Aristippus replies to Sokrates in the Xenophontic dialogue) that the task of ruling others, instead of being a prize to be coveted, was nothing better than an onerous and mortifying servitude,<sup>h</sup> not at all less onerous

beautiful epigram upon Archeanassa is given by Diogenes L. iii. 31. Compare this with the remark of Aristippus—Plutarch, *Amatorius*, p. 750 E.

That the society of these fascinating *Hetaeræ* was dangerous, and exhaustive to the purses of those who sought it, may be seen from the expensive manner of life of Theodoté, described in Xenophon, *Mem.* iii. 11, 4.

The amorous impulses or fancies of Plato were censured by Dikæarchus. See Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* iv. 34, with Davies's note.

<sup>g</sup> This is justly remarked by Wendt in his instructive *Dissertation, De Philosophiâ Cyrenaicâ*, p. 8 (Göttingen, 1841).

<sup>h</sup> It is this servitude of political life, making the politician the slave of per-

because a man took up the burthen of his own accord. These points of agreement are real: but the points of disagreement are not less real. Diogenes maintains his free individuality, and puts himself out of the reach of human enmity, by clothing himself in impenetrable armour: by attaining positive insensibility, as near as human life permits. This is with him not merely the acting out of a scheme of life, but also a matter of pride. He is proud of his ragged garment and coarse<sup>i</sup> fare, as exalting him above others, and as constituting him a pattern of endurance: and he indulges this sentiment by stinging and contemptuous censure of every one. Aristippus has no similar vanity: he achieves his independence without so heavy a renunciation: he follows out his own plan of life, without setting himself up as a pattern for others. But his plan is at the same time more delicate; requiring greater skill and intelligence, more of manifold sagacity, in the performer. Horace, who compares the two and gives the preference to Aristippus, remarks that Diogenes, though professing to want nothing, was nevertheless as much dependent upon the bounty of those who supplied his wallet with provisions, as Aristippus upon the favour of princes: and that Diogenes had only one fixed mode of proceeding, while Aristippus could master and turn to account a great diversity of persons and situations—could endure hardship with patience and dignity, when it was inevitable, and enjoy the opportunities of pleasure when they occurred. “To Aristippus alone it is given to wear both fine garments and rags”—is a remark ascribed to Plato.<sup>k</sup> In truth, Aristippus possesses in

sons and circumstances around him, which Horace contrasts with the philosophical independence of Aristippus:—

Ac ne fortē roges, quo me duce, quo lare tuter;  
Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri  
Quo me cunque rapit tempestas, deferor  
hospes.

Nunc agilis flo et mensor civilibus undis,  
Virtutis veræ custos rigidusque satelles:  
Nunc in Aristippi furtim præcepta relabor,  
Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor.  
(Epist. i. 15.)

So also the Platonic Sokrates (Theæstët. pp. 172-175) depicts forcibly the cramped and fettered lives of rhetors and politicians; contrasting them with the self-judgment and independence of speculative and philo-

sophical enquirers—ὡς οἰκέται  
ἐλευθέρους.

τε καὶ

καλεῖς.

<sup>i</sup> Diog. L. ii. 37.

σθένους τὸ διεβρωγὸς τοῦ ἡματιοῦ εἰς

διὰ τοῦ τριβωνος

<sup>k</sup> Horat. Epistol. i. 17; Diog. L. vi. 46-56-66.

Si pranderet olus patienter, regibus uti  
Nollet Aristippus. Si sciret regibus uti,  
Fastidiret olus, qui me notat. Utrius horum  
Verba probes et facta, doce: vel junior audi.  
Cur sit Aristippi potior sententia. Namque  
Mordacem Cynicum sic eludebat, ut alunt:  
Scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu: rectius hoc et

eminent measure that accomplishment, the want of which Plato proclaims to be so misleading and mischievous—artistic skill in handling human affairs, throughout his dealings with mankind.<sup>1</sup>

That the scheme of life projected by Aristippus was very difficult, requiring great dexterity, prudence, and resolution, to execute it—we may see plainly by the Xenophontic dialogue; wherein Sokrates pronounces it to be all but impracticable. As far as we can judge, he surmounted the difficulties of it: yet we do not know enough of his real life to determine with accuracy what varieties of difficulties he experienced. He followed the profession of a Sophist, receiving fees for his teaching: and his attachment to philosophy (both as contrasted with ignorance and as contrasted with other studies not philosophy), was proclaimed in the most emphatic language. It was better (he said) to be a beggar, than an uneducated man:<sup>m</sup> the former was destitute of money, but the latter was destitute of humanity. He disapproved varied and indiscriminate instruction, maintaining that persons ought to learn in youth what they were to practise in manhood: and he compared those who, neglecting philosophy, employed themselves in literature or physical science, to the suitors in the Odyssey who obtained the favours of Melantho and the other female servants, but were rejected by the queen Penelopè herself.<sup>n</sup> He treated with contempt the study of geometry, because it

Attachment of Aristippus to ethics and philosophy—contempt for other studies.

Splendidus multo est. Equus ut me portet, alai rex,  
Officium facio: tu potius villa rerum,  
Dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem.  
Omnis Aristippum decuit color, et status, et res,  
Tentantem majora, fere presentibus æquum.

(Compare Diog. L. ii. 102, vi. 58, where this anecdote is reported as of Plato instead of Aristippus.)

Horace's view and scheme of life are exceedingly analogous to those of Aristippus. Plutarch, *Fragm.* De Homero, p. 1190; De Fortuna Alex. p. 330 D. Diog. Laert. ii. 67. διό ποτε Στράτων, οἱ δὲ Πλάτων, πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν,

δέδοται καὶ ῥάκος. The remark cannot have been made by Straton, who was not contemporary with Aristippus. Even Sokrates lived by the bounty of his rich friends,

and indeed could have had no other means of supporting his wife and children; though he accepted only a small portion of what they tendered to him, declining the remainder. See the remark of Aristippus, Diog. L. ii. 74.

Plato, Phædon, p. 89 E. *δοτι ἀνευ δ τοιούτους*

χρησθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς

<sup>m</sup> Diog. L. ii. 70; Plutarch, *Fragm.*

.. eis Ἡσίοδον, s. 9.

ἀπ' ἐναντίας δ

Diog. L. ii. 79-80. τοὺς τῶν ἐγ-

δὲ ἀπολειφθέντας, &c. Plutarch. *Fragm.* Στρωματέων, sect. 9.

took no account, and made no mention, of what was good and evil, beautiful and ugly. In other arts (he said), even in the vulgar proceeding of the carpenter and the currier, perpetual reference was made to good, as the purpose intended to be served—and to evil as that which was to be avoided: but in geometry no such purpose was ever noticed.<sup>o</sup>

This last opinion of Aristippus deserves particular attention, because it is attested by Aristotle. And it confirms what we hear upon less certain testimony, that Aristippus discountenanced the department of phy-<sup>rep</sup> <sup>thu</sup> sical study generally (astronomy and physics) as well as geometry; confining his attention to facts and reasonings which bore upon the regulation of life.<sup>p</sup> and others. In this restrictive view he followed the example and precepts of Sokrates—of Isokrates—seemingly also of Protagoras and Prodikus—though not of the Eleian Hippias, whose course of study was larger and more varied.<sup>q</sup> Aristippus taught as a Sophist, and appears to have acquired great reputation in that capacity both at Athens and elsewhere.<sup>r</sup> Indeed, if he had not acquired such intellectual and literary reputation at Athens, he would have had little chance of being invited elsewhere, and still less chance of receiving favours and presents from Dionysius and other princes:<sup>s</sup> whose attentions

Aristot. Metaph. B. 996, a. 32, M. 1078, a. 35. ὥστε διὰ τὰυτα καὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν τινὲς ὁλόν Ἀριστίππος προεπηλάκειζον αὐτὰς, &c.

<sup>p</sup> Diog. L. ii. 92. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 11. Plutarch, apud Eusebium Præp. Ev. i. 8, 9.

<sup>q</sup> Plato, Protagor. p. 318 E, where the different methods followed by Protagoras and Hippias are indicated.

<sup>r</sup> Diog. Laert. ii. 62. Alexis Comicus ap. Athenæ. xii. 544.

Aristokles (ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiv. 18) treats the first Aristippus as a mere voluptuary, who said nothing generally περὶ τοῦ τέλους. All the doctrine (he says) came from the younger Aristippus. I think this very improbable. To what did the dialogues composed by the first Aristippus refer? How did he get his reputation?

<sup>s</sup> Several anecdotes are recounted about sayings and doings of Aristippus in his intercourse with *Dionysius*.

Which *Dionysius* is meant?—the elder or the younger? Probably the elder.

It is to be remembered that *Dionysius* the Elder lived and reigned until the year 367 B.C., in which year his son *Dionysius* the Younger succeeded him. The death of *Sokrates* took place in 399 B.C.: between which, and the accession of *Dionysius* the Younger, an interval of 32 years occurred. Plato was old, being sixty years of age, when he first visited the younger *Dionysius*, shortly after the accession of the latter. *Aristippus* cannot well have been younger than Plato, and he is said to have been older than *Æschines Sokraticus* (D. L. ii. 83). Compare ii. p. 41.

When, with these dates present to our minds, we read the anecdotes recounted by Diog. L. respecting the sayings and doings of *Aristippus* with *Dionysius*, we find that several of them relate to the contrast between the

did not confer celebrity, but waited upon it when obtained, and doubtless augmented it. If Aristippus lived a life of indulgence at Athens, we may fairly presume that his main resources for sustaining it, like those of Isokrates, were derived from his own teaching: and that the presents which he received from Dionysius of Syracuse, like those which Isokrates received from Nikokles of Cyprus, were welcome additions, but not his main income. Those who (like most of the historians of philosophy) adopt the opinion of Sokrates and Plato, that it is disgraceful for an instructor to receive payment from the persons taught—will doubtless despise Aristippus for such a proceeding: for my part I dissent from this opinion, and I therefore do not concur in the disparaging epithets bestowed upon him. And as for the costly indulgences, and subservience to foreign princes, of which Aristippus stands accused, we must recollect that the very same reproaches were advanced against Plato and Aristotle by their contemporaries: and as far as we know, with quite as much foundation.<sup>t</sup>

Aristippus composed several dialogues, of which the titles alone are preserved.<sup>u</sup> They must however have been compositions of considerable merit, since Theopompus accused Plato of borrowing largely from them.

As all the works of Aristippus are lost, we cannot pretend to understand fully his theory from the meagre abstract given in Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes. Yet the theory is of importance in the history of  
sophers.
 ancient speculation, since it passed with some modifications to Epikurus, and was adopted by a large proportion of instructed men. The Kyrenaic doctrine was transmitted

behaviour of Aristippus and that of Plato at Syracuse. Now it is certain that Plato went *once* to Syracuse when he was forty years of age (Epist. vii. init.), in 387 B.C.—and according to one report (Lucian, *De Parasito*, 33), he went there *twice*—while the elder Dionysius was in the plenitude of power: but he made an unfavourable impression, and was speedily sent away in displeasure. I think it very probable that Aristippus may have visited the elder Dionysius, and may have

found greater favour with him than Plato found (see Lucian, l. c.), since Dionysius was an accomplished man and a composer of tragedies. Moreover Aristippus was a Kyrenaean, and wrote about Libya (D. L. ii. 83).

<sup>t</sup> See the epigram of the contemporary poet, Theokritos of Chios, in *Diog. L. v. 11*; compare *Athenæus*, viii. 354, xiii. 566. *Aristokles*, ap. *Eusebium Præp. Ev. xv. 2*.

<sup>u</sup> *Diog. L. ii. 84-85*.

by Aristippus to his disciples Æthiops and Antipater: but his chief disciple appears to have been his daughter Arêtê: whom he instructed so well, that she was able to instruct her own son, the second Aristippus, called for that reason Metrodidactus. The basis of his ethical theory was, pleasure and pain: pleasure being *smooth motion*, pain, *rough motion*:<sup>x</sup> pleasure being the object which all animals, by nature and without deliberation, loved, pursued, and felt satisfaction in obtaining—pain being the object which they all by nature hated and tried to avoid. Aristippus considered that no one pleasure was different from another, nor more pleasurable than another:<sup>y</sup> that the attainment of these special pleasurable moments, or as many of them as practicable, was The End to be pursued in life. By *Happiness*, they understood the sum total of these special pleasures, past, present, and future: yet Happiness was desirable not on its own account, but on account of its constituent items, especially such of those items as were present and certainly future.<sup>z</sup> Pleasures and pains of memory and expectation were considered to be of little importance. Absence of pain or relief from pain, on the one hand—they did not consider as equivalent to positive pleasure—nor absence of pleasure or withdrawal of pleasure, on the other hand—as equivalent to positive pain. Neither the one situation nor the other was a *motion* (κίνησις) i.e. a positive situation, appreciable by the consciousness: each was a middle state—a mere negation of consciousness, like the phenomena of sleep.<sup>a</sup> They recognised some mental pleasures and pains

<sup>x</sup> Diog. L. ii. 86. δύο πάθη ὑφίσταντο, πόνον καὶ ἡδονήν· τὴν μὲν λείαν τὸν δὲ πόνον, τρα

τε  
τὶ εἶναι καὶ τὴν μὲν,  
δὲ

Diog. L. ii. p. 87.

They did not mean by these words to deny that one pleasure was more vehement and attractive than another pleasure, or that one pain is more vehement and deterrent than another pain: for it is expressly said afterwards (s. 90) that they admitted this. They meant to affirm that one pleasure did not differ from another *so far forth as pleasure*: that all pleasures must be ranked as a class, and compared with

each other in respect of intensity, durability, and other properties possessed in greater or less degree.

<sup>y</sup> Diog. L. ii. pp. 88-89. Athenæus, xii. p. 544.

<sup>z</sup> Diog. L. ii. 89-90. μὴ οὕσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἷον καθεύδοντός ἐστι κατὰ ἡμᾶς

A doctrine very different from this is ascribed to Aristippus in Galen—Placit. Philos. (xix. p. 230, Kühn). It is there affirmed that by *pleasure* Aristippus understood not the pleasure of sense, but that disposition of mind whereby a person becomes insensible to pain, and hard to be imposed upon (ἀνδραγαθὸς καὶ δυσγόητευτος).

as derivative from bodily sensation and as exclusively individual—others as not so: for example, there were pleasures and pains of sympathy; and a man often felt joy at the prosperity of his friends and countrymen, quite as genuine as that which he felt for his own good fortune. But they maintained that the bodily pleasures and pains were much more vehement than the mental which were not bodily: for which reason, the pains employed by the laws in punishing offenders were chiefly bodily. The fear of pain was in their judgments more operative than the love of pleasure: and though pleasure was desirable for its own sake, yet the accompanying conditions of many pleasures were so painful as to deter the prudent man from aiming at them. These obstructions rendered it impossible for any one to realise the sum total of pleasures constituting Happiness. Even the wise man sometimes failed, and the foolish man sometimes did well, though in general the reverse was the truth: but under the difficult conditions of life, a man must be satisfied if he realised some particular pleasurable conjunctions, without aspiring to a continuance or totality of the like.<sup>b</sup>

Aristippus regarded prudence or wisdom as good, yet not as good *per se*, but by reason of the pleasures which it enabled us to procure and the pains which it enabled us to avoid—and wealth as a good, for the same reason. A friend also was valuable, for the use and necessities of life: just as each part of one's own body was precious, so long as it was present and could serve a useful purpose.<sup>c</sup> Some branches of virtue might be possessed by persons who were not wise: and bodily training was a valuable auxiliary to virtue.

Prudence—good, by reason of the pleasure which it ensured, and of the pains which it was necessary to avoid. Just and honourable, by law or custom—not by nature.

<sup>b</sup> Diog. L. ii. 91.

It does not appear that the Kyrenaic sect followed out into detail the derivative pleasures and pains: nor the way in which, by force of association, these come to take precedence of the primary, exercising influence on the mind both more forcible and more constant. We find this important fact remarkably stated in the doctrine of Kalliphon.

Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. p. 415, ed. 1629.

Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς περὶ Καλ-  
μὲν τῆς ἡδονῆς παραιο-  
χρόνῳ δὲ ὑστέρον, τὸ

περὶ αὐτὴν κάλλος κατιδοῦσα,  
ἐαυτὴν τῇ ἀρχῇ, τούτεστι τῇ  
πάρσχεν.

<sup>c</sup> Diog. L. ii. 91. τὴν γὰρ  
ἀγαθὴν μὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐ δι'  
δὲ αἰρετὴν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς  
γινόμενα: τὸν φίλον τῆς χρείας εἶ  
καὶ γὰρ μέρος σώματος, μέχρις ἂν

The like comparison is employed by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia (i. 2, 52-55), that men cast away portions of their own body, so soon as these portions cease to be useful.

Even the wise man could never escape pain and fear, for both of these were natural: but he would keep clear of envy, passionate love, and superstition, which were not natural, but consequences of vain opinion. A thorough acquaintance with the real nature of Good and Evil would relieve him from superstition as well as from the fear of death.<sup>d</sup>

The Kyrenaics did not admit that there was anything just, or honourable, or base, by nature: but only by law and custom: nevertheless the wise man would be sufficiently restrained, by the fear of punishment and of discredit, from doing what was repugnant to the society in which he lived. They maintained that wisdom was attainable; that the senses did not at first judge truly, but might be improved by study; that progress was realised in philosophy as in other arts, and that there were different gradations of it, as well as different gradations of pain and suffering, discernible in different men. The wise man, as they conceived him, was a reality; not (like the wise man of the Stoics) a sublime but unattainable idéal.<sup>e</sup>

Such were (as far as our imperfect evidence goes) the ethical and emotional views of the Kyrenaic school: their theory and precepts respecting the plan and prospects of life. In regard to truth and knowledge, they maintained that we could have no knowledge of anything but human sensations, affections, feelings, &c. ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$ ): that respecting the extrinsic, extra-sensational, absolute, objects or causes from whence these feelings proceeded, we could know nothing at all. Partly for this reason, they abstained from all attention to the study of nature—to astronomy and physics: partly also because they did not see any bearing of these subjects upon good and evil, or upon the conduct of life. They turned their attention mainly to ethics, partly also to logic as subsidiary to ethical reasoning.<sup>f</sup>

Their logical theory—nothing knowable except the phenomenal, our own sensations and feelings—no knowledge of the absolute.

Such low estimation of mathematics and physics—and attention given almost exclusively to the feelings and conduct of human life—is a point common to the opposite schools of

<sup>d</sup> Diog. L. ii. p. 92.

<sup>e</sup> Diog. L. ii. p. 93.

<sup>f</sup> L. ii. p. 92. Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vi. 53.

Aristippus and Antisthenes, derived by both of them from Sokrates. Herein Plato stands apart from all the three.

The theory of Aristippus, as given above, is only derived from a meagre abstract and from a few detached hints. We do not know how he himself stated it: still less how he enforced and vindicated it.—He, as well as Antisthenes, composed dialogues: which naturally implies diversity of handling. Their main thesis, therefore—the text, as it were, upon which they debated or expatiated (which is all that the abstract gives)—afford very inadequate means, even if we could rely upon the accuracy of the statement, for appreciating their philosophical competence. We should form but a poor idea of the acute, abundant, elastic and diversified dialectic of Plato, if all his dialogues had been lost—and if we had nothing to rely upon except the summary of Platonism prepared by Diogenes Laertius: which summary, nevertheless, is more copious and elaborate than the same author has furnished either of Aristippus or Antisthenes.

In the history of the Greek mind these two last-mentioned philosophers (though included by Cicero among the *plebei philosophi*) are not less important than Plato and Aristotle. The speculations and precepts of

Antisthenes  
and Aristip-  
pus passed  
to the Stoics  
and Epikureans

Antisthenes passed, with various enlargements and modifications, into the Stoic philosophy: those of Aristippus into the Epikurean: the two most widely extended ethical sects in the subsequent Pagan world.—The Cynic sect, as it stood before it embraced the enlarged physical, kosmical, and social theories of Zeno and his contemporaries, reducing to a minimum all the desires and appetites—cultivating insensibility to the pains of life, and even disdainful insensibility to its pleasures—required extraordinary force of will and obstinate resolution, but little beyond. Where there was no selection or discrimination, the most ordinary prudence sufficed. It was otherwise with the scheme of Aristippus and the Kyrenaics: which, if it tasked less severely the powers of endurance, demanded a far higher measure of intelligent prudence. Selection of that which might safely be enjoyed, and determination of the limit within which enjoyment must be confined, were constantly indispensable. Prudence, knowledge, the art

of mensuration or calculation, were essential to Aristippus, and ought to be put in the foreground when his theory is stated.

That theory is, in point of fact, identical with the theory expounded by the Platonic Sokrates in Plato's Protagoras. The general features of both are the same. Sokrates there lays it down explicitly, that pleasure *per se* is always good, and pain *per se* always evil: that there is no other good (*per se*) except pleasure and diminution of pain—no other evil (*per se*) except pain and diminution of pleasure: that there is no other object in life except to live through it as much as possible with pleasures and without pains;<sup>8</sup> but that many pleasures become evil, because they cannot be had without depriving us of greater pleasures or imposing upon us greater pains—while many pains become good, because they prevent greater pains or ensure greater pleasures: that the safety of life thus lies in a correct comparison of the more or less in pleasures and pains, and in a selection founded thereupon. In other words, the safety of life depends upon calculating knowledge or prudence, the art or science of measuring.

Ethical theory of Aristipp identical that of Platonic Sokrates in Protagoras.

The theory here laid down by the Platonic Sokrates is the same as that of Aristippus. The purpose of life is stated almost in the same words by both: by the Platonic Sokrates, and by Aristippus in the Xenophontic dialogue—"to live through with enjoyment and without suffering." The Platonic Sokrates denies, quite as emphatically as Aristippus, any good or evil, honourable or base, except as representing the result of an intelligent comparison of pleasures and pains. Judicious calculation is postulated by both: pleasures and pains being assumed by both as the only ends of pursuit and avoidance, to which calculation is to be applied. The main difference is, that the prudence, art, or science, required for making this calculation

Difference in the manner of stating the theory by

<sup>8</sup> Plato, Protag. p. 355 A. ἡ ἀρκεί ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἀνευ λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεί, καὶ μὴ ἔχετε

φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, δὲ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾶ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε.

The exposition of this theory, by the Platonic Sokrates, occupies the latter portion of the Protagoras, from p. 351 to

near the conclusion. See above, ch. xxi. of the present work, pp. 60-89, vol. ii.

The language held by Aristippus to Sokrates, in the Xenophontic dialogue (Memor. ii. i. 9), is exactly similar to that of the Platonic Sokrates, as above cited—ἐμαυτὸν τάρτα εἰς τοὺς

rightly, are put forward by the Platonic Sokrates as the prominent item in his provision for passing through life : whereas, in the scheme of Aristippus, as far as we know it, such accomplished intelligence, though equally recognised and implied, is not equally thrust into the foreground. So it appears at least in the abstract which we possess of his theory : if we had his own exposition of it, perhaps we might find the case otherwise. In that abstract, indeed, we find the writer replying to those who affirmed prudence or knowledge to be good *per se*—and maintaining that it is only good by reason of its consequences :<sup>b</sup> that is, that it is not good as End, in the same sense in which pleasure or mitigation of pain are good. This point of the theory, however, coincides again with the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras : where the art of calculation is extolled simply as an indispensable condition to the most precious results of human happiness.

What I say here applies especially to the Protagoras : for I am well aware that in other dialogues the Platonic Sokrates is made to hold different language.<sup>1</sup> But in the Protagoras he defends a theory the same as that of Aristippus, and defends it by an elaborate argument which silences the objections of the Sophist Protagoras ; who at first will not admit the unqualified identity of the pleasurable, judiciously estimated and selected, with the good. The general and comprehensive manner in which Plato conceives and expounds the theory, is probably one evidence of his superior philosophical aptitude as compared with Aristippus and his other contemporaries. He enunciates, side by side, and with equal distinctness, the two conditions requisite for his theory of life. 1. The calculating or measuring art. 2. A description of the items to which alone such measurement must be applied—pleasures and pains.—These two together make the full theory. In

<sup>b</sup> Diog. L. ii. p. 91.

<sup>1</sup> See chapters xxi.-xxii.-xxx. of the present work, in which I enter more fully into the differences between the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Philébus, in respect to this point.

Aristippus agrees with the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras, as to the general theory of life respecting pleasure and pain.

He agrees with the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias (see pp. 500-515), in keeping aloof from active political life. τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμεῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ—which Sokrates, in the Gorgias (p. 526 C), proclaims as the conduct of the true philosopher, is proclaimed with equal emphasis by Aristippus. Compare the Platonic Apology, p. 31 D-E.

other dialogues Plato insists equally upon the necessity of knowledge or calculating prudence: but then he is not equally distinct in specifying the items to which such prudence or calculation is to be applied. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Aristippus, in laying out the same theory, may have dwelt with peculiar emphasis upon the other element in the theory: *i.e.* that while expressly insisting upon pleasures and pains, as the only data to be compared, he may have tacitly assumed the comparing or calculating intelligence, as if it were understood by itself, and did not require to be formally proclaimed.

A distinction must here be made between the general theory of life laid down by Aristippus—and the particular application which he made of that theory to his own course of proceeding. What we may observe is, that the Platonic Sokrates (in the Protagoras) agrees in the first, or general theory: whether he would have agreed in the second (or application to the particular case) we are not informed, but we may probably assume the negative. And we find Sokrates (in the Xenophontic dialogue) taking the same negative ground against Aristippus—upon the second point, not upon the first. He seeks to prove that the course of conduct adopted by Aristippus, instead of carrying with it a preponderance of pleasure, will entail a preponderance of pain. He does not dispute the general theory.

Distinction to be made between a general theory—and the particular application of it made by the theorist to his own tastes and circumstances.

Though Aristippus and the Kyrenaic sect are recognised as the first persons who laid down this general theory, yet various others apart from them adopted it likewise. We may see this not merely from the Protagoras of Plato, but also from the fact that Aristotle, when commenting upon the theory in his Ethics,<sup>k</sup> cites Eudoxus (eminent both as mathematician and astronomer, besides being among the hearers of Plato) as its principal champion. Still the school of Kyrênê are recorded as a continuous body, partly defending, partly modifying the theory of Aristippus.<sup>l</sup>

Kyrenaic theorists after Aristippus.

<sup>k</sup> Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. x. 2.

<sup>l</sup> Sydenham, in his notes on Philébus (note 39, p. 76), accuses Aristippus and

the Kyrenaics of prevarication and sophistry in the statement of their doctrine respecting Pleasure. He says

Hegesias, Annikeris, and Theodôrus are the principal Kyrenaics named: the last of them contemporary with Ptolemy Soter, Lysimachus, Epikurus, Theophrastus, and Stilpon.

Diogenes Laertius had read a powerfully written book of Theodôrus—  
Annikeris—  
Hegesias. Theodôrus, controverting openly the received opinions respecting the Gods:—which few of the philosophers ventured to do. Cicero also mentions a composition of Hegesias.<sup>m</sup> Of Annikeris we know none; but he, too, probably, must have been an author. The doctrines which we find ascribed to these Kyrenaics evince how much affinity there was, at bottom, between them and the Cynics, in spite of the great apparent opposition. Hegesias received the surname of the Death-Persuader: he considered happiness to be quite unattainable, and death to be an object not of fear, but of welcome acceptance, in the eyes of a wise man. He started from the same basis as Aristippus: pleasure as the *expetendum*, pain as the *fugendum*, to which all our personal friendships and aversions were ultimately referable. But he considered that the pains of life preponderated over the pleasures, even under the most favourable circumstances. For conferring pleasure, or for securing continuance of pleasure—wealth, high birth, freedom, glory, were of no greater avail than their contraries poverty, low birth, slavery, ignominy. There was nothing which was, by nature or universally, either pleasurable or painful. Novelty, rarity, satiety, rendered one thing pleasurable, another painful, to different persons and at different times. The wise man would show his wisdom, not in the fruitless struggle for pleasures, but in the avoidance or mitigation of pains: which he would accomplish more successfully by rendering himself indifferent to the causes of pleasure. He would act always for his own account, and would value himself higher than other persons: but he would

that they called it indiscriminately *ἀγαθόν* and *τἀγαθόν*—(a good—The Good)—“they used the fallacy of changing a particular term for a term which is universal, or vice versâ, by the sly omission or insertion of the definite article *The* before the word Good” (p. 73). He contrasts with this prevarication the ingenuousness of

Eudoxus, as the advocate of Pleasure (Aristot. Eth. N. x. 2). I know no evidence for either of these allegations: either for the prevarication of Aristippus or the ingenuousness of Eudoxus.

<sup>m</sup> Diog. L. ii. 97. *Θεόδωρος—παντά-  
πασιν ἀνθρώπων τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας.*  
Diog. L. ii. 86, 97. Cicero, Tusc. Dis.  
i. 34, *Ἡγήσιος δ’*

at the same time reflect that the mistakes of these others were involuntary, and he would give them indulgent counsel, instead of hating them. He would not trust his senses as affording any real knowledge: but he would be satisfied to act upon the probable appearances of sense, or upon phenomenal knowledge."

Such is the summary which we read of the doctrines of Hegesias: who is said to have enforced his views,<sup>o</sup> —of the real character of life, as containing a great preponderance of misfortune and suffering—in a manner so persuasive, that several persons were induced to commit suicide. Hence he was prohibited by the first Ptolemy from lecturing in such a strain. His opinions respecting life coincide in the main with those set forth by Sokrates in the *Phædon* of Plato: which dialogue also is alleged to have operated so powerfully on the Platonic disciple Kleombrotus, that he was induced to terminate his own existence. Hegesias, agreeing with Aristippus that pleasure would be the Good, if you could get it—maintains that the circumstances of life are such as to render pleasure unattainable: and therefore advises to renounce pleasure at once and systematically, in order that we may turn our attention to the only practicable end—that of lessening pain. Such deliberate renunciation of pleasure brings him into harmony with the doctrine of the Cynics.

Hegesias—  
Low estimation of life—  
renunciation of pleasure—  
coincidence with the  
Cynics.

On another point, however, Hegesias repeats just the same doctrine as Aristippus. Both deny anything like absolute knowledge: they maintain that all our knowledge is phenomenal, or relative to our own impressions or affections: that we neither do know, nor can know, anything about any real or supposed ultra-phenomenal object, *i.e.* things in themselves, as distinguished from our own impressions and apart from our senses and other capacities. Having no writings of Aristippus left, we know this doctrine only as it is presented by others, and those too opponents. We cannot tell whether Aristippus or his sup-

Doctrine of  
Relativity  
affirmed by  
the Kyrenaics, as well  
as by Prota-

Diog. L. ii. 93, 94.

<sup>o</sup> Compare the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue entitled *Axiochus*, pp. 366, 367,

and the doctrine of Kleanthes in Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. ix. 88-92. Lucretius, v. 196-234.

porters stated their own doctrine in such a way as to be open to the objections which we read as urged by opponents. But the doctrine itself is not, in my judgment, refuted by any of those objections. "Our affections (πάθη) alone are known to us, but not the supposed objects or causes from which they proceed." The word rendered by *affections* must here be taken in its most general and comprehensive sense—as including not merely sensations, but also remembrances, emotions, judgments, beliefs, doubts, volitions, conscious energies, &c. Whatever we know, we can know only as it appears to, or implicates itself somehow with, our own minds. All the knowledge which I possess, is an aggregate of propositions affirming facts, and the order or conjunction of facts, as they are, or have been, or may be, relative to myself. This doctrine of Aristippus is in substance the same as that which Protagoras announced in other words as—"Man is the measure of all things." I have already explained and illustrated it, at considerable length, in my chapter on the Platonic Theætétus, where it is announced by Theætetus and controverted by Sokrates.<sup>p</sup>

<sup>p</sup> See above, vol. ii. ch. xxvi. p. 325 seq. Compare Aristokles ap. Eusebium, *Præp. Ev.* xiv. 18, 19, and Sextus Emp. *adv. Mathemat.* vii. 190-197, vi. 5.

Sextus gives a summary of this doctrine of the Kyrenaics, more fair and complete than that given by Aristokles—at least so far as the extract from the latter in Eusebius enables us to judge. Aristokles impugns it vehemently, and tries to fasten upon it many absurd consequences—in my judgment without foundation. It is probable that by the term πάθος the Kyrenaics meant simply sensations internal and external: and that the question, as they handled it, was about the reality of the supposed Substratum or Object of sense, independent of any sentient Subject. It is also probable that, in explaining their views, they did not take account of the memory of past sensations—and the expectation of future sensations, in successions or conjunctions more or less similar—associating in the mind with the sensation present and actual, to form what is called a permanent object of sense. I think it likely that they set forth their own doctrine in a narrow and inadequate manner.

But this defect is noway corrected by Aristokles their opponent. On the contrary, he attacks them on their strong side: he vindicates against them the hypothesis of the ultraphenomenal, absolute, transcendental Object, independent of and apart from any sensation, present, past, or future—and from any sentient Subject. Besides that, he assumes them to deny, or ignore, many points which their theory noway requires them to deny. He urges one argument which, when properly understood, goes not against them, but strongly in their favour. "If these philosophers," says Aristokles (*Eus.* xiv. 19, 1), "know that they experience sensation and perceive, they must know something beyond the sensation itself. If I say ἐγὼ καίωμαι, 'I am being burned,' this is a proposition, not a sensation. These three things are of necessity co-essential—the sensation itself, the Object which causes it, the Subject which feels it (*ἀνάγκη τὰ τρία ταῦτα συνυπάρτασθαι—τό τε πάθος αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον*)." In trying to make good his conclusion—That you cannot know the sensation without the Object of sense—Aristokles

at the same time asserts that the Object cannot be known apart from the sensation, nor apart from the knowing Subject. He asserts that the three are by necessity *co-essential*—i. e. implicated and indivisible in substance and existence: if distinguishable therefore, distinguishable only logically (λόγῳ χωριστὰ), admitting of being looked at in different points of view. But this is exactly the case of his opponents, when properly stated. They do not deny Object: they do not deny Subject: but they deny the independent and separate existence of the one as well as of the other: they admit the two only as relative to each other, or as reciprocally implicated in the indivisible fact of cognition. The reasoning of Aristokles thus goes to prove the opinion which he is trying to refute.

Most of the arguments, which Sextus adduces in favour of the Kyrenaic doctrine, show forcibly that the Objective Something, apart from its Subjective correlate, is unknowable and a non-entity; but he does not include in the Subjective as much as ought to be included; he takes note only of the present sensation, and does not include sensations remembered or anticipated. Another very forcible part of Sextus's reasoning may be found, vii. sect. 269-272, where he shows that a logical Subject *per se* is undefinable and inconceivable—that those who attempt to define Man (e. g.) do so by specifying more or fewer of the predicates of Man—and that if you suppose all the predicates to vanish, the Subject vanishes along with them.

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

## XENOPHON.

**THERE** remains one other companion of Sokrates, for whom a dignified place must be reserved in this volume—Xenophon the son of Gryllus. It is to him that we owe, in great part, such knowledge as we possess of the real Sokrates. For the Sokratic conversations related by Xenophon, though doubtless dressed up and expanded by him, appear to me reports in the main of what Sokrates actually said. Xenophon was sparing in the introduction of his master as titular spokesman for opinions, theories, or controversial difficulties, generated in his own mind: a practice in which Plato indulged without any reserve, as we have seen by the numerous dialogues already passed in review.

I shall not however give any complete analysis of Xenophon's works: because both the greater part of them, and the leading features of his personal character, belong rather to active than to speculative Hellenic life. As such, I have dealt with them largely in my History of Greece. What I have here to illustrate is the Sokratic element in his character, which is important indeed as accessory and modifying—yet not fundamental. Though he exemplifies and attests, as a witness, the theorising negative vein, the cross-examining Elenchus of Sokrates—it is the preceptorial vein which he appropriates to himself and expands in its bearing on practical conduct. He is the semi-philosophising general; undervalued indeed as a hybrid by Plato—but by high-minded Romans like Cato, Agricola, Helvidius Priscus, &c., likely to be esteemed higher than Plato himself.\* He is the military

\* See above, my remarks on the Platonic Euthydēmus, vol. i. ch. xix. pp. --- --.

brother of the Sokratic family, distinguished for ability and energy in the responsible functions of command: a man of robust frame, courage, and presence of mind, who affronts cheerfully the danger and fatigues of soldiership, and who extracts philosophy from experience of the variable temper of armies, together with the multiplied difficulties and precarious authority of a Grecian general.<sup>b</sup> For our knowledge, imperfect as it is, of real Grecian life, we are greatly indebted to his works. All historians of Greece must draw largely from his *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*: and we learn much even from his other productions, not properly historical; for he never soars high in the region of ideality, nor grasps at ethereal visions—"nubes et inania"—like Plato.

Respecting the personal history of Xenophon himself, we possess but little information: nor do we know the year either of his birth or death. His *Hellenica* concludes with the battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. But he makes incidental mention in that work of an event five years later—the assassination of Alexander, despot of Phæræ, which took place in 357 B.C.<sup>c</sup>—and his language seems to imply that the event was described shortly after it took place. His pamphlet *De Vectigalibus* appears to have been composed still later—not before 355 B.C. In the year 400 B.C., when Xenophon joined the Grecian military force assembled at Sardis to accompany Cyrus the younger in his march to Babylon, he must have been still a young man: yet he had even then established an intimacy with Sokrates at Athens; and he was old enough to call himself the "ancient guest" of the Bœotian Proxenus, who engaged him to come and take service with Cyrus.<sup>d</sup> We may suppose him to have

Date of Xenophon—probable year of his birth.

<sup>b</sup> We may apply to Plato and Xenophon the following comparison by Euripides, *Supplikes*, 905. (Tydeus and Meleager.)

ἴσον παρέσχεον ὄνομα διὰ τέχνην δορὸς,

ἦθος, πλούσιον φρόνημά τε  
ἐν τοῖσιν ἔργοις, οὐχὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἴσον.

<sup>c</sup> Xenoph. *Hellen.* vi. 4-37. τῶν δὲ ταῦτα πράξαντων (i.e. of the brothers of Thébè, which brothers had assassi-

nated Alexander) ἔχρησεν οὗ

τῶν ἀδελφῶν.

<sup>d</sup> That he was still a young man appears from his language, *Anab.* iii. 1, 25. His intimacy with Sokrates, whose advice he asked about the propriety of accepting the invitation of Proxenus to go to Asia, is shown iii. 1, 5. Proxenus was his ξένος ἀρχαῖος, iii. 1, 4.

The story mentioned by Strabo (ix. 403) that Xenophon served in the Athenian cavalry at the battle of

been then about thirty years of age; and thus to have been born about 430 B.C.—two or three years earlier than Plato. Respecting his early life, we have no facts before us: but we may confidently affirm (as I have already observed about<sup>e</sup> Plato), that as he became liable to military service in 412 B.C., the severe pressure of the war upon Athens must have occasioned him to be largely employed, among other citizens, for the defence of his native city, until its capture in 405 B.C. He seems to have belonged to an equestrian family in the census, and therefore to have served on horseback. More than one of his compositions evinces both intelligent interest in horsemanship, and great familiarity with horses.

Our knowledge of his personal history begins with what he himself recounts in the *Anabasis*. His friend Proxenus, then at Sardis commanding a regiment of Hellenic mercenaries under Cyrus the younger, wrote recommending him earnestly to come over and take service, in the army prepared ostensibly against the Pisidians. Upon this Xenophon asked the advice of Sokrates: who exhorted him to go and consult the Delphian oracle—being apprehensive that as Cyrus had proved himself the strenuous ally of Sparta, and had furnished to her the principal means for crushing Athens, an Athenian taking service under him would incur unpopularity at home. Xenophon accordingly went to Delphi: but instead of asking the question broadly—“Shall I go, or shall I decline to go?”—he put to Apollo the narrower question—“Having in contemplation a journey, to which of the Gods must I sacrifice and pray, in order to accomplish it best, and to come back with safety and success?” Apollo indicated to him the Gods to whom he ought to address himself: but Sokrates was displeased with him for not having first asked, whether he ought to go at all. Nevertheless (continued Sokrates), since you have chosen to put the question in your own way, you must act as the God has prescribed.<sup>f</sup>

His personal history—He consults Sokrates—  
 Delium (424 B.C.), and that his life was saved by Sokrates, I consider to be not less inconsistent with any reasonable chronology, than the analogous anecdote—that Plato distinguished

himself at the battle of Delium. See above, vol. i. ch. iii. p. 117.

<sup>e</sup> See vol. i. ch. 3, pp. 116-118.

<sup>f</sup> Xenoph. *Anab.* iii. 1, 4-6.

The anecdote here recounted by Xenophon is interesting, as it illustrates his sincere faith as well as that of Sokrates, in the Delphian oracle: though we might have expected that on this occasion, Sokrates would have been favoured with some manifestation of that divine sign, which he represents to have warned him so frequently and on such trifling matters. Apollo however was perhaps displeased (as Sokrates was) with Xenophon, for not having submitted the question to him with full frankness: since the answer given was proved by subsequent experience to be incomplete.<sup>5</sup> After fifteen months passed, first, in the hard upward march—next, in the still harder retreat—of the Ten Thousand, to the preservation of whom he largely contributed by his energy, presence of mind, resolute initiative, and ready Athenian eloquence, as one of their leaders—Xenophon returned to Athens. It appears that he must have come back not long after the death of Sokrates. But Athens was not at that time a pleasant residence for him. The Sokratic companions shared in the unpopularity of their deceased master, and many of them were absent: moreover Xenophon himself was unpopular as the active partisan of Cyrus. After a certain stay, we know not how long, at Athens, Xenophon appears to have gone back to Asia; and to have resumed his command of the remaining Cyreian soldiers, then serving under the Lacedæmonian generals against the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. He served first under Derkylidas, next under Agesilaus. For the latter he conceived the warmest admiration, and contracted with him an intimate friendship. At the time when Xenophon rejoined the Cyreians in Asia, Athens was not at war with the Lacedæmonians: but after some time, the hostile confederacy of Athens, Thebes, and Corinth, against them was organised: and Agesilaus was

His service and command with the Ten Thousand Greeks, afterwards under Agesilaus and the Spartans.—He is banished from Athens.

<sup>5</sup> Compare *Anab.* vi. 1, 22, and vii. 8, 1-6.

See also Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* p. 33 C, and Plato, *Theagés*, p. 129; also above, vol. i. ch. xiii. pp. 434-439.

Sokrates and Xenophon are among the most imposing witnesses cited by Quintus Cicero, in his long pleading

to show the reality of divination (*Cicero, De Divinatione*, i. 25-52, i. 54, 122). Antipater the Stoic collected a large number of examples, illustrating the miraculous divining power of Sokrates. Several of these examples appear much more trifling than this incident of Xenophon.

summoned home by them from Asia, to fight their battles in Greece. Xenophon and his Cyreians were still a portion of the army of Agesilaus, and accompanied him in his march into Bœotia; where they took part in his desperate battle and bloody victory at Koroneia.<sup>h</sup> But he was now lending active aid to the enemies of Athens, and holding conspicuous command in their armies. A sentence of banishment, on the ground of Laconism, was passed against him by the Athenians, on the proposition of Eubulus.<sup>i</sup>

How long he served with Agesilaus, we are not told. At the end of his service, the Lacedæmonians provided him with a house and land at the Triphylian town of Skillus near Olympia, which they had seemingly taken from the Eleians and re-colonised. Near this residence he also purchased, under the authority of the God (perhaps Olympian Zeus) a landed estate to be consecrated to the Goddess Artemis: employing therein a portion of the tithe of plunder devoted to Artemis by the Cyreian army, and deposited by him for the time in the care of Megabyzus, priest of Artemis at Ephesus. The estate of the Goddess contained some cultivated ground, but consisted chiefly of pasture; with wild ground, wood and mountain, abounding in game and favourable for hunting. Xenophon became Conservator of this property for Artemis: to whom he dedicated a shrine and a statue, in miniature copy of the great temple at Ephesus. Every year he held a formal hunting-match, to which he invited all the neighbours, with abundant hospitality, at the expense of the Goddess. The Conservator and his successors were bound by formal vow, on pain of her displeasure, to employ one tenth of the whole annual produce in sacrifices to her: and to keep the shrine and statue in good order, out of the remainder.<sup>k</sup>

Xenophon seems to have passed many years of his life either at Skillus or in other parts of Peloponnesus, and is

Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 6; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 18.

<sup>h</sup> Diog. L. ii. 51-59. ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ

<sup>i</sup> Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 8-12; Diog.

L. ii. 52; Pausanias, v. 6, 3.

φησὶ δ' ὁ Δελφάρχης ὅτι καὶ οἰκίαν καὶ

ἔγγον αὐτῷ ἔδωκεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

Deinarchus appears to have composed for a client at Athens a judicial speech against Xenophon, the grandson of Xenophon Sokraticus. He introduced into the speech some facts relating to the grandfather.

said to have died very old at Corinth. The sentence of banishment passed against him by the Athenians was revoked after the battle of Leuktra, when Athens came into alliance with the Lacedæmonians against Thebes. Some of Xenophon's later works indicate that he must have availed himself of this revocation to visit Athens: but whether he permanently resided there is uncertain. He had brought over with him from Asia a wife named Philesia, by whom he had two sons, Gryllus and Diodorus.<sup>1</sup> He sent these two youths to be trained at Sparta, under the countenance of Agesilaus: <sup>m</sup> afterwards the eldest of them, Gryllus, served with honour in the Athenian cavalry which assisted the Lacedæmonians and Mantineians against Epameinondas, B.C. 362. In the important combat <sup>n</sup> of the Athenian and Theban cavalry, close to the gates of Mantinea—shortly preceding the general battle of Mantinea, in which Epameinondas was slain—Gryllus fell, fighting with great bravery. The death of this gallant youth—himself seemingly of great promise, and the son of so eminent a father—was celebrated by Isokrates and several other rhetors, as well as by the painter Euphranor at Athens, and by sculptors at Mantinea itself.<sup>o</sup>

Family of  
Xenophon—  
his son Gryl-  
lus killed at  
Mantineia.

Skillus, the place in which the Lacedæmonians had established Xenophon, was retaken by the Eleians during the humiliation of Lacedæmonian power, not long before the battle of Mantinea. Xenophon himself was absent at the time; but his family were constrained to retire to Lepreum. It was after this, we are

Death of  
Xenophon  
at Corinth—  
Story of the  
Eleian Exe-  
getæ.

<sup>1</sup> Æschines Sokraticus, in one of his dialogues, introduced Aspasia conversing with Xenophon and his (Xenophon's) wife. Cicero, *De Invent.* i. 31, 51-54; Quintil. *Inst. Orat.* v. p. 312.

<sup>m</sup> Plutarch, *Agesilaus*, c. 20.

<sup>n</sup> Xenoph. *Hellen.* vii. 5, 15-16-17. This combat of cavalry near the gates of Mantinea was very close and sharply contested; but at the great battle fought a few days afterwards the Athenian cavalry were hardly at all engaged, vii. 5, 25.

<sup>o</sup> Pausanias, i. 3, 3, viii. 11, 4, ix. 15, 3; Diogenes L. ii. 54. *Harpokration* v.

It appears that Euphranor, in his picture, represented Gryllus as engaged in personal conflict with Epameinondas and wounding him—a compliment not justified by the facts. The Mantineians believed Antikrates, one of their own citizens, to have mortally wounded the great Theban general with his spear, and they awarded to him as recompense immunity from public burthens (*ἀτέλειαν*), both for himself and his descendants. One of his descendants, Kallikrates, continued even in Plutarch's time to enjoy this immunity. Plutarch, *Agesilaus*, c. 35.

told, that he removed to Corinth, where he died in 355 B.C. or in some year later. The Eleian Exegetæ told the traveller Pausanias, when he visited the spot five centuries afterwards, that Xenophon had been condemned in the judicial Council of Olympia as wrongful occupant of the property at Skillus, through Lacedæmonian violence; but that the Eleians had granted him indulgence, and had allowed him to remain.<sup>p</sup> As it seems clearly asserted that he died at Corinth, he can hardly have availed himself of the indulgence; and I incline to suspect that the statement is an invention of subsequent Eleian Exegetæ, after they had learnt to appreciate his literary eminence.

From the brief outline thus presented of Xenophon's life, it will plainly appear that he was quite different in character and habits from Plato and the other Sokratic brethren. He was not only a man of the world (as indeed Aristippus was also), but he was actively engaged in the most responsible and difficult functions of military command: he was moreover a landed proprietor and cultivator, fond of strong exercise with dogs and horses, and an intelligent equestrian. His circumstances were sufficiently easy to dispense with the necessity of either composing discourses or taking pupils for money. Being thus enabled to prosecute letters and philosophy in an independent way, he did not, like Plato and Aristotle, open a school.<sup>a</sup> His relations, as active coadjutor and subordinate, with Agesilaus, form a striking contrast to those of Plato with Dionysius, as tutor and pedagogue. In his mind, the Sokratic conversations, suggestive and stimulating to every one, fell upon the dispositions and aptitudes of a citizen-soldier, and fructified in a peculiar manner. My present work deals with Xenophon,

Pausan. v. 6, 3; Diog. L. ii. 53-56.

<sup>a</sup> See, in the account of Theopompus by Photius (Cod. 176, p. 120; compare also Photius, Cod. 159, p. 102, a. 41), the distinction taken by Theopompus: who said that the four most celebrated literary persons of his day were, his master Isokrates, Theodektês of Phaselis, Naukrates of Erythræ, and himself (Theopompus). He himself and Naukrates were in good circumstances,

so that he passed his life in independent prosecution of philosophy and philomathy. But Isokrates and Theodektês were compelled δι' ἀπορίαν βίου, μισθοῦ λόγους γράφειν καὶ ἐκπαιδεύοντες τοὺς νέους,

Theopompus does not here present the profession of a Sophist (as most Platonic commentators teach us to regard it) as a mean, unprincipled, and corrupting employment.

not as an historian of Grecian affairs or of the Cyreian expedition, but only on the intellectual and theorising side:—as author of the *Memorabilia*, the *Cyropædia*, *Œkonomikus*, *Symposion*, *Hieron*, *De Vectigalibus*, &c.

The *Memorabilia* were composed as records of the conversations of Sokrates, expressly intended to vindicate Sokrates against charges of impiety and of corrupting youthful minds, and to show that he inculcated, before everything, self-denial, moderation of desires, reverence for parents, and worship of the Gods. The *Œkonomikus* and the *Symposion* are expansions of the *Memorabilia*: the first<sup>r</sup> exhibiting Sokrates not only as an attentive observer of the facts of active life (in which character the *Memorabilia* present him also), but even as a learner of husbandry<sup>s</sup> and family management from Ischomachus—the last describing Sokrates and his behaviour amidst the fun and joviality of a convivial company. Sokrates declares<sup>t</sup> that as to himself, though poor, he is quite as rich as he desires to be; that he desires no increase, and regards poverty as no disadvantage. Yet since Kritobulus, though rich, is beset with temptations to expense quite sufficient to embarrass him, good proprietary management is to him a necessity. Accordingly, Sokrates, announcing that he has always been careful to inform himself who were the best economists in the city,<sup>u</sup> now cites as authority Ischomachus, a citizen of wealth and high position, recognised by all as one of the “super-excellent.”<sup>x</sup> Ischomachus loves wealth, and is anxious to maintain and even

His various works—*Memorabilia*, *Œkonomikus*, &c.

<sup>r</sup> Galen calls the *Œkonomikus* the last book of the *Memorabilia* (ad Hippokrat. De Articulis, t. xviii. p. 301, Kühn). It professes to be repeated by Xenophon from what he himself heard Sokrates say—*ἤκουσα δὲ ποτὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ οἰκονομίας τοιαύτῃ διαλεγόμενον*, &c. Sokrates first instructs Kritobulus that economy, or management of property, is an art, governed by rules, and dependant upon principles; next, he recounts to him the lessons which he professes to have himself received from Ischomachus.

I have already adverted to the Xenophontic *Symposion* as containing jocular remarks which some erroneously cite as serious.

<sup>s</sup> To learn in this way the actualities of life, and the way of extracting the greatest amount of wheat and barley from a given piece of land, is the sense which Xenophon puts on the word *φιλόσοφος* (Xen. *Œk.* xvi. 9; compare *Cyropædia*, vi. 1, 41).

<sup>t</sup> Xenoph. *Œkon.* ii. 3; xi. 3, 4.

I have made some observations on the Xenophontic *Symposion*, comparing it with the Platonic *Symposion*, in a prior chapter of this work, vol. ii. ch. xxiv. p. 229.

<sup>u</sup> Xen. *Œkon.* ii. 16.

<sup>x</sup> Xen. *Œkon.* vi. 17, xi. 3. *πρὸς πάντων καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ ξένων καὶ ἰσθίων, καλὸν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐπονομαζόμενον.*

enlarge his property: desiring to spend magnificently for the honour of the Gods, the assistance of friends, and the support of the city.<sup>7</sup> His whole life is arranged, with intelligence and forethought, so as to attain this object, and at the same time to keep up the maximum of bodily health and vigour, especially among the horsemen of the city as an accomplished rider<sup>2</sup> and cavalry soldier. He speaks with respect, and almost with enthusiasm, of husbandry, as an occupation not merely profitable, but improving to the character: though he treats with disrespect other branches of industry and craft.<sup>a</sup> In regard to husbandry, too, as in regard to war or steersmanship, he affirms that the difference between one practitioner and another consists, not so much in unequal knowledge, as in unequal care to practise what both of them know.<sup>b</sup>

Ischomachus describes to Sokrates, in reply to a string of successive questions, both his scheme of life and his scheme of husbandry. He had married his wife before she was fifteen years of age: having first ascertained that she had been brought up carefully, so as to have seen and heard as little as possible, and to know nothing but spinning and weaving.<sup>c</sup> He describes how he took this very young wife into training, so as to form her to the habits which he himself approved. He declares that the duties and functions of women are confined to in-door work and superintendence, while the out-door proceedings, acquisition as well as defence, belong to men:<sup>d</sup> he insists upon such separation of functions emphatically, as an ordinance of nature—holding an opinion the direct reverse of that which he have seen expressed by Plato.<sup>e</sup> He makes many remarks on the arrangements of the house, and of the

hero of the  
Œkonomikos  
—ideal of an

housemaster,  
&c.

<sup>7</sup> Xen. Œkon. xi. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Œkon. xi. 17-21. ἐν τοῖς ἱπικωτάτοις τε καὶ πλουσιωτάτοις.

<sup>a</sup> Xen. Œkon. iv. 2-3, vi. 5-7. Ischomachus asserts that his father had been more devoted to agriculture (φιλογεωργότατος) than any man at Athens: that he had bought several pieces of land (χώρους) when out of order, improved them, and then resold them with very large profit, xx. 26.

<sup>b</sup> Xen. Œkon. xx. 2-10.

<sup>c</sup> Xen. Œkon. vii. 3-7. τὸν δ' ἔμ-  
προσθεν χρόνον ἔζη ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἐπι-

μελείας, ὅπως ὡς ἐλάχιστα μὲν ὄφειτο, ἐλάχιστα δὲ ἀκούσοιτο, ἐλάχιστα δὲ ἔροιτο.

The διδασκαλία addressed to Sokrates by Ischomachus is in the form of ἐρώτησις, xix. 15. The Sokratic interrogation is here brought to bear upon Sokrates, instead of by Sokrates; like the Elenchus in the Parmenides of Plato.

<sup>d</sup> Xen. Œkon. vii. 22-32.

<sup>e</sup> See above, ch. xxxv. pp. 216-225.

Compare also Aristotel. Politic. iii. 4, 1277, b. 25, where Aristotle lays down the same principle as Xenophon.

stores within it: and he dwells particularly on the management of servants, male and female.

It is upon this last point that he lays more stress than upon any other. To know how to command men—is the first of all accomplishments in the mind of Xenophon. Ischomachus proclaims it as essential that the superior shall not merely give orders to his subordinates, but also see them executed, and set the example of personal active watchfulness in every way. Xenophon aims at securing not simply obedience, but cheerful and willing obedience—even attachment from those who obey. “To exercise command over willing subjects”<sup>f</sup> (he says), “is a good more than human, granted only to men truly consummated in virtue of character essentially divine. To exercise command over unwilling subjects, is a torment like that of Tantalus.”

Text upon

spital dif-

tween com-  
mand over  
subordinates  
willing, and  
subordinates  
unwilling.

The sentence just transcribed (the last sentence in the *Œkonomikus*) brings to our notice a central focus in Xenophon's mind, from whence many of his most valuable speculations emanate. “What are the conditions under which subordinates will cheerfully obey their commanders?”—was a problem forced upon his thoughts by his own personal experience, as well as by contemporary phenomena in Hellas. He had been elected one of the generals of the Ten Thousand: a large body of brave warriors from different cities, most of them unknown to him personally, and inviting his authority only because they were in extreme peril, and because no one else took the initiative.<sup>g</sup> He discharged his duties admirably: and his ready eloquence was an invaluable accomplishment, distinguishing him from all his colleagues. Nevertheless when the army arrived at the Euxine, out of the reach of urgent peril, he was made to feel sensibly the vexations of authority resting upon such pre-

Probable cir-

Xenophon's  
mind.

<sup>f</sup> Xen. *Œkon.* xxi. 10-12.  
βασιλικού—θεῖον γενέσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ  
πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ὅλον τοῦτ' ἂν

λόγων

τοῖς ἀληθινῶς σωφροσύνη τετελεσ-  
τῷ δὲ ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν δι-  
οὺς ἂν ἡγῶνται

ἐν Ἀδοῦ λέγεται. Compare also iv. 19,  
xiii. 3-7.

<sup>g</sup> The reader will find in my ‘History of Greece,’ ch. 70, p. 103 seq., a narrative of the circumstances under which Xenophon was first chosen to command, as well as his conduct afterwards.

carious basis, and perpetually traversed by jealous rivals. Moreover, Xenophon, besides his own personal experience, had witnessed violent political changes running extensively through the cities of the Grecian world: first, at the close of the Peloponnesian war—next, after the battle of Knidus—again, under Lacedæmonian supremacy, after the peace of Antalkidas, and the subsequent seizure of the citadel of Thebes—lastly, after the Thebans had regained their freedom and humbled the Lacedæmonians by the battle of Leuktra. To Xenophon—partly actor, partly spectator—these political revolutions were matters of anxious interest; especially as he ardently sympathised with Agesilaus, a political partisan interested in most of them, either as conservative or revolutionary.

We thus see, from the personal history of Xenophon, how his attention came to be peculiarly turned to the difficulty of ensuring steady obedience from subordinates, and to the conditions by which such difficulty might be overcome. The sentence, above transcribed from the *Œkonomikus*, embodies two texts upon which he has discoursed in two of his most interesting compositions—*Cyropædia* and *Hieron*. In *Cyropædia* he explains and exemplifies the divine gift of ruling over cheerful subordinates: in *Hieron*, the torment of governing the disaffected and refractory. For neither of these purposes would the name and person of Sokrates have been suitable, exclusively connected as they were with Athens. Accordingly Xenophon, having carried that respected name through the *Œkonomikus* and *Symposion*, now dismisses it, yet retaining still the familiar and colloquial manner which belonged to Sokrates. The Epilogue, or concluding chapter, of the *Cyropædia*, must unquestionably have been composed after 364 B.C.—in the last ten years of Xenophon's life: the main body of it may perhaps have been composed earlier.

The *Hieron* gives no indication of date: but as a picture purely Hellenic, it deserves precedence over the *Cyropædia*, and conveys to my mind the impression of having been written earlier. It describes a supposed conversation (probably suggested by current traditional

This text  
affords sub-  
jects for the  
*Hieron* and  
*Cyropædia*—  
Name of  
Sokrates not  
suitable.

—Simonides  
and Hieron.

conversations, like that between Solon and Krcesus) between the poet Simonides and Hieron the despot of Syracuse; who, shortly after the Persian invasion of Greece by Xerxes, had succeeded his brother Gelon the former despot.<sup>h</sup> Both of them had been once private citizens, of no remarkable consequence: but Gelon, an energetic and ambitious military man, having raised himself to power in the service of Hippokrates despot of Gela, had seized the sceptre on the death of his master: after which he conquered Syracuse, and acquired a formidable dominion, enjoyed after his death by his brother Hieron. This last was a great patron of eminent poets—Pindar, Simonides, Æschylus, Bacchylides: but he laboured under a painful internal complaint, and appears to have been of an irritable and oppressive temper.<sup>i</sup>

Simonides asks of Hieron, who had personally tried both the life of a private citizen and that of a despot, which of the two he considered preferable, in regard to pleasures and pains. Upon this subject, a conversation of some length ensues, in which Hieron declares that the life of a despot has much more pain, and much less pleasure, than that of a private citizen under middling circumstances: <sup>j</sup> while Simonides takes the contrary side, and insists in detail upon the superior means of enjoyment, apparent at least, possessed by the despot. As each of these means is successively brought forward, Hieron shews that however the matter may appear to the spectator, the despot feels no greater real happiness in his own bosom: while he suffers many pains and privations, of which the spectator takes no account. As to the pleasures of sight, the despot forfeits altogether the first and greatest, because it is unsafe for him to visit the public festivals and matches. In regard

Questions put to Hieron, view taken by Simonides. Answer of Hieron.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, Epistol. ii. p. 311 A. Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 16, 1391, a. 9; Cicero, Nat. Deo. i. 22, 60. How high was the opinion entertained about Simonides as a poet, may be seen illustrated in a passage of Aristophanes, Vespæ, 1362.

<sup>i</sup> See the first and second Pythian Odes of Pindar, addressed to Hieron, especially Pyth. i. 55-61-90, with the Scholia and Boeckh's Commentary. Pindar compliments Hieron upon hav-

ing founded his new city of Ætna—θεοδμάτω σὺν ἐλευθερίᾳ. This does not coincide with the view of Hieron's character taken by Xenophon; but Pindar agrees with Xenophon in exhorting Hieron to make himself popular by a liberal expenditure.

<sup>j</sup> Xenoph. Hier. i. 8. εὖ ἴσθι, ὁ Σιμωνίδη, ὅτι πολλὸ μῆλ' εὐφραίνονται οἱ τύραννοι τῶν μετρίως διαγόντων πολλὸ δὲ

to hearing—many praises, and no reproach, reach his ears: but then he knows that the praises are insincere—and that reproach is unheard, only because speakers dare not express what they really feel. The despot has finer cookery and richer unguents; but others enjoy a modest banquet as much or more—while the scent of the unguents pleases those who are near him more than himself.<sup>k</sup> Then as to the pleasures of love, these do not exist, except where the beloved person manifests spontaneous sympathy and return of attachment. Now the despot can never extort such return by his power; while even if it be granted freely, he cannot trust its sincerity, and is compelled even to be more on his guard, since successful conspiracies against his life generally proceed from those who profess attachment to him.<sup>l</sup> The private citizen on the contrary knows that those who profess to love him, may be trusted, as having no motive for falsehood.

Still (contends Simonides) there are other pleasures greater than those of sense. You despots possess the greatest abundance and variety of possessions—the finest chariots and horses, the most splendid arms, the finest palaces, ornaments and furniture—the most brilliant ornaments for your wives—the most intelligent and valuable servants. You execute the greatest enterprises: you can do most to benefit your friends, and hurt your enemies: you have all the proud consciousness of superior might.<sup>m</sup>—Such is the opinion of the multitude (replies Hieron), who are misled by appearances: but a wise man like you, Simonides, ought to see the reality in the background, and to recollect that happiness or unhappiness reside only in a man's internal feelings. You cannot but know, that a despot lives in perpetual insecurity, both at home and abroad: that he must always go armed himself, and have armed guards around him: that whether at war or at peace, he is always alike in danger: that, while suspecting every one as an enemy, he nevertheless knows that when he has put to

Misery of governing unwilling subjects declared by Hieron.

<sup>k</sup> Xen. Hieron, i. 12-15-24.

<sup>l</sup> Xen. Hier. i. 26-38. Τῷ

οὐ ποτ' ἐστὶ πιστεῦσαι, ὥς φιλεῖται. Αἱ ἐπιβουλαὶ ἐξ οὐδένων πλείονες τοῖς τυράννοις εἰσὶν, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν φιλεῖν αὐτοὺς

This chapter affords remarkable illustration of Grecian manners, especially in the distinction drawn between and τ

<sup>m</sup> Xen. Hier. ii. 2.

death the persons suspected, he has only weakened the power of the city :<sup>n</sup> that he has no sincere friendship with any one : that he cannot count even upon good faith, and must cause all his food to be tasted by others, before he eats it : that whoever has slain a private citizen, is shunned in Grecian cities as an abomination—while the tyrannicide is everywhere honoured and recompensed : that there is no safety for the despot even in his own family, many having been killed by their nearest relatives :<sup>o</sup> that he is compelled to rely upon mercenary foreign soldiers and liberated slaves, against the free citizens who hate him : and that the hire of such inauspicious protectors compels him to raise money, by despoiling individuals and plundering temples :<sup>p</sup> that the best and most estimable citizens are incurably hostile to him, while none but the worst will serve him for pay : that he looks back with bitter sorrow to the pleasures and confidential friendships which he enjoyed as a private man, but from which he is altogether debarred as a despot.<sup>q</sup>

Nothing brings a man so near to the Gods (rejoins Simonides) as the feeling of being honoured. Power and a brilliant position must be of inestimable value, if they are worth purchasing at the price which you describe.<sup>r</sup> Otherwise, why do you not throw up your sceptre ? How happens it that no despot has ever yet done this?—To be honoured (answers Hieron), is the greatest of earthly blessings, when a man obtains honour from the spontaneous voice of freemen. But a despot enjoys no such satisfaction. He lives like a criminal under sentence of death by every one : and it is impossible for him to lay down his power, because of the number of persons whom he has been obliged to make his enemies. He can neither endure his present condition, nor yet escape from it. The best thing he can do is to hang himself.<sup>s</sup>

Xen. Hieron, ii. 5-17.

Xenoph. Hieron, ii. 8, iii. 1, 5.  
Compare Xenoph. Hellenic. iii. 1, 14.

<sup>n</sup> Xen. Hieron, iv. 7-11.

<sup>q</sup> Xen. Hieron, vi. 1-12.

<sup>r</sup> Xen. Hieron, vii. 1-5.

<sup>s</sup> Xen. Hier. vii. 5-13. 'Ο δὲ τύραννος, ὡς ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων καταδ' ἀδικίαν ἀποθνήσκειν—καὶ καὶ ἡμέραν διάγει. 'ΑΛΛ' εἴπερ λυσίτελεϊ

τυράννη ἐγὼγε εὗρισκω μάλιστα τοῦτο λυσίτελοῦν ποιῆσαι. Μόνῃ γὰρ αὐτῷ οὔτε ἔχειν, οὔτε καταθέσθαι τὰ κακὰ λυσίτελεϊ.

Solon in his poems makes the remark, that for the man who once usurps the sceptre no retreat is possible. See my 'History of Greece,' ch. xi. p. 132 seq.

The impressive contrast here drawn by Hieron (o. vi.) between his condition

Simonides in reply, after sympathising with Hieron's despondency, undertakes to console him by showing that such consequences do not necessarily attend despotic rule. The despot's power is an instrument available for good as well as for evil. By a proper employment of it, he may not only avoid being hated, but may even make himself beloved, beyond the measure attainable by any private citizen. Even kind words, and petty courtesies, are welcomed far more eagerly when they come from a powerful man than from an equal: moreover a showy and brilliant exterior seldom fails to fascinate the spectator.<sup>1</sup> But besides this, the despot may render to his city the most substantial and important services. He may punish criminals and reward meritorious men: the punishments he ought to inflict by the hands of others, while he will administer the rewards in person—giving prizes for superior excellence in every department, and thus endearing himself to all.<sup>2</sup> Such prizes would provoke a salutary competition in the performance of military duties, in choric exhibitions, in husbandry, commerce, and public usefulness of every kind. Even the foreign mercenaries, though usually odious, might be so handled and disciplined as to afford defence against foreign danger,—to ensure for the citizens undisturbed leisure in their own private affairs—to protect and befriend the honest man, and to use force only against criminals.<sup>3</sup> If thus employed, such mercenaries, instead of being hated, would be welcome companions: and the despot himself may count, not only upon security against attack, but upon the warmest gratitude and attachment. The citizens will readily furnish contributions to him when asked, and will regard him as their greatest benefactor. "You will obtain in this way" (Simonides thus concludes his address to Hieron), "the finest and most enviable of all acquisitions. You will have your subjects obeying you willingly, and caring for you of their own accord. You may travel safely wherever you please, and will be a welcome visitor at all the crowded

Advice to Hieron by Simonides—that he should govern well, and thus make himself beloved by his subjects.

as a despot and the past enjoyments of private life and citizenship which he has lost, reminds one of the still more sorrowful contrast in the Atys of

Catullus, v. 58-70.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Hieron, viii. 2-7.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Hieron, ix. 1-4.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hieron, x. 6-8.

festivals. You will be happy, without jealousy from any one." <sup>†</sup>

The dialogue of which I have given this short abstract, illustrates what Xenophon calls the torment of Tantalus—the misery of a despot who has to extort obedience from unwilling subjects:—especially if the despot be one who has once known the comfort and security of private life, under tolerably favourable circumstances. If we compare this dialogue with the Platonic Gorgias, where we have seen a thesis very analogous handled in respect to Archelaus,—we shall find Plato soaring into a sublime ethical region of his own, measuring the despot's happiness and misery by a standard peculiar to himself, and making good what he admits to be a paradox by abundant eloquence covering faulty dialectic: while Xenophon, herein following his master, applies to human life the measure of a rational common sense, talks about pleasures and pains which every one can feel to be such, and points out how many of these pleasures the despot forfeits, how many of these pains and privations he undergoes,—in spite of that great power of doing hurt, and less power, though still considerable, of doing good, which raises the envy of spectators. The Hieron gives utterance to an interesting vein of sentiment, more common at Athens than elsewhere in Greece; enforced by the conversation of Sokrates, and serving as corrective protest against that unqualified worship of power which prevailed in the ancient world no less than in the modern. That the Syrakusan Hieron should be selected as an exemplifying name, may be explained by the circumstance, that during thirty-eight years of Xenophon's mature life (405-367 B.C.), Dionysius the elder was despot of Syrakuse; a man of energy and ability, who had extinguished the liberties of his native city, and acquired power and dominion greater than that of any living Greek. Xenophon, resident at Skillus, within a short distance from Olympia, had probably <sup>2</sup> seen the splendid Thêory (or sacred legation of representative envoys) installed in rich and orna-

Probable experience had by Xenophon of the feelings at Olympia against Dionysius.

<sup>†</sup> Xen. Hieron, xi. 10-12-15. ταῦτα πάντα ποιῆς, εἰ ἴσθι πάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων κάλλιστον καὶ τὰτον γὰρ οὐ. Xenoph. Anab. v. 3. 11.

mented tents, and the fine running horses sent by Dionysius, at the ninety-ninth Olympic festival (384 B.C.): but he probably also heard the execration with which the name of Dionysius himself had been received by the spectators, and he would feel that the despot could hardly shew himself there in person. There were narratives in circulation about the interior life of Dionysius,<sup>a</sup> analogous to those statements which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Hieron. A predecessor of Dionysius as despot of Syracuse<sup>b</sup> and also as patron of poets, was therefore a suitable person to choose for illustrating the first part of Xenophon's thesis—the countervailing pains and penalties which spoil all the value of power, if exercised over unwilling and repugnant subjects.<sup>c</sup>

But when Xenophon came to illustrate the second part of his thesis—the possibility of exercising power in such manner as to render the holder of it popular and beloved—it would have been scarcely possible for him to lay the scene in any Grecian city. The repugnance of the citizens of a Grecian city towards a despot who usurped power over them, was incurable—however much the more ambitious individuals among them might have wished to obtain such power for themselves: a repugnance as great among oligarchs as among democrats—perhaps even greater. When we read the recommendations addressed by Simonides, teaching Hieron how he might render himself popular, we perceive at once that they are alike well intentioned and ineffectual. Xenophon could neither find any real Grecian despot corresponding to this portion of his illustrative purpose—nor could he invent one with any show of plausibility. He was forced to resort to other countries and other habits different from those of Greece.

To this necessity probably we owe the *Cyropædia*: a romance in which Persian and Grecian experience are singularly blended, and both of them so trans-

<sup>a</sup> See chap. 83, vol. xi. pp. 40-50, of my 'History of Greece,' where this memorable scene at Olympia is described.

<sup>b</sup> Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 20, 57-63; *De Officiis*, ii. 7, 24-25.

"Multos timebit ille, quem multi timent."

<sup>c</sup> An anecdote is told about a visit of Xenophon to Dionysius at Syracuse—whether the elder or the younger is not specified—but the tenor of the anecdote points to the younger; if so, the visit must have been later than 307 B.C. (*Athenæus*, x. 427).

Xenophon could not have chosen a Grecian despot to illustrate his theory of the happiness of governing willing sub-

formed as to suit the philosophical purpose of the narrator. Xenophon had personally served and communicated with Cyrus the younger: respecting whom also he had large means of information, from his intimate friend Proxenus, as well as from the other Grecian generals of the expedition. In the first book of the *Anabasis*, we find this young prince depicted as an energetic and magnanimous character, faithful to his word and generous in his friendships—inspiring strong attachment in those around him, yet vigorous in administration and in punishing criminals—not only courting the Greeks as useful for his ambitious projects, but appreciating sincerely the superiority of Hellenic character and freedom over Oriental servitude.<sup>d</sup> And in the *Œkonomikus*, Cyrus is quoted as illustrating in his character the true virtue of a commander; the test of which Xenophon declares to be—That his subordinates follow him willingly, and stand by him to the death.<sup>e</sup>

tome—Xenophon's experience of Cyrus the Younger.

It is this character—Hellenised, Sokratished, idealised—that Xenophon paints into his glowing picture of Cyrus the founder of the Persian monarchy, or the *Cyropædia*. He thus escapes the insuperable difficulty arising from the position of a Grecian despot; who never could acquire willing or loving obedience, because his possession of power was felt by a majority of his subjects to be wrongful, violent, tainted. The Cyrus of the *Cyropædia* begins as son of Kambyzes, king or chief of Persia, and grandson of Astyages, king of Media; recognised according to established custom by all, as the person to whom they look for orders. Xenophon furnishes him with a splendid outfit of heroic qualities, suitable to this ascendant position; and represents the foundation of the vast Persian empire, with the unshaken fidelity of all the heterogeneous people composing it, as the reward of a laborious life spent in the active display

Portrait of Cyrus the Great—his education—Preface to the *Cyropædia*.

<sup>d</sup> Xenoph. *Anab.* i. 9, also i. 7, 3, the address of Cyrus to the Greek soldiers—Ὅπως οὖν ἐσεσθε ἄνδρες ἀξιοὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἧς κέκτησθε, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἧς ὑμᾶς εὐδαιμονίζω. Εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὅτι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐλοίμην ἂν, ἀντὶ ᾧ ἔχω πάντων καὶ ἄλλων πολλαπλασίῳ, compared with i. 5, 16, where Cyrus gives his appreciation of the Oriental

portion of his army, and the remarkable description of the trial of Orontes, i. 6.

<sup>e</sup> Xenoph. *Œconom.* iv, 18-19. Κύρος, εἰ ἐβίωσεν, ἀριστος ἂν δοκεῖ ἄρχων γενέσθαι—ἡγοῦμαι μέγα τεκμήριον ἀρχontos ἀρετῆς εἶναι, φ' ἂν ἐκόντες ἑπώνται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς παραμένειν ἐθέλωσιν. Compare *Anab.* i. 9, 29-30.

of such qualities. In his interesting Preface to the *Cyropædia*, he presents this as the solution of a problem which had greatly perplexed him. He had witnessed many revolutions in the Grecian cities—subversions of democracies, oligarchies, and despotisms: he had seen also private establishments, some with numerous servants, some with few, yet scarcely any house-master able to obtain hearty or continued obedience. But as to herds of cattle or flocks of sheep, on the contrary, he had seen them uniformly obedient; suffering the herdsman or shepherd to do what he pleased with them, and never once conspiring against him. The first inference of Xenophon from these facts was, that man was by nature the most difficult of all animals to govern.<sup>f</sup> But he became satisfied that he was mistaken, when he reflected on the history of Cyrus; who had acquired and maintained dominion over more men than had ever been united under one empire, always obeying him cheerfully and affectionately. This history proved to Xenophon that it was not impossible, nor even difficult,<sup>g</sup> to rule mankind, provided a man undertook it with scientific or artistic competence. Accordingly, he proceeded to examine what Cyrus was in birth, disposition, and education—and how he came to be so admirably accomplished in the government of men.<sup>h</sup> The result is the *Cyropædia*. We must observe however that his solution of the problem is one which does not meet the full difficulties. These difficulties, as he states them, had been suggested to him by his Hellenic experience: by the instability of government in Grecian cities. But the solution which he provides departs from Hellenic experience, and implies what Aristotle and Hippokrates called the more yielding and servile disposition of Asiatics:<sup>i</sup> for it postulates an hereditary chief of heroic or divine lineage, such as was nowhere acknowledged in Greece, except at Sparta—and there, only under restrictions which would have rendered the case unfit for Xenophon's purpose. The heroic and regal

<sup>f</sup> Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 1, 2.

<sup>g</sup> Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 1, 3. ἐκ τούτου δὴ  
 ὁμῶς μετανοεῖν, μὴ οὔτε τῶν  
 οὔτε τῶν χαλεπῶν ἔργων ἢ  
 ἢ ν τ ι ς

τοῦτο πρῶτον.

Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 1, 3-8.

<sup>i</sup> Aristot. *Politic.* vii. 7, 1327, b.:  
 τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν,  
 καὶ

ἢ ν τ ι ς.

Hippokrates, *De Aere, Locis, et  
 Aquis*, c. 19-23.

lineage of Cyrus was a condition not less essential to success, than his disposition and education:<sup>k</sup> and not merely his lineage, but also the farther fact, that besides being constant in the duties of prayer and sacrifice to the Gods, he was peculiarly favoured by them with premonitory signs and warnings in all difficult emergencies.<sup>l</sup>

The fundamental principle of Xenophon is, that to obtain hearty and unshaken obedience is not difficult for a ruler, provided he possesses the science or art of ruling. This is a principle expressly laid down by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia.<sup>m</sup> We have seen Plato affirming in the Politikus<sup>n</sup> that this is the only true government, though very few individuals are competent to it: Plato gives to it a peculiar application in the Republic, and points out a philosophical or dialectic tuition whereby he supposes that his Elders will acquire the science or art of command. The Cyropædia presents to us an illustrative example. Cyrus is a young prince who, from twenty-six years of age to his dying day is always ready with his initiative, provident in calculation of consequences, and personally active in enforcement: giving the right order at the right moment, with good assignable reasons. As a military man, he is not only personally forward, but peculiarly dexterous in the marshalling and management of soldiers; like the Homeric Agamemnon<sup>o</sup>—

Xenophon does not solve his own problem—The governing aptitude and popularity of Cyrus come from nature, not from education.

, βυσιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς, κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής.

<sup>k</sup> So it is stated by Xenophon himself, in the speech addressed by Kræsus after his defeat and captivity to Cyrus, vii. 2, 24—ἀγνοῶν ἑμαυτὸν ὅτι σοὶ

κανὸς ὄμην εἶναι, πρῶτον γεγονότι, ἔπειτα δὲ διὰ πεφυκότι, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐκ παιδὸς τῶν δ' ἐμῶν προγόνων

τὸν

ἐὰ καὶ ἐλεύθερον γενέσθαι. *Cyrus.* τοῦ Περσείδων γένους, i. 2. 1.

<sup>l</sup> See the remarkable words addressed by Cyrus, shortly before his death, in sacrificing on the hill-top to Ζεὺς Παῶς and Ἥλιος, *Cyrop.* viii. 7, 3.

The special communications of the Gods to Cyrus are insisted on by Xenophon, like those made to Sokrates, and like the constant aid of Athênê to Odysseus in Homer, *Odys.* iii. 221:—

Οὐ γάρ πω ἴδον ὦδε θεοῦς

ἀναφανδὰ παρίστατο

<sup>m</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 10-12.

<sup>n</sup> See what has been said above about the Platonic Politikus, vol. ii. ch. xxviii. pp. 489-496.

<sup>o</sup> Cicero, when called upon in his province of Cilicia to conduct warlike operations against the Parthians, as well as against some refractory mountaineers, improved his military knowledge by studying and commenting on the *Cyropædia*. *Epist. ad Famil.* ix. 25. Compare the remarkable observation made by Cicero (*Academic. Prior.* ii. init.) about the way in which Lucullus made up his deficiency of military experience by reading military books.

But we must consider this aptitude for command as a spontaneous growth in Cyrus—a portion of his divine constitution or of the golden element in his nature (to speak in the phrase of the Platonic Republic): for no means are pointed out whereby he acquired it, and the Platonic Sokrates would have asked in vain, where teachers of it were to be found. It is true that he is made to go through a rigorous and long-continued training: but this training is common to him with all the other Persian youths of good family, and is calculated to teach obedience, not to communicate aptitude for command; while the master of tactics, whose lessons he receives apart, is expressly declared to have known little about the duties of a commander.<sup>p</sup> Kambyzes indeed (father of Cyrus) gives to his son valuable general exhortations respecting the multiplicity of exigencies which press upon a commander, and the constant watchfulness, precautions, fertility of invention, required on his part to meet them. We read the like in the conversations of Sokrates in the *Memorabilia*:<sup>q</sup> but neither Kambyzes nor Sokrates are teachers of the art of commanding. For this art, Cyrus is assumed to possess a natural aptitude; like the other elements of his dispositions—his warm sympathies, his frank and engaging manners, his ardent emulation combined with perfect freedom from jealousy, his courage, his love of learning, his willingness to endure any amount of labour for the purpose of obtaining praise, &c., all which Xenophon represents as belonging to him by nature, together with a very handsome person.<sup>r</sup>

The *Cyropædia* is a title not fairly representing the contents of the work, which contains a more copious biography of the hero than any which we read in Plutarch or Suetonius. But the education of Cyrus<sup>s</sup> is the most remarkable part of it, in which the ethico-political theory of Xenophon, generated by Sokratic refining criticism brought to bear on the Spartan drill and discipline, is put forth. Professing to describe the Persian

Views of  
Xenophon  
about public  
and official  
training of  
all citizens.

<sup>p</sup> Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 6, 12-15.

<sup>q</sup> Compare *Cyropæd.* i. 6 with *Memorab.* iii. 1.

<sup>r</sup> *Cyropæd.* i. 2, 1.  $\phi\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota\ \delta\epsilon\ \delta\ \kappa\upsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ , &c. i. 3, 1-2.  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\upsilon$

$\sigma\tau\omicron\rho\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\omega}\nu\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ , &c.

<sup>s</sup> I have already observed that the phrase of Plato in *Legg.* iii. p. 694 C may be considered as conveying his denial of the assertion, that Cyrus had received a good education.

polity, he in reality describes only the Persian education; which is public, and prescribed by law, intended to form the character of individuals so that they shall stand in no need of coercive laws or penalties. Most cities leave the education of youth to be conducted at the discretion of their parents, and think it sufficient to enact and enforce laws forbidding, under penal sanction, theft, murder, and various other acts enumerated as criminal. But Xenophon (like Plato and Aristotle) disapproves of this system.<sup>†</sup> His Persian polity places the citizen even from infancy under official tuition, and aims at forming his first habits and character, as well as at upholding them when formed, so that instead of having any disposition of his own to commit such acts, he shall contract a repugnance to them. He is kept under perpetual training, drill, and active official employment throughout life, but the supervision is most unremitting during boyhood and youth.

There are four categories of age:—boys, up to sixteen—  
 young men or ephêbi, from sixteen to twenty-six—  
 mature men, as far as fifty-one—above that age,  
 elders. To each of these four classes there is as-  
 signed a certain portion of the “free agora:” *i.e.* the  
 great square of the city, where no buying or selling or vulgar  
 occupation is allowed—where the regal residence is situated,  
 and none but dignified functions, civil or military, are carried  
 on. Here the boys and the mature men assemble every day  
 at sunrise, continue under drill, and take their meals; while  
 the young men even pass the night on guard near the govern-  
 ment house. Each of the four sections is commanded by  
 superintendents or officers: those superintending the boys are  
 Elders, who are employed in administering justice to the boys,  
 and in teaching them what justice is. They hold judicial  
 trials of the boys for various sorts of misconduct: for violence,  
 theft, abusive words, lying, and even for ingratitude. In  
 cases of proved guilt, beating or flogging is inflicted. The  
 boys go there to learn justice (says Xenophon), as boys in  
 Hellas go to school to learn letters. Under this discipline,  
 and in learning the use of the bow and javelin besides, they

Details of (so  
 called) Per-  
 sian educa-  
 tion—Severe  
 discipline—  
 Distribution  
 of four ages.

<sup>†</sup> Xenophon says the same about the scheme of Lykurgus at Sparta, *De Lac. Repub.* c. 2.

spend the time until sixteen years of age. They bring their food with them from home (wheaten bread, with a condiment of kardamon, or bruised seed of the nasturtium), together with a wooden cup to draw water from the river: and they dine at public tables under the eye of the teacher. The young men perform all the military and police duty under the commands of the King and the Elders: moreover, they accompany the King when he goes on a hunting expedition—which accustoms them to fatigue and long abstinence, as well as to the encounter of dangerous wild animals. The Elders do not take part in these hunts, nor in any foreign military march, nor are they bound, like the others, to daily attendance in the agora. They appoint all officers, and try judicially the cases shown up by the superintendents, or other accusers, of all youths or mature men who have failed in the requirements of the public discipline. The gravest derelictions they punish with death: where this is not called for, they put the offender out of his class, so that he remains degraded all his life.<sup>a</sup>

This severe discipline is by law open to all Persians who choose to attend, and the honours of the state are attainable by all equally. But in practice it is confined to a few: for neither boys nor men can attend it continuously, except such as possess an independent maintenance; nor is any one allowed to enter the regiment of youths or mature men, unless he has previously gone through the discipline of boyhood. The elders, by whom the higher functions are exercised, must be persons who have passed without reproach through all the three preceding stages: so that these offices, though legally open to all, are in practice confined to a few—the small class of Homotimoi.<sup>x</sup>

Such is Xenophon's conception of a perfect Polity. It consists in an effective public discipline and drill, begun in early boyhood and continued until old age. The evidence on which he specially insists to prove its good results relates first

Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 6-16.

οἱ δὲ γεραίτεροι ἀκούσαντες  
ὁ δὲ ἐκκριθεὶς ἄτιμος τῶν

οἱ φαίνονται μὲν οἱ λοιπὸν βίον διατελεῖ.  
τῶν ἄλλων δ

<sup>x</sup> Cyropæd. i. 2, 14-15.

to the body. The bodies of the Persians become so dry and hard, that they neither spit, nor have occasion to wipe their noses, nor are full of wind, nor are ever seen to retire for the satisfaction of natural wants.<sup>y</sup> Besides this, the discipline enforces complete habits of obedience, sobriety, justice, endurance of pain and privation.

We may note here both the agreement, and the difference, between Xenophon and Plato, as to the tests applied for measuring the goodness of their respective disciplinarian schemes. In regard to the ethical effects desirable (obedience, sobriety, &c.) both were agreed. But while Plato (in Republic) dwells much besides upon the musical training necessary, Xenophon omits this, and substitutes in its place the working off of all the superfluous moisture of the body.<sup>z</sup>

Through the two youthful stages of this discipline Cyrus is represented as having passed; undergoing all the fatigues as well as the punishment (he is beaten or flogged by the superintendent<sup>a</sup>) with as much rigour as the rest, and even surpassing all his comrades in endurance and exemplary obedience, not less than in the bow and the javelin. In the lessons about justice he manifests such pre-eminence, that he is appointed by the superintendent to administer justice to other boys: and it is in this capacity that he is chastised for his well-known decision, awarding the large coat to the great boy and the little coat to the little boy, as being more convenient to both,<sup>b</sup> though the proprietorship was opposite: the master impressing upon him, as a general explanation, that the lawful or customary was the Just.<sup>c</sup> Cyrus has been brought as a boy by his mother Mandanê to visit her father, the Median king Astyages. The boy wins the affection of Astyages and all around by his child-like frankness and affectionate sympathy (admirably depicted in Xenophon): while he at the same time resists the corruptions of a luxurious court, and adheres to the simplicity of his Persian

Exemplary obedience of Cyrus to the public discipline—He had learnt justice well —His award about the two coats— Lesson inculcated upon him by the Justice-Master.

<sup>y</sup> Cyrop. i. 2, 16.

<sup>z</sup> See above, chap. xxxv. pp. 174-

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<sup>a</sup> Cyrop. i. 3, 17, i. 5, 4.

<sup>b</sup> Cyrop. i. 3, 17. This is an in-

genious and apposite illustration of the law of property.

<sup>c</sup> Cyrop. i. 3, 17. ἔπειτα δὲ ἔφη τὸ μὲν νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ

training. When Mandanê is about to depart and to rejoin her husband Kambyses in Persis, she is entreated by Astyages to allow Cyrus to remain with him. Cyrus himself also desires to remain: but Mandanê hesitates to allow it: putting to Cyrus, among other difficulties, the question—How will you learn justice here, when the teachers of it are in Persis? To which Cyrus replies—I am already well taught in justice: as you may see by the fact, that my teacher made me a judge over other boys, and compelled me to render account to him of all my proceedings.<sup>d</sup> Besides which, if I am found wanting, my grandfather Astyages will make up the deficient teaching. But (says Mandanê) justice is not the same here under Astyages, as it is in Persis. Astyages has made himself master of all the Medes: while among the Persians equality is accounted justice. Your father Kambyses both performs all that the city directs, and receives nothing more than what the city allows: the measure for him is, not his own inclination, but the law. You must therefore be cautious of staying here, lest you should bring back with you to Persis habits of despotism, and of grasping at more than any one else, contracted from your grandfather: for if you come back in this spirit, you will assuredly be flogged to death. Never fear, mother (answered Cyrus): my grandfather teaches every one round him to claim less than his due—not more than his due: and he will teach me the same.<sup>e</sup>

The portion of the *Cyropædia* just cited deserves especial attention, in reference to Xenophon as a companion and pupil of Sokrates. The reader has been already familiarised throughout this work with the questions habitually propounded and canvassed by Sokrates—What is Justice, Temperance, Courage, &c.? Are these virtues teachable? If they are so, where are the teachers of them to be found?—for he professed to have looked in vain for any teachers.<sup>f</sup> I have farther remarked that Sokrates required these questions to be debated in the order here stated. That is—you must first know what Justice

Xenophon's conception of the Sokratic problems—He does not recognise the Sokratic order of solution of those problems.

<sup>d</sup> *Cyropæd.* i. 4, 2.

<sup>e</sup> *Cyrop.* i. 3, 17-18. Ὅπως οὖν μὴ ᾧ μαστιγούμενος, ἐπειδὴν οἶμαι ἦς, ἀρὰ τοῦτου μαθὼν ἡκῆς ἀντὶ τοῦ

βασιλικοῦ τὸ τυραννικόν, ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τὸ πλέον οἰεσθαι χρῆναι πάντων ἔχειν.

<sup>f</sup> *Xenoph. Memor.* i. 16, iv. 4, 5.

is, before you can determine whether it be teachable or not—nay, before you are in a position to affirm anything at all about it, or to declare any particular acts to be either just or unjust.<sup>c</sup>

Now Xenophon, in his description of the Persian official discipline, provides a sufficient answer to the second question—Whether justice is teachable—and where are the teachers thereof? It is teachable: there are official teachers appointed: and every boy passes through a course of teaching prolonged for several years.—But Xenophon does not at all recognise the Sokratic requirement, that the first question shall be fully canvassed and satisfactorily answered, before the second is approached. The first question is indeed answered in a certain way—though the answer appears here only as an *obiter dictum*, and is never submitted to any Elenchus at all. The master explains—What is Justice?—by telling Cyrus, “That the lawful is just, and that the lawless is violent.” Now if we consider this as preceptorial—as an admonition to the youthful Cyrus how he ought to decide judicial cases—it is perfectly reasonable:—“Let your decisions be conformable to the law or custom of the country.” But if we consider it as a portion of philosophy or reasoned truth—as a definition or rational explanation of Justice, advanced by a respondent who is bound to defend it against the Sokratic cross-examination—we shall find it altogether insufficient. Xenophon himself tells us here, that Law or Custom is one thing among the Medes, and the reverse among the Persians: accordingly an action which is just in the one place will be unjust in the other. It is by objections of this kind that Sokrates, both in Plato and Xenophon, refutes explanations propounded by his respondents.<sup>h</sup>

<sup>c</sup> See above, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 385; vol. ii. ch. xx. pp. 8-11, ch. xxi. p. 72.

<sup>h</sup> Plato, *Republ.* v. p. 479 A. τοῦ-  
ολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἐστίν, ὃ  
ὅν φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δι-  
ὃ οὐκ ἔδικον; καὶ τῶν δσίων ὃ  
οὐκ ἀνόσιον; Compare *Republ.* i. p.  
331 C, and the conversation of So-  
krates with Euthydēmus in the *Xeno-  
phontic Memorab.* iv. 2, 13-19, and  
*Cyropædia*, i. 6, 27-34, about what is just  
and good morality towards enemies.

We read in Pascal, *Pensées*, iv. 4:—  
“On ne voit presque rien de juste ou  
d'injuste, qui ne change de qualité en  
changeant de climat. Trois degrés  
d'élevation du pôle renversent toute la  
jurisprudence. Un méridien décide de  
la vérité: en peu d'années de posses-  
sion, les loix fondamentales changent:  
le droit a ses époques. Plaisante  
justice, qu'une rivière borne! Vérité  
au delà des Pyrénées—erreur au delà!  
“Ils confessent que la justice n'est

Though the explanation of Justice here given is altogether untenable, yet we shall find it advanced by Sokrates himself as complete and conclusive, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, where he is conversing with the Sophist Hippias. That Sophist is represented as at first urging difficulties against it, but afterwards as concurring with Sokrates: who enlarges upon the definition, and extols it as perfectly satisfactory. If Sokrates really delivered this answer to Hippias, as a general definition of Justice—we may learn from it how much greater was his negative acuteness in overthrowing the definitions of others, than his affirmative perspicacity in discovering unexceptionable definitions of his own. This is the deficiency admitted by himself in the Platonic Apology—lamented by friends like Kleitophon—arraigned by opponents like Hippias and Thrasymachus. Xenophon, whose intellect was practical rather than speculative, appears not to be aware of it. He does not feel the depth and difficulty of the Sokratic problems, even while he himself enunciates them. He does not appreciate all the conditions of a good definition, capable of being maintained against that formidable cross-examination (recounted by himself) whereby Sokrates humbled the youth Euthydêmus: still less does he enter into the spirit of that Sokratic order of precedence (declared in the negative Platonic dialogues), in the study of philosophical questions:—First define Justice, and find a definition of it such as you can maintain against a cross-examining adversary—before you proceed either to affirm or deny any predicates concerning it. The practical advice and reflexions of Xenophon are, for the

pas dans les coutumes, mais qu'elle reside dans les loix naturelles, connues en tout pays. Certainement ils la soutiendraient opiniâtement, si la témérité du hasard qui a semé les loix humaines en avait rencontré au moins une qui fut universelle: mais la plaisanterie est telle, que le caprice des hommes s'est si bien diversifié, qu'il n'y en a point.

“ Le larcin, l'inceste, le meurtre des enfans et des pères, tout a eu sa place entre les actions vertueuses. Se peut-il rien de plus plaisant, qu'un homme ait droit de me tuer parcequ'il demeure

au-delà de l'eau, et que son prince a querelle avec le mien, quoique je n'en aie aucune avec lui ?

“ L'un dit que l'essence de la justice est l'autorité du législateur: l'autre, la commodité du souverain: l'autre, la coutume présente—et c'est le plus sûr. Rien, suivant la seule raison, n'est juste de soi: tout branle avec le temps. La coutume fait toute l'équité, par cette seule cause qu'elle est reçue: c'est le fondement mystique de son autorité. Qui la ramène à son principe, l'anéantit.”

most part, judicious and penetrating. But he falls very short when he comes to deal with philosophical theory:—with reasoned truth, and with the Sokratic Elenchus as a test for discriminating such truth from the false, the doubtful, or the not-proven.

Cyrus is allowed by his mother to remain amidst the luxuries of the Median court. It is a part of his admirable disposition that he resists all its temptations,<sup>i</sup> and goes back to the hard fare and discipline of the Persians with the same exemplary obedience as before. He is appointed by the Elders to command the Persian contingent which is sent to assist Kyaxares (son of Astyages) king of Media; and he thus enters upon that active military career which is described as occupying his whole life, until his conquest of Babylon, and his subsequent organization of the great Persian empire. His father Kambyzes sends him forth with excellent exhortations, many of which are almost in the same words as those which we read ascribed to Sokrates in the *Memorabilia*. In the details of Cyrus's biography which follow, the stamp of Sokratic influence is less marked, yet seldom altogether wanting. The conversation of Sokrates had taught Xenophon how to make the most of his own large experience and observation. His biography of Cyrus represents a string of successive situations, calling forth and displaying the aptitude of the hero for command. The epical invention with which these situations are imagined—the variety of characters introduced, Araspes, Abradates, Pantheia, Chrysantas, Hystaspes, Gادات, Gobryas, Tigranes, &c.—the dramatic propriety with which each of these persons is animated as speaker, and made to teach a lesson bearing on the predetermined conclusion—all these are highly honourable to the Xenophontic genius, but all of them likewise bespeak the Companion of Sokrates. Xenophon dwells, with evident pleasure, on the details connected with the *rationale* of military proceedings: the wants and liabilities of soldiers, the advantages or disadvantages of different weapons or different modes of marshalling, the duties of the general as compared with those of the soldier, &c.

Biography of  
Cyrus—constant  
military success  
earned by  
suitable qual-  
ities—Variety of char-  
acters and  
situations.

Cyrus is not merely always ready with his orders, but also competent as a speaker to explain the propriety of what he orders.<sup>k</sup> We have the truly Athenian idea, that persuasive speech is the precursor of intelligent and energetic action: and that it is an attribute essentially necessary for a general, for the purpose of informing, appeasing, re-assuring, the minds of the soldiers.<sup>l</sup> This, as well as other duties and functions of a military commander, we find laid down generally in the conversations of Sokrates,<sup>m</sup> who conceives these functions, in their most general aspect, as a branch of the comprehensive art of guiding or governing men. What Sokrates thus enunciates generally, is exemplified in detail throughout the life of Cyrus.

Throughout all the *Cyropædia*, the heroic qualities and personal agency of Cyrus are always in the foreground, working with unerring success and determining everything. He is moreover recommended to our sympathies, not merely by the energy and judgment of a leader, but also by the amiable qualities of a generous man—by the remarkable combination of self-command with indulgence towards others—by considerate lenity towards subdued enemies like Kroesus and the Armenian prince—even by solicitude shown that the miseries of war should fall altogether on the fighting men, and that the cultivators of the land should be left unmolested by both parties.<sup>n</sup> Respecting several other persons in the narrative, too—the Armenian Tigranes, Gadatas, Gobryas, &c.—the adventures and scenes described are touching: but the tale of Abradates and Pantheia transcends them all, and is perhaps the most pathetic recital embodied in the works of Hellenic antiquity.<sup>o</sup> In all these narratives the vein of sentiment is

Generous and amiable qualities of Cyrus. Abradates and Pantheia.

<sup>k</sup> *Cyropæd.* v. 5, 46. λεκτικώτατος καὶ πρακτικώτατος. Compare the *Memorabilia*, iv. 6, 1-15.

<sup>l</sup> *Memorab.* iii. 3, 11; *Hipparch.* viii. 22; *Cyropæd.* vi. 2, 13. Compare the impressive portion of the funeral oration delivered by Perikles in *Thucydides*, ii. 40.

<sup>m</sup> See the four first chapters of the third book of the *Xenophontic Memorabilia*. The treatise of Xenophon called *Ἱππαρχικός* enumerates also the

general duties required from a commander of cavalry: among these, *ψευδοτόμολοι* are mentioned (iv. 7). Now the employment, with effect, of a *ψευδοτόμολος*, is described with much detail in the *Cyropædia*. See the case of Araspes (vi. 1, 37, vi. 3, 16).

<sup>n</sup> *Cyrop.* iii. 1, 10-38, vii. 2, 9-29, v. 4, 26, vi. 1, 37. Ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν, ὦ Κύρε, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοῖος εἶ, πρῶς τε καὶ σὺ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀμαρτημάτων.

<sup>o</sup> *Cyrop.* vii. 3.

neither Sokratic nor Platonic, but belongs to Xenophon himself.

This last remark may also be made respecting the concluding proceedings of Cyrus, after he has thoroughly completed his conquests, and when he establishes arrangements for governing them permanently. The scheme of government which Xenophon imagines, and introduces him as organizing, is neither Sokratic nor Platonic, nor even Hellenic: it would probably have been as little acceptable to his friend Agesilaus, the marked "hater of Persia,"<sup>p</sup> as to any Athenian politician. It is altogether an Oriental despotism, skilfully organized both for the security of the despot and for enabling him to keep a vigorous hold on subjects distant as well as near: such as the younger Cyrus might possibly have attempted, if his brother Artaxerxes had been slain at Kunaxa, instead of himself. "Eam conditionem esse imperandi, ut non aliter ratio constet, quam si uni reddatur"<sup>q</sup>—is a maxim repugnant to Hellenic ideas, and not likely to be rendered welcome even by the regulations of detail with which Xenophon surrounds it: judicious as these regulations are for their contemplated purpose. The amiable and popular character which Cyrus has maintained from youth upwards, and by means of which he has gained an uninterrupted series of victories, is difficult to be reconciled with the insecurity, however imposing, in which he dwells as Great King. When we find that he accounts it a necessary precaution to surround himself with eunuchs, on the express ground that they are despised by every one else and therefore likely to be more faithful to their master—when we read also that in consequence of the number of disaffected subjects, he is forced to keep a guard composed of twenty thousand soldiers taken from poor Persian mountaineers<sup>r</sup>—we find realised, in the case of the triumphant Cyrus, much of that peril and insecurity which the despot Hieron had so bitterly deplored in his conversation with Simonides. However unsatisfactory the ideal

Scheme of government devised by Cyrus when his conquests are completed—Oriental despotism, wisely arranged.

<sup>p</sup> Xenoph. Agesilaus, vii. 7. εἰ δ' αὖ καὶ μισοπέρσῃν εἶναι—ἐξέεν, δ, τι δύναιτο κακὸν ποιῆσων

Tacit. Annal. i. 6.

<sup>r</sup> Xen. Cyrop. vii. 5, 58-70.

of government may be, which Plato lays out either in the Republic or the Leges—that which Xenophon sets before us is not at all more acceptable, in spite of the splendid individual portrait whereby he dazzles our imagination. Few Athenians would have exchanged Athens either for Babylon under Cyrus, or for Plato's Magnêtic colony in Krete.

The Xenophontic government is thus noway admirable, even as an ideal. But he himself presents it only as an ideal—or (which is the same thing in the eyes of a companion of Sokrates) as a quasi-historical fact, belonging to the unknown and undetermined past. When Xenophon talks of what the Persians *are now*, he presents us with nothing but a shocking contrast to this ideal; nothing but vice, corruption, degeneracy of every kind, exorbitant sensuality, faithlessness and cowardice.\* His picture of Persia is like that of the Platonic Kosmos, which we have read in the Timæus:† a splendid Kosmos in its original plan and construction, but full of defects and evil as it actually exists. The strength and excellence of the Xenophontic orderly despotism dies with its heroic beginner. His two sons (as Plato remarked) do not receive the same elaborate training and discipline as himself: nor can they be restrained, even by the impressive appeal which he makes to them on his death-bed, from violent dissension among themselves, and misgovernment of every kind."

Whatever we may think of the political ideal of Xenophon, his Cyropædia is among the glories of the Sokratic family; as an excellent specimen of the philosophical imagination, in carrying a general doctrine into illustrative details—and of the epical imagination in respect to varied characters and touching incident. In stringing together instructive conversations, moreover, it displays the same art which we trace in the Memorabilia, Œkonomikus, Hieron, &c., and which is worthy of the attentive companion of Sokrates. Whenever Xenophon talks about military affairs, horsemanship, agriculture, house-management, &c., he is within the range of

Persian present reality—is described by Xenophon as thoroughly depraved, in striking contrast to the establishment of Cyrus.

Xenophon

commerce.

\* Cyropæd. viii. 8.

† See above, ch. xxxvi. p. 291 seq.

\* Cyropæd. viii. 7, 9-19; Plato, Legg. iii. p. 694 D.

personal experience of his own; and his recommendations, controlled as they thus are by known realities, are for the most part instructive and valuable. Such is the case not merely with the *Cyropædia* and *Œkonomikus*, but also in his two short treatises, *De Re Equestri* and *De Officio Magistri Equitum*.

But we cannot say so much when he discusses plans of finance.

We read among his works a discourse—composed after his sentence of exile had been repealed, and when he was very old, seemingly not earlier than 355 B.C.\*—criticising the actual condition of Athens, and proposing various measures for the improvement of the finances, as well as for relief of the citizens from poverty. He begins this discourse by a sentiment thoroughly Sokratic and Platonic, which would serve almost as a continuation of the *Cyropædia*. The government of a city will be measured by the character and ability of its leaders.† He closes it by another sentiment equally Sokratic and Platonic; advising that before his measures are adopted, special messengers shall be sent to Delphi and Dodona; to ascertain whether the Gods approve them—and if they approve, to which Gods they enjoin that the initiatory sacrifices shall be offered.‡ But almost everything in the discourse, between the first and last sentences, is in a vein not at all Sokratic—in a vein, indeed, positively anti-Platonic and anti-Spartan. We have already seen that wealth, gold and silver, commerce, influx of strangers, &c., are discouraged as much as possible by Plato, and by the theory (though evaded partially in practice) of Sparta. Now it is precisely these objects which Xenophon, in the treatise before us, does his utmost to foster and extend at Athens. Nothing is here said about the vulgarising influence of trade as compared with farming, which we read in the *Œkonomikus*: nor about the ethical and pædagogic

Discourse of Xenophon on Athenian finance and the condition of Athens. His admiration of active commerce and variety of pursuits.

\* Xenophon, Πόροι—ἡ περὶ Προσόδων. De Vectigalibus. See Schneider's Proleg. to this treatise, pp. 138-140.

† De Vectig. i. ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτο ἀεὶ ποτε νομίζω, ὅποιοι τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται ᾤσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι.

‡ De Vect. vi. 2. Compare this with Anab. iii. 1, 5, where Sokrates reproves Xenophon for his evasive manner of putting a question to the Delphian God. Xenophon here adopts the plenary manner enjoined by Sokrates.

dictation which pervades so much of the *Cyropædia*, and reigns paramount throughout the Platonic Republic and *Leges*. Xenophon takes Athens as she stands, with great variety of tastes, active occupation, and condition among the inhabitants: her mild climate and productive territory, especially her veins of silver and her fine marble: her importing and exporting merchants, her central situation, as convenient entrepôt for commodities produced in the most distant lands:<sup>a</sup> her skilful artisans and craftsmen: her monied capitalists: and not these alone, but also the congregation and affluence of fine artists, intellectual men, philosophers, Sophists, poets, rhapsodes, actors, &c.: last, though not least, the temples adorning her akropolis, and the dramatic representations exhibited at her Dionysiac festivals, which afforded the highest captivation to eye as well as ear, and attracted strangers from all quarters as visitors.<sup>b</sup> Xenophon extols these charms of Athens with a warmth which reminds us of the Periklean funeral oration in Thucydides.<sup>c</sup> He no longer speaks like one whose heart and affections are with the Spartan drill: still less does he speak like Plato—to whom (as we see both by the Republic and the *Leges*) such artistic and poetical exhibitions were abominations calling for censorial repression—and in whose eyes gold, silver, commerce, abundant influx of strangers, &c., were dangerous enemies of all civic virtue.

Yet while recognising all these charms and advantages, Xenophon finds himself compelled to lament great poverty among the citizens; which poverty (he says) is often urged by the leading men as an excuse for unjust proceedings. Accordingly he comes forward with various financial suggestions, by means of which he confidently anticipates that every Athenian citizen may obtain a comfortable maintenance from the public.<sup>d</sup>

First, he dwells upon the great advantage of encouraging

<sup>a</sup> De Vectig. c. i. —

<sup>b</sup> De Vect. v. 4. Τί δὲ οἱ πολυέλαιοι;

τί δὲ οἱ

καὶ

καὶ

καὶ φιλόσοφοι οἱ δὲ ποιηταί, οἱ δὲ τὰ  
τούτων μεταχειριζόμενοι, οἱ δ' ἀξιοθεά-  
των ἢ ἀξιακούστων ἱερῶν ἢ δόσιων ἐπι-

θυμοῦντες, &c.

<sup>c</sup> Thucyd. ii. 34-42; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 12. Compare Xenophon, Republ. Athen. ii. 7, iii. 8.

<sup>d</sup> De Vectig. iv. 33. καὶ ἐ

εῖρηται, ὥς ἂν ἡγοῦμαι κατασκευασθείσης  
τῆς πόλεως ἰκανὴν ἂν πᾶσ  
ἀπὸ κοινοῦ γενέσθαι

metics, or foreigners resident at Athens, each of whom paid an annual capitation tax to the treasury. There were already many such, not merely Greeks, but Orientals also, Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, &c.:<sup>e</sup> and by judicious encouragement all expatriated men everywhere might be made to prefer the agreeable residence at Athens, thus largely increasing the annual amount of the tax. The metics ought (he says) to be exempted from military service (which the citizens ought to perform and might perform alone) but to be admitted to the honours of the equestrian duty, whenever they were rich enough to afford it: and farther, to be allowed the liberty of purchasing land and building houses in the city. Moreover not merely resident metics, but also foreign merchants who came as visitors, conducting an extensive commerce—ought to be flattered by complimentary votes and occasional hospitalities: while the curators of the harbour, whose function it was to settle disputes among them, should receive prizes if they adjudicated equitably and speedily.<sup>f</sup>

All this (Xenophon observes) will require only friendly and considerate demonstrations. His farther schemes are more ambitious, not to be effected without a large outlay. He proposes to raise an ample fund for the purposes of the city, by voluntary contributions; which he expects to obtain not merely from private Athenians and metics, rich and in easy circumstances—but also from other cities, and even from foreign despots, kings, satraps, &c. The tempting inducement will be, that the names of all contributors with their respective contributions will be inscribed on public tablets, and permanently commemorated as benefactors of the city.<sup>g</sup> Contributors (he says) are found, for the outfit of a fleet, where they expect no return: much more will they come forward here, where a good return will accrue. The fund so raised will be employed under public authority with the most profitable result, in many different ways. The city will build docks and warehouses for bonding goods—houses

Advantage

encouraged.

Proposal to raise by voluntary contributions a large sum to be employed as capital by the city. Dis-

citizens.

<sup>e</sup> De Vect. ii. 3-7.

<sup>g</sup> De Vect. iii. 11.

<sup>f</sup> De Vect. iii. 2-6.

near the harbour to be let to merchants—merchant-vessels to be let out on freight. But the largest profit will be obtained by working the silver mines at Laureion in Attica. The city will purchase a number of foreign slaves, and will employ them under the superintendence of old free citizens who are past the age of labour, partly in working these mines for public account, each of the ten tribes employing one tenth part of the number—partly by letting them out to private mining undertakers, at so much per diem for each slave: the slaves being distinguished by a conspicuous public stamp, and the undertaker binding himself under penalty always to restore the same number of them as he received.<sup>h</sup> Such competition between the city and the private mining undertakers will augment the total produce, and will be no loss to either, but wholesome for both. The mines will absorb as many workmen as are put into them: for in the production of silver (Xenophon argues) there can never be any glut, as there is sometimes in corn, wine, or oil. Silver is always in demand, and is not lessened in value by increase of quantity. Every one is anxious to get it, and has as much pleasure in hoarding it under ground as in actively employing it.<sup>i</sup> The scheme, thus described, may (if found necessary) be brought into operation by degrees, a certain number of slaves being purchased annually until the full total is made up. From these various financial projects, and especially from the fund thus employed as capital under the management of the Senate, the largest returns are expected. Amidst the general abundance which will ensue, the religious festivals will be celebrated with increased splendour—the temples will be repaired, the docks and walls will be put in complete order—the priests, the Senate, the magistrates, the horsemen, will receive the full stipends which the old custom of Athens destined for them.<sup>k</sup> But besides all these, the object which Xenophon has

<sup>h</sup> De Vect. iv. 13-19.

De Vect. iv. 4-7.

De Vectig. vi. 1-2. Καὶ ὁ μὲν | ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ  
 , οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι | ἱππεῦσι τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν—πῶς  
 τῆς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον δαπάνης ἀπαλ-  
 ολλῆς γενο- | ἵνα ἔτι ἐξ  
 ἔτι ἡ νῦν | μετ' ἀσφαλείας

most at heart will be accomplished: the poor citizens will be rescued from poverty. There will be a regular distribution among all citizens, per head and equally. Three oboli, or half a drachma, will be allotted daily to each, to poor and rich alike. For the poor citizens, this will provide a comfortable subsistence, without any contribution on their part: the poverty now prevailing will thus be alleviated. The rich, like the poor, receive the daily triobolon as a free gift: but if they even compute it as interest for their investments, they will find that the rate of interest is full and satisfactory, like the rate on bottomry. Three oboli per day amount in the year of 360 days to 180 drachmæ: now if a rich man has contributed ten minæ (= 1000 drachmæ), he will thus receive interest at the rate of 18 per cent. per annum: if another less rich citizen has contributed one mina (= 100 drachmæ) he will receive interest at the rate of 180 per cent. per annum: more than he could realise in any other investment.<sup>1</sup>

Half a drachma, or three oboli, per day, was the highest rate of pay ever received (the rate varied at different times) by the citizens as Dikasts and Ekklesiasts, for attending in judicature or in assembly. It is this amount of pay which Xenophon here proposes to ensure to every citizen, without exception, out of the public treasury; which (he calculates) would be enriched by his project so as easily to bear such a disbursement. He relieves the poor citizens from poverty by making them all pensioners on the public treasury, with or without service rendered, or the pretence of service. He strains yet farther the dangerous principle of the Theôrikon, without the same excuse as can be shown for the Theôrikon itself on religious grounds.<sup>m</sup> If such a proposition had been made by Kleon, Hyperbolus, Kleophon, Agyrrhius, &c., it would have been dwelt upon by most historians of Greece as an illustration of the cacoethes of democracy—to extract money, somehow or other, from the rich, for the purpose of keeping the poor in comfort. Not one of the democratical leaders, so far as we know, ever

Purpose and principle of this distribution.

<sup>1</sup> De Vectig. iii. 9-12.

<sup>m</sup> Respecting the Theôrikon at Athens, see my 'History of Greece,' ch. 88, pp. 492-498.

ventured to propose so sweeping a measure: we have it here from the pen of the oligarchical Xenophon.

But we must of course discuss Xenophon's scheme as a whole: the aggregate enlargement of revenue, from his various new ways and means, on one side—  
Visionary anticipations of Xenophon, financial and commercial. against the new mode and increased amount of expenditure, on the other side. He would not have proposed such an expenditure, if he had not thoroughly believed in the correctness of his own anticipations, both as to the profits of the mining scheme, and as to the increase of receipts from other sources; such as the multiplication of tax-paying Metics, the rent paid by them for the new houses to be built by the city, the increase of the harbour dues from expanded foreign trade. But of these anticipations, even the least unpromising are vague and uncertain: while the prospects of the mining scheme appear thoroughly chimerical. Nothing is clear or certain except the disbursement. We scarcely understand how Xenophon could seriously have imagined, either that voluntary contributors could have been found to subscribe the aggregate fund as he proposes—or that if subscribed, it could have yielded the prodigious return upon which he reckons. We must however recollect, that he had no familiarity with finance, or with the conditions and liabilities of commerce, or with the raising of money from voluntary contributors for any collective purpose. He would not have indulged in similar fancies if the question had been about getting together supplies for an army. Practical Athenian financiers would probably say, in criticising his financial project—what *Heraldu*<sup>n</sup> observes upon some views of his opponent *Salmasius*,

<sup>n</sup> This passage of *Heraldu* is cited by M. Boeckh in his *Public Economy of Athens*, B. iv. ch. 21, p. 606, Eng. Trans. In that chapter of M. Boeckh's work (pp. 600-610) some very instructive pages will be found about the Xenophontic scheme here noticed.

I will however mention one or two points on which my understanding of the scheme differs from his. He says 605):—"The author supposes that profit upon this speculation would amount to three oboli per day, so that the subscribers would obtain a very high per centage on their shares.

Xenophon supposes unequal contributions, according to the different amounts of property, agreeable to the principles of a property-tax, but an equal distribution of the receipts for the purpose of favouring and aiding the poor. What Xenophon is speaking of is an income annually arising upon each share, either equal to or exceeding the interest of the loans on bottomry. Where, however, is the security that the undertaking would produce three oboli a day to each subscriber?"

I concur in most of what is here said; but M. Boeckh states the matter

about the relations of capital and interest in Attica—"Somnium est hominis harum rerum, etiam cum vigilat, nihil scientis."<sup>o</sup> The financial management of Athens was doubtless defective in many ways: but it would not have been improved in the hands of Xenophon—any more than the administrative and judiciary department of Athens would have become better under the severe regimen of Plato.<sup>p</sup> The merits

too much, as if the three oboli per diem were a real return arising from the scheme, and payable to each shareholder upon each *share* as he calls it. This is an accident of the case, not the essential feature. The poorest citizens—for whose benefit, more than for any other object, the scheme is contrived—would not be shareholders at all: they would be too poor to contribute anything, yet each of them would receive his triobolon like the rest. Moreover, many citizens, even though able to pay, might hold back, and decline to pay: yet still each would receive as much. And again, the foreigners, kings, satraps, &c., would be contributors, but would receive nothing at all. The distribution of the triobolon would be made to citizens only. Xenophon does indeed state the proportion of receipts to payments in the cases of some rich contributors, as an auxiliary motive to conciliate them. But we ought not to treat this receipt as if it were a real return yielded by the public mining speculation, or as profit actually brought in.

As I conceive the scheme, the daily triobolon, and the respective contributions furnished, have no premeditated ratio, no essential connection with each other. The daily payment of the triobolon to every citizen indiscriminately, is a new and heavy burden which Xenophon imposes upon the city. But this is only one among many other burdens, as we may see by cap. 6. In order to augment the wealth of the city, so as to defray these large expenses, he proposes several new financial measures. Of these the most considerable was the public mining speculation; but it did not stand alone. The financial scheme of Xenophon, both as to receipts and as to expenditure, is more general than M. Boeckh allows for.

<sup>o</sup> It is truly surprising to read in

one of Hume's *Essays* the following sentence. Essay XII. on Civil Liberty, p. 107 ed. of Hume's *Philosophical Works*, 1825.

"The Athenians, though governed by a Republic, paid near two hundred per cent for those sums of money which any emergence made it necessary for them to borrow, as we learn from Xenophon."

In the note Hume quotes the following passage from this discourse, *De Vectigalibus*:—Κτήσιν δὲ ἀπ'

οὐδὲ γὰρ  
ψονται κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ ὅσα ἂν εἰσενέγκωσιν. Οἱ γὰρ μὲν προτελέσαντες, ἐγγὺς δυοῖν μνᾶν πρόσδοον ἔξουσιν. \*Ο  
καὶ πολυχρονιάτατον τε

Hume has been misled by dwelling upon one or two separate sentences. If he had taken into consideration the whole discourse and its declared scope, he would have seen that it affords no warrant for any inference as to the rate of interest paid by the Athenian public when they wanted to borrow. In Xenophon's scheme there is no fixed proportion between what a contributor to the fund would pay and what he would receive. The triobolon received is a fixed sum to each citizen, whereas the contributions of *each* would be different. Moreover the foreigners and metics would contribute without receiving anything, while the poor citizens would receive their triobolon per head, without having contributed anything.

<sup>p</sup> Aristides the Rhetor has some forcible remarks in defending Rhetoric and the Athenian statesmen against the bitter criticisms of Plato in the *Gorgias*: pointing out that Plato himself had never made trial of the difficulty of governing any real community of men, or of the necessities under

of the Sokratic companions—and great merits they were—lay in the region of instructive theory.

Xenophon accompanies his financial scheme with a strong recommendation to his countrymen, that they should abstain from warlike enterprises and maintain peace with every one. He expatiates on the manifest advantages, nay, even on the necessity, of continued peace, under the actual poverty of the city : for the purpose of recruiting the exhausted means of the citizens, as well as of favouring his own new projects for the improvement of finance and commerce. While he especially deprecates any attempt on the part of Athens to regain by force her lost headship over the Greeks, he at the same time holds out hopes that this dignity would be spontaneously tendered to her, if, besides abstaining from all violence, she conducted herself with a liberal and conciliatory spirit towards all : if she did her best to adjust differences among other cities, and to uphold the autonomy of the Delphian temple.<sup>1</sup> As far as we can judge, such pacific exhortations were at that time wise and politic. Athens had just then concluded peace (355 B.C.) after the three years of ruinous and unsuccessful war, called the Social War, carried on against her revolted allies Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium. To attempt the recovery of empire by force was most mischievous. There was indeed one purpose, for which she was called upon by a wise forecast to put forth her strength—to check the aggrandisement of Philip in Macedonia. But this was a distant purpose : and the necessity, though it became every year more urgent, was not so prominently manifest<sup>r</sup> in 355 B.C. as to affect the judgment of Xenophon. At that early day, Demosthenes himself did not see the danger from Macedonia : his first Philippic was delivered in 351 B.C., and even then his remonstrances, highly creditable to his own forecast, made little impression on others. But when we read the financial oration *De Symmoriis* we

which a statesman in actual political life was placed (*Orat.* xlv. *Περὶ Πρωτοπικίης*, pp. 109-110, Dindorf).

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. *De Vectig.* v. 3-8.

<sup>r</sup> See my 'History of Greece,' ch. 86, p. 325 seq.

I agree with Boeckh, *Public Econ.* of Athens, *ut supra*, p. 601, that this pamphlet of Xenophon is probably to be referred to the close of the Social War, about 355 B.C.

appreciate his sound administrative and practical judgment; compared with the benevolent dreams and ample public largess in which Xenophon here indulges.\*

We have seen that Plato died in 347 B.C., having reached the full age of eighty: Xenophon must have attained the same age nearly, and may perhaps have attained it completely—though we do not know the exact year of his death. With both these two illustrious companions of Sokrates, the point of view is considerably modified in their last compositions as compared to their earlier. Xenophon shows the alteration not less clearly than Plato, though in an opposite direction. His discourse on the Athenian revenues differs quite as much from the *Anabasis*, *Cyropædia*, and *Ekonomikus*—as the *Leges* and *Epinomis* differ from any of Plato's earlier works. Whatever we may think of the financial and commercial anticipations of Xenophon, his pamphlet on the Athenian revenues betokens a warm sympathy for his native city—a genuine appreciation of her individual freedom and her many-sided intellectual activity—an earnest interest in her actual career, and even in the extension of her commercial and manufacturing wealth. In these respects it recommends itself to our feelings more than the last Platonic production—*Leges* and *Epinomis*—composed nearly at the same time, between 356-347 B.C. While Xenophon in old age, becoming reconciled to his country, forgets his early passion for the Spartan drill and discipline, perpetual, monotonous, unlettered—we find in the senility of Plato a more cramping limitation of the varieties of human agency—a stricter compression, even of individual thought and speech, under the infallible official orthodoxy—a more extensive use of the pædagogic rod and the censorial muzzle—than he had ever proposed before.

In thus taking an unwilling leave of the Sokratic family, represented by these two venerable survivors—to both of whom the students of Athenian letters and philosophy are so deeply indebted—I feel some satisfaction in the belief, that

\* Respecting the first Philippic, and the *Oratio De Symmoriis* of Demosthenes, see my 'History of Greece,' ch. 87, pp. 401-431.

Difference of the latest compositions of Xenophon and Plato, from Plato in the earlier.

both of them died, as they were born, citizens of free Athens and of unconquered Hellas: and that neither of them was preserved to an excessive old age, like their contemporary Isokrates, to witness the extinction of Hellenic autonomy by the battle of Chæroneia.<sup>†</sup>

<sup>†</sup> Compare the touching passage in Tacitus's description of the death of Agricola, c. 44-45.

"Festinatæ mortis grande solatium tulit, evasisse postremum illud tempus," &c.

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